

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF OHIO
WESTERN DIVISION AT DAYTON

DANA M. WELDY,

Plaintiff,

Case No. 3:17-cv-158

vs.

COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY,

Magistrate Judge Michael J. Newman
(Consent Case)

Defendant.

**DECISION AND ENTRY: (1) AFFIRMING THE ALJ'S NON-DISABILITY FINDING
AS SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE; AND (2) TERMINATING THIS
CASE ON THE COURT'S DOCKET**

This Social Security disability benefits appeal is before the undersigned for disposition based upon the parties' consent. Doc. 7. At issue is whether the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred in finding Plaintiff not "disabled" and therefore unentitled to Disability Insurance Benefits ("DIB") and/or Supplemental Security Income ("SSI").¹ This case is before the Court on Plaintiff's Statement of Errors (doc. 10), the Commissioner's memorandum in opposition (doc. 11), the administrative record (doc. 4), and the record as a whole.

I.

A. Procedural History

Plaintiff filed applications for DIB² and SSI on November 19, 2013 as a result of a number of alleged impairments including, *inter alia*, rheumatoid arthritis, degenerative disc disease, fibromyalgia, headaches, and anxiety. PageID 39.

¹ "The Commissioner's regulations governing the evaluation of disability for DIB and SSI are identical . . . and are found at 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520, and 20 C.F.R. § 416.920 respectively." *Colvin v. Barnhart*, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007). Citations in this Decision and Entry to DIB regulations are made with full knowledge of the corresponding SSI regulations, and *vice versa*.

² Plaintiff previously applied for DIB and was denied benefits in a decision dated June 20, 2012. PageID 115-29. Because Plaintiff did not appeal the non-disability finding, it became the final

After an initial denial of her applications, Plaintiff received a hearing before ALJ Benjamin Chaykin (hereafter “ALJ”) on October 29, 2015. PageID 62-98. The ALJ issued a decision on January 19, 2016 finding Plaintiff not disabled. PageID 36-53. Specifically, the ALJ found at Step Five that, based upon Plaintiff’s residual functional capacity (“RFC”) to perform a reduced range of sedentary work, “there are jobs in that exist in significant numbers in the national economy that [she] can perform[.]” PageID 45-53.

Thereafter, the Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review, making the ALJ’s non-disability finding the final administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 25-27. *See Casey v. Sec’y of Health & Human Servs.*, 987 F.2d 1230, 1233 (6th Cir. 1993). Plaintiff then filed this timely appeal. *Cook v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 480 F.3d 432, 435 (6th Cir. 2007).

B. Evidence of Record

The evidence of record is adequately summarized in the ALJ’s decision (PageID 36-53), Plaintiff’s Statement of Errors (doc. 10) and the Commissioner’s memorandum in opposition (doc. 11). The undersigned incorporates all of the foregoing and sets forth the facts relevant to this appeal herein.

II.

A. Standard of Review

The Court’s inquiry on a Social Security appeal is to determine (1) whether the ALJ’s non-disability finding is supported by substantial evidence, and (2) whether the ALJ employed the correct legal criteria. 42 U.S.C. § 405(g); *Bowen v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 478 F.3d 742,745-46 (6th Cir. 2007). In performing this review, the Court must consider the record as a whole. *Hephner v. Mathews*, 574 F.2d 359, 362 (6th Cir. 1978).

administrative decision of the Commissioner. PageID 36. However, because the record reflects new and material evidence documenting new a severe condition of rheumatoid arthritis, the previous RFC is not binding on ALJ Chaykin. *Drummond v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 126 F.3d 837 (6th Cir. 1997); *Dennard v. Sec. of Health & Human Servs.*, 907 F.2d 598 (6th Cir. 1990).

Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.” *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971). When substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s denial of benefits, that finding must be affirmed, even if substantial evidence also exists in the record upon which the ALJ could have found Plaintiff disabled. *Buxton v. Halter*, 246 F.3d 762, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). Thus, the ALJ has a “‘zone of choice’ within which he [or she] can act without the fear of court interference.” *Id.* at 773.

The second judicial inquiry -- reviewing the correctness of the ALJ’s legal analysis -- may result in reversal even if the ALJ’s decision is supported by substantial evidence in the record. *Rabbers v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.*, 582 F.3d 647, 651 (6th Cir. 2009). “[A] decision of the Commissioner will not be upheld where the [Social Security Administration] fails to follow its own regulations and where that error prejudices a claimant on the merits or deprives the claimant of a substantial right.” *Bowen*, 478 F.3d at 746.

B. “Disability” Defined

To be eligible for disability benefits, a claimant must be under a “disability” as defined by the Social Security Act. 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(1)(A). Narrowed to its statutory meaning, a “disability” includes physical and/or mental impairments that are both “medically determinable” and severe enough to prevent a claimant from (1) performing his or her past job and (2) engaging in “substantial gainful activity” that is available in the regional or national economies. *Id.*

Administrative regulations require a five-step sequential evaluation for disability determinations. 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4). Although a dispositive finding at any step ends the ALJ’s review, *see Colvin v. Barnhart*, 475 F.3d 727, 730 (6th Cir. 2007), the complete sequential review poses five questions:

1. Has the claimant engaged in substantial gainful activity?;
2. Does the claimant suffer from one or more severe impairments?;

3. Do the claimant's severe impairments, alone or in combination, meet or equal the criteria of an impairment set forth in the Commissioner's Listing of Impairments (the "Listings"), 20 C.F.R. Subpart P, Appendix 1?;
4. Considering the claimant's RFC, can he or she perform his or her past relevant work?; and
5. Assuming the claimant can no longer perform his or her past relevant work -- and also considering the claimant's age, education, past work experience, and RFC -- do significant numbers of other jobs exist in the national economy which the claimant can perform?

20 C.F.R. § 404.1520(a)(4); *see also Miller v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, 181 F. Supp.2d 816, 818 (S.D. Ohio 2001). A claimant bears the ultimate burden of establishing disability under the Social Security Act's definition. *Key v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec.*, 109 F.3d 270, 274 (6th Cir. 1997).

III.

In her Statement of Errors, Plaintiff argues the ALJ erred by: (1) failing to account for her headaches in the RFC; and (2) failing to appropriately consider the Vocational Expert's ("VE") testimony. Doc. 10 at PageID 2339-41.

Having carefully reviewed the administrative record and the parties' briefs, and also having carefully considered the ALJ's analysis leading to the non-disability finding here at issue, the Court finds the ALJ carefully and reasonably developed and reviewed the record; appropriately considered the medical evidence at issue including Plaintiff's headaches; properly weighed opinion evidence based upon reasons supported by substantial evidence; reasonably assessed Plaintiff's credibility; posed appropriate hypothetical questions to the VE; accurately determined Plaintiff's RFC which accounted for Plaintiff's headaches; and appropriately concluded, at Step Five (and in reliance on the VE's sworn testimony), that Plaintiff can perform a significant number of jobs in the national economy.

IV.

The Court thus **AFFIRMS** the ALJ's non-disability finding as supported by substantial evidence, and **TERMINATES** this case on the Court's docket.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Date: February 27, 2018

s/ Michael J. Newman
Michael J. Newman
United States Magistrate Judge