1	IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
2	FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS MARSHALL DIVISION
3	FUNCTION MEDIA, LLC * Civil Docket No. * 2:07-CV-279
4	VS. * Marshall, Texas
5	* January 21, 2010 GOOGLE, INC. * 8:30 A.M.
6	, TRANSCRIPT OF JURY TRIAL
7	BEFORE THE HONORABLE CHAD EVERINGHAM UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE
8	
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1 APPEARANCES CONTINUED: 2 3 FOR THE DEFENDANTS: MR. CHARLES VERHOEVEN 4 MS. AMY CANDIDO Quinn Emanuel 5 50 California Street 22nd Floor 6 San Francisco, CA 94111 7 MR. EDWARD DEFRANCO Ouinn Emanuel 8 51 Madison Avenue 22nd Floor 9 New York, NY 10010 MR. HARRY L. GILLAM 10 Gillam & Smith 11 303 South Washington Avenue Marshall, TX 75670 12 P R O C E E D I N G S 13 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. 14 15 (Jury in.) 16 THE COURT: All right. Thank you. 17 Please be seated. 18 Pick up with the direct examination of 19 Mr. Bratic where we left off. 20 MR. NELSON: Yes, sir. WALTER BRATIC, PLAINTIFF'S WITNESS, PREVIOUSLY SWORN 21 22 DIRECT EXAMINATION (CONTINUED) 23 BY MR. NELSON: 24 Q. Good morning. 25 A. Good morning.

1 Q . When we last left, we were discussing benefits 2 that publishers received that is not part of Google's profits, and I want to be clear on something so that 3 there's no confusion here. 4 5 You understand there's no allegation that the publishers infringe or practice this patent, right? 6 7 Α. Yes. 8 Okay. So you're only testifying about the Q. 9 benefits that they would receive that are in addition to 10 Google's profits here, right? Α. Correct. 11 12 Q . Okay. Was -- the benefit to publishers, was 13 that a factor in your determination of the royalty rate? 14 Α. Yes. 15 How did that factor one way or the other? Ο. 16 Well, it factored in, because I have to look Α. 17 at -- as Georgia-Pacific says, one of the 18 Georgia-Pacific factors is you have to look at the 19 benefits to all those who -- you know, who have benefitted from the patent. 20 21 And you've got the benefits to Google from practicing the patent and generating the ad revenues and 22 generating profits from those, and then you have the 23 24 publishers who benefit, because Google pays them 25 significant sums of money for the ads that are placed on

their websites that aren't generating revenue otherwise. 1 2 Ο. Now, Mr. Bratic, are you aware of Google's 3 argument that the royalty here -- excuse me -- that the royalty here is too large because it's approximately 4 5 two-thirds of Google's profits? Yes, I was here when that argument was made. 6 Α. 7 Does Google's argument account for the Q. 8 benefits that Google has apart from purely its profit 9 statement? 10 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, leading. THE COURT: Sustained. 11 (By Mr. Nelson) What other benefits does 12 Q. 13 Google have besides just the pure profit? 14 Well, Google's able to leverage off its other Α. 15 There was a clip yesterday, a video clip, for assets. example, in the morning, I believe, where it talked 16 about Google's other business interests that don't 17 18 generate revenues but benefit from products like 19 AdSense. 20 Q. Okay. 21 MR. NELSON: Let's please put up 22 Plaintiff's Exhibit 1696 and let's go to the strategic 23 benefits. 24 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here, 25 Mr. Bratic?

A. Well, this is an example of -- this is, again, 1 2 an internal Google document. It talks about why AdSense 3 is strategic to Google. And one of the benefits, it says, from a 4 5 strategic perspective, it builds a stronger Google ad network. 6 7 Q. Mr. Bratic, are you aware of whether 8 senior-level Google executives have recognized the fact 9 that there are benefits to Google besides a pure profit 10 statement? MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, form, leading. 11 12 THE COURT: Overruled. 13 I'm sorry. Could you repeat that? Α. 14 (By Mr. Nelson) Yes. Ο. 15 Are you aware one way or the other whether Google's senior-level executives have recognized these 16 17 benefits to Google aside from its pure profit? 18 A. Yes. 19 MR. NELSON: Let's go to Plaintiff's 20 Exhibit 549. 21 (By Mr. Nelson) And, Mr. Bratic, what are we Q. looking at here? 22 This is an e-mail from Brian Axe at Google, 23 Α. 24 and he's talking about Content Ads. And it's -- again, 25 it's an internal e-mail from March of 2003, which is


about or shortly before the launch of AdSense for 1 2 Content Online. 3 Q. Okay. MR. NELSON: Let's go to Page 3 of this. 4 5 (By Mr. Nelson) Okay. Who is L.P.? Q. Larry Page, one of the co-founders of Google. 6 Α. 7 Okay. And what is Mr. Page saying about this Q. 8 market? 9 Α. Well, he's saying that the market for small 10 companies is way too conservative. In other words, at this time, Google was preparing projections about the 11 market for AdSense for Content. And he was commenting 12 13 here that the market for these companies is way too conservative. 14 15 Okay. And who is E.S.? Q. 16 E.S. is Eric Schmidt, who is the Chief Α. Executive Officer of the company, and he's pointing out 17 18 realizing how big the gross revenue is for this 19 business. 20 Q. Are you aware, Mr. Bratic, of whether Mr. Schmidt has ever made any other comments about the 21 22 importance of revenue to Google wholly apart from profits? 23 24 Α. Yes. You know, there are things called 25 investor calls where -- or analyst calls where the


executives, like Mr. Schmidt, would get on a conference 1 call with industry analysts and investment analyst 2 3 people that follow the stock of Google and so forth, and he has made comments to them in public that the most 4 5 important thing to Google is revenue. Are you aware of how the Securities and 6 Q. 7 Exchange Commission of the federal government requires 8 Google to report these payments? 9 Α. Well, yes. Google is required to report --10 report the monies it receives from its advertising 11 revenue as revenue. 12 Q. Did Google ever try to convince the Securities 13 and Exchange Commission that it did not have to report 14 these payments as revenue? 15 Α. Yes. 16 And what did the Securities and Exchange Q. 17 Commission conclude? 18 Α. The Securities and Exchange Commission 19 concluded that Google has to report its advertising 20 revenue that it generates from the publisher websites as 21 revenue to Google. 22 Q. Okay. 2.3 MR. NELSON: Let's please go to Plaintiff's Exhibit 370. 24 25 Oh, excuse me. Before we get off this


one, let's go to the next page. 1 2 Ο. (By Mr. Nelson) And up at the top, you see it 3 says S.B.? Α. 4 Yes. 5 Who is S.B.? Q. That's Sergey Brin, I believe. 6 Α. 7 Okay. And what does S.B. say about the Q. 8 benefits that this product will have to the rest of 9 Google's business? Well, in the first line, it says gross 10 Α. revenue, 150 million at the end of this year. So he's 11 talking about upon the launch of AdSense for Content 12 13 Online, it's going to generate \$150 million by the end 14 of the first year. 15 And he goes on to say this does not factor in 16 that it will have benefits to the rest of the business. 17 In other words, that 150 million of revenues won't 18 reflect all the benefits to the company. There's more 19 benefits that just aren't expressed in dollars and 20 cents. 21 Okay. Have you seen any other documents that Ο. 22 express that Google values gross revenue wholly apart 23 from any profit? 24 Α. Okay. 25 Q. Okay.


MR. NELSON: Please let's go to 1 Plaintiff's Exhibit 375. 2 3 Α. 375? 4 (By Mr. Nelson) Yes. And it's Page 671 of Ο. 5 that document. Α. Sorry. 375. Okay. 6 7 MR. NELSON: 6 -- 671, Matt. 8 (By Mr. Nelson) Okay. What does it say here, Q. 9 Mr. Bratic? 10 Α. Well, first of all, this is another Google internal document. And it says: Gross revenue is an 11 important measure of our business since it drives many 12 13 of our costs and is a key indicator of the value we 14 create for our partners. 15 Partners here would be the publisher partners. 16 Okay. How does that affect your analysis? Q. 17 Well, it's just part of the fact that Google Α. 18 recognizes that revenues on these ad placement of these 19 ads is very important to Google, and that there are 20 other benefits to Google that aren't reflected in those 21 revenue numbers they take in. 22 Q. Thank you. Okay. 2.3 MR. NELSON: May we approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: 24 Yes. 25 (Bench conference.)


1 THE COURT: Excuse me just a second. Ι 2 was going to accomplish one other thing at this bench 3 conference that dealt with the two documents that you asked --4 5 MR. NELSON: Oh, yes, sir. THE COURT: And I don't have the numbers 6 7 written down. If you could go and retrieve those, I'll 8 go ahead -- I'm going to allow you to use one and not 9 the other, but I'll do it for purposes of the record at 10 this time, if you want me to. 11 MR. NELSON: Yes, sir. 12 THE COURT: But I know what you're 13 approaching me about. 14 MR. NELSON: Yes. 15 THE COURT: To go ahead and close the 16 courtroom. 17 MR. NELSON: Yes. 18 THE COURT: But I wanted to take care of 19 that here at the bench, too. 20 MR. NELSON: I can do it by memory. 1656 21 is what you did not allow them to use. 22 THE COURT: Okay. I'm sustaining that 23 objection. 24 MR. NELSON: 1659 is what he can use. 25 THE COURT: Okay. The objection was it







































































Okay. And what are those? Q. 1 2 Α. Well, I'm looking at the red bar here for 3 license terms, and there's four -- there's four Georgia-Pacific factors here, one of which is the nature 4 5 and scope of the license. Now, this license would be -- in the 6 7 hypothetical negotiation, would be a bare patent 8 license. In other words, Google wouldn't get any 9 technology from Function Media. They'd just get the 10 right to practice the patent. So that would tend to favor Google in this case in the hypothetical 11 negotiation. 12 13 Ο. Okay. What about Factor No. 4? 14 Well, that's the patent owner's willingness to Α. 15 license. 16 Because Function Media doesn't have products from which it can monetize its patents, then Function 17 18 Media has to work with companies like Google to generate 19 profits or generate -- excuse me -- a way for Function 20 Media to monetize its patents-in-suit. So that would tend to benefit Google, because 21 22 Google is, if you will, the monetization engine in some 23 respect for Function Media's patent. Okay. What about No. 5? 24 Ο. 25 Α. Well, here it talks about the competitive

nature of the parties, whether they're competitors or 1 2 not, and neither Function Media nor Google compete with 3 each other. So that would tend to favor Google. Okay. And what about No. 7? 4 Ο. 5 Finally, the duration and -- of the patent --Α. well, the duration of the patent, under Georgia-Pacific, 6 7 is you go into the hypothetical negotiation and you get 8 a license for the life of the patent, for the duration 9 of the patent. So I really consider this more or less a 10 neutral factor. Ο. 11 Okay. 12 MR. NELSON: Let's go to Slide 26, 13 please. 14 (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here? Ο. 15 Well, we're now talking about another bucket Α. 16 of the Georgia-Pacific factors, about the benefits and advantages of the invention. 17 18 Okay. And did you analyze -- as part of your Q. 19 analysis, did you rely on Dr. Rhyne and his opinions 20 about the importance of these patents here? 21 Oh, yes, I did. Α. 22 Q. Okay. 2.3 MR. NELSON: Next slide, please. 24 (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here? 0. 25 Well, this is a summary of some of the Α.

benefits Google enjoys from -- and benefits that Google 1 2 enjoys and its publisher partners enjoy from the 3 patents. Now, I know that the jury has seen a lot of 4 Ο. 5 documents both from Dr. Rhyne two days ago and yesterday and from yourself yesterday. 6 7 Are you relying on those documents to talk 8 about the importance of all of these factors here? 9 Α. Yes, and other documents I've seen. 10 Q. Okay. Let's just go through them quickly. 11 Automated? 12 A. Yes. 13 Okay. Scalable, you've seen documents about Q. 14 that? 15 A. Yes. The scalability, and that means being able to draw in, you know, millions of publishers 16 17 getting a very big system. 18 Q. Okay. Easy to use. Were you here for 19 Mr. Dean's testimony? 20 Α. Yes. 21 Ο. Okay. Did you hear him talking about trying 22 to solve the problem here, to make it easy to use? 2.3 Α. Yes. 24 Okay. What about this last one? Ο. 25 A. Customization, look and feel. That, as I

understand, is a very important aspect of the 1 2 patents-in-suit, and allows for the customization 3 process so you can automatically create these ads that have -- are customized to have the look and feel of the 4 5 publisher's website. Let me ask you a question specifically to that 6 Q. 7 that I don't think has yet come up. 8 Have you seen any documents about -- or 9 evidence about the effect of even a change in font size would have on revenue here? 10 Yes, just changing a font size alone -- I saw 11 Α. an internal group of memos saying that that would --12 13 THE COURT: Can you slow down a little 14 bit? 15 THE WITNESS: I apologize. 16 THE COURT: It's for her benefit as well 17 as the jurors. 18 THE WITNESS: I apologize. 19 Α. Yes. There was a document I saw that 20 indicated that Google, if they just changed the font 21 size in AdSense for Content Online, that could increase 22 their revenues by a hundred million dollars a year just 23 for that one change. 24 (By Mr. Nelson) Okay. And does -- have you Ο. 25 seen any evidence that Google thinks its important for

its own site to have these look-and-feel 1 characteristics? 2 3 Α. Yes. Okay. Thank you. 4 Ο. 5 Now, we haven't really talked about this My Client Center, which is part of the '059 patent. 6 7 MR. NELSON: Actually, Your Honor, let me 8 approach. 9 (Bench conference.) MR. NELSON: I had not thought this is 10 confidential. I do not think this is confidential. It 11 is -- what I'm about to ask is -- and they have not 12 raised it as confidential. It is -- it's 53 percent of 13 14 AdWords revenue comes through MCC, and I -- I just want 15 to be really careful here. MS. CANDIDO: I believe that's correct. 16 That's something I need to ask our client here. 17 18 MR. VERHOEVEN: We can check with our 19 client right now. 20 MR. NELSON: Is it okay if you can explain to the jury why we're -- why I have to go back 21 22 and forth so much about trying to maintain the 23 confidentiality here? 24 THE COURT: (Nods head.) 25 MR. NELSON: Thank you.

