



It is well settled that pleadings filed by *pro se* litigants are to be construed liberally. McNeil v. United States, 508 U.S. 106, 113 (1993); Higgins v. Beyer, 293 F.3d 683, 688 (3d Cir. 2002). And in such circumstances the court has an obligation to "apply the applicable law, irrespective of whether a *pro se* litigant has mentioned it by name." Higgins, 293 F.3d at 688 (quoting Holley v. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, 165 F.3d 244, 247-48 (3d Cir. 1999)).

But the above-referenced standards are not to be read as a license to excuse or overlook procedural shortcomings in pleadings submitted by those who choose to represent themselves. McNeil, 508 U.S. at 113 ("we have never suggested that procedural rules in ordinary civil litigation should be interpreted so as to excuse mistakes by those who proceed without counsel"). Thus, a complaint drafted without the benefit of counsel nevertheless must comply with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a). And, while Fed. R. Civ. P. 8(a)(2) requires only a "short and plain statement of the claims showing that the pleader is entitled to relief," Rule 12(b)(6) is not without meaning. Krantz v. Prudential Investments Fund Management, 305 F.3d 140, 142 (3d Cir. 2002). It follows that in order to comply with the applicable pleading standards "more detail is often required than the bald statement by plaintiff that he has a valid claim of some type against defendant." Id. at 142 - 43 (quoting Charles A. Wright and Arthur R. Miller, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE, § 1357 at 318 (2d ed. 1990)). This principle appears to be even more well-grounded after Twombly.

Defendants seek to hold plaintiff to the demands that govern pleadings by skilled attorneys. We decline to do so. Nevertheless, plaintiff must place the factual grounds of his claims in an operative complaint and that operative complaint must contain short and plain allegations of fact which make a plausible showing that he is entitled to relief under a cognizable legal theory of recovery.

As a general matter, a plaintiff is to be granted leave to amend a claim that has been dismissed when an amendment might be able to cure the deficiencies resulting in the dismissal. Phillips v. County of Allegheny, 515 F.3d 224, 236 (3d Cir. 2008). Plaintiff's responses to defendants' motion make such a showing. Accordingly, he has been granted leave to amend.

s/David Stewart Cercone  
David Stewart Cercone  
Senior United States District Judge

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