## UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

09-CV-0727 DAVID RUDOVSKY and LEONARD SOSNOV, Plaintiffs, VS. WEST PUBLISHING CORPORATION, WEST SERVICES, INC., and THOMPSON LEGAL AND REGULATORY, INC., t/a Philadelphia, PA THOMPSON WEST, December 16, 2010 Defendants. 9:58 a.m.

> TRANSCRIPT OF TRIAL BEFORE THE HONORABLE JOHN P. FULLAM UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

## APPEARANCES:

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MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, may we -- may was be heard on a special verdict form? (No audible response) As I understand Your Honor's, it doesn't make any distinction between the finding of per se libel or actual malice. And I think the law is pretty clear, starting with <a href="New York Times v.">New York Times v.</a>
Solesman (phonetic), that there should be special verdicts and -- given to juries in libel cases.

THE COURT: What's your position, Mr. Bazelon?

MR. BAZELON: Our -- our position, Your Honor, is that that would be covered in the charge.

THE COURT: At least that's what I plan to do.

MR. RITTINGER: But I'm talking about a special verdicts, Your Honor. The problem is at the -- at the -- when the -- when the jury comes in, if all they have is a compensatory damage award, you don't know what they did it on. Here, you -- here, it's even more compounded because they have to make a finding of libel per se based upon the instruction having to do with the user concluding. And we also have Third Circuit law on that as well, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Well, the problem with your form is the questions don't make much sense. "Did the users of the 2008 pocket part conclude that it was inaccurate and out of date?" Does that mean that everybody that subscribed had to conclude that it was? It seems to me that it's --

MR. RITTINGER: Well, Your Honor --

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THE COURT: -- it's libel as if only if one or two.

MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, it can be modified, but that's taken from your order.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. RITTINGER: I -- I believe that is taken from your order. Your order uses intended users or intended audience.

THE COURT: What order? I didn't -- I've never had an order as to what --

MR. RITTINGER: No, your -- you -- your order of December 10th, when you determined that on our motion to reargue -- we made a motion to re-argue, saying that the Court was supposed to, as a matter of law, determine whether a statement is libel as a per se or not. There is no dispute in this case that if -- if it's not libel per se, the case is over, because there's no special damages.

Your Honor has granted the motion to re-argue and -but then issued an order that said that you were going to give
to the jury the question of whether the -- I think the words
were intended audience concluded that the supplement was
inaccurate or out of date, then you would determine that it was
libel per se. So we're just -- we're -- we're using what we
understand -- and by the way, that instruction is in -- in the
instructions submitted by the plaintiffs as well.

MR. BAZELON: It certainly is not. There's --

MR. RITTINGER: Well, but --

MR. BAZELON: There's a major difference between -- I respectfully submit, Judge, between what Mr. Rittinger has just told you and what your order of December the -- I think it's December 8th said. Your order said, "It is for the jury to determine whether the intended audience of the pocket part would conclude," and -- and then it goes on, "would conclude that the plaintiffs authored an inaccurate and out-of-date supplement to the treatise.

What -- what that means, at least to me, and I don't want to be presumptuous, but I would expect to Your Honor, was that the jury looks at the facts as to what was published and uses it -- its judgment to determine what a reader would conclude, not -- it's much different than what Mr. Rittinger is saying. He's asking that there's a factual finding as to what readers actually did conclude as compared to what they would naturally, in the normal course, conclude based on the publication. That is a major difference. But in any event, Judge, that is covered in the instructions. And presumably, hopefully, the instructions will be so worded. Your Honor --

MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, here's -- here's the problem.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. RITTINGER: I said here is the problem that we -- that we face in terms of what we submit to -- I'm sorry.

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with that.

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THE COURT: What?

MR. BAZELON: And that's the issue we discussed before, Judge. And that is that what West is attempting to do is to frame this that the jury needs to find that there was an actual determination made by the audience. And that's the language that Mr. Rittinger is now proposing. And that's -- that's not what Your Honor is doing in the rest of this charge. It's not what Your Honor said in his order.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RITTINGER: Well, Your Honor, if you look at -if you -- if you look at the instruction on -- that is given,
which really takes the language -- it's really just using the
statute, which appears on page 1 and 2. It says, "The falsity
of the publication." And that's -- that's what the statute
requires, to -- the statute doesn't require it was not
substantially true. It requires falsity. That's what a libel
is. And I -- there's no citation for this. I don't know where
it came from. I don't know if it came from -- I -- but if it
-- if it says false and it says was understood, then it's
consistent with the statute.

THE COURT: How about we split the difference, that it was false and would reasonably have been understood by those other than the plaintiffs as defamatory? (No audible response) Okay. What else do you got?