MS. CANDIDO: We can live with that. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 3 MS. CANDIDO: Thank you. THE COURT: I'll do that at a break. 4 5 MR. NELSON: Thank you. (Bench conference concluded.) 6 7 (By Mr. Nelson) Mr. Bratic, have you seen any Q. 8 evidence about the percentage of revenue of AdWords that 9 comes through My Client Center, which is the accused 10 product -- part of the accused product in the '059 patent? 11 12 Yes. It's over 50 percent. If my Α. recollection is correct, it's around 53 percent. 13 14 Ο. Thank you. 15 MR. NELSON: Let's go to the next slide, 16 please. 17 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here, 18 Mr. Bratic? 19 Α. Well, this is based on my discussions, my 20 interviews of Dr. Rhyne and his testimony here in the 21 Court, that there's no acceptable non-infringing alternatives. 22 2.3 And what that means is -- from an economic 24 standpoint is, there's no other way of achieving the 25 benefits of practicing the patents-in-suit, unless you

practice the patents. In other words, there's no way to 1 2 get the same benefits in a non-infringing manner. 3 And we talked a little bit about this while Ο. the courtroom was sealed. 4 5 Does that evidence support your opinion here, that there is no available alternative non-infringing --6 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q . Thank you. 9 Α. I'm sorry. 10 No, no, that's okay. Q. 11 Α. I didn't mean to speak over you. 12 Q. And are you aware of Google's other arguments 13 about how they can just make changes and -- and what Dr. Rhyne has said about those, about whether they can make 14 15 a change to make it an alternative here? 16 Α. Yes. And what is your opinion about those? 17 0. 18 Well, it's that basically those arguments or Α. 19 basically they're actually removing the functionality as opposed to doing -- doing the same or similar 20 21 functionality just in a different way. 22 That's a very different situation. It's not 23 the same. It doesn't qualify for being an acceptable 24 substitute. 25 Q. Okay.


1 MR. NELSON: Let's please go to Slide 37. (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here, 2 Ο. 3 Mr. Bratic? Well, this is the last two Georgia-Pacific 4 Α. 5 factors, one of which is relying on the opinion of And I've relied on Dr. Rhyne's expertise in 6 experts. 7 forming part of my opinions. 8 And, finally, all those Georgia-Pacific 9 factors we've talked about, all 14 of them, roll up into 10 that hypothetical negotiation I was talking to you about 11 yesterday. 12 Q. Okay. 13 MR. NELSON: Let's please go to Slide 38. 14 (By Mr. Nelson) What is this? Ο. 15 Now, this is just a recap of the 15 factors Α. 16 and kind of how they would be affected in a hypothetical 17 negotiation. 18 Q. Okay. And this has --19 Α. So --20 I don't want you to go through them Q. 21 individually and talk about them all --22 Α. Right. 2.3 -- right now, but is this a fair summary of --Q. 24 It is. And you can see the green arrows are Α. 25 pointing up, so most of these factors are pointing up,


and that means they tilt in favor of Function Media in a 1 2 hypothetical negotiation. 3 There's three Georgia-Pacific factors that go down that are in favor of Google. And the big -- the 4 5 yellow lines going across are just that there's two factors that, in my opinion, are neutral. 6 7 Q. Okay. 8 MR. NELSON: Let's go to the next slide. 9 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) What is this? 10 Well, that's just my opinion that a reasonable Α. royalty rate in this case would be 12 percent of the 11 sales of the accused products. 12 13 Q. Okay. 14 MR. NELSON: Next slide, please. 15 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) Okay. We've talked about the rate. 16 17 Α. Yes. 18 Q . Let's talk about the base. 19 Α. Right. 20 How did you determine that the base of the Q. 21 accused products here was \$5.061 billion? 22 Well, Google produced a lot of detailed Α. 23 financial records, and we went through those in great detail and pulled out information regarding AdSense for 24 25 Content Direct sales, AdSense for Content Direct and

AdSense for Content Online. 1 That information was provided through 2 3 September 30th, 2009. So I took that information and I kind of, what's called, analyzed or I kind of just 4 5 pulled it forward to last -- up to this last Monday right before trial. 6 7 Q. Did you use conservative projections for the 8 fourth quarter data here? 9 Α. Yes. In my view, I did. 10 Q . Okay. 11 I could have used higher estimates, but I Α. 12 didn't. Let me ask it differently. 13 Ο. 14 Were there higher rates that you reasonably 15 could have used? 16 Α. Higher growth rates I could have used, but I 17 didn't. 18 Q. Okay. 19 MR. NELSON: Let's please go to Slide 41. 20 (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here? Q. 21 That's just a breakdown of AdSense for Content Α. Online and AdSense for Content Mobile sales. And you 22 23 can see the vast majority of them have been AdSense for Content Online, but they total a little over \$5 billion 24 25 dollars to date.

1 Q. Okay. MR. NELSON: Let's go to Slide 43. 2 3 (By Mr. Nelson) What is this? Q. Oh, well, this is just the sum -- this is just 4 Α. 5 the final result. If you take the 12-percent royalty rate, based on my analysis of the Georgia-Pacific 6 7 factors, multiplied by a little over \$5 billion in 8 accused sales from July 2007 to now, you'll get a royalty of \$607 million. 9 10 Now, that's a large number. Q. It is. 11 Α. 12 Have you done any reasonableness checks here Q. to support that number? 13 14 Α. Yes. 15 Okay. There are some we talked about while Q. the courtroom was closed. 16 17 Α. Right. 18 Okay. Were there others that you also Q. 19 discussed? 20 A. I did. 21 Q. Okay. 22 MR. NELSON: Let's go to Slide 49. 2.3 (By Mr. Nelson) What is this that we're Q. 24 looking at? 25 Well, this was -- I mentioned earlier, if you Α.

had taken Google's stock -- I mean -- excuse me -- the 1 2 stock that was given to Stanford in the Google transaction in 1998, that stock would have been worth at 3 the time of the hypothetical negotiation \$1.4 billion. 4 5 And I'm showing that in comparison to the royalty to Function Media of about \$600 million. 6 7 Excuse me. Now, you said this at the Q . 8 beginning of your testimony yesterday. We've looked at 9 a lot of documents, a lot of evidence. 10 What is -- is this all the evidence you relied on in the formation of your opinion? 11 12 Α. No. I've just given you an overview of the 13 many things I did; you know, the legal pleadings, the 14 detailed financial records. I've looked at the 15 deposition transcripts. I've looked at -- I've only shown you some of the internal e-mails and slide 16 presentations from Google and witness depositions and 17 18 exhibits. 19 And I've relied on all of that information as 20 represented in both of my expert reports. 21 MR. NELSON: Let's go to Slide 17. 22 (By Mr. Nelson) What are we looking at here, Q. Mr. Bratic? 2.3 24 This is just, if you will, a summary of the Α. 25 various licensing data points we discussed yesterday.





(Bench conference.) 1 MR. NELSON: I'd like to move to admit 2 3 this as a summary of Mr. Bratic's opinion, but I didn't want to do it so that they're put in the position of 4 5 having to object, and so I didn't --MR. VERHOEVEN: These are demonstrative 6 7 exhibits, Your Honor. 8 THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. 9 It can be used for demonstrative purposes. There's too 10 much of his opinion testimony up in there. It's a demonstrative. 11 12 MR. NELSON: Okay. 13 MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, while we're here so I don't have to call another side-bar, when I'm 14 15 doing my cross, I intend to cover some of the same stuff he's already closed the courtroom for. 16 17 Rather than me come up and do a side-bar, should I just tell you from the lectern that --18 19 MR. NELSON: We have an objection to 20 Mr. Bratic being limited to what he can say in an answer 21 in open court to what Mr. Verhoeven asks. And if he wants -- I would rather that the courtroom be sealed for 22 23 the entire cross than have some, you know, back and 24 forth. 25 I don't think that's appropriate, but I

want to make sure that my expert can testify truthfully 1 2 and completely about it. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Well, I didn't finish what I was going to say, Your Honor. 4 5 All I was going to say was, I'm going to cover some of the same topics that we've already agreed 6 7 the courtroom should be cleared on. And I was just 8 saying, rather than me coming up every time and 9 having -- excuse me -- a side-bar, that I would just 10 indicate to you -- I mean, if -- I assume Your Honor 11 wants to keep the courtroom open as much as possible. 12 THE COURT: How much cross do you have? 13 MR. VERHOEVEN: Maybe an hour and a half. Hour, hour and a half. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. Well, just signal to I'm going to -- I'm going to announce when you --16 me. 17 when you pass the witness, I'm going to let them know 18 what I'm going to do. But I'm going to go ahead and --19 I'll do that at the -- at the time after you pass the 20 witness, okay? 21 MR. VERHOEVEN: I'm sorry. Clear it for the whole time? 22 2.3 THE COURT: No. I'm going to just -- I'm 24 going to -- you can just signal me from the lectern, but 25 I'm going to let them know there may be -- because of

the nature of cross-examination, there may be multiple 1 times I have to invite them to leave. 2 3 They're invited to -- if they want to or if they elect to stay outside the entirety of the 4 5 cross-examination anticipated for about an hour and a 6 half. 7 MR. VERHOEVEN: Thank you. 8 THE COURT: Okay. 9 (Bench conference concluded.) 10 (By Mr. Nelson) Mr. Bratic, we were discussing Q . this slide. 11 12 Α. Yes. 13 And you were discussing the rates on the low Ο. 14 end of this scale. 15 What was your conclusion -- after looking at 16 all of the evidence and all of the data in this case, what do you think the reasonable royalty is that is 17 18 appropriate in this case? 19 Α. Well, my opinion is it's what's highlighted on 20 the very bottom row, that I think an appropriate royalty 21 rate in this case would be 12 percent of the sales of 22 over \$5 billion, which would give you that royalty 23 amount of \$607 million. 24 Q. Thank you. 25 MR. NELSON: I'll pass the witness.

THE COURT: Cross-examination. 1 2 MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor. One 3 minute to set up, please. THE COURT: Of course. 4 5 While counsel is setting up, let the jury know that one reason for all of the bench conferences 6 7 that are being requested by the counsel examining the 8 witness is only counsel who knows what questions he's 9 going to ask, and because of prior orders of the Court, 10 it's the responsibility of the lawyer asking the questions to approach the bench and advise the Court if 11 something is likely to come into evidence that's been 12 13 deemed highly confidential to one or the other of the 14 parties to the case. 15 That's the -- I'm trying to keep the 16 interruptions to a minimum, but that's the nature of the beast in some -- in these types of cases. 17 18 And, likewise, to the folks in the 19 audience, due to the nature of cross-examination, the 20 questions that are propounded to the witness on 21 cross-examination, we may have several occasions that I have to ask you to exit the courtroom during the 22 cross-examination of -- of this witness. 2.3 24 Now, I anticipate the cross-examination 25 is going to take about an hour and a half, so you're

invited in for as much of that as you can be here, but I 1 2 want to let you know, if you want to stay outside for 3 the entirety of the cross-examination, you can do that, or you can come in when I signal the CSO to let you back 4 5 It's up to you. in. But just -- I just wanted to alert you in 6 7 advance that I may have to ask you to leave the 8 courtroom multiple times. 9 Proceed. 10 Yes, sir? 11 MR. ANDERSON: Permission to approach? 12 MR. VERHOEVEN: I have a binder, Your 13 Honor, to pass out. 14 CROSS-EXAMINATION 15 BY MR. VERHOEVEN: 16 Q. Good morning, Mr. Bratic. Good morning. 17 Α. 18 Now, the issue here at a really high level is, Q. 19 what kind of license Google and Function Media would 20 have come to during a hypothetical negotiation in July 21 2007, right? 22 Α. At a high level, yes. And so -- and we looked at a lot of documents 23 Q. 24 that you looked at. I'm going to look at some documents 25 you haven't looked at.

1 MR. VERHOEVEN: So let's bring up 2 Exhibit 710, please. 3 I'm sorry. 710? Α. MR. VERHOEVEN: And if we could just 4 5 highlight the top third of that page, please, Charles. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, Defendant's 6 Q. 7 Exhibit 710 is a patent purchase and sale agreement, 8 correct, sir? 9 Α. Yes, this document is. 10 Q. And this is an actual agreement --11 I'm sorry. Excuse me one second. Α. 12 (Witness reviews document.) 13 Yes. This is just a patent purchase and sale 14 agreement. 15 Right. It's not an acquisition of an entire Q. 16 company, is it? 17 Α. No. 18 It's a patent purchase and sale agreement. Q. 19 Α. Correct. 20 And the analysis that you're supposed to Q. engage in is not to analyze what the price would be 21 or -- or the terms would be for an exact acquisition of 22 23 an entire company, is it? 24 Α. I'm sorry. I'm not sure what the question is. 25 The analysis that you're engaged in is, what Q.

would be the terms just for a license for the two 1 patents at issue in this case, right? 2 3 Α. Yes. Not for a whole company. 4 Ο. 5 Α. Correct. Not for products. 6 Q. 7 Α. Correct. Not for software. 8 Q. 9 Α. That's correct. 10 Just bare patents, right? Q. 11 Α. Correct. 12 Okay. Q. 13 Α. I agree. And this is a patent purchase and sale 14 Q. 15 agreement for bare patents, right? 16 I believe so. Α. 17 Okay. Well, let's take a look at it. Q. You see the date on this agreement? 18 19 Α. Yes. 20 And it's December 18th, 2008? Q . 21 Yes, about a year ago. Α. 22 And you see Google is a signatory to this Q. 23 agreement? 24 Α. Yes. 25 This is a real-world agreement that Google Q.

entered into, correct? 1 2 Α. Yes, it is. 3 And about a little over a year after the date Ο. 4 of the hypothetical negotiation, correct? 5 About a year and a half. Α. 6 Okay. And you've looked at this agreement as Q. 7 part of your analysis, right? 8 Α. Yes. 9 Q. Okay. Direct your attention to the schedule. 10 In the bottom right-hand, it says G65173 in 11 your binder. 12 Α. 173? Okay. 13 MR. VERHOEVEN: Could we bring that up, 14 Charles? 15 And can we highlight the top all the way down to the bottom of the chart -- or bring it out? 16 I'm 17 sorry. 18 (By Mr. Verhoeven) You see the title here? Q.. 19 Assignment of Patent Rights. 20 A. Yes. 21 Ο. Do you see that? 22 So this is a real-world agreement between 23 Google and Mr. Meyer, correct? 24 A. I believe that's correct --25 Q. Okay.

