

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO  
WESTERN DIVISION

TERRY ELAM, :  
 :  
Plaintiff, : Case No. 3:11cv234  
 :  
vs. : JUDGE WALTER HERBERT RICE  
 :  
COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, :  
 :  
Defendant. :

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DECISION AND ENTRY ADOPTING REPORT AND RECOMMENDATIONS  
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE (DOC. #11) IN THEIR  
ENTIRETY; PLAINTIFF'S OBJECTIONS TO SAID JUDICIAL FILING (DOC.  
#12) OVERRULED; JUDGMENT TO BE ENTERED IN FAVOR OF  
DEFENDANT COMMISSIONER AND AGAINST PLAINTIFF, AFFIRMING  
COMMISSIONER'S DECISION THAT PLAINTIFF WAS NOT DISABLED  
AND, THEREFORE, NOT ENTITLED TO BENEFITS UNDER THE SOCIAL  
SECURITY ACT; TERMINATION ENTRY

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Plaintiff has brought this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) to review a decision of the Defendant Commissioner denying Plaintiff's application for Social Security disability benefits. On June 26, 2012, the United States Magistrate Judge filed a Report and Recommendations (Doc. #11), recommending that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act be affirmed. Based upon reasoning and citations of authority set forth in the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations (Doc. #11) and in the Defendant's Response to Plaintiff's Objections (Doc. #13, 1-3), as well as upon a thorough de novo review of this Court's file, including the Administrative Transcript

(Doc. #7), and a thorough review of the applicable law, this Court adopts the aforesaid Report and Recommendations in their entirety and, in so doing, orders the entry of judgment in favor of the Defendant Commissioner and against the Plaintiff, concluding that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was supported by substantial evidence. The Plaintiff's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #12) are overruled. Accordingly, the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act is affirmed.

In reviewing the Commissioner's decision, the Magistrate's task is to determine if that decision is supported by "substantial evidence and if the administrative law judge employed the correct legal criteria." 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). Under 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C), this Court, upon objections being made to the Magistrate Judge's Report and Recommendations, is required to make a de novo review of those recommendations of the report to which objection is made. This de novo review, in turn, requires this Court to re-examine all the relevant evidence, previously reviewed by the Magistrate, to determine whether the findings of the Secretary [now Commissioner] are supported by "substantial evidence." Lashley v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 708 F.2d 1048, 1053 (6th Cir. 1983); Gibson v. Secretary of Health, Education and Welfare, 678 F.2d 653, 654 (6th Cir. 1982). This Court's sole function is to determine whether the record as a whole contains substantial evidence to support the Commissioner's decision. The Commissioner's findings must be affirmed if they are supported by "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971), citing Consolidated Edison Company v.

NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938); Landsaw v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 803 F.2d 211, 213 (6th Cir. 1986). Substantial evidence means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. Richardson, supra, at 401; Ellis v. Schweicker, 739 F.2d 245, 248 (6th Cir. 1984). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but only so much as would be required to prevent a directed verdict (now judgment as a matter of law) against the Commissioner if this case were being tried to a jury. Foster v. Bowen, 853 F.2d 483, 486 (6th Cir. 1988); NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, 306 U.S. 292, 300 (1939). To be substantial, the evidence “must do more than create a suspicion of the existence of the fact to be established... [I]t must be enough to justify, if the trial were to a jury, a refusal to direct a verdict when the conclusion sought to be drawn from it is one of fact for the jury.” LeMaster v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 802 F.2d 839, 840 (6th Cir. 1986), quoting NLRB v. Columbian Enameling and Stamping Company, supra.

In determining whether the Commissioner’s findings are supported by substantial evidence, the Court must consider the record as a whole. Hephner v. Mathews, 574 F.2d 359 (6th Cir. 1978); Ellis, supra; Kirk v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 667 F.2d 524, 536 (6th Cir. 1981); Houston v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 736 F.2d 365 (6th Cir. 1984); Garner v. Heckler, 745 F.2d 383 (6th Cir. 1984). However, the Court may not try the case de novo, resolve conflicts in evidence or decide questions of credibility. Garner, supra. The findings of the Commissioner of Social Security and proceedings on Claimant’s application for social security disability benefits are not subject to reversal merely because there exists in the record substantial evidence to support a different conclusion. Buxton v. Halter, Commissioner of Social Security, 246 F.3d 762

(6th Cir. 2001). If the Commissioner's decision is supported by substantial evidence, it must be affirmed, even if the Court as a trier of fact would have arrived at a different conclusion. Elkins v. Secretary of Health and Human Services, 658 F.2d 437, 439 (6th Cir. 1981).

In addition to the foregoing, in ruling as aforesaid, this Court makes the following, non-exclusive, observations:

1. Under the particular circumstances outlined by the Magistrate Judge, the Administrative Law Judge, while permitted to recontact Dr. Patel, was under no obligation to do so. While counsel who appeared with Plaintiff at the hearing before the ALJ was not the counsel who represented him initially, there is no indication in the record that successor counsel was, in any way, foreclosed from reviewing his client's file to make certain that all of the desired evidence was part of the record before the Administrative Law Judge. Under the circumstances as clearly outlined by the Magistrate Judge at pages 14-18 of her Report and Recommendations (Doc. #11), the hearing officer was under no obligation to do the work that Plaintiff's counsel should have done.

2. Despite the Administrative Law Judge's decision that he lacked the information needed to determine if Dr. Patel was an examining medical source or was Plaintiff's treating physician, he nonetheless treating that medical practitioner as a treating physician and concluded that his conclusions could not be given controlling, or even deferential, weight. That conclusion is supported by substantial evidence.

3. Plaintiff is not entitled to a Sentence Six remand, given that the evidence he seeks to put before the Administrative Law Judge on any potential remand, to the extent


that said evidence was available at the time of the initial hearing, is neither new nor, as far as the Court can discern, material, within the meaning of the law.

4. As for the possibility of a Sentence Four remand, in order to consider evidence that was in existence at the time of the hearing, were this Court able to conclude that such evidence was missing from the record for any reason other than the default of Plaintiff's counsel, the Court might order such a remand for the purpose of considering such evidence. This Court cannot make such a finding and, further, this Court has reached the conclusion that such evidence, albeit not part of Plaintiff's file before the hearing officer, was not such as to raise a reasonable probability that same would have changed the Administrative Law Judge's non-disability determination.

WHEREFORE, based upon the aforesaid, this Court adopts the Report and Recommendations of the United States Magistrate Judge (Doc. #11) in their entirety, having concluded that the Commissioner's decision that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act was supported by substantial evidence and that the Administrative Law Judge employed the correct legal criteria. Plaintiff's Objections to said judicial filing (Doc. #12) are overruled. Judgment will be ordered entered in favor of the Defendant Commissioner and against Plaintiff herein, affirming the decision of the Defendant Commissioner that Plaintiff was not disabled and, therefore, not entitled to benefits under the Social Security Act.

The captioned cause is hereby ordered terminated upon the docket records of the United States District Court for the Southern District of Ohio, Western Division, at Dayton.

September 27, 2012

  
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WALTER HERBERT RICE, JUDGE  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

Copies to:

Counsel of record