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MR. RITTINGER: Well, Your Honor --

MR. BAZELON: Your Honor, so what -- what's the resolution that you were suggesting, Your Honor? Sorry, I don't mean to interrupt.

THE COURT: I'm agreeing with him that instead of saying it was not substantially true, it would -- that it was false. And instead of it might reasonably have been understood, that it would reasonably have been understood.

MR. RITTINGER: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay?

MR. BAZELON: Yes, Your Honor. You -- you should bear in mind that I don't normally prepare a written charge or read it to the jury. I like to listen to the arguments of counsel and then refute all their arguments that are improper.

MR. RITTINGER: Somehow I -- somehow I think I get that, Your Honor.

MR. BAZELON: I quess that keeps the argument short, Judge.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, I -- I think we really need clarification to talk about the last couple, because I'm not sure what Your Honor's ruling is. It's -- and maybe if I could just -- it's our position that in order to recover either punitive damages, or put it the other way, I don't think there's any dispute about punitive damages. I think the

judicial question as to what the bounds of that are. It's not a jury question.

THE COURT: I'm not going to do anything about. We'll just take our chances with what the jury does. Okay.

MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, we accept that. Just for purposes of the record and Rule 51, it's our position that we object to the instructions to the extent that they don't follow the ones that we last set -- sent in. And we object to the lack of a special verdict form, Your Honor, for the record.

THE COURT: What do you mean the lack of a special verdict form?

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: What we have there is a special verdict.

MR. RITTINGER: No, for the -- for the -- to the extent that it doesn't follow the -- the special verdict that we last submitted to the Court. I want to -- I just want that on the record, Your Honor, for Appellate purposes.

THE COURT: He just wants it on the record. (Pause)

In other words -- well, Your Honor, I -- I think what I'm being asked now, or being told is that we wanted a -- a -- at least a specific inquiry or question about actual malice in the -- in your --

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: In the special verdict form.

MR. RITTINGER: -- verdict -- in your special verdict form.

1	THE COURT: That's going to be covered by the charge.
2	That will be covered by the charge. I don't think we need a
3	special question on that. Do we?
4	COURTROOM CLERK: Bring in the jury?
5	THE COURT: Pardon?
6	COURTROOM CLERK: Bring in the jury, Judge?
7	THE COURT: That's what we have them out there for,
8	yes.
9	MR. BAZELON: Judge, I take it that that we will
10	have a sidebar after the you instruct the jury, and that
11	they are and that they leave to deliberate?
12	THE COURT: You have yes, if you need one. But
13	you have all the exhibits ready to go out?
14	MR. BAZELON: We have all the exhibits ready to go
15	out. And Your Honor, just for the just so I don't forget, I
16	just want to remind Your Honor that we do have a request for
17	injunctive relief in this case, which, in our view doesn't go
18	to the jury. But I didn't want to be deemed to have waived it
19	by not reminding Your Honor.
20	THE COURT: Would you be inclined to agree that we
21	await the jury's finding on liability before we consider
22	injunctive relief?
23	MR. BAZELON: Yes, Your Honor, I do. Thank you.
24	THE COURT: Okay.
25	COURTROOM CLERK: All rise.

The Court - Jury Instructions discussed earlier. 1 The plaintiffs would still be entitled to recover 2 damages for emotional distress that they suffered, if you 3 accept their testimony. But they would not be entitled to damages to their reputation or -- as I say, presumed damages --5 or to punitive damages, unless they establish by fair and 6 convincing evidence that the defendant acted with malice. 8 Okay? 9 MR. RITTINGER: Thank you, Your Honor. 10 MR. BAZELON: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: I hope that doesn't change your minds. You may take -- follow that young lady. 12 COURTROOM CLERK: All rise. 13 THE COURT: And we will eagerly await your response. 1415 (Jury out for deliberations) THE COURT: And the charge as given is accepted to by 16 17 every lawyer in the room --MR. RITTINGER: Yes, Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: -- and so noted. 19 20 MR. BAZELON: Thank you. 21 THE COURT: Recess till we get a verdict. 22 (Recess) COURTROOM CLERK: All rise. 23 24 THE COURT: Bring in the jury. The jury has submitted a question, which I assume you've received, have you? 25

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The Court - Jury Instructions that this was an update of Pennsylvania law and that it had been prepared by the plaintiffs, if they knew that was false or acted with reckless disregard as to whether it was false or not, they would be -- they would be quilty of actual malice, and that would enable you to award damages for any other consequences that you find that plaintiffs may have suffered.

Does that -- have I cleared that up or made a -- a mess of it?

That's -- that's satisfactory, Your MR. BAZELON: Honor.

THE COURT: Pardon?

MR. BAZELON: That's satisfactory.

THE COURT: Fine. Thank you.