1 Α. -- yes. And how many patents are subject to this 2 Q. 3 agreement, sir? There's three patents. 4 Α. 5 Okay. And two applications. Q . Correct. 6 Α. 7 And Google is acquiring an interest in those Q. 8 patents, right? 9 Α. Was requiring the entire interest. 10 Q. Okay. So it's not just a license; they're 11 getting the entire interest --12 They're getting --Α. 13 Ο. -- right? -- they're getting all the rights. 14 Α. 15 Right, which is more than what we're supposed Q. 16 to assume for a hypothetical negotiation, right? 17 Α. That's correct. 18 Okay. And let's look at what these patents Q. 19 concern. 20 You see on the right-hand of the column, it 21 talks about the title of the patent? I do. 22 Α. 2.3 And the '808 patent at the top, method, Q. algorithm, and computer program for optimizing the 24 performance of messages, including advertisements. 25

1 Do you see that? I do. 2 Α. 3 So this first one concerns advertising. Ο. To -- in some way. 4 Α. 5 Yeah. And the second one, the '434 patent --Q. 6 do you see that one? 7 Α. I do. 8 Q . And do you see the title of it? 9 I'll read it for the record. System and 10 method for improving the performance of electronic media advertising campaigns through multi-attribute analysis 11 12 and optimization. 13 Do you see that? 14 I do. Α. 15 And that one also concerns electronic media Ο. 16 advertising, doesn't it, sir? 17 Yes, it does. Α. 18 And then the third one, method and Q . 19 algorithm -- excuse me -- method, algorithm, and 20 computer program for optimizing the performance of messages, including advertisements, in an interactive 21 measurable medium. 22 2.3 You see that? I do. 24 Α. 25 This one also concerns advertisements. Q.

Yes, in some way. 1 Α. 2 Ο. And the two applications, if you take a look, 3 also include electronic media advertising campaigns, correct? 4 5 Α. Yes. That's what it says. So all of these patents, on their face, in the 6 Q. 7 title, concern internet advertising, don't they, sir? 8 Α. Yes. They relate to it. 9 Q. Okay. And Google -- this is a real-world 10 agreement where Google purchases these patents, right? 11 Α. Yes. Google purchased -- well, they purchased 12 the patents and the applications. 13 Ο. Right. And it's dated about a year and a half 14 after the hypothetical negotiation. 15 Okay. Let's see, in the real world, what 16 Google paid for that. 17 Α. Okay. 18 Direct your attention back to the first page Q. 19 of this exhibit. For the record, it's G65166, Section 20 3.1. 21 MR. VERHOEVEN: Can we bring that up, Charles? 22 23 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And do you see in the Q. 24 middle there, it says, quote, the total purchase price for the assigned rights is -- what is that? What does 25

that say? 1 3,550,000. 2 Α. 3 \$3,550,000. Not 600 million, 3 million, Ο. right? 4 5 Α. 3-1/2 million. 3-1/2 million. 6 Q. 7 Α. Correct. 8 So in the real world, on this actual patent Q. 9 purchase agreement that Google actually entered into for bare patents, instead of acquisitions, Google paid \$3.5 10 million, right? 11 12 Well, not quite, because this was an Α. 13 acquisition. 14 This agreement here is a patent purchase and Ο. 15 sale agreement, sir --16 Α. Yes. 17 -- correct? Ο. 18 Α. It's a purchase. It's an acquisition. Yes. 19 Q. Okay. It's an acquisition of a company, sir? 20 Α. No. It's an acquisition of assets. 21 Applied Semantics was an acquisition of a Q. 22 company, right? 23 Correct. Α. Dclick was an acquisition of a company, right? 24 Q. 25 Α. Yes.

D-Link was an acquisition of a company, right? 1 Q. Yes. 2 Α. 3 You relied on acquisitions of companies, Ο. right? 4 5 Not quite -- not -- no. I relied on Α. 6 information regarding the acquisition of those 7 companies. 8 Q. Okay. You didn't rely on this agreement, did you, sir? 9 10 Α. No, I did not. 11 Q. Okay. 12 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to DX683. 13 Α. I'm sorry. 683? 14 MR. NELSON: May we approach, Your Honor? 15 THE COURT: Yes. 16 (Bench conference.) 17 MR. NELSON: The last one was a Meyer 18 agreement, which is about the terms of the license. 19 This is the INVENDA agreement. 20 There's also the IBM Agreement in the 21 book, which this Court has, I think -- I'm not sure of 22 the exact scope of the ruling. I had the impression 23 that is not reliable because of the --24 THE COURT: I'm sustaining the objection. 25 MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, these are

written documents that exist in the record that he 1 2 reviewed. 3 I'm not asking to have Mr. Wagner testify about them, Your Honor. I'm just asking whether he 4 5 looked at these terms and whether he considered them. He's free to say on redirect that he didn't consider 6 7 them because the 30(b)(6) didn't have the ability to 8 describe them. That's fine. 9 But aren't I allowed to say, these exist; 10 these are the terms; you reviewed them; but you didn't consider them, Your Honor? 11 12 THE COURT: Well --13 MR. VERHOEVEN: This is cross-14 examination. 15 THE COURT: I know it is, Counselor, but 16 the reason I excluded them was because y'all didn't comply with your obligation under 30(b)(6). That's why 17 18 I prevented you from using them in your case-in-chief, 19 and now you're trying to get it in indirectly what I 20 told you you couldn't do directly. 21 So I'm sustaining the objection. (Bench conference concluded.) 22 2.3 MR. VERHOEVEN: One minute, Your Honor, please. 24 25 THE COURT: Yes, sir.

(Pause in proceedings.) 1 MR. VERHOEVEN: All right. Charles, if 2 3 we could bring up the exhibit -- it's Defendant's Exhibit 710. I have a couple more questions on that 4 5 one. And if we could bring up Article 3, 6 7 Section 3.1, on the front page, and highlight that 8 sentence, Charles, that we did on the purchase price. 9 Ο. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, your opinion is that 10 in the hypothetical negotiation between Google and Function Media in 2007, which concerned a nonexclusive 11 license for two patents, that Google would have agreed 12 13 to pay \$607 million, correct? 14 Well, that's what the math results in. Α. They 15 would have agreed to pay a royalty of 12 percent. 16 Is it your testimony that Google would have Q. agreed to pay \$607 million as part of the hypothetical 17 18 negotiation, sir? 19 Α. Yes. In the end, my total calculation is \$607 million. 20 21 Now, isn't it true that's over 173 times Ο. 22 larger than what Google agreed to pay in this real-world 23 patent purchase agreement? 24 A. I haven't done the math, but it's many times 25 higher.

Q. 173. 1 2 Α. Well, divide 6 by 3 is 180, so, yeah, that's 3 probably close. Ο. 4 Okay. 5 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to Defendant's Exhibit 703. 6 7 A. 703. Okay. MR. VERHOEVEN: And, Charles, if you 8 9 could just highlight the -- bring up what the text is. 10 Thank you. 11 (By Mr. Verhoeven) You see what this is, sir? Ο. This is a patent license agreement. 12 13 Do you see that? 14 I do. Α. 15 And Google -- this is a real-world agreement Q. 16 that Google entered into, correct? 17 Α. Correct. 18 This is one of the agreements you reviewed Q. 19 when went through the documents, right? 20 Yes, I did. Α. 21 And who did -- and you see that the other Ο. 22 parties to the agreement are Nokia Corporation? 2.3 Α. Yes. 24 Did you know that Nokia Corporation is the Ο. 25 largest telephone wireless handset manufacturer in the

world, sir? 1 Well, at one time, they were. I'm not sure 2 Α. 3 that that's the case today. Do you see the second -- or the third entity 4 0. 5 down? It's got a foreign word, and then it says 6 Ericcson? 7 Α. Yes. You've heard of Ericcson before, right? 8 Q . 9 Α. Oh, yes. Big company, right? 10 Q. Big Swedish telecommunications company. 11 Α. 12 One of the biggest companies in the Q . 13 telecommunications industry in the world, right? 14 Yes, I would say so. Α. 15 Okay. And then there's yet another company, Q. 16 VoiceAge Corporation, right? 17 Α. Yes. 18 And what's VoiceAge Corporation? Q. 19 Α. Well, I don't know the details of it, but I'm 20 assuming -- my understanding and my recollection is that 21 VoiceAge was a company that was somehow owned by these two or related to these two companies. 22 2.3 Direct your attention to Page 5. If you look Q. 24 at the bottom -- not the control numbers, but to the 25 footer, you see there's Page 5 of 39. The control

number is 31975. 1 A. Okay. Yes. Okay. 2 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: And, Charles, could you bring out Section 1.15? 4 5 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) This is the license provision in the agreement, isn't it, sir? 6 7 Α. Well, it's one of them. 8 Q. And you see about halfway down, it says: For 9 convenience, the most recently updated list of such 10 licensed patents is attached to this agreement in 11 Appendix A. 12 Α. Yes. 13 Ο. Do you see that? 14 I'm sorry. Yes. Α. 15 So let's go to Appendix A. Q. 16 Α. Okay. MR. VERHOEVEN: And could we make that a 17 18 little easier to read, Charles? Maybe put a box around 19 it and bring it out? 20 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) This is -- this is the 21 licensors' list of licensed patents, right? A. Yes. 22 23 Okay. And the first list here is from Q. 24 Ericcson, right? 25 A. Yes.

And, gosh, how many patents are there on this 1 Q. page? Let's see, there's 14 on the first section --2 3 I don't know. I haven't added it up. Α. --1, then 10, then 4 -- 29 patents on that 4 0. 5 page, the way I count them. Α. 6 Okay. 7 Does it look like that to you? Ο. 8 I haven't added them up, but I'll agree Α. 9 there's several, probably 20 something. 10 Q . Okay. 11 MR. VERHOEVEN: And go to the next page, and bring that out. 12 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And it looks like there's 13 Ο. 14 five more patents listed on this page, right? 15 Α. Yes. 16 MR. VERHOEVEN: And then the next page, 17 please. 18 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, these are patents that Ο. 19 are owned by Nokia, right? 20 Α. That appears to be what to be -- what it is. 21 Q. Right. And in the right-hand column, it lists 22 the patents, and it looks like, by my count, there's 19 more patents on this page. 23 24 Do you agree? 25 You want me to add them up? I agree Α.

1 there's --2 Ο. Well, take a look at it and tell me if you 3 agree. 4 Α. Okay. (Witness reviews document.) 5 I counted 21. 21. Okay. I was off. 6 Q . 7 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to the next 8 page. 9 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, these are patents --10 MR. VERHOEVEN: If we could highlight 11 that as well and bring it up. 12 (By Mr. Verhoeven) These are patents that are Q. listed under VoiceAge Corporation. 13 14 Do you see that? 15 I do. Α. 16 And on the right-hand column is a list of Q. 17 patents, right? 18 Α. Yes. 19 Q. That are being licensed by VoiceAge 20 Corporation, right? 21 Α. Yes. 22 Okay. How many patents do you count there? Q. 23 Well, it's 20 something, but do you want me to Α. count them specifically? 24 25 Q. By my count, I have 16, plus 3, plus 17 -- 36

patents on this page by my count; is that right? 1 2 Α. I'd have to add it up. 3 Q. It's a lot. I'll agree it's probably somewhere near your 4 Α. 5 number, if not your number. Q. And then the next page, it continues. 6 7 VoiceAge Corporation, and we've got another -- by my 8 count, 27 more patents on this page. 9 Take a look at it and tell me if you disagree. 10 Α. I agree. Just eyeballing it, it looks like it's over 20. 11 12 Q. Okay. So fair to say, this is a license for over a hundred patents? 13 14 I haven't added it up, but it's probably in Α. 15 that range. 16 Q. Do you agree with that? 17 A. Yes. 18 Okay. And these companies that are licensing Q. 19 these patents, these are big companies, aren't they, 20 sir? 21 A. Well, I don't know about VoiceAge, but the other two are. 22 23 Q. All right. 24 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's look at Appendix C, 25 the next page. And let's -- if we can highlight from

the title down to the end of the box, Charles. 1 2 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, you see the title? Ιt 3 says: License fees. 4 Do you see that? 5 Α. Yes. 6 And then under C, it says: Maximum annual Q. 7 royalty? 8 A. I do. 9 Q. And then at the very bottom --MR. VERHOEVEN: If we could highlight 10 11 that row in the box. 12 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) -- it says: The maximum annual royalty is \$2 million; is that right? 13 14 Α. Yes. 15 Q. So under this agreement with these giant 16 corporations with over a hundred patents, in the real world, Google got a license to all of those patents for 17 how much? 18 19 Α. Well, they paid running royalties, but they 20 couldn't exceed \$2 million a year. 21 Q. Maximum \$2 million a year. A. Correct. 22 23 Q. Real-world license. 24 A. Yes. 25 Q. Google entered into it.

