

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF TENNESSEE  
AT GREENEVILLE

NATHANIEL ROBERT WHITE YOUNG, )  
 )  
 Plaintiff, )  
 )  
 v. ) No. 2:21-CV-00060-JRG-CRW  
 )  
 SULLIVAN COUNTY SHERIFF’S )  
 DEPARTMENT, SULLIVAN COUNTY )  
 JAIL, and OFFICER LINTON, )  
 )  
 Defendants. )

**MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER**

The Court is in receipt of a prisoner’s pro se complaint for violation of § 1983 [Doc. 1] and motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* [Doc. 4]. For the reasons set forth below, the motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* [*Id.*] will be **GRANTED** and this action will proceed only against Defendant Officer Linton.

**I. FILING FEE**

It appears from Plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* [*Id.*] that he is unable to pay the filing fee. Accordingly, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915, this motion will be **GRANTED**.

Because Plaintiff is a prisoner, he will be **ASSESSED** the civil filing fee of \$350.00. The custodian of Plaintiff’s inmate trust account will be **DIRECTED** to submit to the Clerk, U.S. District Court, 220 West Depot Street, Suite 200, Greeneville, Tennessee 37743, as an initial partial payment, whichever is the greater of: (a) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly deposits to Plaintiff’s inmate trust account; or (b) twenty percent (20%) of the average monthly balance in his inmate trust account for the six-month period preceding the filing of the complaint.

28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1)(A) and (B). Thereafter, the custodian of Plaintiff's inmate trust account shall submit twenty percent (20%) of Plaintiff's preceding monthly income (or income credited to Plaintiff's trust account for the preceding month), but only when such monthly income exceeds ten dollars (\$10.00), until the full filing fee of three hundred fifty dollars (\$350.00) as authorized under 28 U.S.C. § 1914(a) has been paid to the Clerk. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2).

To ensure compliance with this fee-collection procedure, the Clerk will be **DIRECTED** to provide a copy of this memorandum and order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and to the Court's financial deputy. This order shall be placed in Plaintiff's prison file and follow him if he is transferred to another correctional institution.

## **II. SCREENING STANDARD**

Under the Prison Litigation Reform Act ("PLRA"), district courts must screen prisoner complaints and shall, at any time, *sua sponte* dismiss any claims that are frivolous or malicious, fail to state a claim for relief, or are against a defendant who is immune. *See, e.g.*, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915(A); *Benson v. O'Brian*, 179 F.3d 1014 (6th Cir. 1999). The dismissal standard that the Supreme Court set forth in *Ashcroft v. Iqbal*, 556 U.S. 662 (2009) and in *Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly*, 550 U.S. 544 (2007) "governs dismissals for failure state a claim under [28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2)(B) and 1915A] because the relevant statutory language tracks the language in Rule 12(b)(6)." *Hill v. Lappin*, 630 F.3d 468, 470–71 (6th Cir. 2010). Thus, to survive an initial review under the PLRA, a complaint "must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to 'state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" *Iqbal*, 556 U.S. at 678 (quoting *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570).

Formulaic and conclusory recitations of the elements of a claim are insufficient to state a plausible claim for relief. *Id.* at 681. Likewise, an allegation that does not raise a plaintiff's right

to relief “above a speculative level” fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. *Twombly*, 550 U.S. at 570. However, courts liberally construe pro se pleadings and hold them to a less stringent standard than lawyer-drafted pleadings. *Haines v. Kerner*, 404 U.S. 519, 520 (1972).

A claim for violation of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 requires a plaintiff to establish that a person acting under color of state law deprived him a federal right. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.

### **III. ANALYSIS**

First, while Plaintiff has sued the Sullivan County Sheriff’s Department and the Sullivan County Jail, these are not entities subject to suit under § 1983. *Cage v. Kent County Corr. Facility*, No. 96-1167, 1997 WL 225647, at \*1 (6th Cir. May 1, 1997) (stating that “[t]he district court also properly found that the jail facility named as a defendant was not an entity subject to suit under § 1983”); *Mathes v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville & Davidson Cnty.*, No. 3:10-cv-0496, 2010 WL 3341889, at \*1–\*2 (collecting cases holding that police and sheriff’s departments are not entities subject to suit under § 1983) (M.D. Tenn. Aug. 25, 2010). Moreover, Plaintiff has not set forth any facts that allow the Court to plausibly infer that a custom or policy of Sullivan County caused any violation of his constitutional rights, such that the Court could liberally construe any of his allegations to state a claim for relief under § 1983 as against this municipality. *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs.*, 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978) (holding that a municipality may be liable under § 1983 for a constitutional deprivation only if there is a direct causal link between a policy or custom of the entity and the constitutional violation). Thus, these Defendants will be **DISMISSED**.

However, Plaintiff’s claims will proceed against Defendant Officer Linton.

### **IV. CONCLUSION**

For the reasons set forth above:

1. Plaintiff's motion for leave to proceed *in forma pauperis* [Doc. 4] is **GRANTED**;
2. Plaintiff is **ASSESSED** the civil filing fee of \$350.00;
3. The custodian of Plaintiff's inmate trust account is **DIRECTED** to submit the filing fee to the Clerk in the manner set forth above;
4. The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to provide a copy of this memorandum and order to the custodian of inmate accounts at the institution where Plaintiff is now confined and to the Court's financial deputy;
5. Even liberally construing the complaint in favor of Plaintiff, it fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted under § 1983 as to the Sullivan County Sheriff's Department and the Sullivan County Jail, and these Defendants are **DISMISSED**;
6. The Clerk is **DIRECTED** to send Plaintiff a service packet (a blank summons and USM 285 form) for Defendant Officer Linton;
7. Plaintiff is **ORDERED** to complete the service packet and return it to the Clerk's Office within twenty (20) days of entry of this order;
8. At that time, the summons will be signed and sealed by the Clerk and forwarded to the U.S. Marshal for service, *see* Fed. R. Civ. P. 4;
9. Service on Defendant shall be made pursuant to Rule 4(e) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and Rule 4.04(1) and (10) of the Tennessee Rules of Civil Procedure, either by mail or personally if mail service is not effective;
10. Plaintiff is **NOTIFIED** that if he fails to timely return the completed service packet, this action will be dismissed;
11. Defendant Officer Linton shall answer or otherwise respond to the complaint within twenty-one (21) days from the date of service. If he fails to timely respond to the complaint, it may result in entry of judgment by default against him; and
12. Plaintiff is **ORDERED** to immediately inform the Court and Defendant or his counsel of record of any address changes in writing. Pursuant to Local Rule 83.13, it is the duty of a pro se party to promptly notify the Clerk and the other parties to the proceedings of any change in his or her address, to monitor the progress of the case, and to prosecute or defend the action diligently. E.D. Tenn. L.R. 83.13. Failure to provide a correct address to this Court within fourteen days of any change in address may result in the dismissal of this action.

So ordered.

ENTER:

s/J. RONNIE GREER  

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UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE