

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
DISTRICT OF SOUTH CAROLINA

Jerry William Nelson, # 269049,)	C/A No. 8:08-3804-HMH-BHH
a/k/a Jerry W. Nelson,)	
)	
Plaintiff,)	
)	Report and Recommendation
vs.)	
)	
Judge William M. Catoe,)	
)	
Defendant.)	
)	

Introduction

The plaintiff, Jerry William Nelson, proceeding *pro se*, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983.¹ Plaintiff is an inmate at Lieber Correctional Institution, a facility of the South Carolina Department of Corrections (SCDC), and he files this action *in forma pauperis* under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. The complaint names a United States magistrate judge as a defendant.² The plaintiff alleges that Judge William M. Catoe has violated his civil rights by discriminating against him based upon his race, African-American. The plaintiff alleges that Judge Catoe discriminates against him every time he files a paper with the United States Court in the District of South Carolina by summarily dismissing his cases. The plaintiff asserts that Judge Catoe should have hearings in his cases to determine the factual basis of his claims. The complaint should be dismissed based upon absolute immunity and the “three strikes” rule.

¹ Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. §636(b)(1)(B), and Local Rule 73.02(B)(2)(d), D.S.C., the undersigned is authorized to review such complaints for relief and submit findings and recommendations to the District Court.

² Title 28 U.S.C. § 1915A (a) requires an initial review of a “complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.”

Pro Se Review pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA)

Under established local procedure in this judicial district, a careful review has been made of the *pro se* complaint pursuant to the procedural provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1915; 28 U.S.C. § 1915A; and the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), Pub. L. No. 104-134, 110 Stat. 1321 (1996). This review has been conducted in light of the following precedents: *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. 25 (1992); *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); *Nasim v. Warden, Md. House of Corr.*, 64 F.3d 951 (4th Cir. 1995) (*en banc*); *Todd v. Baskerville*, 712 F.2d 70 (4th Cir. 1983).

The complaint herein has been filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, which permits an indigent litigant to commence an action in federal court without prepaying the administrative costs of proceeding with the lawsuit. To protect against possible abuses of this privilege, the statute allows a district court to dismiss the case upon a finding that the action “fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted,” “is frivolous or malicious,” or “seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from such relief.” Title 28 § 1915(e)(2)(B). A finding of frivolity can be made where the complaint “lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” *Denton v. Hernandez*, 504 U.S. at 31. Hence, under § 1915(e)(2)(B), a claim based on a meritless legal theory may be dismissed *sua sponte*. *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319 (1989); *Allison v. Kyle*, 66 F.3d 71 (5th Cir. 1995). Plaintiff is a prisoner under the definition in 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(c), and “seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). Thus, even if the plaintiff had paid the full filing fee, this Court is charged with screening the plaintiff’s lawsuit to identify cognizable claims or to dismiss the complaint if

(1) it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or (2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.

This Court is required to liberally construe *pro se* documents, *Erickson v. Pardus*, 127 S.Ct. 2197 (2007), holding them to a less stringent standard than those drafted by attorneys. *Estelle v. Gamble*, 429 U.S. 97 (1976); *Hughes v. Rowe*, 449 U.S. 9 (1980) (*per curiam*). Even under this less stringent standard, however, the *pro se* complaint is subject to summary dismissal. The mandated liberal construction afforded to *pro se* pleadings means that if the court can reasonably read the pleadings to state a valid claim on which the plaintiff could prevail, it should do so, but a district court may not rewrite a petition to include claims that were never presented, *Barnett v. Hargett*, 174 F.3d 1128, 1133 (10th Cir. 1999), or construct the plaintiff's legal arguments for him, *Small v. Endicott*, 998 F.2d 411, 417-18 (7th Cir. 1993), or “conjure up questions never squarely presented” to the court, *Beaudett v. City of Hampton*, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). The requirement of liberal construction does not mean that the court can ignore a clear failure in the pleading to allege facts which set forth a claim currently cognizable in a federal district court. *Weller v. Dep't of Soc. Servs.*, 901 F.2d 387 (4th Cir. 1990).

Discussion

United States Magistrate Judge William M. Catoe has absolute judicial immunity for claims arising out of his judicial actions. The plaintiff claims that the defendant is racially prejudiced against the plaintiff as demonstrated during each lawsuit the plaintiff files in this court and that the defendant refuses to hold hearings due to his prejudice. These

allegations arise out of the defendant's judicial actions. Judges have absolute immunity from a claim for damages arising out of their judicial actions. See *Mireles v. Waco*, 502 U.S. 9 (1991); *Stump v. Sparkman*, 435 U.S. 349, 351-364 (1978); *Pressly v. Gregory*, 831 F.2d 514, 517 (4th Cir. 1987) (a suit against two Virginia magistrates); and *Chu v. Griffith*, 771 F.2d 79, 81 (4th Cir. 1985) ("It has long been settled that a judge is absolutely immune from a claim for damages arising out of his judicial actions."). State and federal judges are also immune to requests for injunctive relief. See *Gilbert v. Ferry*, 298 F.Supp.2d 606, 612 (E.D. Mich. 2003), *aff'd* 401 F.3d 411 (6th Cir. 2005); *Bolin v. Story*, 225 F.3d 1234, 1242 (11th Cir. 2000). See also 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (limiting when injunctive relief may be granted against a judicial officer). Immunity presents a threshold question. See *Harlow v. Fitzgerald*, 475 U.S. 800, 818 (1982). Absolute immunity is "an immunity from suit rather than a mere defense to liability." *Mitchell v. Forsyth*, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(2) and § 1915(e)(2)(B)(iii), this action against the defendant should be summarily dismissed because the defendant was acting within his judicial capacity while he allegedly violated the plaintiff's civil rights.

