

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

FREDERICK BANKS,	:	
	:	
Plaintiff	:	Civil No. 1:14-CV-5
	:	
v.	:	(Chief Judge Conner)
	:	
DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF	:	(Magistrate Judge Carlson)
SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,	:	
BEHAVIORAL MODIFICATION	:	
UNIT, et al.,	:	
	:	
Defendants	:	

REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. Statement of Facts and of the Case

Albert Einstein once stated that doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results is the highest form of folly. We are reminded of Einstein’s wisdom as we consider the instant civil lawsuit filed by Frederick Banks. In his current complaint, Banks identifies hundreds of named and unnamed federal officials and agencies as defendants, alleging that these officials and agencies have engaged in “Voice to skull” electronic harassment of Banks, beaming harassing messages into Bank’s skull. (Doc. 1) As relief, Banks seeks \$800,000,000 in damages, and a writ of mandamus forbidding future use of “Voice to skull” technology by the United States government. (Id.) This claim is virtually identical to complaints filed by

Banks in August of 2013 and October 2013, and dismissed by this Court as frivolous in September and December, 2013. Banks v. Unknown Federal Judges, 1:13-CV-2095; Banks v. CIA, 1:13-2664. Therefore, we find that Banks is now engaging in Einstein's folly, doing the same thing over again and expecting a different result.

Along with this complaint, Banks has filed a motion seeking leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. (Doc. 2) Upon an initial screening of the complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, we will GRANT plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis*, but recommend that the Court DISMISS this complaint as frivolous and because it fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii).

II. DISCUSSION

A. Legal Standards Governing Sufficiency of Civil Complaints

This Court has an ongoing statutory obligation to conduct a preliminary review of *pro se* complaints brought by plaintiffs given leave to proceed *in forma pauperis*. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii). Specifically, the Court must assess whether a *pro se* complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, since Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provides that a complaint should be dismissed for "failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted." Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). In addition, when reviewing *in forma pauperis* complaints, 28 U.S.C. §

1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) enjoins us to “dismiss the complaint at any time if the court determines that . . . the action . . . fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted.”

With respect to this benchmark standard for legal sufficiency of a complaint, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has aptly noted the evolving standards governing pleading practice in federal court, stating that:

Standards of pleading have been in the forefront of jurisprudence in recent years. Beginning with the Supreme Court's opinion in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) continuing with our opinion in Phillips [v. County of Allegheny], 515 F.3d 224, 230 (3d Cir. 2008)]and culminating recently with the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal –U.S.–, 129 S.Ct. 1937 (2009) pleading standards have seemingly shifted from simple notice pleading to a more heightened form of pleading, requiring a plaintiff to plead more than the possibility of relief to survive a motion to dismiss.

Fowler v. UPMC Shadyside, 578 F.3d 203, 209-10 (3d Cir. 2009).

In considering whether a complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, the court must accept as true all allegations in the complaint and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the complaint are to be construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Jordan v. Fox Rothschild, O’Brien & Frankel, Inc., 20 F.3d 1250, 1261 (3d Cir. 1994). However, a court “need not credit a complaint’s bald assertions or legal conclusions when deciding a motion to dismiss.” Morse v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 132 F.3d 902, 906 (3d Cir. 1997). Additionally

a court need not “assume that a ... plaintiff can prove facts that the ... plaintiff has not alleged.” Associated Gen. Contractors of Cal. v. California State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 526 (1983). As the Supreme Court held in Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544 (2007), in order to state a valid cause of action a plaintiff must provide some factual grounds for relief which “requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of actions will not do.” Id. at 555. “Factual allegations must be enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level.” Id.

In keeping with the principles of Twombly, the Supreme Court has underscored that a trial court must assess whether a complaint states facts upon which relief can be granted when ruling on a motion to dismiss. In Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009), the Supreme Court held that, when considering a motion to dismiss, a court should “begin by identifying pleadings that, because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.” Id. at 679. According to the Supreme Court, “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory statements, do not suffice.” Id. at 678. Rather, in conducting a review of the adequacy of complaint, the Supreme Court has advised trial courts that they must:

[B]egin by identifying pleadings that because they are no more than conclusions are not entitled to the assumption of truth. While legal conclusions can provide the framework of a complaint, they must be supported by factual allegations. When there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement to relief.

Id. at 679.

