



The "STATEMENT OF CLAIM" portion of the § 1983 complaint reveals that this civil rights action arises out of the plaintiff's former criminal case. The plaintiff contends that he is falsely imprisoned because he was not indicted and because an "Invalid Commitment/sentence form" was used (Complaint, at page 2). The plaintiff also alleges that the defendants have confused him with James Cabbagestalk. In his prayer for relief, the plaintiff seeks to be paid for every day he has been in prison or jail from January 12, 2007, to the date of his release; release from prison; a court order firing the defendants from state employment; waiver of immunity for the defendants; money for pain and suffering; and a court order barring further prosecution of the plaintiff.

### *Discussion*

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review<sup>1</sup> has been made of the *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915, 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and the Prison Litigation Reform Act. The review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Maryland House of Correction*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995)(*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983); *Boyce v. Alizaduh*, 595 F.2d 948 (4th Cir. 1979) (recognizing the district court's authority to conduct an initial screening of any *pro se* filing);<sup>2</sup> *Loe v. Armistead*, 582 F.2d 1291 (4th Cir. 1978); and

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<sup>1</sup>Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B) and Local Civil Rule 73.02 (DSC), the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

<sup>2</sup>*Boyce* has been held by some authorities to have been abrogated in part, on other grounds, by *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989) (insofar as *Neitzke* establishes that a complaint that fails  
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*Gordon v. Leeke*, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978). The plaintiff is a *pro se* litigant, and thus his pleadings are accorded liberal construction. See *Erickson v. Pardus*, \_\_\_ U.S. \_\_\_, 75 U.S.L.W. 3643, 167 L.Ed.2d 1081, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007)(*per curiam*); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 5, 9-10 & n. 7 (1980)(*per curiam*); and *Cruz v. Beto*, 405 U.S. 319 (1972). When a federal court is evaluating a *pro se* complaint or petition, the plaintiff's or petitioner's allegations are assumed to be true. *Fine v. City of New York*, 529 F.2d 70, 74 (2nd Cir. 1975). Even under this less stringent standard, the § 1983 complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Department of Social Services*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Since the plaintiff is challenging his conviction and sentence, this case is subject to summary dismissal because a right of action has not accrued. See *Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. 477 (1994):

We hold that, in order to recover damages for allegedly unconstitutional conviction or imprisonment, or for other harm caused by actions whose unlawfulness would render a conviction or sentence invalid, a § 1983 plaintiff must prove that the conviction or sentence has been reversed on direct appeal, expunged by executive order, declared invalid by a state tribunal authorized to make such a determination, or called into question by a federal court's issuance of a writ of habeas corpus, 28 U.S.C. § 2254. A claim for damages bearing that relationship to a conviction or sentence that has not been so invalidated is not cognizable under § 1983. Thus, when a state prisoner seeks damages in a § 1983 suit, the district court must consider whether a judgment in favor of the plaintiff would necessarily imply the invalidity of his conviction or sentence; if it would, the complaint must be dismissed unless the plaintiff can

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(...continued)

to state a claim, under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), does not by definition merit *sua sponte* dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(i) [formerly 28 U.S.C. § 1915(d)], as “frivolous”).

demonstrate that the conviction or sentence has already been invalidated.

*Heck v. Humphrey*, 512 U.S. at 486-87 (footnote omitted). See also *Woods v. Candela*, 47 F.3d 545 (2nd Cir. 1995) (litigant's conviction reversed by state court in 1993; hence, civil rights action timely filed); *Treece v. Village of Naperville*, 903 F. Supp. 1251 (N.D. Ill. 1995); *Seaton v. Kato*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2380, \*12-\*13, 1995 WL 88956 (N.D. Ill., Feb. 28, 1995); and *Smith v. Holtz*, 879 F. Supp. 435 (M.D. Pa. 1995), *affirmed*, 87 F.3d 108 (3rd Cir. 1995).