1 Α. Yes. You didn't consider this as part of your 2 Ο. 3 opinion, did you, sir? I considered it in my analysis, I certainly 4 Α. 5 did. Okay. And what did you consider, sir? 6 Q. 7 Well, I considered the fact that -- as I Α. 8 showed the jury yesterday, that Google told VoiceAge 9 that they had a design-around and that that's why they 10 agreed to the cap, because there was a design-around that Google could go to to avoid using VoiceAge's codec. 11 12 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to Plaintiff's Exhibit 313. 13 14 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Remember this? You looked Ο. 15 at this yesterday, sir. 16 A. You have to blow it up for me. 17 MR. VERHOEVEN: Okay. Let's blow it up for him. 18 19 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Remember this document? 20 Α. Yes. 21 Ο. Okay. 22 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go down to about a 23 third of the way down where it says: Take it or leave 24 it. 25 (By Mr. Verhoeven) It says, regarding the cap, Q.

take it or leave it? 1 2 Α. Yes. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Can you bring that up, Charles, and highlight take it or leave it? 4 5 Α. Yes. 6 MR. VERHOEVEN: Just take it or leave it, 7 Charles. 8 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And you remember yesterday, Q. 9 you said this -- this is a situation sometimes you have; 10 somebody says: Take it or leave it, right? 11 A. Correct. Q. And that may make the royalty rate a little 12 13 bit higher if someone has got that position and that 14 control and that power, right? 15 Α. Correct. 16 Okay. This license we're looking at, that's a Q. take-it-or-leave-it license, isn't it? 17 18 Α. From VoiceAge, yes. 19 Ο. Yeah. 20 Α. Right. 21 Q. Right? 22 Α. Correct. 23 Google has no power. They either have to take Q . 24 it or leave it, right? 25 A. Well, they either take the license, or they

1 don't practice the technology.

Q. They either take the license, or they leave 3 the license, right?

A. Okay. Correct.

4

Q. And they -- they can't up that license; they can't negotiate it. It's just take it or leave it from these massive corporations, right?

A. Well, I don't know if it's take or leave from 9 these massive corporations, but because of the codec 10 technology, it was their choice to either take the 11 license or not practice the license, because they had 12 another way of getting there.

13 Q. It was nonnegotiable.

A. From the VoiceAge standpoint, that's right.
Q. Right. Google couldn't negotiate it. Either
take the deal or you leave the deal, right?

A. Well, not quite.

18 Q. Google could not negotiate those rates down.
19 You dispute that, sir?

A. Look at the -- yes. Look at the next line.
21 It says: The only leverage we have is --

22 THE COURT: Well --

23 THE WITNESS: I'm sorry.

24 THE COURT: The question is, do you

25 dispute it?

1 THE WITNESS: Yes, I do, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 2 3 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Well, yesterday you were --Ο. you pointed to this --4 5 Α. Yes. -- as saying, basically, support that, well, 6 Q. 7 Google would have to take or leave the Function Media 8 patents, too. 9 And what this document is talking about is the 10 VoiceAge agreement, correct? 11 Α. Yes. 12 Okay. And the VoiceAge agreement, the amount Q . that Google had to take or leave for over a hundred 13 14 patents was maximum \$2 million a year. 15 Yes. The maximum was \$2 million a year. Α. 16 That's a real-world agreement between (sic) Q. Google for a license of over hundred patents, right? 17 18 Α. Well, I didn't add up the total patents, but I 19 agree, it's a real-world license. 20 And isn't it true that that's over \$240 Q. 21 million -- let me -- let me take that back. 22 Now, let's circle back to your opinion. Your 23 opinion is that Google, in a hypothetical negotiation with Function Media, that has no facilities, has no 24 25 employees, has no operations, has no working software,

has no customers, has no impressions, that, 1 2 nevertheless, Google would pay them over \$600 million 3 for a license for only two and a half years. That's your opinion, right, sir? 4 5 Correct. Two and a half years to date. Α. Okay. Now, isn't it true that that is over 6 Q. 7 \$240 million per year more than what Google paid in this 8 real-world VoiceAge license agreement? 9 Α. I don't want to quibble with you, but I don't 10 know exactly what all Google ended up ultimately paying VoiceAge. We just know what the maximum was every year. 11 12 Isn't it true that that is over \$240 million a Q . 13 year more -- your opinion of what would have happened in the hypothetical negotiation, \$240 million more than the 14 15 maximum Google would ever have to pay under this 16 real-world license agreement of over a hundred patents with these massive corporations? 17 18 Isn't that true, sir? 19 Α. Yes, I would agree with that. 20 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to DX707. 21 Α. Okay. 22 MR. VERHOEVEN: And in particular, 23 Charles, if we could go to G64344. 24 And could we highlight the title in the 25 top paragraph, please.

1 MR. NELSON: May we approach, Your Honor? THE COURT: Yes. 2 3 (Bench conference.) MR. NELSON: There were numerous -- there 4 5 were numerous agreements that were in -- Mr. Chen testified that he said, I don't know about, including 6 7 this one. This was not specifically called out in the 8 motion. 9 THE COURT: Okay. Overrule the 10 objection. 11 MR. NELSON: Okay. 12 (Bench conference concluded.) 13 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, this is an Ο. 14 agreement -- I think the date is October 7th, 2004. 15 Do you see that? 16 Yes. Α. 17 MR. VERHOEVEN: Could we highlight that, 18 please, Charles? 19 No, no. Please bring the title and that 20 first paragraph up again and just highlight the date, so 21 the jurors can see it. It's right up here (indicating). 22 Thank you. 2.3 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And the agreement is Q. 24 between Hewlett-Packard and Google. Do you agree with 25 that?

A. Hewlett-Packard Development Company and 1 Google, yes. 2 3 Q. Okay. So this is another real-world agreement that concerns intellectual property that Google entered 4 5 into, right? 6 A. Yes. 7 Q. And Hewlett-Packard, you've heard of them 8 before, haven't you? 9 A. Yes. Q. They're a massive corporation, aren't they? 10 11 They're a big company. Α. 12 Q. Yeah. And this agreement was entered into in around 2004, right? 13 14 Α. Yes. 15 Q. All right. I direct your attention to Page 6 16 of this agreement. Control number is G64349. 17 A. 49? 18 Q. 64349. 19 A. Okay. Oh, I see. Page 6. Okay. 20 MR. VERHOEVEN: And could we bring up Section 2.1? 21 22 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) And it says: Patent 2.3 Licenses. 24 Do you see that? 25 A. Yes.

This is a real-world patent license agreement 1 Q. 2 that Google and HP entered into, correct? 3 Well, it was more than just a patent license. Α. Does this say: Patent Licenses? 4 0. 5 That part of it says: Patent Licenses. Α. And it says: Patent license grant to Google 6 Q . 7 under licensed e-mail and video patents. 8 Do you see that? 9 Α. I do. 10 Q. And do you see that that paragraph refers to a Schedule 1? 11 12 Α. Schedule 1. I apologize. It doesn't refer to it. It says 13 Ο. that effective as of the effective date and subject to 14 the terms and conditions here of HPDC -- and that's a 15 reference to Hewlett-Packard, right? 16 17 A. Yes. 18 Q. Hewlett-Packard Development Corporation? 19 Α. Yes. 20 Q. -- hereby grants Google and its affiliates a personal, nontransferable, nonexclusive, 21 nonsublicensable license under the license e-mail and 22 23 video patents. Do you see that? 24 25 I do. Α.

1 Q. I direct your attention to Page 19, 2 Schedule 1. 3 Α. I'm sorry. Page --19. 4 Ο. 5 Number Page 19. Α. And this is G64363. 6 Q. 7 Α. Okay. Let me -- okay. 8 MR. VERHOEVEN: And if we could bring 9 that a little bit larger, Charles. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, this is a list of the 10 Q. patents that are being licensed by HP, correct? 11 12 Excuse me. This is a list of the patents that 13 Google is licensing from HP, correct? Let me look. 14 Α. 15 (Witness reviews document.) 16 Yes. This -- this -- well, they don't make a reference back in 2 -- Section 2.1. 17 18 (Witness reviews document.) 19 I can't say for certain only because there's no reference back in the Section 2.1 to Schedule 1 20 and --21 Q. You can't tell? 22 23 Well, I don't have a patent number -- it just Α. 24 says patent numbers; it doesn't say whose the owner of 25 the patents.

1 Q. You see the title? It says: Licensed e-mail 2 and video patents. 3 Do you see that? Yes. 4 Α. 5 Okay. And you see there's 14 patents listed Q . there? 6 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q. You saw Section 2.1. Did you forget what that 9 said, or do you remember? 10 Α. No. I have -- actually have the page open. 11 License under the licensed e-mail Q. It says: and video patents. 12 13 Do you see that? 14 Yes. Α. 15 These are the licensed e-mail and video Q. 16 patents, aren't they, sir? 17 Α. I agree. 18 Okay. So Google takes a license in the real Q . 19 world from a massive corporation, Hewlett-Packard, one 20 of the biggest computer corporations in the world, for 21 14 patents, right? 22 A. Yes. 23 Q. Okay. 24 MR. VERHOEVEN: Now let's look at Page 25 11, G64454.

1 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Are you there? I am. 2 Α. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Charles? (By Mr. Verhoeven) And this section is talking 4 0. 5 about what Google has to pay for those patents, right? That's the consideration, yes. 6 Α. 7 Ο. Yes. 8 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to the next 9 page, please. 10 And then if we can bring up the first full paragraph, please. 11 12 Α. I'm sorry. 13 (By Mr. Verhoeven) In the second sentence --Ο. 14 I'm sorry. Excuse me. What page are you on? Α. 15 Page 12, Control No. G64355. Q. 16 Oh, okay. The top of Page 12. Thank you. Α. 17 The second sentence says, quote, no additional Q. 18 payments will be required at such time when aggregate 19 amounts paid under the earlier clauses exceed \$20 20 million. 21 Do you see that? I do. 22 Α. 2.3 So under this agreement with HP, Google --Q. Google's maximum payment is \$20 million, agreed? 24 25 Correct. Α.

1 Q. Okay. Now, you testified that Google would have agreed in the hypothetical negotiation with 2 3 Mr. Stone and -- or excuse me -- with Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone in 2007, that Google would have agreed to 4 5 \$607.3 million, right? 6 Α. Yes. 7 But this real-world agreement with Q. Okay. 8 Hewlett-Packard, a massive company with major worldwide 9 facilities, Google agreed to -- the maximum Google paid 10 for 14 patents is \$20 million, right? The maximum they agreed to pay, yes. 11 Α. That's over \$587 million more that you say 12 Q . 13 Google would pay to two individuals, Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone, than it would pay for 14 patents, instead of 14 15 two patents, to a massive corporation. 16 Is that your testimony, sir? 17 Α. To the two individuals and their company, yes. 18 That company is Function Media, right? Q. 19 Α. Correct. 20 Function Media was formed for the sole purpose Q. of enforcing the patents, wasn't it, sir? 21 22 Well, I don't know if it was for enforcing the Α. patent. 23 It was an assignment to that company. 24 It's a holding company, right? 0. 25 It is a holding company. Α.

It has no operations, does it? 1 Q. Other than its licensing program, no. 2 Α. 3 Doesn't have any facilities? Ο. Well, I don't know what facilities --4 Α. 5 You don't know? Q . My understanding is that they have 6 Α. 7 operations -- they're based out of Tyler, Texas. 8 Q . Well, do they have offices? 9 Α. I assume they have some kind of office. You don't know? 10 Q . 11 Well, I haven't been to their office. Α. 12 Did you look into it? Q. 13 Not in any detail, no. Α. 14 Did you look into whether they had any Q. 15 employees? 16 Α. I understand they do not. They don't have any employees. 17 Q. 18 Did you look into whether they have any 19 customers? 20 A. I don't know how to answer that question. 21 Okay. Well, that's fine. You don't need to, 0. 22 if you don't know how to. 2.3 THE COURT: Let's avoid arguing with the 24 witness. 25 MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor.

Let's go to Defendant's Exhibit 735. 1 2 Α. Okay. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: And if we could just bring that up on the screen, please. 4 5 (By Mr. Verhoeven) What does the title of this Q . 6 document say, sir? 7 Α. I'm sorry. This is 735? 8 Q. Yes, sir. 9 Α. It's Alcatel-Lucent patent license. 10 Q. This is a patent -- a real-world patent 11 license agreement that Google entered into with 12 Alcatel-Lucent? A. Yes. 13 14 And who is Alcatel-Lucent? Ο. 15 Well, Alcatel-Lucent is a telecommunications Α. 16 company that was formed from the merger of a French 17 company called Alcatel and Lucent, a U.S. company. 18 Q. Another giant telecommunications company, 19 isn't it? 20 Α. It's very large, yes. 21 And this is a patent license agreement, right? Ο. Yes. 22 Α. 23 That's what the title says, right? Q. 24 Α. Correct. 25 So it's a real-world license agreement that Q.

Google entered into with this massive company, right? 1 2 Α. It's a real world agreement. 3 I direct your attention to Page 16. Ο. MR. VERHOEVEN: And the third paragraph 4 5 down, if you'll bring that out. (By Mr. Verhoeven) This is the definition of 6 Q . 7 the Alcatel-Lucent patents that are being licensed, isn't it? 8 9 A. I believe so. And that's 11 patents, right? You want me to 10 Q . 11 count them? 12 Well, I'm counting them. Α. (Witness reviews document.) 13 14 Yes. 15 And I direct your attention to Page 5. Q. 16 You want me to go back? Α. 17 Page 5, which is G172931, talks about how much Q. 18 Google pays, right? 19 Α. Yes. 20 MR. VERHOEVEN: Can you bring that out? 21 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And what does it say? Q. 22 Well, it's got scheduled payments here of \$18 Α. 23 million. 24 Ο. Six million a year, right? 25 Α. Yes.