Thus, following Twombly and Iqbal a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a complaint must recite factual allegations sufficient to raise the plaintiff's claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation. As the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has stated:

[A]fter Iqbal, when presented with a motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim, district courts should conduct a two-part analysis. First, the factual and legal elements of a claim should be separated. The District Court must accept all of the complaint's well-pleaded facts as true, but may disregard any legal conclusions. Second, a District Court must then determine whether the facts alleged in the complaint are sufficient to show that the plaintiff has a "plausible claim for relief." In other words, a complaint must do more than allege the plaintiff's entitlement to relief. A complaint has to "show" such an entitlement with its facts.

Fowler, 578 F.3d at 210-11.

In practice, consideration of the legal sufficiency of a complaint entails a three-step analysis: "First, the court must 'tak[e] note of the elements a plaintiff must plead to state a claim.' Iqbal, 129 S.Ct. at 1947. Second, the court should identify

allegations that, ‘because they are no more than conclusions, are not entitled to the assumption of truth.’ Id. at 1950. Finally, ‘where there are well-pleaded factual allegations, a court should assume their veracity and then determine whether they plausibly give rise to an entitlement for relief.’ Id.” Santiago v. Warminster Tp., 629 F.3d 121, 130 (3d Cir. 2010).

In addition to these pleading rules, a civil complaint must comply with the requirements of Rule 8(a) of the Federal Rule of Civil Procedure which defines what a complaint should say and provides that:

(a) A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain (1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court’s jurisdiction, unless the court already has jurisdiction and the claim needs no new jurisdictional support; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought, which may include relief in the alternative or different types of relief.

Thus, a well-pleaded complaint must contain more than mere legal labels and conclusions. Rather, a *pro se* plaintiff’s complaint must recite factual allegations which are sufficient to raise the plaintiff’s claimed right to relief beyond the level of mere speculation, set forth in a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action.

B. Banks’ Complaint Fails to State a Claim Upon Which Relief Can Be Granted

In the complaint, Banks repeats a number of wide-ranging, seemingly unconnected, largely speculative, and frequently incredible allegations involving

“Voice to skull” electronic surveillance and harassment, events and incidents that are alleged to have occurred to him, and claims which have been rejected by this Court within the past 4 months. In its current form Banks’ complaint is flawed in several other fundamental respects.

First, the complaint is subject to dismissal because it presents a cause of action that “relies on ‘fantastic or delusional scenarios.’ Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 328, 109 S.Ct. 1827, 104 L.Ed.2d 338 (1989).” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). We are obliged to “*sua sponte* dismiss a complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) when the allegations within the complaint ‘are so attenuated and unsubstantial as to be absolutely devoid of merit, ... wholly insubstantial, ... obviously frivolous, ... plainly unsubstantial, ... or no longer open to discussion.’ Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 536-37, 94 S.Ct. 1372, 39 L.Ed.2d 577 (1974) (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). There is no question that [these] claims meet this standard, as they rely on fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis.” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009).

In addition, dismissal of this complaint is warranted because the complaint plainly fails to comply with Rule 8's basic injunction that “A pleading that states a claim for relief must contain . . . a short and plain statement of the claim showing that

the pleader is entitled to relief.” It is well-settled that: “[t]he Federal Rules of Civil Procedure require that a complaint contain ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(a)(2), and that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,’ Fed.R.Civ.P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F.App’x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Thus, when a complaint is “illegible or incomprehensible”, id., or when a complaint “is not only of an unwieldy length, but it is also largely unintelligible”, Stephanatos v. Cohen, 236 F.App’x 785, 787 (3d Cir. 2007), an order dismissing a complaint under Rule 8 is clearly appropriate. See, e.g., Mincy v. Klem, 303 F.App’x 106 (3d Cir. 2008); Rhett v. New Jersey State Superior Court, 260 F.App’x 513 (3d Cir. 2008); Stephanatos v. Cohen. supra; Scibelli v. Lebanon County, supra; Bennett-Nelson v. La. Bd. of Regents, 431 F.3d 448, 450 n. 1 (5th Cir.2005). Furthermore, dismissal under Rule 8 is proper when a complaint “left the defendants having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action];” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App’x 158 (3d Cir. 2011), or when the complaint is so “rambling and unclear” as to defy response. Tillio v.Spiess, No. 11-1276, 2011 WL 3346787 (Aug. 4, 2011). Finally, a complaint may be dismissed under Rule 8 when the pleading is simply illegible and cannot be understood. See, e.g., Moss v. United States, 329 F. App'x 335 (3d Cir. 2009)(dismissing illegible complaint); Radin v. Jersey City Medical Center, 375 F.

