UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS TYLER DIVISION

o. 6:09-cv-00446-LED (filed Oct. 6, 2009)

DEFENDANTS' REPLY IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT OF INVALIDITY FOR LACK OF WRITTEN DESCRIPTION

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Eolas's response brief fails to offer any evidence—not a single citation to the specification of the patents-in-suit—to establish to one of ordinary skill that the inventors possessed the full scope of the "embed text format" that Eolas now claims. Instead, Eolas's opposition is built upon the misguided notion that this Court's claim construction order has resolved written description *ipso facto*. But claim construction is merely a <u>predicate</u> that frames the written description question, it does not answer it.

A. Eolas Misconceives The Legal Issue Presented

Contrary to Eolas's assertions, Defendants' motion does not "attempt to limit" the Court's construction of "embed text format." *See* D.I. 996 ("Resp.") at 6-7. Rather, Defendants' motion presents an entirely separate inquiry. Now that the claims have been construed broadly at Eolas's urging, is there sufficient disclosure in the specification to convey to one skilled that the inventors had possession of the <u>full</u> scope of the claims? *See* Mot. at 1-2 (citing cases); *Atl. Research Mktg. Sys., Inc. v. Troy*, Nos. 2011-1002, -1003, slip op. at 12-16 (Fed. Cir. Oct. 6, 2011) (construing claim first before incorporating that construction into the written description analysis). A claim may be construed to define a genus, "yet the question may still remain whether the specification, including original claim language, demonstrates that the applicant has invented species sufficient to support a claim to a genus." *Ariad Pharm., Inc., v. Eli Lilly & Co.*, 598 F.3d 1336, 1349 (Fed. Cir. 2010). "[M]erely drawing a fence around the outer limits of a purported genus is not an adequate substitute for describing a variety of materials constituting the genus and showing that one has invented a genus and not just a species." *Id.* at 1350.¹

¹ Eolas's quotation of *Phillips v. AWH Corp.*, 415 F.3d 1303, 1312-13 (Fed. Cir. 2005), merely reiterates the non-controversial statement that claims may be construed more broadly than the embodiment disclosed. But it does not address whether that narrower disclosure is in turn sufficient to show possession of the broader claim for purposes of Section 112.

B. There Is No Support in the Written Description Suggesting The Inventors Possessed A Non-Tag "Embed Text Format" — And Eolas Cites None

It is uncontested that the phrase "embed text format" does not appear in the specification but is a made-up term added during prosecution. *See* Mot. at 1. Here, Eolas has urged the Court to construe "embed text format" very broadly to include any kind of "coded information." *See* D.I. 914 ("Order") at 15. Its claim to all "coded information" capable of embedding content amounts to a functional claim for which the written description concern is "especially acute." *Ariad*, 598 F.3d at 1349. Yet, Eolas essentially acknowledges that the specification fails to disclose an "embed text format" that is not a tag, much less all of the unlimited types of coded information claimed to be covered. Indeed, Eolas does not dispute that during prosecution (and subsequent legal proceedings) the patentees repeatedly relied on the "embed text format" being a "special tag" to distinguish prior art that did not use tags. *See* Mot. at 1-2, 5 (attaching and quoting file history).² Thus, after reading the specification, one skilled in the art would not understand Eolas to have invented species sufficient to support a claim to the broad genus including unlimited kinds of "coded information." *See Ariad*, 598 F.3d at 1349.

Unable to point to any disclosure in the specification, Eolas submits the declaration of David Martin to attempt to create a factual dispute. First, Dr. Martin cites the so-called "IMAGE3D <u>tags</u>" buried in source code appendices. Martin Decl. at ¶ 7. Yet he admits this is merely another example of a <u>tag</u>. *Id*. ("[T]he specification teaches the use of an IMAGE3D tag."). Thus, it provides no support for use of any other type of coded information.

Second, Dr. Martin cites an example of an external application type,

² Eolas's reliance on *Crown Packaging Tech., Inc. v. Ball Metal Beverage Container Corp.* is therefore misplaced, as that case acknowledges that *ICU*, *Lizard*, and *Tronzo* properly invalidated claims where, as in this case, "the specification discloses only one specific method" and the patentee used that to distinguish prior art that used a different method. 635 F.3d 1373, 1382 (Fed. Cir. 2011).

"application/postscript," that "may be used with the invention." *Id.* ¶ 8. As the quotation from the specification makes perfectly clear, this is simply an example of an "application" type "to be used to handle the object." '906 Patent at 13:2–7. That is, it is given as an example of the "executable application," which is an entirely separate and distinct limitation from the "embed text format." The phrase "application/postscript" is given as an example "value" of the type "element" within the EMBED tag example, so one of ordinary skill would not understand it to disclose the use of "postscript," or any other scripting language for that matter, as the "embed text format" itself. The rest of the declaration consisting of lawyer argument and conclusory assertion also cannot raise a genuine issue of material fact. *See PowerOasis, Inc. v. T-Mobile USA, Inc.*, 522 F.3d 1299, 1310 (Fed. Cir. 2008).

C. Eolas Concedes There Is No Support For An "Embed Text Format" At A Location Other Than Where The Object Is Displayed

This Court has declared that the claim limitations "logically demonstrate[] that the embed text format location in the document is where the displayed object will appear." Order at 17 (emphasis added). Eolas does not dispute that there is no support in the written description for an "embed text format" at a location other than where the "object" is displayed.³ The Court's construction has resolved Defendants' motion in this respect. However, if Eolas were to contend that the embed text format need not be so located, such a construction would lack written description support. *See*, *e.g.*, *PowerOasis*, 522 F.3d at 1309 (finding embodiments disclosing co-located elements insufficient to support claim covering elements at different locations).

For the foregoing reasons, Defendants' respectfully request that Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment of Invalidity for Lack of Written Description be GRANTED.

³ Eolas merely asserts the Court "rejected" the requirement that the "embed text format" be at the same location. This is plainly wrong, as the Court's *Markman* order makes clear.

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