But you must be unanimous in order to enter any of these questions. Okay? You may retire to the jury room and quick reach a verdict.

COURTROOM CLERK: All rise.

(Jury out for deliberations)

THE COURT: I will assume for the record that all the lawyers in the courtroom object to what I just said. And you will be able to raise it on appeal. (Pause)

MR. RITTINGER: Yeah, Your Honor, I'm wondering if it makes sense, since they wanted a written, we'd -- we'd just agree on the definition of actual malice right here and give it to them?

The Court - Jury Instructions

MR. CHARLSON: I can attest to the truth of that statement, though.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: I made it back, Your Honor.

UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Mr. Charlson is our good luck.

(Pause)

COURTROOM CLERK: All rise.

(Jury in)

will note for the record that we have two more questions you've sent in. And I'll try to dispose of them. The first question is, "In number one of the verdict form, the word 'establish' is used. Are we determining whether proof was provided? Or are we still working under the idea of presuming that at least one person could have thought less about either Professor Rudovsky or Professor Sosnov?"

As I've tried to make clear earlier -- first of all, the word established means to prove. So in order to answer the question yes, you must all agree that it is more likely than not on the basis of the evidence that yes is the correct answer. And that involves the analysis of the evidence, which is the proof. But to answer your question specifically, as I thought I made clear earlier, but maybe I didn't, if you find that the plaintiffs were defamed, the defendant issued a defamatory communication, then they are entitled to damages for emotional distress that find esta -- they established by the

1 evidence.

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But if they also show that the defamation occurred -that the defendant West Publishing Company actually knew that it was false or had -- or acted in reckless of disregard of whether it was true or false, then they would be entitled to presumed damages. And there isn't much difference, but it -it would -- the law says that if the defendant acted with actual malice, it's presumed that the defendants (sic) suffered -- that the plaintiffs suffered some damage to their reputation. And you don't get -- don't have to have any actual proof that their reputations were -- that somebody else thought less of them. It's presumed that that happened if there was actual malice. And in order to have def -- defamation of any kind, you would have to show that the intended reader would probably have concluded that -- that the plaintiffs wrote the supplement and that the supplement was, to some extent, less than adequate.

Now, the second question is, "Are the determinings of plaintiffs dictated by any guide -- of damages, I'm sorry -- dictated by any guidelines? Or are such determinations -- determinings arbitrary?" The answer is, there are no specific guidelines. We leave that up to the common sense and good judgment of the jury as to what would be a fair and reasonable amount to award as damages. That does not make them arbitrary. We leave them up to the good judgment and common sense of the

T	jurors. That's what jurors are for. Okay?
2	UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: We'll see you soon, I hope.
4	(Jury out for deliberations)
5	THE COURT: Everybody has objections. They're all
6	noted on record. We'll recess till we get a verdict, I hope.
7	MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, I we have an
8	objection.
9	THE COURT: Pardon?
10	MR. RITTINGER: I said, we have an objection, or a
11.	comment
12	THE COURT: I said, I just noted you had an
13	objection, I assumed.
14	MR. RITTINGER: I know, but well, I I thought
15	Mr. Bazelon was going to go. Your Honor, it seems it seems
16	to me that we've now the last two definitions of actual
17	malice have not included the second sentence, which is so
18	important in this case. That's that the plaintiffs must
19	demonstrate in order to define reckless disregard, that the
20	plaintiffs must demonstrate that the defendant, in fact,
21	entertained serious doubts.
22	THE COURT: Oh, I did that often enough, I think.
23	(Recess)
24	COURTROOM CLERK: Court is now in session.
25	THE COURT: Good afternoon. Or evening. I

1	them?
2	MR. RITTINGER: No. No, Your Honor.
3	THE COURT: I think the you
4	MR. BAZELON: Your Honor
5	THE COURT: offered what, seventeen-five each?
6	MR. RITTINGER: Yes, Your Honor.
7	THE COURT: And my figure was 15,000. So
8	congratulations to somebody. I'm not sure who. We'll see you
9	later.
10	MR. RITTINGER: Your Honor, you'll you'll take
11	motions to set aside on paper then? Is that
12	THE COURT: You don't have to, but if you want to
13	file such motions, you may do it.
14	MR. RITTINGER: Well, I think I think we probably
15	should under the circumstances.
16	THE COURT: You may do it any time you want within
17	the time limit specified.
18	MR. RITTINGER: Within the 28 days. Thank you, Your
19	Honor.
20	THE COURT: Okay. Good night, all.
21	UNIDENTIFIED COUNSEL: Thank you, Your Honor.
22	(Briefly off the record)
23	(Audio begins here)
24	MR. BAZELON: relief. The the request for
25	injunctive relief.