App'x 205 (3d Cir. 2010); Earnest v. Ling, 140 F. App'x 431 (3d Cir. 2005)(dismissing complaint where “complaint fails to clearly identify which parties [the plaintiff] seeks to sue”); Oneal v. U.S. Fed. Prob., CIV.A. 05-5509 (MLC), 2006 WL 758301 (D.N.J. Mar. 22, 2006)(dismissing complaint consisting of approximately 50 pages of mostly-illegible handwriting); Gearhart v. City of Philadelphia Police, CIV.A.06-0130, 2006 WL 446071 (E.D. Pa. Feb. 21, 2006) (dismissing illegible complaint).

Here, Banks' complaint is largely incomprehensible. The complaint, hardly “contain[s] ‘a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2), and [fails to meet Rule 8's requirement] that each averment be ‘concise, and direct,’ Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(e)(1).” Scibelli v. Lebanon County, 219 F. App'x 221, 222 (3d Cir. 2007). Further, the factual averments set forth in the complaint consist of an apparent, but often incomprehensible, catalogue of events that are presented without any context, content, coherence or continuity, making it virtually impossible to ascertain the legal and factual significance of these allegations. Thus, we are “left . . . having to guess what of the many things discussed constituted [a cause of action].” Binsack v. Lackawanna County Prison, 438 F. App'x 158 (3d Cir. 2011). In such instances, Rule 8 compels the dismissal of this

complaint since, by any standard, this complaint is not a “short and plain” statement of a cause of action containing averments that are “concise, and direct.”¹

In addition, Banks’ latest complaint appears to attempt to re-litigate a matter which has previously been conclusively resolved by the federal courts within the past 4 months. In conducting an initial screening assessment of this aspect of the complaint: “ We have the authority to apply the doctrine of claim preclusion or *res judicata sua sponte*. Gleash v. Yuswak, 308 F.3d 758, 760 (7th Cir.2002); Ezekoye v. Ocwen Federal Bank FSB, 179 F.App'x 111, 114 (3d Cir.2006) (non precedential). [and] can . . . invoke *res judicata* ‘if it is so plain from the language of the complaint and other documents in the district court's files that it renders the suit frivolous.’ Gleash, 308 F.3d at 760.” Guider v. Mauer, CIVIL 1:CV-09-1915, 2009 WL 4015568 (M.D. Pa. Nov. 19, 2009). In our view, upon a preliminary screening review of this, Banks’ latest lawsuit, the *res judicata*, collateral estoppel and issue preclusion doctrines apply and compel dismissal of any of the previously litigated claims that are made by the plaintiff in this complaint. Collateral estoppel, *res judicata* and issue preclusion are doctrines which play a vital role in litigation. It has long been

¹While such dismissals are often initially made without prejudice, in this case where we find that the claims also “rely on fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis,” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009), we believe that dismissal of these allegations, with prejudice, would be appropriate.

recognized that “[t]he doctrine[] of . . . collateral estoppel, now . . . termed . . . issue preclusion, ‘shar[es] the common goals of judicial economy, predictability, and freedom from harassment....’ Gregory v. Chehi, 843 F.2d 111, 116 (3d Cir.1988). Generally speaking, the . . . doctrine of issue preclusion, ‘precludes the relitigation of an issue that has been put in issue and directly determined adversely to the party against whom the estoppel is asserted.’ Melikian v. Corradetti, 791 F.2d 274, 277 (3d Cir.1986).” Electro-Miniatures Corp. v. Wendon Co., Inc. 889 F.2d 41, 44 (3d Cir.1989)(citations omitted).

