

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF PENNSYLVANIA**

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| RICHARD E. BOYD, |) | |
| |) | Civil Action No. 10 – 1492 |
| Plaintiff, |) | |
| |) | Chief District Judge Gary L. Lancaster |
| v. |) | |
| |) | Magistrate Judge Lisa Pupo Lenihan |
| GOVERNOR EDWARD RENDELL, |) | |
| |) | |
| Defendant. |) | |
| |) | |
| |) | |

MAGISTRATE JUDGE’S REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION

I. RECOMMENDATION

It is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

II. REPORT

Plaintiff, a prisoner currently incarcerated at the State Correctional Institution at Fayette, located in LaBelle, Pennsylvania, brings this civil rights action pursuant to the Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983, against Governor Edward Rendell, complaining about a violation of his speedy trial rights in connection with his conviction in the Court of Common Pleas of Washington County for which he was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of from twelve (12) to twenty-six (26) years. For the reasons that follow, Plaintiff's Complaint must be dismissed.

A. Standard of Review

This Court must review Plaintiff's Complaint in accordance with the amendments promulgated in the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321

(1996). Pertinent to the case at bar is the authority granted to federal courts for *sua sponte* screening and dismissal of prisoner claims. Specifically, Congress enacted a new statutory provision at 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, entitled "Screening," which requires the court to review complaints filed by prisoners seeking redress from a governmental entity or an officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). If the complaint is "frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted," or "seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief," the court must dismiss the complaint. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b).

In addition, Congress significantly amended Title 28 of the United States Code, section 1915, which establishes the criteria for allowing an action to proceed in forma pauperis ("IFP"), *i.e.*, without prepayment of costs. Section 1915(e) (as amended) requires the federal courts to review complaints filed by persons who are proceeding in forma pauperis and to dismiss, at any time, any action that is frivolous or malicious, fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted, or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B).

Plaintiff is considered a "prisoner" as that term is defined under the PLRA.¹ Several of the Defendants are officers or employees of governmental entities. In addition, Plaintiff has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis (doc. no. 3). Thus his allegations must be reviewed in accordance with the directives provided in 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e). In reviewing complaints under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915A & 1915(e), a federal court applies the same standard applied to motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).² A

1. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(h); 1915A(c).

2. See, e.g., Bradley v. Puckett, 157 F.3d 1022, 1025 (5th Cir. 1998); Anyanwutaku v. Moore, 151 F.3d 1053 (D.C. Cir. 1998); Mitchell v. Farcass, 112 F.3d 1483, 1484 (11th Cir. 1997); McGore v. Wrigglesworth, 114 F.3d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1997); Atkinson v. Bohn, 91 F.3d 1127, 1128 (8th Cir. 1996); Powell v. Hoover, 956 F. Supp. 564, 568

complaint must be dismissed pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b)(6) if it does not allege “enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.” Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 554, 556 (2007) (rejecting the traditional 12 (b)(6) standard set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)). The court must accept as true all allegations of the complaint and all reasonable factual inferences must be viewed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. Angelastro v. Prudential-Bache Securities, Inc., 764 F.2d 939, 944 (3d Cir. 1985).³

B. Liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983

In his Complaint, Plaintiff complains that his speedy trial rights were violated and that, as a consequence, he is being illegally detained in violation of the Thirteenth Amendment. Resolution of Plaintiff’s claims is dictated by the teachings of the United States Supreme Court as stated in Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 488-490 (1973), and subsequent cases interpreting that opinion. In Preiser, the plaintiffs were state prisoners who were deprived of good-time credits as a result of disciplinary proceedings; they sought injunctive relief restoring their good-time credits, which would have resulted in their immediate release from confinement. In making its ruling in Preiser, the Court was called upon to determine the proper relationship between the Civil Rights Act and the federal habeas corpus statute, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Despite the admitted “literal applicability” of § 1983 to the action before it, the Court concluded that “when a state prisoner is challenging the very fact or duration of his physical imprisonment, and

(M.D. Pa. 1997)(applying Rule 12(b)(6) standard to claim dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)); Tucker v. Angelone, 954 F. Supp. 134 (E.D. Va.), *aff’d*, 116 F.3d 473 (Table) (4th Cir. 1997).