Now, the reasonable royalty that you've opined 1 Q. 2 about was for a period of two and a half years. 3 Α. Yes. Okay. And under this agreement, what Google 4 0. 5 would have to pay this large corporation, Alcatel-Lucent, for 11 patents is \$6 million a year, right? 6 7 Α. In part. 8 \$6 million a year is what it says right here, Q. right, sir? 9 10 Α. Yes. 11 Q. Okay. 12 Α. But I'm saying in part in response to your 13 question. 14 \$6 million a year. Ο. 15 Now, you've opined, again, that Google would 16 have agreed to pay Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone \$607 million for only two and a half years, right? 17 18 Α. Yes. 19 Ο. Okay. Isn't it true that that is over \$240 million per year more than what Google agreed in the 20 21 real world, in this license agreement, to pay Alcatel-Lucent, a massive corporation? 22 2.3 I haven't done the math, but I agree. Α. It's a What I'm saying that Google owes -- would go --24 lot. 25 owe Function Media would be a lot more than \$6 million a

1 year. Do you dispute that at -- what your opinion 2 Q. 3 is, is over 240 million times per year larger than what this actual real-world agreement is? 4 5 Α. 240 million times? Well, maybe I misspoke. 6 Q. 7 Do you agree, sir -- or let me -- let me 8 withdraw. 9 Do you dispute, sir, that your opinion of 10 \$607.3 million for two and a half years amounts to over 240 million more per year, in your opinion, that Google 11 would have paid these two individuals for two patents 12 than what Google, in the real world, agreed to pay a 13 14 large company, Alcatel-Lucent, for 11 patents per year? 15 Well, I -- I don't disagree that they would Α. pay significantly more under my analysis. 16 17 Do you dispute it's 240 million than this Q. 18 agreement? 19 Α. I don't have a pen, but I can --20 Do you dispute it? Q. Well, I haven't done the math. So I'm just 21 Α. 22 saying, the reason I ask -- I'm saying that is because there's a half a year involved, not a full year. But I 23 24 would agree, for the first two full years, it would be 25 240, more or less.

So we've looked at four real-world patent 1 Q . 2 agreements that Google actually entered into that are 3 license agreements, haven't we, sir? Yes and no. Α. 4 5 The Carl Meyer agreement, Google paid \$3.5 Q. 6 million. 7 Α. I'm sorry. Did you say that was a license 8 agreement? 9 Ο. The Carl Meyer agreement was more than a 10 license agreement, wasn't it, sir? It was a purchase of the patents. 11 12 Α. That document was a purchase, yes. So it was even more -- it should cost more 13 Ο. 14 than a license, right? 15 Not necessarily. Α. 16 The Carl Meyer agreement, Google paid \$3.5 Q. million to purchase the patents at issue, right? 17 18 Α. Yes, the patents in --19 Ο. And that real --I'm --20 Α. 21 That's a real-world agreement, right? Ο. 22 Α. Yes. 2.3 And your opinion is over 173 times more than Q. 24 that for what you think that Google would have paid --25 agreed to pay Function Media, right?

I agree with you that -- I haven't done the 1 Α. 2 math, but that sounds about right. 3 And the VoiceAge agreement we looked at, Ο. that's a license to over a hundred patents, right, sir? 4 5 I haven't added up the number of patents. Α. And Google -- that's a real-world agreement 6 Q. 7 that Google entered into with massive corporations, 8 Nokia, Ericcson, right? 9 A. Yes, except we don't know if -- VoiceAge, I don't believe, is massive. 10 And Google paid a maximum of 2 million per 11 Ο. year for over a hundred patents, right? 12 13 Α. Again, I don't know if it's over a hundred 14 patents, but I agree, they agreed to pay no more than 2 15 million a year. 16 Q. And that's over -- in your opinion as to what Google would have paid Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone, is over 17 18 \$240 million more per year than what Google actually, in 19 the real world, in this VoiceAge agreement, agreed to 20 pay for over a hundred patents to VoiceAge and its 21 affiliates, right? 22 That would be approximately. I agree with you Α. approximately, because I haven't done the math. 23 Q. And we looked at another real-world agreement 24 25 between Google and Hewlett-Packard?

1 THE COURT: Well, let's -- excuse me for 2 interrupting you. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes. 4 THE COURT: We're going to take our 5 morning recess at this point. Ladies and Gentlemen, be back ready to 6 7 come in the courtroom at 10:30. 8 Remember my prior instructions -- excuse 9 me -- and don't talk about the case. 10 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. 11 (Jury out.) 12 THE COURT: All right. Let's try to avoid repetition, okay? 13 14 MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor. 15 THE COURT: I mean, when you start introducing your questions with, and we looked at and 16 17 again, it's a pretty good indication that you're being 18 repetitive. 19 MR. VERHOEVEN: I appreciate that. 20 THE COURT: And I'm giving you some latitude because it's cross-examination, but don't be 21 repeating yourself. 22 2.3 And avoid side-bars, okay? I know it's 24 cross-examination, and you're trying to represent your 25 client, but I don't allow you to argue with the witness,

okay? 1 MR. VERHOEVEN: Yes, Your Honor. 2 3 THE COURT: All right. MR. VERHOEVEN: 4 Thank you. 5 THE COURT: We'll be in recess. 6 (Recess.) 7 COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise. 8 (Jury in.) 9 THE COURT: Please be seated. Let's continue. 10 MR. VERHOEVEN: Thank you, Your Honor. 11 12 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, Mr. Bratic, on your Q. 13 direct examination, I recall you gave some testimony 14 about an acquisition that Google made of a company 15 called Applied Semantics. 16 Do you remember that, generally? I do. 17 Α. 18 Now, the deal between Google and Applied Q. 19 Semantics, that was an acquisition of an entire company, 20 wasn't it, sir? 21 Α. Yes. 22 So that had -- Google bought people, right? Q. 2.3 You don't buy people. Α. 24 Ο. Well, it --25 You get --Α.

1	Q. It	acquired employees?
2	А. Уе	es yes.
3	Q.Er	ngineers?
4	A. Ye	es.
5	Q. Ap	oplied Semantics had products?
6	A. Ye	es, it did have a product.
7	Q. Ap	oplied Semantics had customers?
8	A. Ye	es.
9	Q. Th	ney had offices and facilities?
10	A. Th	ney did.
11	Q. Th	ne Google acquisition of Applied Semantics
12	was not a ba	are license agreement, was it, sir?
13	A. No	o, it wasn't.
14		MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to Plaintiff's
15	Exhibit 807,	, and would you go to Page I think it's 3;
16	it bears Control No. 4299.	
17		THE WITNESS: Okay.
18		MR. VERHOEVEN: If we can highlight the
19	bullet there.	
20	Q. (E	By Mr. Verhoeven) There's a reference to 19
21	engineers ar	nd 38 to 44 employees, right?
22	A. I'	'm sorry. I didn't get the last part.
23	Q. Th	nere is a reference there
24	A. Oh	n. Oh, I'm sorry.
25	Q	- to the ASI employees who would go and be

hired by Google, right? 1 2 Α. Yes. 3 Ο. So there's an acquisition of employees. MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to the next 4 5 page. (By Mr. Verhoeven) You see the title --6 Q . 7 MR. VERHOEVEN: If we could just 8 highlight the -- Charles, just highlight from the 9 factors considered to value ASI all the way down to the 10 bottom. 11 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And among the factors Ο. considered to value ASI, you see the second bullet under 12 13 the first heading, Proven Success of Domain Products. 14 Do you see that? 15 I do. Α. 16 Do you know what that's a reference to? Q . 17 Well, they had an AdSense -- excuse me --Α. 18 Applied Semantics had a product. 19 Q. And this document is saying one of the factors -- it's a Google document, right? 20 21 Yes, this is a Google document. Α. 22 You considered a number of Google documents as Q. 23 part of your opinion, right? And this one. 24 Α. 25 Q. And this says factors considered when they


valued this acquisition of an entire company, and they 1 say proven success of domain products, right? 2 3 Α. Yes. Fair to say that that was a factor that Google 4 Ο. 5 considered when they decided to do this transaction? Α. Yes. 6 7 And so ASI had proved that it had successful Q. 8 domain products at that time, right? 9 Α. Yes. Now, Function Media, in this hypothetical 10 Q. negotiation, they didn't have any proven success of any 11 products, did they? 12 A. No. They had no products. 13 14 Right. Ο. 15 I direct your attention down to the second 16 part of this. In the second -- third to last bullet there, it says establishes Southern California product 17 18 development center. 19 Do you see that? 20 Α. Yes. 21 So -- and above that, it says synergies with Ο. Google. 22 2.3 Do you see that? 24 Α. Yes. 25 So one of the synergies is it would help Q.


establish a Southern California product development 1 2 center, if Google did this acquisition. Fair? 3 It appears to be the case. Α. Now, in this hypothetical negotiation that 4 Ο. 5 you've given your opinion about, Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone, they don't have any product development center, do they? 6 7 Α. No. 8 Q . Don't have any -- any products even? 9 Α. Not as far as I know. 10 Q. Okay. 11 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's go to PX441. 12 I'm sorry. 441? Α. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Uh-huh. 13 Ο. 14 And if we could go to --15 I'm sorry. Let me find my copy. Α. 16 Certainly. Take your time. Q. Okay. I've got it. Thank you. 17 Α. 18 MR. VERHOEVEN: And if we could go to 19 Page 4 of 18, G14470, and highlight from why Google 20 acquired ASI on down. 21 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And you'll see again, this Ο. 22 is a Google document, right? 2.3 It's the same document. Α. 24 And it says why Google acquired ASI, right? 0. 25 Α. Yes.


And then one of the reason listed is proven 1 Q . 2 success of domain products, right? 3 Α. Yes. The next bullet: Increasing traction of ASI 4 Ο. 5 news and enterprise solutions. 6 Do you see that? 7 Α. I do. 8 Q. What's your understanding of what that refers 9 to? 10 Α. Apparently, Applied Semantics had some kind of -- I'm not sure what the news is, but enterprise 11 solutions, they had some kind of products for companies 12 to use. 13 14 And that was the reason -- one of the reasons Ο. 15 why Google acquired them, right? 16 Α. It was one of the reasons, yes. 17 Q. Right. And if you look down below that, the second 18 19 bullet in the next section says: Google will be able to 20 grow its engineering presence and recruiting efforts in 21 the Southern California region. 22 Do you see that? 2.3 Α. Yes. So that's one of the synergies to Google of 24 Ο. 25 acquiring an entire company here is that Google will be

able to grow its engineering presence by acquiring this 1 2 company in Southern California, right? 3 Α. Yes. Okay. Now, in your hypothetical negotiation, 4 0. 5 this is just supposed to be a bare patent license, not an acquisition of a whole company, right? 6 7 Α. Correct. 8 Q. And in your hypothetical negotiation, you 9 would agree with me that Function Media does not have 10 any engineering presence? Function Media, yes. 11 Α. They do not have one, right? 12 Q . 13 Yes, they do not have an engineering presence Α. 14 as far as I know. 15 All they have are the two patents, right? Q. 16 Α. Yes. Nothing else? 17 Q. 18 I -- I thought Mr. Dean said that Function Α. 19 Media held some other patents. 20 In our hypothetical negotiation, is that Q. relevant? 21 22 Α. No, but --23 Q . Okay. 24 -- I was just responding to your question. Α. 25 Okay. So in our hypothetical negotiation, all Q.

we're talking about acquiring is a license that's 1 2 non-exclusive for just those two patents, right? 3 Α. Yes. And only for two and a half years, right? 4 Ο. 5 Well, under Georgia-Pacific, it's presumed Α. that the license is for the life of the patent. 6 7 Well, your number is only for two and a half Q. 8 years? 9 Α. Yes, because we're here in trial today. 10 Q. Okay. You also talked about another 11 acquisition, dMarc. 12 Do you remember that generally? 13 Α. DMarc Broadcasting. 14 Ο. Yes. 15 MR. VERHOEVEN: DX357, please. 16 I don't think that's in my binder, but -- did Α. 17 you say 357? 18 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) 354 -- I misspoke, 19 Mr. Bratic. I apologize. PX354. 20 A. Okay. 21 Is that in your binder, sir? Ο. 354 is. 22 Α. 23 Okay. And this is a Google document, correct? Q . It is. 24 Α. 25 Q. And this is a reference to -- this concerns







1	REDACTED BY ORDER OF THE COURT	
2	MR. VERHOEVEN: Now we can take that off	
3	the screen, Charles.	
4	Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Now, you testified on	
5	direct about what you called industry royalty rates.	
6	Do you remember that generally?	
7	A. Yes.	
8	Q. Something you found in a publication called	
9	Licensing Economics Review.	
10	Do you recall that?	
11	A. I do.	
12	Q. You have no evidence, sir, that those rates	
13	are for analogous inventions to the inventions in this	
14	case, do you?	
15	A. No. Not as to the specific inventions, no.	
16	Q. And you have no evidence that those rates are	
17	for bare patent licenses, do you?	
18	A. No.	
19	Q. They're for lots of different things, aren't	
20	they? Software, technology?	
21	A. Oh, yes.	
22	Q. Things that aren't patents, right?	
23	A. Well, they would include software patents and	
24	the like.	
25	Q. They're not just bare patent licenses, are	

they? 1 2 Α. No, they're not. 3 Would agree with me that somebody would pay Q. more to license intellectual property if they got not 4 5 just a patent but also the technology and the software and the engineers and the know-how? 6 7 No, not necessarily. Α. 8 Q . Oh, you think that they wouldn't pay more for 9 that? 10 Α. It depends on the circumstances. Do you think Google would pay more in a 11 0. hypothetical negotiation if Function Media actually had 12 a working product that people liked and used and had 13 14 thousands of impressions per day? 15 Do you think that might be more valuable to 16 Google? 17 No, it wouldn't matter. Α. 18 Q . Wouldn't matter? 19 Α. No. 20 Wouldn't matter, in your opinion, to Google's Q. 21 assessment of how much the technology was worth, whether 22 all you had was Mr. Dean and Ms. Stone and a couple of patents versus a functioning product that had millions 23 24 of impressions per day, that worked well, and customers 25 liked?