Additionally, the plaintiff's claims in this case are subject to summary dismissal under the "three strikes" rule of the Prison Litigation Reform Act. This rule, codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), provides:

In no event shall a prisoner bring a civil action or appeal a judgement in a civil action or proceeding under this section if the prisoner has, on 3 or more prior occasions, while incarcerated or detained in any facility, brought an action or appeal in a court of the United States that was dismissed on the grounds that it is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, unless the prisoner is under imminent danger of serious physical injury.

The Congress enacted the three-strikes rule to bar prisoners, such as the plaintiff, who have filed prior frivolous litigation in a federal court, from pursuing certain types of federal civil rights litigation *in forma pauperis* pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915. See *Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon*, 366 F. Supp. 51, 55 & n. 6 (D.D.C. 1973) (“When it comes to the jurisdiction of the federal courts, truly to paraphrase the scripture, the Congress giveth and the Congress taketh away.”); *Bay View, Inc. v. AHTNA, Inc.*, 105 F.3d 1281, 1283, (9th Cir. 1997). Notably, to avoid application of 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g), a prisoner plaintiff may prepay in full the filing fee; however, the district court is still required to screen all civil lawsuits brought by prisoners pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, even those lawsuits where the full filing fee is paid up front. See *Green v. Young*, 454 F.3d 405, 407 (4th Cir. 2006).

This Court may take judicial notice that the plaintiff has previously filed at least three (3) cases dismissed and deemed a strike under § 1915(g) by this Court. See *Aloe Creme Laboratories, Inc. v. Francine Co.*, 425 F.2d 1295, 1296 (5th Cir. 1970) (the court may take judicial notice of its own records); *Mann v. Peoples First Nat. Bank & Trust Co.*, 209 F.2d 570, 572 (4th Cir. 1954) (approving trial court’s taking judicial notice of proceedings had before it in prior suit with same parties). The cases in which “strikes” have been entered against the plaintiff are: *Nelson v. Lieber Corr. Institution*, C/A No. 6:08-779-HMH (D.S.C. 2008); *Nelson v. Myers*, C/A No. 6:06-2423-HMH (D.S.C. 2006); and *Nelson v. Myers*, C/A No. 6:05-2659-HMH (D.S.C. 2006). In light of the plaintiff’s prior “strikes,” he cannot proceed with the instant complaint pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915 unless his claim satisfies the exception for “imminent danger of serious physical injury” provided by the three-strikes

rule. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g); see *Banos v O'Guin*, 144 F.3d 883 (5th Cir. 1998). The complaint does not fit within this exception as the plaintiff does not allege any imminent danger of serious physical injury.

Recommendation

Accordingly, it is recommended that the District Court dismiss the complaint in the above-captioned case *without prejudice* and without issuance and service of process. See *Neitzke v. Williams*, 490 U.S. 319, 324-25 (1989); *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519 (1972); and 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915, 1915A. **The plaintiff's attention is directed to the important notice on the next page.**

s/Bruce Howe Hendricks
United States Magistrate Judge

December 16, 2008
Greenville, South Carolina

Notice of Right to File Objections to Report and Recommendation

The parties are advised that they may file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation with the District Court Judge. Objections must specifically identify the portions of the Report and Recommendation to which objections are made and the basis for such objections. In the absence of a timely filed objection, a district court need not conduct a de novo review, but instead must “only satisfy itself that there is no clear error on the face of the record in order to accept the recommendation.” *Diamond v. Colonial Life & Acc. Ins. Co.*, 416 F.3d 310 (4th Cir. 2005).

Specific written objections must be filed within ten (10) days of the date of service of this Report and Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). The time calculation of this ten-day period excludes weekends and holidays and provides for an additional three (3) days for filing by mail. Fed. R. Civ. P. 6(a) & (e). Filing by mail pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 5 may be accomplished by mailing objections to:

Larry W. Propes, Clerk
United States District Court
P. O. Box 10768
Greenville, South Carolina 29603

Failure to timely file specific written objections to this Report and Recommendation will result in waiver of the right to appeal from a judgment of the District Court based upon such Recommendation. 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); *Thomas v. Arn*, 474 U.S. 140 (1985); *United States v. Schronce*, 727 F.2d 91 (4th Cir. 1984); *Wright v. Collins*, 766 F.2d 841 (4th Cir. 1985).