

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE MIDDLE DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

<b>SCOTT NJOS,</b>	:	<b>CIVIL NO. 3:12-CV-1251</b>
	:	
<b>Plaintiff,</b>	:	<b>(Judge Kosik)</b>
	:	
<b>v.</b>	:	
	:	<b>(Magistrate Judge Carlson)</b>
<b>UNITED STATES OF AMERICA</b>	:	
	:	
<b>Defendant.</b>	:	

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**<sup>1</sup>

**I. Statement of Facts and of the Case**

Scott Njos is a federal inmate housed at the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, where he is currently serving an 188-month sentence following his conviction on bank robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, escape, and assault on a federal officer charges. While in federal custody, Njos has amassed an extensive disciplinary history, having been cited on dozens of occasions with prison rules infractions, many of which involved violent or disruptive behavior by Njos in an institutional setting. This history of recidivism and on-going institutional misconduct led to the reassignment of Njos to the Special Management Unit of the United States Penitentiary, Lewisburg, where the plaintiff currently resides.

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<sup>1</sup>The parties are advised that, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636, the district court has orally referred the above-captioned case to the undersigned for pre-trial management, resolution of non-dispositive motions, and preparation of reports and recommendations on potentially dispositive matters.

Njos is also a prolific litigator in federal court.<sup>2</sup> Much of this litigation involves Njos' recurring complaint regarding the medical care and treatment which he receives at the Lewisburg Penitentiary. The instant case is but one example of this growing body of litigation brought by Njos. While this lawsuit has undergone several transformations during the past three years that it has been pending before the court, in its current form this case brings a single claim against a solitary defendant.

Presently, Njos is bringing a claim against the Federal Bureau of Prisons in this case pursuant to the Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. §§504, 705, and 794(a). In essence, Njos alleges that the Federal Bureau of Prisons is discriminating against him based upon a disability which he suffers, in that federal prison official are excluding him from prison programming based solely upon his disabilities. Njos describes these disabilities as a history of bi-polar disorder, post-traumatic stress disorder, major depressive disorder, and schizophrenia. (Doc. 83.)

Having framed his claim in this lawsuit in this fashion, Njos has now filed a motion, described as a motion regarding sufficiency of answer and objection, (Doc. 147.), which takes issue with some of the responses which Njos has received to

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<sup>2</sup>See e.g., Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-243; Njos v. Bledsoe, 3:12-CV-476; Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2721; Njos v. Thomas, 3:13-CV-2816; Njos v. Thomas, 3:14-CV-766; Njos v. Bureau of Prisons, 3:12-CV-1251; Njos v. Kane, 3:12-CV-1252; Njos v. Carney, 3:12-CV-1375; Njos v. United States, 3:15-CV-1960; Njos v. Thomas, 3:14-CV-875.

requests for admission from the defendant. Njos then demands that we direct a criminal investigation and prosecution of those responsible for these responses under 18 U.S.C. §1001, a criminal statute which forbids false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States government.

Having considered this motion, for the reasons set forth below, the motion will be denied.

## **II. Discussion**

In this motion, Njos appears to asks this Court to commence a criminal prosecution under 18 U.S.C. §1001. This he may not do. It is well established that decisions regarding the filing of criminal charges are the prerogative of the executive branch of government, are consigned to the sound discretion of prosecutors, and under the separation of powers doctrine are not subject to judicial fiat. Indeed, it has long been recognized that the exercise of prosecutorial discretion is a matter, “particularly ill-suited to judicial review.” Wayte v. United States, 470 U.S. 598, 607, 105 S.Ct. 1524, 84 L.Ed.2d 547 (1985). Recognizing this fact, courts have long held that a civil rights plaintiff may not seek relief in civil litigation in the form of an order directing the criminal prosecution of some third parties, finding that civil plaintiffs lack standing to make such claims and concluding that such relief simply is unavailable in a civil lawsuit. See, e.g., Ostrowski v. Mehlretter, 20 Fed. Appx. 87, 90 (2d Cir.2001)

(stating that “Ostrowski has no standing to sue for any of Mehlretter's actions. First of all, he has not shown, injury-in-fact. The failure of Mehlretter to investigate or prosecute Bybel did not injure him in any direct manner-he has no ‘personal stake in the outcome’ of a perjury case brought against (or not brought against) another person .”); See also Kim v. Romero, 877 F.2d 64, 1989 WL 67116 at \*1 (9th Cir. June 14, 1989) (affirming the dismissal of a suit against various prosecuting authorities for their failure to bring charges against a sheriff for alleged battery); McMinn v. Damiani, 765 F.2d 145, 1985 WL 13323 (6th Cir. May 3, 1985) (affirming the dismissal for lack of standing a pro se civil rights case where plaintiff had sued state prosecuting authorities for failing to investigate or prosecute claims against various state judges and lawyers); Gessner v. Dep't of Corr., 3:14-CV-111, 2014 WL 972290 (M.D. Pa. Mar. 12, 2014); Snyder v. Aaron, CIV.A. 05–1602, 2006 WL 544466 (W.D.Pa. Mar.6, 2006); Moyer v. Borough of North Wales, Civ. No. 00–1092, 2000 WL 1665132 at \*2 (E.D.Pa.Nov.7, 2000) (stating that “Moyer has no judicially cognizable interest in Timothy Conley's criminal prosecution. Accordingly, an agreement to refrain from prosecuting Conley for sexual assault or to charge him with disorderly conduct or the act thereof violates no constitutional right that Moyer has standing to assert.”); see also Wise v. Augustine, Civ. No. 97–2651, 1997 WL 534695 at \*2 (E.D.Pa. Aug.8, 1997) (stating that “[a] private citizen has no constitutional, statutory, or common law right to require a public official to investigate or prosecute a crime.”); Dundore v.

O'Donnell, Civ. No. 85–2907, 1985 WL 2681 at \*2 (E.D.Pa. Sept.17, 1985) (stating that “Defendant O'Donnell is alleged to have refused to file the criminal charges brought by plaintiffs. Although plaintiffs were no doubt aggrieved when O'Donnell refused to file the charges, they have no constitutional right that I am aware of to have criminal charges filed.”); Corbin v. Stevens, Civ. No. 91–1054, 1992 WL 96684 at \*2 (S.D.N.Y. April 30, 1992) (stating that “[p]laintiff possesses no constitutional right to have someone arrested....”).

### **III. Order**

For the foregoing reasons, Njos’ motion, described as a motion regarding sufficiency of answer and objection, (Doc. 147.), which takes issue with some of the responses which Njos has received to requests for admission from the defendant and then demands that we direct a criminal investigation and prosecution of those responsible for these responses under 18 U.S.C. §1001, a criminal statute which forbids false statements in matters within the jurisdiction of agencies of the United States government, is DENIED.

So ordered this 2d day of September 2015.

**S/Martin C. Carlson**  
Martin C. Carlson  
United States Magistrate Judge