That wouldn't make a difference to Google? 1 2 Α. Well, it would because that's exactly what Google had. 3 In the hypothetical negotiation, sir, do you 4 0. 5 think it would be more valuable to Google if Function Media had all those products and all that success, other 6 7 than just the two patents? 8 Α. No, it wouldn't matter. 9 Ο. Wouldn't matter? 10 Α. Because then we'd be talking about lost profits. 11 12 Q . Oh, okay. So it's your testimony that Google wouldn't value that higher than Google would value a 13 14 hypothetical negotiation where there was no product, no 15 facilities, no employees, just two bare patents? 16 Α. Not under the facts of this case, no. Okay. Now, these industry rights, you -- your 17 Ο. 18 slide showed that you used -- I think it was a hundred 19 different licenses they were based on. 20 Do you remember that? 21 Α. Yes. 22 You didn't study those licenses, did you? Q. 2.3 Α. No. 24 Ο. Didn't even read them, did you? 25 Α. No.

You don't know if they're bare patent licenses 1 Q. 2 or software licenses, do you? 3 I do know. Α. Okay. Which ones are bare patent licenses and 4 0. 5 which ones are software licenses? What I do know is the document itself says 6 Α. 7 internet licenses, parenthesis, including software. So 8 I know they include internet software licenses. 9 Q. So you know they include software, which isn't 10 part of the hypothetical negotiation, right? Well, software itself is not. 11 Α. 12 So that's a yes? Q . 13 Α. Yes. 14 Okay. You don't know anything about the terms Ο. 15 of the hundred and some licenses, whether they're 16 exclusive, non-exclusive, right? 17 Α. That's correct. 18 Ο. Never even read them? 19 Α. That's correct. 20 But you're relying on this? Q. 21 In part. Α. 22 MR. VERHOEVEN: Now, I'm trying to stay organized, Your Honor, but I misplaced a paper. I want 23 to make sure that I'm organizing this so we can minimize 24 25 the amount of time we have to have jurors -- or the

people out of the room. 1 THE COURT: I understand. 2 3 (By Mr. Verhoeven) All right. Let's talk a Q . little bit about the Stanford license. You talked about 4 5 the Stanford license in your direct exam. Do you remember that? 6 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q. Now, that --9 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's bring up DX689, 10 please. 11 And just can we highlight the title in the first paragraph, please? 12 13 Ο. (By Mr. Verhoeven) This is the agreement you 14 were testifying about yesterday, right? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Q. And this is dated December 1, 1998, right? 17 Yes. Α. 18 Q . What's the date of the hypothetical 19 negotiation? 20 A. It's July 2007. 21 July 2007. So that's nine years later? Ο. 22 Α. Yes. 2.3 Okay. Would you agree with me that the Q. internet and the industries surrounding the internet 24 25 were vastly, exponentially different in 2007 than they

were in 1998? 1 2 Α. Well, I would agree. The internet grew a lot in that time period. 3 What you could do was completely expand it, 4 Ο. 5 wasn't it? I'm not sure what you mean by --6 Α. 7 Well, by 1998, you didn't have broadband, did Q . 8 you? 9 Α. I'm not so sure. You couldn't watch -- you couldn't have a good 10 Q . user experience watching graphics or video on the 11 internet, could you? 12 13 Α. It's a while ago. I can't say for certain. You're not sure? 14 Ο. 15 I'm just saying I can't say for certain. Α. 16 Would you agree with me that the environment Q . in this industry, in the internet world, was vastly 17 18 different in 1998 than it was in 2007? 19 Α. Yes, I'll say it was very different. 20 Q. Okay. 21 It's grown an awful lot. It's become much Α. 22 more important. 23 And the things that you could do on the Q. 24 internet have advanced greatly, haven't they? 25 Yes. You mean since 1998? Α.


That's right. 1 Q. Yes. They advance every year. 2 Α. 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Now, let's put up DX Demo 54. 4 5 (By Mr. Verhoeven) And you can stay on this Q. document, sir. I just have a demonstrative slide to 6 7 illustrate what I think the terms of the actual 8 agreement were in 1998. 9 Α. I'm sorry. Can you tell -- bear -- just bear 10 with me. Let me go -- what is that; Section 8.1 you're 11 talking about? 12 Q. Yeah. 13 Α. Okay. 14 Do you dispute, sir, that the value of this Ο. deal in 1998 was \$180,000? 15 16 Α. Yes. 17 You do dispute that? Ο. 18 Α. Yes. 19 Q. Okay. Do you dispute that 2 percent of \$8 20 million is \$160,000? 21 I don't dispute that math. Α. And 8. -- Section 8.1 talks about 2-percent 22 Q. 23 equity of issued shares after the round of investor financing which resulted in 8 -- in 8-million-dollar 24 25 post-money valuation.


Do you see that? 1 Yes, I do. 2 Α. 3 Okay. And if you do the math, it comes to Q. \$160,000. 4 5 I agree; 2 percent of 8 million is 160,000. Α. And then the issue royalty is \$20,000, right? 6 Q. 7 Yes, initial payment. Α. 8 Q. And then the exclusive period royalty is 9 \$50,000? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Ο. Okay. That was the terms of the deal in 1998, 12 correct? 13 Α. No, not quite. 14 Does that -- is that what 8.1 and 8.2 say, Ο. 15 sir? 16 Not the way you've characterized it. Α. 17 Okay. Does 8.1 say Google agrees to pay Q. Stanford a non-credible, non-refundable license issue 18 19 royalty of \$20,000? 20 A. Yes. 21 In addition, Google agrees to issue to Ο. Stanford shares of Google stock equivalent to 2-percent 22 23 equity of issued shares after the round of investor financing which resulted in an 8-million-dollar 24 25 post-money valuation.


1 Do you see that? 2 Α. I do. 3 That's what -- so that says that Google agrees Q. to give Stanford 2 percent of \$8 million, right? 4 5 That's not the whole story. Α. Is that what it says, sir? 6 Q. 7 That's not all it says. Α. 8 What else does it say in 8.1? Q. 9 Α. What it says in 8.1 is Google only gets that 10 2 percent of stock, if Stanford is able to raise \$8 million in funds. In other words, a 2-percent equity is 11 contingent and dependent on Stanford going out and 12 13 raising \$8 million. 14 So at the time that agreement was executed, 15 that \$8 million wasn't in place. 16 So that might not even happen? Q. 17 Correct. Α. 18 Okay. But if it does, it's \$160,000? Q. 19 Α. Well --20 Q. That's what the math adds up to, sir. 21 That's what the math adds up to. Α. 22 And that's the transaction in 1998, sir, Q. 23 right? 24 Α. Yes. 25 Now, your testimony talks about how Google's Q .


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
stock has grown over the years, but no one knew in 1998 1 whether Google would be one of the millions of dot com 2 3 companies that bailed in the dot com bust, did they? Nobody knew, no, for certain. 4 Α. 5 And would you agree with me that startup Q. companies, the vast majority of startup companies, fail? 6 7 Α. I would -- I don't know if I could say the 8 vast majority but a lot of them do. 9 Q. Yeah, especially where Google comes from, 10 right? In the Bay Area? 11 In the Silicon Valley area, a number of them Α. 12 failed. That's true. Well over 50 percent. 13 Ο. 14 That I can't say. I don't have --Α. 15 You can't say? Q. 16 Α. I just know a lot. 17 Okay. Fair to say that Google and Stanford Q. 18 had no idea in 1998 that their stock would be worth a 19 lot of money 10 years later, did they? 20 Α. I agree with that. Okay. The deal they struck was a deal in 21 Ο. 22 1998, right? 2.3 Α. Yes. 24 And these are the terms of the deal they 0. 25 struck in 1998, right, sir?













































































1	A. I understand they're large companies.
2	Q. Yeah. Large companies
3	A. Yeah.
4	Q right?
5	A. Yes.
6	Q. And did you understand that Google can't
7	simply tell these companies: We want you to use our
8	automated service because it's more profitable?
9	A. I'm sorry?
10	Q. Did you understand do you understand,
11	Mr. Bratic, that Google can't simply tell these large
12	advertising companies: We want you to move over to
13	on the online service, because it's more profitable
14	for us?
15	Do you understand that?
16	A. Not from the documents I saw.
17	Q. You think that that Google can simply tell
18	these major advertising companies, who want to do direct
19	advertising, that we're not going to do that; you got to
20	go and use our online service just because it's more
21	profitable for us?
22	A. No, that's not my testimony.
23	Q. Okay. They couldn't do that, could they?
24	A. I don't understand the question.
25	Q. In the real world, if you have major customers

who prefer Product A, you can't just say: We're going 1 2 to move you to Product B because it's more profitable, 3 can you? Depends on the circumstance. Α. 4 5 Well, if they say no and they're one of your Q. major customers, you're going to lose the customer, 6 7 right? 8 Maybe; maybe not. It depends if they have a Α. 9 choice. 10 Q. Okay. You don't know one way or the other. 11 Α. Right. 12 You can't simply assume that we can just move Q. 13 all these major advertisers out of their preferred product into another product that's more profitable, and 14 15 there's no problem there, can you? 16 Α. No. I never did assume that. Okay. Do you think maybe the difference in 17 Q. 18 profitability between AFC Online, AdSense for Content 19 Online, the accused product, and AdSense for Content 20 Direct, which has all the major advertisers -- do you 21 think maybe the difference in profitability is that the major advertisers have more power and can negotiate a 22 23 better deal? 24 Oh, yes, I'm sure that's part of it. Α. 25 Q. And that's part of the reason why AdSense for

Content Direct is less profitable, isn't it, sir? 1 AdSense for Content Direct? 2 Α. 3 Ο. Yes. Yes. 4 Α. 5 That's one of the reason it's less profitable Q. than AdSense for Content Online, right? 6 7 Α. Well, right, because -- yes, because Google 8 has more control over its AdSense for Content Online publishers. 9 10 Right. And those publishers happen to be a Q. lot smaller than the AdSense for Content Direct 11 publishers, don't they? 12 13 A. Yes, they do. 14 Okay. So you can't simply take the Ο. 15 profitability or lack thereof of the nonaccused product, AdSense for Content Direct, and say, well, we can just 16 move all those guys over for to AdSense for --17 18 MR. VERHOEVEN: Sorry, Your Honor. I hit 19 the thing. 20 Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) We can just take all these products over and move them for AdSense for Content 21 22 Online and be a wash. No problem. 2.3 That's not realistic, is it, sir? 24 Well, I never said that. Α. 25 Q. And it's not realistic, is it?

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1 Α. No. Now, you said that, in your opinion, there 2 Ο. 3 aren't any noninfringing substitutes to these patents. Acceptable noninfringing substitutes. 4 Α. 5 Thank you. You said there are no acceptable Q . noninfringing substitutes. And your opinion is based 6 7 100 percent on somebody else's testimony, right? 8 Α. Yes. Dr. Rhyne. 9 Ο. So it's not -- you're just pointing to him, 10 right? 11 Α. Yes. I'm not a technical expert. I'm relying 12 on him. 13 Ο. Okay. Did you ever hear of AdForce? 14 Yes. Α. 15 Did you know that AdForce was out, and people Q. 16 were doing it before the patents had issued in this 17 case? 18 Α. I don't know when people were doing AdForce. 19 Q. Did you know that AdForce was a fully 20 automated system? 21 Α. I don't know that to be true. 22 Did you know AdForce had a publisher interface Q. 23 and a seller interface? The specifics, I don't recall. 24 Α. 25 Q. Did you know that AdForce didn't get a patent

on its technology so people could use it without 1 2 violating their patent? 3 I did not make an investigation of AdForce's Α. patent. 4 5 You didn't look into that? Q . I don't recall. 6 Α. 7 Now, if -- if it turns out that I'm right, Q. 8 AdForce was out there, and it did this functionality, 9 it's fully automated, and Google could use it for free, 10 that would be an alternative for Google instead of signing a license in the hypothetical negotiation, 11 right? 12 13 Α. Not necessarily. 14 It could be, couldn't it? Ο. 15 Well, we don't know, because you don't know Α. 16 what terms AdForce would agree to, and you don't know whether AdForce's technology is comparable. 17 18 Well, let's assume that it had the same Q. 19 automatic technology that we're talking about. That 20 would be a noninfringing substitute, right? 21 If it had the same functionality. Α. 22 Now, it's interesting you talk about Q. 23 functionality. By functionality, do you mean the claim elements? 24 25 A. Not at all.

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1 Q. Okay. I mean the characteristics. In other words --2 Α. 3 The characteristics. Ο. So what are the characteristics that you think 4 5 is the functionality that can't be designed around? Well, I'm not a technical expert, so I'm not 6 Α. 7 sure what you want me to --8 Q. Well, you told -- I'm sorry. Go ahead and 9 finish. 10 Α. No. I'm just saying -- I don't want to give you a long answer, so why don't you please restate your 11 question. 12 Q. What are the technical characteristics you 13 14 just referred to that would be an acceptable 15 noninfringing substitute that you've concluded aren't 16 available to Google? 17 I've just told you, I'm not a technical Α. 18 I'm relying on Dr. Rhyne regarding the expert. 19 technical aspects of that issue. 20 Q. You've told the jury that there's no 21 acceptable noninfringing substitutes. Α. 22 Yes. 2.3 Okay. What are the features that you think Q. 24 are the accept -- the functionality that would be 25 acceptable that can't be designed around?

