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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF PUERTO RICO**

REYES ORTIZ,

Plaintiff,

v.

McCONNELL VALDES, et al.,

Defendants.

CIVIL NO. 09-1933 (GAG)

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MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

Presently before the court is Defendants' motion to alter or amend judgment under Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e) (Docket No. 20), which was timely opposed by Plaintiff (Docket No. 22). For the reasons set forth herein, the court **GRANTS** Defendants' motion.

"Rule 59(e) motions are granted only where the movant shows a manifest error of law or newly discovered evidence." Prescott v. Higgins, 538 F.3d 32, 45 (1st Cir. 2008) (quoting Kansky v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co. of New Eng., 492 F.3d 54, 60 (1st Cir. 2007)). Because the movant must "clearly establish" a manifest error of law or present newly discovered evidence, it is "very difficult to prevail" on a Rule 59(e) motion. Marie v. Allied Home Mortgage Corp., 402 F.3d 1, 7 n.2 (1st Cir. 2005) (citations omitted). The First Circuit has repeatedly warned movants that a motion to alter or amend judgment may not be used by the losing party "to repeat old arguments previously considered and rejected, or to raise new legal theories that should have been raised earlier." National Metal Finishing Co. v. Barclays American/Commercial, Inc., 899 F.2d 119, 123 (1st Cir. 1990); see, e.g., United States v. \$23,000 in U.S. Currency, 356 F.3d 157, 165 n. 9 (1st Cir. 2004) ("The repetition of previous arguments is not sufficient to prevail on a Rule 59(e) motion."); F.D.I.C. Ins. Co. v. World University, Inc., 978 F.2d 10, 16 (1st Cir. 1992) (motions under Rule 59(e) "may not be used to argue a new legal theory.").

In its Opinion and Order at Docket No. 19, the court denied Defendants' argument for dismissal of Plaintiff's Law 100 claim based on timeliness. The court first concluded that the last discriminatory act based on sex or gender against Plaintiff was alleged to have taken place on

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1 September 5, 2008, and that, therefore, Plaintiff's Law 100 claim accrued on that date. The court
2 then went on to state that, because Plaintiff had filed her administrative charge with the EEOC and
3 the Anti Discrimination Unit of the Puerto Rico Department of Labor (ADU) on September 8,
4 2008, the charge served to toll Law 100's one-year statute of limitations as an extrajudicial claim.
5 Finally, since the letter attached to the charge mentioned all of the co-defendants, the court
6 concluded that "it cannot be said that the named co-defendants [Aponte, Rivera and Velez] were
7 not included in Plaintiff's administrative charge," (Docket No. 19 at 8.) and proceeded to deny
8 Defendants' motion.

9 Defendants argue in their motion to alter or amend judgment that, although the
10 administrative charge mentioned co-defendants Aponte, Rivera and Velez, the same were not
11 personally notified of Plaintiff's charge. Therefore, they contend that the administrative charge
12 could not have served to toll the statute of limitations as an extrajudicial claim. After reviewing
13 the applicable case law, the court finds that Defendants' analysis in this respect is sound, and that
14 it committed an error of law by denying Defendants' motion to dismiss Plaintiff's Law 100 claim
15 against co-defendants Aponte, Rivera and Velez as untimely.