In until the plaintiff's conviction is set aside, any civil rights action based on the conviction, sentence, direct appeal, and related matters will be barred because of the holding in *Heck v. Humphrey*. *Sufka v. Minnesota*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 84544, 2007 WL 4072313 (D. Minn., Nov. 15, 2007). Even so, the limitations period will not begin to run until the cause of action accrues. See *Benson v. New Jersey State Parole Board*, 947 F. Supp. 827, 830 & n. 3 (D.N.J. 1996) (following *Heck v. Humphrey*: "[b]ecause a prisoner's § 1983 cause of action will not have arisen, there need be no concern that it might be barred by the relevant statute of limitations."); and *Snyder v. City of Alexandria*, 870 F. Supp. 672, 685-88 (E.D. Va. 1994).

The plaintiff cannot obtain release from prison in this civil rights action. *Myers v. Pauling*, 1995 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7628, 1995 WL 334284 (E.D. Pa., June 2, 1995) ("Release from prison is not a remedy available under 42 U.S.C. § 1983."). Hence, the plaintiff's motion to vacate (Entry No. 3) must be denied.

The Supreme Court of South Carolina, the Court of Appeals of South Carolina, Courts of General Sessions, Courts of Common Pleas, Family Courts, Probate Courts, magistrate's courts, and municipal courts are in a unified judicial system. See S.C. Const. Article V, § 1 ("The judicial power

shall be vested in a unified judicial system, which shall include a Supreme Court, a Court of Appeals, a Circuit Court, and such other courts of uniform jurisdiction as may be provided for by general law."); *City of Pickens v. Schmitz*, 297 S.C. 253, 376 S.E.2d 271, 272 (1989); and *Cort Industries Corp. v. Swirl, Inc.*, 264 S.C. 142, 213 S.E.2d 445, 446 (1975). The entity known as the South Carolina Court Administration operates the State of South Carolina's unified judicial system pursuant to the authority delegated by the Supreme Court of South Carolina. See *Bailey v. State*, 309 S.C. 455, 424 S.E.2d 503 (1992).

Judge Rogers, Judge Davis, and Judge King are immune from suit in the above-captioned civil rights action. See *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 351-364 (1978); *Pressly v. Gregory*, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit by South Carolina inmate against two Virginia magistrates); and *Chu v. Griffith*, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."). See also *Siegert v. Gilley*, 500 U.S. 226 (1991) (immunity presents a threshold question which should be resolved before discovery is even allowed); and *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985) (absolute immunity "is an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability"). *Accord Bolin v. Story*, 225 F.3d 1234 (11th Cir. 2000) (discussing judicial immunity of United States District Judges and United States Circuit Judges).

The Kirkland Reception and Evaluation Center is a group of buildings or a facility. Inanimate objects – such as buildings, facilities, and grounds – do not act under color of state law. Hence, the Kirkland Reception and Evaluation Center is not a "person" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. See *Allison v. California Adult Authority*, 419 F.2d 822, 823 (9th Cir. 1969) (California Adult Authority and San Quentin Prison not "person[s]" subject to suit under 42 U.S.C.

§ 1983); *Preval v. Reno*, 57 F. Supp. 2d 307, 310 (E.D. Va. 1999) (“[T]he Piedmont Regional Jail is not a ‘person,’ and therefore not amenable to suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.”); and *Brooks v. Pembroke City Jail*, 722 F. Supp. 1294, 1301 (E.D.N.C. 1989) (“Claims under § 1983 are directed at ‘persons’ and the jail is not a person amenable to suit.”). *Cf. Wright v. El Paso County Jail*, 642 F.2d 134, 136 n. 3 (5th Cir. 1981).

The South Carolina Department of Corrections is immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment, which divests this court of jurisdiction to entertain a suit brought against the State of South Carolina or its integral parts, such as a state agency or department. *See, e.g., Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority*, 535 U.S. 743 (2002); *Board of Trustees of University of Alabama v. Garrett*, 531 U.S. 356 (2001); *Kimel v. Florida Board of Regents*, 528 U.S. 62 (2000); *Alden v. Maine*, 527 U.S. 706 (1999); *Pennhurst State School & Hospital v. Halderman*, 465 U.S. 89 (1984) (although express language of Eleventh Amendment only forbids suits by citizens of other States against a State, Eleventh Amendment bars suits against a State filed by its own citizens); *Belcher v. South Carolina Board of Corrections*, 460 F. Supp. 805, 808-809 (D.S.C. 1978); and *Simmons v. South Carolina State Highway Dept.*, 195 F. Supp. 516, 517 (E.D.S.C. 1961).