Α. Okay. 1 2 Ο. Can you tell us that? Yes, I can, just with the caution that I'm not 3 Α. 4 a technical person, so I'll explain to you what I 5 understand. 6 Q. Okay. 7 And so I'll give you just a general overview. Α. 8 My understanding is, what's critical and core and 9 fundamental about the patents-in-suit is that they have 10 taught a method -- a way of taking -- allowing advertisers to -- on a self-service, fully automatic 11 basis, loading information regarding their preferences 12 13 for how they want their ads -- what they want their ads to have in them, and then here on the other side --14 15 imagine three wheels. 16 You have one wheel out here, which is the advertisers, completely automated, doing their thing, 17 18 completely loading in all their advertising information 19 with no human intervention. 20 Imagine another wheel over here, which are 21 publishers. Publishers are putting in all their 22 publication -- what are called publication rules, meaning the look, the feel, the font, the color, the 23 24 background of their website, how they want the ads to 25 match both the color, the texture, everything, so that

there's a seamless introduction of the advertisement 1 when it pops up on that customer's website. 2 3 That's a completely different and completely independent wheel, again, taught by the patents. 4 5 The third wheel or circle in the middle is where both of those publisher and advertiser wheels or 6 7 circles come together in a completely self --8 self-contained, automated fashion and allow for the 9 creation -- automatic creation of advertisers --10 advertisements that then end up on those publishers' websites. 11 12 And it's that contextual look and feel, that 13 automatic process, which enables Google to do it on a 14 mass scale. 15 And when I talk about scalability, we're talking about able to take those publishers' websites 16 and make money for the publishers and Google, because 17 18 those publishers otherwise would not have made money, 19 because all they had was content, and they had no way, 20 because of their size and the many millions of 21 publishers out there -- it was a unique way for publishers and Google to make money. 22 2.3 And that's what my understanding it is. 24 MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor, may I come 25 around and use the butcher paper here?

THE COURT: Yes. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Can you see here? I can see the top part. I can stand up, if THE COURT: Just move it over a little THE WITNESS: I tell you what, if I move over here, I think we're good. Q. (By Mr. Verhoeven) Okay. So I think you talked about three -- did you call them wheels?

11 Yes, circles or wheels. Α.

12 Okay. So one is the publisher interface? Q .

13 Α. The publisher network, yes.

Publisher network? 14 Ο.

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9

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Q.

Α.

you like.

bit closer.

15 Well, I call it the automated publisher Α. 16 system.

17 Okay. So this is the publisher. Q.

And then the other is what? 18

19 Α. The advertisers.

20 And the third one? Q.

21 Is Google. Α.

22 No. I'm talking about the patents. Features Q. in the patents that you think are needed for there to be 23 24 an acceptable substitute.

25 A. I can't tell you what's needed, because that's

a technical question. I can just tell you what I 1 understand --2 3 Q. Okay. A. -- is the way the system operates and what's 4 5 taught and what the benefits of doing -- or practicing the patent is. 6 7 Q. Well, you're -- you're an expert, who has 8 provided an opinion on whether there's any acceptable 9 noninfringing substitutes, correct? 10 Α. What my understanding is on them. Do you have an opinion on it? 11 Ο. I've told you my opinion is based on 12 Α. 13 Dr. Rhyne. 14 Q. Okay. So this is -- is this the computer 15 controller? 16 A. That's what I've heard it referred to. I'm not sure if that's the correct term, but it's the Google 17 interface that links those two wheels. 18 19 Ο. Well, I want to make sure I have your 20 understanding, so what would you call this? I would just call it the Google system that 21 Α. links both of the wheels. 22 2.3 I'm talking about the patent, sir. Q. 24 Yes. That's what I'm talking about. But I'm Α. 25 not --

1 Q. The patents -- the patents don't say the Google system, do they? 2 I haven't looked at them in a while. 3 Α. This is the central controller that manages 4 Ο. 5 all this and publishes, right? I would agree -- I understand that there is an 6 Α. 7 automated computer system at Google that manages the 8 whole process. That's the third wheel I'm talking 9 about. 10 Ο. Okay. And so the publishers. Then the information the publishers put in it goes here 11 (indicating), right? 12 A. Yes. 13 And the information the advertisers put in 14 Ο. 15 goes here (indicating), right? 16 Α. Correct. 17 Okay. Do you know -- did you know that 0. 18 AdSense has a publisher interface and advertiser 19 interface and central computer system? 20 AdSense? Α. 21 Ο. Yes. 22 Α. Yes. Yes, of course. 2.3 Q. You did know that. Yes. AdSense for Content. 24 Α. 25 Q. Did you know -- I'm sorry. I misspoke.

Did you know that AdForce has a publisher interface, an 1 2 advertiser interface, and a central computer system? 3 Not specifically, no. Α. You didn't know that? Ο. 4 5 No. I don't know the details -- from a Α. technical standpoint, I don't know the details about 6 7 AdForce. 8 Q.. Okay. Did you know that DoubleClick DART has 9 a publisher interface, an advertiser interface, and a central controller? 10 Well, I knew that DoubleClick had DART for 11 Α. publishers and DART for advertiser --12 13 Q. Did you know --14 -- as an automated management system -- let me Α. 15 finish, please -- as an automated management system. 16 That, I knew. 17 O. You knew it was automated? 18 Α. Yes. 19 Q. Okay. Did you know that AdForce was 20 automated, also? I understood that. 21 Α. 22 And is it your testimony that if these two Q. systems were around and created by others prior to the 23 24 inventors, they would still be noninfringing acceptable 25 substitutes?

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I'm sorry. You'll have to repeat that. 1 Α. 2 Ο. Is it your testimony that if AdForce and 3 DoubleClick were out there before the patents, that they would still not be an acceptable noninfringing 4 5 substitute? Α. Oh. That's an issue I have no opinion on. 6 7 You're being paid by the hour today? Q. Okay. 8 For my time, yes. Α. 9 Ο. Yeah. \$600 an hour? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Is it true that you've given expert testimony Ο. on damages in court in 28 different matters in the last 12 four years? 13 14 Sounds about right. Α. 15 Is it true that you've given deposition Q. 16 testimony as an expert witness under oath 69 times in the last four years? 17 18 Α. That sounds about right. 19 Q. Is it fair to say you're a professional 20 damages witness? No. I'm a professional -- I'm a professional 21 Α. 22 and an expert in patent damages. 2.3 Fair to say you're --Q. But I've testified on a number of occasions. 24 Α. 25 Q . Okay. Now, your expertise is with numbers,

A. Well, it's economics, finance, accounting, You're supposed to be pretty good with Q. Okay. Now, at your deposition, you were asked how much you billed Function Media in this case in

9 connection with this matter. Do you remember that testimony? 10

A. Somewhat. 11

right?

statistics.

numbers?

Ο.

A. Try to be.

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12 Q. You said that you billed somewhere between 150 and \$175,000? 13

That's what CRA billed. 14 Α.

15 Q. Okay.

16 Α. That's what my recollection was.

17 Do you remember that? Q.

18 Α. Yes.

19 Q. That was your testimony under oath.

20 Α. Yes. That was my understanding.

21 MR. VERHOEVEN: Let's bring up DX demo 153. No. 153. 22 23 (By Mr. Verhoeven) Do you recognize this Q. document? 24

25 A. No.

It says: Summary of CRA International, Inc.'s 1 Q. 2 invoices related to Function Media, LLC, versus Google, 3 Inc., in this matter. 4 Do you see that? 5 Α. I do. And if we pull out the bottom total, the total 6 Q . 7 is \$524,177. 8 Do you see that? 9 Α. I do. So that's off by a factor of over two times 10 Q. what you said in your deposition, right? 11 Well, it's a different time period, too. 12 Α. 13 Okay. Your deposition asked through the end Q. 14 of November, right? 15 Α. Yes. 16 Q. So if you look at this invoice, can you tell me what your CRA invoice is worth at the end of 17 18 November? 19 A. CRA invoiced --20 THE WITNESS: Can you take the shading 21 off? Because I can't read it on the screen. 22 A. CRA invoiced \$100,000 between November and 23 January. 24 (By Mr. Verhoeven) So let's take off \$100,000, Ο. 25 just to be safe, okay?

Okay. All right. Α. 1 2 Ο. So you testified at deposition that it was 150 3 to 175, but it's actually 400, right? That's what it turns out to be, yes. Α. 4 5 It's off by a major factor. Q. Well, yes. It's different. I mean, in other 6 Α. 7 words, what I estimated, based on what I knew or 8 recalled, was different than the total. 9 Q. So as a damages expert, at your deposition, 10 when you testified under oath as to how much you billed, you were inaccurate by a factor of two, weren't you? 11 No, I wasn't inaccurate. I just -- I didn't 12 Α. have access to the invoices. I don't work for CRA, so I 13 don't get their invoices. 14 15 Oh, you don't work for CRA. Q. 16 Α. No, I'm not an employee. I'm a consultant. So I don't see any invoices. 17 18 So you don't look at them to see if they're Q. 19 accurate --20 Α. They're not --21 0. -- if they accurately reflect your time? 22 I have -- no, I do not. I don't get to see Α. any invoices CRA sends out. That's a CRA matter. 23 24 That's why I don't know anything about these invoices. 25 Q. Okay. So you're -- you were unable to get

access to information to tell us accurately at your 1 2 deposition how much CRA billed. 3 Is that your testimony? No. My testimony is, what I recall that Α. 4 5 somebody had told me we had billed that fall, was in the range of 175,000 or so. That's what I recalled, because 6 7 I had never seen the invoices. 8 Q. And that was off by a factor of two. 9 Α. Well, they've invoiced more, yes. 10 Q . Okay. MR. VERHOEVEN: No further questions, 11 12 Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: Redirect? 14 MR. NELSON: Yes, sir. 15 REDIRECT EXAMINATION 16 BY MR. NELSON: 17 Q. Let me take that last point first. 18 Α. Sure. 19 Q. And then we'll go out, and we're going to hit 20 actually, I think, every single major point that he 21 discussed during the next few minutes or so, hopefully, even before lunch. 22 2.3 Α. Okay. 24 First, the bills that he just put up -- I 0. 25 think you just testified to this, but you do not see

these bills, correct? 1 2 Α. I've never seen these bills. In fact, I've 3 never seen that list. At your deposition, you specifically said that 4 Ο. 5 you didn't know for sure what had been billed, right? Correct. 6 Α. 7 Okay. And I don't mean to quote exactly on Q . 8 that, but you've made clear that you were not trying to 9 give an exact number on it, correct? 10 Α. Correct. And I also explained in my deposition that I don't work -- I'm not an employee of 11 CRA, so I don't see their information. 12 13 Okay. At that time, your bills were Ο. 14 significantly lower than \$100,000 at the time, correct? 15 Α. Yes. 16 So any difference would be what CRA, a company Q. you don't work for, had billed; is that right? 17 18 Α. Correct. 19 Okay. Generally, what's your understanding --0. 20 in terms of your rate, is your rate higher or lower than 21 Google's damages expert? 22 Oh, it's a lot lower. Α. 2.3 Okay. In terms of a -- sort of a monthly Q. 24 average of -- of what you and your firm -- or your 25 consulting firm has billed compared to Google's expert

and his damages experts, has -- on a monthly basis, has 1 2 Google billed for more -- or Google's damages expert billed more for its damages consulting than you have? 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, leading, 4 5 foundation. THE COURT: Overruled. 6 7 From my recollection, they billed a little Α. 8 more. Excuse me. They billed more. 9 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) And their period, actually, 10 was only over a four-month period, right? Yes. I've been working on this for a year and 11 Α. a half. 12 13 Q. And you're aware, actually, Google had another damages expert before their current damages expert got 14 hired, and they billed for that case, too, right? 15 16 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, leading. THE COURT: Sustained. 17 18 (By Mr. Nelson) Are you aware of whether Q. 19 Google had another damages expert before the expert they 20 had just retained a few months ago? 21 Α. I learned that during this case, yes, that they ended up with two different experts. 22 And any amount that Google's own damages 23 Q . 24 expert billed, that is already more than you, wouldn't 25 even include the other amount that Google's first

damages expert, who was not testifying at trial, has 1 billed, correct? 2 3 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, leading. THE COURT: Sustained. 4 5 (By Mr. Nelson) Would any amount include, as a Q . comparison, what Google had -- or Google's first damages 6 7 expert had billed to Google? 8 Α. Yes. In other words, you had the combined 9 total of what Mr. Wagner and his company billed, plus 10 what Mr. -- I'm trying to remember his name, but the -the other consulting firm, Keith Ugone's firm, billed to 11 Google. You'd have to take the combined total to 12 13 represent their effort on damages. 14 Did you learn, one way or the other, why Ο. 15 Google changed damages experts here? 16 No, I don't know why. Α. You were questioned about some -- I think 17 0. 18 there were four patent licenses that -- or patent 19 technology agreements that Mr. Verhoeven put in front of 20 you, and I'd like to go through every single one of those with you. 21 22 First, let me start from the beginning as we get to the substance here. 2.3 24 Did anything in Mr. Verhoeven's cross-25 examination change your opinion that it would be a

reasonable royalty of 12 percent? 1 2 Α. No, nothing changed. 3 Okay. Earlier yesterday in your direct Ο. examination, we saw a clip of Mr. Chen testifying over 4 5 and over again: I don't know; I don't know; I don't 6 know. 7 Do you recall that testimony? 8 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, 9 characterization. THE COURT: Sustained. 10 11 (By Mr. Nelson) Did you recall Mr. Chen's Ο. testimony yesterday? 12 13 Oh, yes. I read his deposition. Α. 14 And you -- and also during --Ο. 15 And the testimony yesterday. Α. 16 Can you please recap for the jury what they Q . saw yesterday on that to remind the jury of that? 17 18 Α. Well, he was asked about a number of licenses 19 and some transactions, like the Carl Meyer agreement, 20 and he didn't know anything about them. He knew very 21 little about them. 22 What is the importance, what is the Q. relevance -- if a company cannot explain what licenses 23 24 are about, how does that affect your analysis? 25 Well, I wasn't at any of those transactions, Α.

so I have to rely on information, such as information 1 2 from Google's own witnesses and corporate representatives, who testified under oath, about the 3 subject matter of those transactions. 4 5 And if you don't have -- you, as an expert, damages expert or economic expert, don't have 6 7 information that you can get access to as to who the 8 parties were to the transaction, why the transaction was 9 executed, in other words, what was the business purpose, 10 what were the reasons associated with it, you can't put it in any context, and it's a meaningless analysis. 11 12 Let me try to give you a hypothetical and see Q. what you think about that. 13 14 Α. Sure. 15 Is it a fair comparison, if I go to a used car Q. 16 lot and I buy the rattiest, worst car on that lot for \$750, and then -- can I say that, because I bought that 17 18 car for \$750, that, therefore, a Rolls Royce is worth 19 \$750? 20 No, of course not. You need --Α. 21 Why not? Ο. 22 Α. Well, you need to know the details. You're 23 dealing with a spanking new Rolls Royce, which has got a 24 lot of bells and whistles to it, and you've got a 10-, 25 15-year-old car that have dings and dents in it, and for

all I know, may have bald tires. 1 But you have to understand what's in that used 2 3 car and what's in that new car in order to make an 4 analysis of that. 5 And did Google -- was Google able to give any Q. of the analysis, the car facts, for what it was about? 6 7 Α. In those transactions, no. 8 Okay. For example, on the Carl Meyer patent, Q. 9 we heard yesterday -- did Google even know who Carl 10 Meyer was? 11 Α. No. Google did not know who Carl Meyer was. 12 You did independent research about this Q . transaction, correct? 13 14 Α. Yes. 15 Did you find that there was actually a Q. 16 relationship, one way or another, between Carl Meyer and 17 Google? 18 Α. Yes. 19 Ο. And what was that relationship? 20 Α. One of the inventors on the Carl Meyer's patents was actually an employee of Google at the time 21 22 of the December 2008 agreement. 2.3 Q. And, Mr. Bratic --24 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection. May I 25 approach?