16 As stated by the court in its previous Opinion and Order, the filing of a claim with the ADU
17 constitutes an extrajudicial claim. (Docket No. 19 at 7) (citing Leon-Nogueras v. University of
18 Puerto Rico, 964 F.Supp. 585, 587-88 (D.P.R. 1997)). However, as interpreted by the Supreme
19 Court of Puerto Rico, in order for an administrative complaint before the ADU or the EEOC to toll
20 the statute of limitations for a cause of action under Title VII or Law 100, each particular defendant
21 needs to have been notified of the filing of the administrative complaint. See Leon-Nogueras, 964
22 F.Supp. at 588 (citing generally Matos-Molero v. Roche Products, Inc., 132 P.R. Dec. 470, 484;
23 Cintron v. E.L.A., 127 P.R. Dec. 582, 593 (1990); Secretario del Trabajo v. Finetex Hosiery Co.,
24 116 P.R. Dec. 823, 826-27 (1986)); see also Huertas-Gonzalez v. Univeristy of Puerto Rico, 520
25 F. Supp. 2d. 304, 317-18 (D.P.R. 2007). "The principal distinction between [the filing of a
26 complaint and an extrajudicial claim] is that the filing of a complaint in court will toll the running
27 of the statute of limitations even if the complaint is not notified to the defendant, while an
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1 extrajudicial claim *must* be notified to the defendant if it is to have a tolling effect.” Id. (emphasis
2 in original) (comparing Silva-Wiscovich v. Weber Dental Manufacturing Co., 835 F.2d 409 (1st
3 Cir. 1987) (statute of limitations was tolled by filing of suit, even when suit was voluntarily
4 dismissed by the plaintiffs before serving process upon the defendants), with Secretario del Trabajo,
5 116 P.R. Dec. 823, 827 (1986) (timely *notification* of administrative charge tolls running of statute
6 of limitations)). In this respect, the First Circuit has summarized the applicable Puerto Rico
7 doctrine as follows:

8 [A]n extrajudicial claim does in fact include virtually any demand formulated by the
9 creditor. The only limitations are that the claim must be made by the holder of the
10 substantive right (or his legal representative), . . . , *it must be addressed to the debtor
or passive subject of the right, not to a third party*, . . . , and it must require or
demand the same conduct or relief ultimately sought in the subsequent lawsuit.

11 Rodriguez-Narvaez v. Nazario, 895 F.2d 38, 44 (1st Cir. 1990) (citations to Puerto Rico Supreme
12 Court cases omitted) (emphasis added). Therefore, “[u]nlike filing a lawsuit, the mere filing of an
13 administrative charge is insufficient to toll the running of a statute of limitations even for causes
14 of action under employment discrimination laws. Because an administrative charge operates as an
15 extrajudicial claim, it must be personally notified to the defendant if it is to have a tolling effect.”
16 Leon-Nogueras, 964 F.Supp. at 989.

17 Plaintiff does not refute Defendants’ contention that the named co-defendants were not
18 personally notified of Plaintiff’s administrative charge, or its amendment. The mere inclusion of
19 the individual defendants’ names in Plaintiff’s addendum to the administrative charge, which
20 relates the alleged discriminatory events, does not suffice for an extrajudicial claim where “the
21 debtor or passive subject of the right” did not personally receive notice. Rodriguez-Narvaez, 895
22 F.2d at 44 (citation omitted). Inasmuch as Plaintiff expected to effect notice of her claims as to
23 these defendants through her administrative charge, she could not do so by notifying a third party,
24 co-defendant McConnell Valdes. Therefore, the court must conclude that the filing of the
25 administrative charge did not toll the statute of limitations regarding Plaintiff’s Law 100 claim
26 against co-defendants Aponte, Rivera and Velez.

27 Furthermore, the court is reluctant to revisit the issue of when the Law 100 claim accrued.
28 Defendants’ only argument on reconsideration focused on the sufficiency of Plaintiff’s

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1 extrajudicial/administrative notification for the purpose of tolling the statute of limitations on
2 Plaintiff's Law 100 claim. As pointed out by Defendants, Plaintiff did not move for reconsideration
3 of the court's determination as to accrual within the 28-day jurisdictional period provided by
4 Fed.R.Civ.P. 59(e), and now attempts to relitigate the issue of accrual in her opposition to
5 Defendants' motion. Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) prohibits an expansion of the time to act under Rule 59(e).
6 See Fed.R.Civ.P. 6(b) ("A court must not extend the time to act under Rules 50(b) and (d), 52(b),
7 59(b), (d) and (e), and 60(b)."). Moreover, "[a]n untimely Rule 59(e) motion cannot be salvaged
8 on the grounds that the opposing party filed a timely motion." See 12 Moore's Federal Practice,
9 § 59.31[4] (Mathew Bender 3d ed.); Hidle v. Geneva County Bd. of Educ., 792 F.2d 1098, 1100
10 (11th Cir. 1986) (untimely motion to alter or amend does not invoke trial court's jurisdiction,
11 regardless of whether or not opposition filed timely motion); see also Hertz Corp. v. Alamo
12 Rent-A-Car, 16 F.3d 1126, 1129-33 (11th Cir. 1994) (same, where co-party filed timely motion).