The parameters of this doctrine, which precludes relitigation of certain issues, have been defined by the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit in the following terms:

Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, prevents parties from relitigating an issue that has already been actually litigated. “The prerequisites for the application of issue preclusion are satisfied when: ‘(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.’ ” Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5(1979). In its classic form, collateral estoppel also required “mutuality”-i.e., that the parties on both sides of the current proceeding be bound by the judgment in the prior proceeding. Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 326-27. Under the modern doctrine of non-mutual issue preclusion, however, a litigant may also be estopped from advancing a position that he or she has presented and lost

in a prior proceeding against a different adversary. See Blonder-Tongue Labs., Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 324 (1971); Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 329. For . . . non-mutual issue preclusion [] to apply, the party to be precluded must have had a “full and fair” opportunity to litigate the issue in the first action. See Parklane Hosiery, 439 U.S. at 328; Blonder-Tongue Labs., 402 U.S. at 331.

Peloro v. United States, 488 F.3d 163, 174-5 (3d Cir. 2007). Stated succinctly, principles of collateral estoppel compel a later court to honor the an earlier decision of a matter that was actually litigated. Dici v. Commonwealth of Pa., 91 F.3d 542 (3d Cir. 1997). This doctrine, which involves an assessment of the overlap between issues presented in separate lawsuits, raises essentially legal questions which are often amenable to resolution by courts as a matter of law. See, e.g., Peloro v. United States, supra; Jean Alexander Cosmetics, Inc. v. L'Oreal USA, Inc, supra; Witkowski v. Welch, 173 F.3d 192, 198-205 (3d Cir. 1999); Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merchant Marine Co., Ltd., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-9 (3d Cir. 1995)(summary judgment, offensive issue preclusion).

Here, we find that, with respect to the claims made by Banks in the instant complaint regarding “Voice to skull” electronic surveillance and harassment, the legal requisites for issue preclusion are fully satisfied, since: “ ‘(1) the issue sought to be precluded [is] the same as that involved in the prior action; (2) that issue [was] actually litigated; (3) it [was] determined by a final and valid judgment; and (4) the

determination [was] essential to the prior judgment.’ ” Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Hyundai Merch. Marine Co., 63 F.3d 1227, 1231-32 (3d Cir.1995) (quoting In re Graham, 973 F.2d 1089, 1097 (3d Cir.1992)); see also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322, 326, n. 5(1979). Therefore, these claims should be dismissed.

Thus, simply put, this complaint “rel[ies] on fantastic scenarios lacking any arguable factual basis,” DeGrazia v. F.B.I., 316 F. App'x 172, 173 (3d Cir. 2009). Because the shortcomings of the complaint are manifold and obvious, we recommend that the district court dismiss this action as frivolous and for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. We recognize that in civil rights cases *pro se* plaintiffs often should be afforded an opportunity to amend a complaint before the complaint is dismissed in its entirety, see Fletcher-Hardee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, 482 F.3d 247, 253 (3d Cir. 2007), unless granting further leave to amend would be futile or result in undue delay. Alston v. Parker, 363 F.3d 229, 235 (3d Cir. 2004). In this case, however, the plaintiff has not articulated any civil rights cause of action, has repeated allegations previously found to be frivolous, and in our estimation the complaint itself demonstrates that plaintiff’s lawsuit is frivolous and provides no basis upon which relief could be granted in federal court. Accordingly, we will recommend that the action be dismissed with prejudice.

III. Recommendation

Accordingly, plaintiff's motion to proceed *in forma pauperis* is GRANTED (Doc. 2), but IT IS HEREBY RECOMMENDED that the Court dismiss this action pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(I) and (ii).

The plaintiff is further placed on notice that pursuant to Local Rule 72.3:

Any party may object to a magistrate judge's proposed findings, recommendations or report addressing a motion or matter described in 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(B) or making a recommendation for the disposition of a prisoner case or a habeas corpus petition within fourteen (14) days after being served with a copy thereof. Such party shall file with the clerk of court, and serve on the magistrate judge and all parties, written objections which shall specifically identify the portions of the proposed findings, recommendations or report to which objection is made and the basis for such objections. The briefing requirements set forth in Local Rule 72.2 shall apply. A judge shall make a de novo determination of those portions of the report or specified proposed findings or recommendations to which objection is made and may accept, reject, or modify, in whole or in part, the findings or recommendations made by the magistrate judge. The judge, however, need not conduct a new hearing only in his or her discretion or where required by law, and may consider the record developed before the magistrate judge, making his or her own determination on the basis of that record. The judge may also receive further evidence, recall witnesses or recommit the matter to the magistrate judge with instructions.

Submitted this 6th day of January, 2014.

S/Martin C. Carlson
Martin C. Carlson
United States Magistrate Judge