THE COURT: Yes. 1 (Bench conference.) 2 3 MS. CANDIDO: We have already made it clear at the argument on this motion that this purported 4 5 employee of Google has never worked for Google. And yet Counsel is continuing to raise that as a fact. It's not 6 7 in evidence, and it's not correct. 8 MR. NELSON: They can certainly do 9 recross on the fact that what is in the public record is 10 not accurate, but the public record states he's an 11 employee. 12 THE COURT: Well --13 MR. VERHOEVEN: Your Honor --14 MR. NELSON: And he's relied on that, and 15 they --16 MS. CANDIDO: Excuse me. Mr. Verhoeven 17 was pointing out to me that we're not stuck with the 18 terms of the agreement, but yet Function Media's counsel 19 is going beyond the terms. 20 THE COURT: Well, I'm going to overrule 21 the objection. You can call a witness, if you want to, to testify about whether this person was actually a 22 witness (sic) or not. 23 24 But based on what's represented as being 25 in the public record, I'm going to allow -- I'm going to

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allow this line of testimony. 1 2 Overruled. 3 (Bench conference concluded.) (By Mr. Nelson) Mr. Bratic, in the public 4 Ο. 5 record, you've seen evidence that there is a connection between Carl Meyer and Google, right? 6 7 Α. Yes. 8 Q. And this license -- Mr. Verhoeven glossed over 9 this fact, but what -- this transaction was how long 10 after this case actually was filed for suit? 11 About a year and a half. Α. Okay. In fact, it was, what, December 18th, 12 Q. 13 2008; is that right? 14 Right. And the lawsuit was filed in July Α. 15 2007. 16 And is it possible that there was litigation Q . between the parties? 17 It's possible. 18 Α. 19 Ο. Is it --20 I don't know. Α. 21 Ο. Is it possible that there was an agreement 22 between the parties to buy at a low number? 23 It's possible. Α. 24 You just don't know. Ο. 25 No, I don't. Α.

And Google doesn't know. Q. 1 2 Α. And Google does not know. 3 Okay. Or at least in this case, Google Q. doesn't know? 4 5 Well, put it this way: Nobody at Google has Α. said anything about it, that they know anything about 6 7 it. 8 It's certainly not in the record, right? Q. 9 Α. Correct. 10 Okay. And let's go to -- oh, I'm sorry. Q . One other point on the Carl Meyer patent. And I want to --11 you mentioned this before, but this is, I think, 12 13 relevant to all the patents. 14 Part of your analysis is the fact that there 15 is no design-around; is that a fair --16 Α. Correct. Okay. Do you know, for example, how easy it 17 Ο. 18 would be for Google to design around these licenses that 19 they showed us? 20 Α. No, I don't. 21 Q. Okay. 22 Well, I do know that in the VoiceAge Α. transaction, Google -- one of the negotiating points 23 24 Google had in its favor that it went back to VoiceAge 25 on, was that they had a design-around for that codec.

And we'll get to that in a second, but with 1 Q. 2 respect to Carl Meyer --3 Α. Right. 4 -- we don't know anything. 0. 5 Α. We don't know. We don't know whether --6 Q. 7 THE COURT: Excuse me. 8 MR. VERHOEVEN: I'm sorry to interrupt. 9 I'd like to be able to see, Your Honor, if I could. 10 THE COURT: Back up just a little bit. 11 MR. VERHOEVEN: Thank you. 12 MR. NELSON: Sorry. 13 (By Mr. Nelson) We don't know, for example, Ο. 14 whether, based on these I-don't-know answers, Google 15 even practices these technologies and uses these inventions. 16 17 A. Yeah. There's no way to know if Google even uses them. 18 19 Q. Okay. Now, do we even know whether they're related to AdSense? 20 21 Α. No. 22 Okay. Let's go to -- about the VoiceAge. Q. 2.3 MR. NELSON: And let's put up Plaintiff's Exhibit 313. 24 25 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) We've seen this document a

1 lot.

2 A. Yes.

Q. Mr. Chen, Google's corporate representative, the person who spoke for Google on licensing, is -what, Mr. Bratic, in this document allows you to state that the design-arounds and the ability to design around a particular patent is important?

A. Well, you can see the last line on the bottom 9 of this document where it's showing on the screen. It 10 says: The only leverage we have is that we have another 11 codec.

So this is Google's analysis that they have an alternative, they have a substitute, to the VoiceAge technology. So they can avoid -- they can leave it; they can avoid the VoiceAge patent. They don't have to take a patent license from VoiceAge, because they have an alternative.

18 Q. And, first of all, let me ask you a basic19 question about VoiceAge.

20 A. Yes.

21 Q. That concerned phones?

22 A. Yes.

Q. Are phones part of the relevant field here?A. No.

25 Q. Does Mr. Wagner, Google's expert, agree that

phones are not part of the relevant field here? 1 Yes. 2 Α. 3 And part of your analysis of analyzing Ο. 4 relevant licenses, are you supposed to look at the 5 relevant field here? Α. Yes. 6 7 Q. Okay. Now, did you review and rely on 8 Mr. Chen's deposition testimony about whether there was 9 a design-around anywhere? 10 Α. Yes. 11 Q. Okay. 12 MR. NELSON: Let's go to Page 131 of 13 Mr. Chen's deposition. Let's go to Line 16 first. 14 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) This is -- you see, I asked 15 the question, and then what is his answer? 16 It says: Actually, what we did was -- it's Α. interesting. In this particular deal, we actually 17 18 developed a workaround. We actually have a new -- our 19 own codec. So those -- for those phones, we're not even 20 using AMR. 21 Okay. And Mr. Verhoeven, if you remember, Ο. talked about how there were two big corporations that 22 were at issue, and therefore, perhaps that the license 23 24 should be higher. 25 Mr. Bratic, if two big corporations get

together jointly, are you aware generally whether there 1 2 are laws in place that these corporations have to act --3 that they can't violate the antitrust laws, for example? Α. 4 Yes. 5 And, generally, do they have to impose Q. reasonable and nondiscriminatory forums on license 6 7 agreements? 8 A. Yes. 9 Q. Okay. 10 MR. NELSON: Let's go to the top of that 11 same page. 12 Q. (By Mr. Nelson) And this is Mr. Chen's 13 testimony, too? 14 Α. Yes. 15 Okay. What is he saying about the terms of --Q. 16 THE COURT: And, Counsel, you need to slow down a little bit. 17 18 MR. NELSON: Excuse me, Your Honor. 19 (By Mr. Nelson) What did Mr. Chen testify to 0. 20 about the terms and the reason why the terms were what they were in the VoiceAge agreement? 21 22 Well, because he said with -- well, in Α. 23 addition to the fact that Google had a design-around, he 24 said, with respect to VoiceAge, because there's a 25 standard, there's noncompetitive and nonpreferential

treatment laws, that they have -- they, being 1 2 VoiceAge -- have to abide by, that there's not much deviation from the standard contract. 3 In other words, they pretty much have to give 4 5 it on standard terms to everybody who wants a license. How would this differ from a hypothetical 6 Q. 7 negotiation? 8 Α. There are no standards and there's no --9 there's no standards governing -- and what I mean by 10 standards is, there's no legal standards or law standards regarding technology standards that are 11 subject to the hypothetical negotiation. 12 So neither Function Media nor Google have to 13 14 deal with the issue about having to give licenses on a 15 nondiscriminatory or other basis to anybody. 16 Q. And when Mr. --17 MR. NELSON: Let's go back to PX313. 18 (By Mr. Nelson) When Mr. Chen said, take it or Q. 19 leave it, he was -- what was he recognizing here? 20 Α. He was recognizing that the terms of that agreement had this standard provision, that it was a 21 22 standard agreement across the industry. 2.3 And what was he recognizing in terms of the Q. 24 ability of a design-around? 25 He was recognizing there was one. In fact, we Α.

1 just saw it in his deposition. They actually achieved a 2 design-around. 3 Okay. And with respect to the Hewlett-Packard Q. agreement, the third license they talked about --4 5 Α. Yes ---- was that a cross-license? 6 Q. 7 -- it was. Α. 8 What, in your opinion, makes a cross-license Q. 9 different from a regular bare patent license? 10 Α. Yeah. A cross-license is what it says. Α 11 cross-license, each party is giving something to the 12 other side. Hewlett-Packard was giving something to 13 Google, and Google was giving something to 14 Hewlett-Packard. 15 And Hewlett-Packard -- Google has still agreed 16 to pay, even in that cross-license -- after Google got something from Hewlett-Packard and Hewlett-Packard got 17 18 something from Google, Google agreed to pay running 19 royalties. They just capped it at \$20 million. 20 What you can't do from a cross-license, at 21 least not from the information that Google provided in 22 this case, is unravel that cross-license to find out what Google -- I mean, what Hewlett-Packard would have 23 24 charged Google if there had been no cross-license. 25 In other words, if Hewlett-Packard hadn't received

anything from -- any technology rights from Google, you 1 don't know what Hewlett-Packard would have charged in 2 3 the alternative. And was that in the same relevant technology 4 Ο. 5 field anyway, that Hewlett-Packard agreement? It had to do with search technology. They 6 Α. 7 excluded it. 8 Q. Yeah, they excluded it. 9 And was it about e-mail? 10 Α. Yes. It had to do with e-mail technology. 11 Was it -- was it a relevant license in this Ο. 12 field? 13 Α. No. 14 Now, Mr. Verhoeven spent a fair amount of time Ο. 15 asking you questions about whether Function Media was an ongoing business where they had developed software. 16 17 Let me ask you, are you aware of what Google's 18 own damages expert's opinion is on whether it even 19 matters if they completed this product? 20 MR. VERHOEVEN: Objection, Your Honor. The witness -- he's asking the witness to characterize 21 testimony that hadn't occurred yet. 22 2.3 THE COURT: Overruled. 24 I'm sorry. You're going to have to repeat the Α. 25 question.

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1 (By Mr. Nelson) Are you aware, Mr. Bratic, of Q. 2 whether Google's own damages expert states that it does not matter whether Function Media has attempted to 3 commercialize the invention, in terms of setting the 4 5 royalty rate here? 6 Α. Yes, I'm aware. Mr. Wagner, his report said 7 it did not matter. 8 Okay. And are you aware that Mr. Wagner, Q. 9 Google's own damages expert, has stated that it does not 10 matter whether a company is large or small in terms of setting the rate for a reasonable royalty negotiation? 11 12 Α. Yes. 13 Okay. Thank you. Ο. 14 MR. NELSON: Your Honor, I have actually 15 about 10 more minutes worth of cross -- five or ten minutes worth of cross-examination (sic). I'm happy to 16 try to continue it now. I know we're right at noon. 17 18 I'm at the Court's pleasure. 19 THE COURT: Well, as much as I would like 20 to be through and move on to another witness, I think 21 we'll break for lunch, because I anticipate there will be some additional recross. 22 23 Ladies and Gentlemen, be back at 1:15. 24 Have a nice lunch, and don't talk about the case. 25 You're excused.

1		COURT SECURITY OFFICER: All rise.
2		(Jury out.)
3		THE COURT: Recess till 1:15.
4		Stay behind the podium so he can see me,
5	okay?	
6		MR. NELSON: Yes, sir.
7		THE COURT: I asked you to do that once
8	for me	
9		MR. NELSON: Oh, I'm sorry.
10		THE COURT: okay?
11		MR. NELSON: Yes, sir.
12		(Recess.)
13		* * * *
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1 2 3 CERTIFICATION 4 5 I HEREBY CERTIFY that the foregoing is a 6 true and correct transcript from the stenographic notes 7 of the proceedings in the above-entitled matter to the 8 best of my ability. 9 10 11 12 /s/____ SUSAN SIMMONS, CSR Date 13 Official Court Reporter State of Texas No.: 267 14 Expiration Date: 12/31/10 15 16 17 /s/____ SHELLY HOLMES, CSR Date 18 Deputy Official Court Reporter State of Texas No.: 7804 19 Expiration Date 12/31/10 20 21 22 23 24 25