The Dillon County Sheriff’s Department is subject to summary dismissal. Sheriff’s Departments in South Carolina are state agencies, not municipal departments. *See* S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-550 (2008); 1975 S.C.Att’y.Gen’l.Op. No. 47 (Jan. 22, 1975); and S.C. Code Ann. § 23-13-10 (2008), which provides that only the Sheriff has the authority to hire or terminate employees of the Sheriff’s Department, and that the Sheriff is responsible for neglect of duty or misconduct by a deputy sheriff. *See also Allen v. Fidelity and Deposit Company*, 515 F. Supp. 1185, 1189-91 (D.S.C. 1981) (County cannot be held liable for actions of deputy sheriff because deputy

sheriffs serve at pleasure of the Sheriff, not the County), *affirmed*, 694 F.2d 716 (4th Cir. 1982) [Table]; and *Comer v. Brown*, 88 F.3d 1315, 1332 (4th Cir. 1996) (suit against Sheriff of Greenville County: “. . . Sheriff Brown is an arm of the State.”). Indeed, any damages to the plaintiff, if awarded in this case, would be paid by the South Carolina State Insurance Reserve Fund. *Comer v. Brown*, 88 F.3d at 1332 (“Judgments against the Greenville County Sheriff are paid by the South Carolina State Insurance Reserve Fund.”).

Dillon County cannot be held liable for actions of the Court of General Sessions for Dillon County. It can be judicially noticed that, in South Carolina, a County's authority over courts within its boundaries was abolished when Article V of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina was ratified in 1973. *See* Act No. 58, 1973 S.C. Acts 161; S.C. Const. Art. V, § 1; and *State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County*, 265 S.C. 114, 217 S.E.2d 23, 24 (1975).<sup>3</sup>

Under the current version of S.C. Const. Art. V, § 1, the Supreme Court of South Carolina, not Dillon County, retains the *sole* authority to supervise magistrates' courts, municipal courts, Family Courts, Probate Courts, and Courts of General Sessions in Dillon County. *See Spartanburg County Dept. of Social Services v. Padgett*, 296 S.C. 79, 370 S.E.2d 872, 875-76 & n. 1 (1988). By virtue of Article V, a County does not exercise administrative or supervisory authority over municipal courts, magistrates' courts, or courts of the State of South Carolina located within the geographical boundaries of the particular County. Moreover, Dillon County is not responsible for actions of the Circuit Solicitor in the plaintiff's criminal case because Dillon County does not hire

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<sup>3</sup>County courts in the State of South Carolina no longer exist. Section 22 of Article V of the Constitution of the State of South Carolina (1973) allowed "any existing court" on the date of ratification to continue operating until Article V was fully implemented. *State ex rel. McLeod v. Civil and Criminal Court of Horry County*, 217 S.E.2d at 24 ("The Horry County Court is one of the courts continued in existence solely by virtue of the provisions of Section 22 of Article V.").

or supervise the elected Solicitor, who “hires and fires” Assistant Solicitors. *Anders v. County Council for Richland County*, 284 S.C. 142, 325 S.E.2d 538 (1985). Consequently, Dillon County should be dismissed because it is not responsible for the alleged violations of the plaintiff’s rights during the relevant times at issue in the above-captioned case.

It is not clear why the plaintiff has named the “Bureau of Prisons” as a defendant. The plaintiff is confined in a facility of the South Carolina Department of Corrections, not the Federal Bureau of Prisons (which houses federal inmates). The United States cannot be sued without its express consent, and express consent is a prerequisite to a suit against the United States. *United States v. Mitchell*, 463 U.S. 206, 212 (1983). The bar of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided by naming officers, such as the President of the United States, or employees as defendants. *Gilbert v. Da Grossa*, 756 F.2d 1455, 1458 (9th Cir. 1985). *Cf. Hawaii v. Gordon*, 373 U.S. 57, 58 (1963). Similarly, the bar of sovereign immunity cannot be avoided by the filing of a suit against a federal agency or a federal department. *See Campbell v. United States*, 496 F. Supp. 36, 37-38 & n. \* (E.D. Tenn. 1980). Hence, the Bureau of Prisons is also subject to summary dismissal.