3. This Court recognizes that the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit has held that, in civil rights cases, a court must give a plaintiff the opportunity to amend a deficient complaint - regardless of whether the plaintiff requests to do so - when dismissing a case for failure to state a claim, unless doing so would be inequitable or futile. See Fletcher-Harlee Corp. v. Pote Concrete Contractors, Inc., 482 F.3d 247, 251 (3d Cir. 2007). Because it would be futile to allow Plaintiff to amend, this Court is recommending that the action be dismissed.

the relief he seeks is a determination that he is entitled to immediate or speedier release from that imprisonment, his sole federal remedy is a writ of habeas corpus.” *Id.*, 411 U.S. at 500.

Over two decades later, the Supreme Court again examined the relationship between the federal civil rights law and habeas corpus actions in Heck v. Humphrey, 512 U.S. 477 (1994). In Heck, the petitioner was convicted of voluntary manslaughter for killing his wife. While his direct appeal was pending in the state courts, Heck filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against the prosecutors in his criminal action and various members of the state police department. The complaint alleged that the defendants had engaged in an unlawful investigation and had knowingly destroyed exculpatory evidence. Heck sought compensatory and punitive damages but did not seek injunctive relief or release from custody. After reviewing its origin and history, the Court determined that the civil rights law was not meant to provide a means for collaterally challenging the validity of a conviction through the pursuit of money damages. In so concluding, the Court announced the following rule.

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated. But if the district court determines that the plaintiff's action, even if successful, will not demonstrate the invalidity of any outstanding criminal judgment against the plaintiff, the action should be allowed to proceed, in the absence of some other bar to the suit.

Id. at 486-87 (footnotes omitted) (emphasis added).

In order to succeed on his claim, this Court necessarily must conclude that Plaintiff's criminal conviction is unlawful because it was based on a violation of his speedy trial rights. To the extent that he still is serving any portion of that sentence and is seeking immediate release from prison, he is precluded from seeking such relief through a civil rights complaint because, under Preiser, a federal habeas corpus petition is his only available avenue for immediate release. To the extent that Plaintiff is seeking monetary damages for the length of time he has been "unlawfully incarcerated," he is precluded from seeking such relief under the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Heck because a judgment in his favor necessarily would implicate the validity of his conviction. As such, Plaintiff's section 1983 claim is not cognizable. Heck, 512 U.S. at 486 ("We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254."). *See also* Mitchell v. Department of Corrections, 272 F.Supp.2d 464, 473 (M. D. Pa. 2003) (holding that the favorable termination rule of Heck, under which a state inmate must secure a determination of invalidity of his conviction or sentence before seeking § 1983 damages for unconstitutional conviction or confinement, applies to suits by prisoners who no longer are in custody, even though federal habeas relief no longer is available due to the prisoner's release).

Here, Plaintiff has not demonstrated that he successfully has challenged his conviction. Accordingly, he cannot pursue his claim that Defendants violated his constitutional rights in this

civil rights action until he can show that his conviction is legally invalidated on constitutional grounds through a writ of habeas corpus or other available means. *Accord* Randell v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 300, 301 (5th Cir. 2000) (affirming dismissal of complaint for failure to state a claim of former inmate seeking damages pursuant to § 1983 for unconstitutional imprisonment because he had not satisfied the favorable termination requirement of Heck), *cert. denied*, 532 U.S. 971 (2001).

III. CONCLUSION

For the reasons stated above, it is respectfully recommended that Plaintiff's Complaint be dismissed in accordance with the Prison Litigation Reform Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii) and/or 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b) for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

In accordance with the Magistrate Judges Act, 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and (C), and Rule 72(D)(2) of the Local Rules for Magistrates Judges, the parties are allowed fourteen (14) days from the date of service to file objections to this report and recommendation. Any party opposing the objections shall have ten (14) days from the date of service of objections to respond thereto. Failure to file timely objections may constitute a waiver of any appellate rights.

Date: November 30, 2010

cc: Richard E. Boyd, EP-5703
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Lisa Pupo Lenihan
United States Magistrate Judge