13 Regardless, the court understands that it has not committed a manifest error of law as to the
14 time of accrual. Plaintiff argues in her opposition to Defendants' motion that her claim could have
15 accrued after September 5, 2008; some time between September 11th and October 6th, 2008, "when
16 she became aware that she had been replaced with a male employee younger than forty (40), that
17 is, [upon] 'the effectuation of the decision.'" (Docket No. 22 at 2) (citing Aguirre Vargas v. Fuller
18 Brush Co. of P.R., Inc., 336 F. Supp. 2d 134, 143 (D.P.R. 2004)). Though tenuous, this is
19 Plaintiff's only salient argument in opposition,¹ yet her own averments in the administrative charge
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22 ¹ Plaintiff also argued that accrual of the constructive discharge claim did not occur until
23 March 3, 2009, when she amended her administrative charge to reflect that the defendants' actions
24 amounted to a constructive discharge. However, as referenced by Plaintiff herself, "in the context
25 of a constructive discharge, the date the employee elects to retire [is what] triggers the Law 100
26 limitation period." (Docket No. 22 at 3) (citing American Airlines v. Cardoza-Rodriguez, 133 F.3d
27 111, 124-25 (1st Cir. 1998)). Thus, it is irrelevant for purposes of accrual when the Plaintiff first
28 included this claim in her administrative charge.

26 Plaintiff's other argument involves co-defendant McConnell Valdes's ("McV") averment
27 in its answer to the complaint, to the effect that Plaintiff continues to be an employee of McV.
28 (See Docket No. 10, ¶ 2.) Plaintiff contends that the court cannot dismiss the Law 100 claim without
allowing discovery because McV's averment creates an issue as to whether or not her claim has
accrued. The court understands, however, that this is a defense raised by McV, not the named co-
defendants whose motion for dismissal is under reconsideration. The court shall consider this

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1 contradict it. The final remarks in her addendum to the original administrative charge, which was
2 filed on September 8, 2008 but was dated August 25, 2008, reflect that one of the defendants had
3 told her that she would be replaced by a younger male. (See Docket No. 11-2 at 3.) Thus,
4 Plaintiff's claim could not have accrued past September 8, 2008, at the latest, since by then she
5 already had knowledge of the adverse personnel action. See American Airlines, 133 F.3d at 124-
6 25 ("Under substantive Puerto Rico law generally, actions for civil liability based on fault
7 commence 'from the time the aggrieved person had knowledge thereof.' " (quoting Article 1968,
8 Puerto Rico Civil Code, P.R. Laws Ann. tit. 31, § 5298 (1991))). That would put the filing of the
9 complaint in this case (September 15, 2009) past the one-year statute of limitations for Law 100
10 claims.

11 Having determined that Plaintiff's Law 100 claim accrued on September 5, 2008 (or
12 September 8, 2008, at the latest), and that the filing of the administrative charge (or its amendment)
13 did not toll the one-year statute of limitations as to the individually named co-defendants, the court
14 must conclude that Plaintiff's Law 100 claim was time-barred by the time the complaint was filed
15 in this case, on September 15, 2009. Accordingly, Plaintiff's Law 100 claim against co-defendants
16 Aponte, Rivera and Velez is hereby **DISMISSED** as untimely.

17 **SO ORDERED.**

18 In San Juan, Puerto Rico this 10th day of May, 2010.

19 *S/ Gustavo A. Gelpi*

20 GUSTAVO A. GELPI
21 United States District Judge
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27 _____
28 argument as to McV, if and when McV moves for dismissal or summary judgment.