This federal court cannot “fire” the individual defendants from their various state jobs or positions. *See Maxton v. Johnson*, 488 F. Supp. 1030, 1032 n. 2 (D.S.C. 1980) (a federal district court lacks inherent power to hire, remove, or reassign officials not within the executive control of that federal district court), *citing United States v. White County Bridge Commission*, 275 F.2d 529, 535 (7th Cir. 1960).

On page 3 of the complaint, the plaintiff alleges that on January 13, 2008, and on February 14, 2008, he was brutally beaten at the Lieber Correctional Institution. Although excessive force is actionable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, *Riley v. Dorton*, 115 F.3d 1159 (4th Cir. 1997)

(indicating what constitutes *actionable* excessive force), the plaintiff has not named as defendants the correctional officers who, allegedly, brutally beat him. Since the named defendants in this case were not personally involved in the two incidents at the Lieber Correctional Institution, liability under § 1983 may not be imposed upon them. *See Wilson v. Cooper*, 922 F. Supp. 1286, 1293 (N.D. Ill. 1996); and *Campo v. Keane*, 913 F. Supp. 814, 825 & n. 11 (S.D.N.Y. 1996). *See also Horton v. Marovich*, 925 F. Supp. 540, 543 (N.D. Ill. 1996) ("Thus, a plaintiff suing a government official in his individual capacity and therefore seeking to hold the official personally liable must show that the official personally caused or played a role in causing the deprivation of a federal right."); and *Smith v. Beasley*, 2007 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 54010, 2007 WL 2156632, \*2 (D.S.C., July 25, 2007) (adopting magistrate judge's Report and Recommendation, which cites *Horton v. Marovich*).


#### ***Recommendation***

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. *See Denton v. Hernandez; Neitzke v. Williams; Brown v. Briscoe*, 998 F.2d 201, 202-204 (4th Cir. 1993); 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B) [essentially a redesignation of "old" § 1915(d)]; and 28 U.S.C. § 1915A [as soon as possible after docketing, district courts should review prisoner cases to determine whether they are subject to summary dismissal]. It is also recommended that the plaintiff's motion to vacate sentence and for immediate release (Entry No. 3) be **denied**.

I also recommend that this case be deemed to be a "strike" for purposes of the "three strikes" rule of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g). *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g). These provisions require an inmate to pay the filing fee for his or her case in advance after he or she has had three cases "dismissed on

the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.” *Id.* As discussed above under *Heck v. Humphrey*, a prisoner must show that his or her conviction or sentence has been reversed or vacated before he or she can recover in tort for the unlawful conviction or sentence. Where, as here, the conviction or sentence has not been overturned, the inmate’s constitutional tort action under § 1983 must be dismissed. Several courts have held that a dismissal under *Heck* constitutes a “strike” under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g). See *Sandles v. Randa*, 945 F. Supp. 169 (E.D. Wis. 1996); *Sanders v. DeTella*, 1997 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 2838, 1997 WL 126866 (N.D. Ill., March 13, 1997)(unpublished); and *Grant v. Sotelo*, 1998 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16798, 1998 WL 740826 (N.D. Tex., Oct. 19, 1998)(unpublished).<sup>4</sup> See also *Adepegba v. Hammons*, 103 F.3d 383, 384 (5th Cir. 1996) (noting that district court dismissed a claim as frivolous under *Heck* and declining to address the propriety of the district court’s dismissal because plaintiff had not exhausted his appeal) and *cf. Okoro v. Bohman*, 164 F.3d 1059, 1061-64 (7th Cir. 1999). Thus, the undersigned concludes that this action is frivolous under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2) and (g) and should be deemed a “strike” under this statute. The plaintiff’s attention is directed to the Notice on the next page.

December 31, 2008  
Columbia, South Carolina

  
Joseph R. McCrorey  
United States Magistrate Judge

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<sup>4</sup>In *Grant*, the court recognized that “the question may be raised whether a cause dismissed pursuant to *Heck* considerations should be considered for purposes of computing the three strikes...” but followed the decisions of *Sandles* and *Sanders*

**Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation**

The plaintiff is advised that he may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. **Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections.** In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court judge need not conduct a *de novo* review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

**Larry W. Propes, Clerk  
United States District Court  
901 Richland Street  
Columbia, South Carolina 29201**

**Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in a waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation.** 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); and *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).