UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA

1:15-CV-1644

Judge Carlson)

KAREEM MILLHOUSE,	:	CIVIL NO. 1:1
	:	
Plaintiff,	:	(Judge Rambo)
	:	
v.	:	(Magistrate Jud
	:	
	:	
CHARLES SAMUELS, et al.,	:	
	:	
Defendants.	:	

MEMORANDUM ORDER

THE BACKGROUND OF THIS ORDER IS AS FOLLOWS:

This is a *pro se* prisoner civil rights lawsuit. The plaintiff, Kareem Millhouse, has filed a motion to compel discovery (Doc. 31), and two motions to compel a response to a motion for preliminary injunction. (Docs. 26 and 28.) These motions were filed by Millhouse before any attorney had entered an appearance for the defendants. Counsel has now entered an appearance and moved to dismiss this complaint.

Given this background the motion to compel discovery, (Doc. 31) will be denied and discovery will be stayed pending resolution of the motion to dismiss. The motions to compel a response to the request for preliminary injunction (Docs. 26 and 28) will be granted.

Several basic guiding principles inform our resolution of these motions. At the outset, with respect to Millhouse's motion to compel discovery, rulingsregarding the proper scope of discovery, and the extent to which discovery may be compelled, are matters consigned to the court's discretion and judgment. Thus, it has long been held that decisions regarding Rule 37 motions are "committed to the sound discretion of the district court." DiGregorio v. First Rediscount Corp., 506 F.2d 781, 788 (3d Cir. 1974). Similarly, issues relating to the scope of discovery permitted under Rule 26 also rest in the sound discretion of the Court. Wisniewski v. Johns-Manville Corp., 812 F.2d 81, 90 (3d Cir. 1987). Thus, a court's decisions regarding the conduct of discovery, and whether to compel disclosure of certain information, will be disturbed only upon a showing of an abuse of discretion. Marroquin-Manriquez v. I.N.S., 699 F.2d 129, 134 (3d Cir. 1983). This far-reaching discretion extends to rulings by United States Magistrate Judges on discovery matters. In this regard:

District courts provide magistrate judges with particularly broad discretion in resolving discovery disputes. See Farmers & Merchs. Nat'l Bank v. San Clemente Fin. Group Sec., Inc., 174 F.R.D. 572, 585 (D.N.J.1997). When a magistrate judge's decision involves a discretionary [discovery] matter . . . , "courts in this district have determined that the clearly erroneous standard implicitly becomes an abuse of discretion standard." Saldi v. Paul Revere Life Ins. Co., 224 F.R.D. 169, 174 (E.D.Pa.2004) (citing Scott Paper Co. v. United States, 943 F.Supp. 501, 502 (E.D.Pa.1996)). Under that standard, a magistrate judge's discovery ruling "is entitled to great deference and is reversible only for abuse of discretion." Kresefky v. Panasonic Commc'ns and Sys.

<u>Co.</u>, 169 F.R.D. 54, 64 (D.N.J.1996); <u>see also Hasbrouck v.</u> <u>BankAmerica Hous. Servs.</u>, 190 F.R.D. 42, 44-45 (N.D.N.Y.1999) (holding that discovery rulings are reviewed under abuse of discretion standard rather than de novo standard); <u>EEOC v. Mr. Gold, Inc.</u>, 223 F.R.D. 100, 102 (E.D.N.Y.2004) (holding that a magistrate judge's resolution of discovery disputes deserves substantial deference and should be reversed only if there is an abuse of discretion).

Halsey v. Pfeiffer, No. 09-1138, 2010 WL 3735702, *1 (D.N.J. Sept. 17, 2010).

We also note that our broad discretion over discovery matters extends to decisions under Rule 26(c) relating to the issuance of protective orders limiting and regulating the timing of discovery. Indeed, it is undisputed that: " '[t]he grant and nature of [a protective order] is singularly within the discretion of the district court and may be reversed only on a clear showing of abuse of discretion.' Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986, 997 (2d Cir.1973) (citation omitted)." Dove v. Atlantic Capital Corp., 963 F.2d 15, 19 (2d Cir. 1992). This discretion is guided, however, by certain basic principles. One of these cardinal principles, governing the exercise of discretion in this field, is that the district court may properly defer or delay discovery while it considers a potentially dispositive pretrial motion, provided the district court concludes that the pretrial motion does not, on its face, appear groundless. See, e.g., James v. York County Police Dep't, 160 F.App'x 126, 136 (3d Cir. 2005); Nolan v. U.S. Dep't of Justice, 973 F.2d 843,849 (10th Cir. 1992); Johnson v. New York Univ. Sch. of Ed., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). Briefly deferring discovery in such

a case, while the court determines the threshold issue of whether a complaint has sufficient merit to go forward, recognizes a simple, fundamental truth: Parties who file motions which may present potentially meritorious and complete legal defenses to civil actions should not be put to the time, expense and burden of factual discovery until after these claimed legal defenses are addressed by the court. In such instances, it is clearly established that:

"[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion 'appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way, 'do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.' " <u>In re Currency Conversion Fee Antitrust Litigation</u>, 2002 WL 88278, at *1 (S.D.N.Y. Jan. 22, 2002) (<u>quoting Chrysler Capital Corp. v. Century Power Corp.</u>, 137 F.R.D. 209, 209-10 (S.D.N.Y.1991)) (<u>citing Flores v. Southern Peru Copper Corp.</u>, 203 F.R.D. 92, 2001 WL 396422, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. Apr. 19, 2001); <u>Anti-Monopoly, Inc. v. Hasbro, Inc.</u>, 1996 WL 101277, at *2 (S.D.N.Y. March 7, 1996)).

Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

Guided by these legal tenets we conclude that further discovery should be briefly stayed at this time until after the court resolves the pending motion to dismiss. We reach this conclusion in accordance with settled case law, finding that: "[A] stay of discovery is appropriate pending resolution of a potentially dispositive motion where the motion 'appear[s] to have substantial grounds' or, stated another way, 'do[es] not appear to be without foundation in law.'" Johnson v. New York Univ. School of Educ., 205 F.R.D. 433, 434 (S.D.N.Y. 2002).

We agree, however, that the defendants should now respond to Millhouse's motion for preliminary injunction and will direct a response to that motion.

An appropriate order follows:

<u>Order</u>

Upon consideration of the pending motion to compel discovery (Doc. 31),IT IS ORDERED that this motion is DENIED and further discovery is STAYED pending resolution of the outstanding motion to dismiss filed by the defendants. IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that the plaintiff's motions to compel a response to the request for preliminary injunction (Docs. 26 and 28) are GRANTED, and defendants shall respond to the motion for preliminary injunction on or before **April 29, 2016**. The movant may then file a reply brief on or before **May 13, 2016**.

So ordered this 15th day of April, 2016.

<u>S/Martin C. Carlson</u> Martin C. Carlson United States Magistrate Judge