

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS
DALLAS DIVISION**

<p>CHIMA AGIM,</p> <p>ID #870112,</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Petitioner,</p> <p>vs.</p> <p>RICK THALER, Director,</p> <p>Texas Department of Criminal</p> <p>Justice, Correctional Institutions Division,</p> <p style="padding-left: 40px;">Respondent.</p>	<p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p> <p>)</p>	<p>No. 3:09-CV-1727-K-BH</p> <p>Referred to U.S. Magistrate Judge</p>
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**FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATION
OF THE UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

Pursuant to the provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 636(b) and an Order of the Court, this case has been referred to the United States Magistrate Judge for findings, conclusions, and recommendation.

I. BACKGROUND

Petitioner, an inmate currently incarcerated in the Texas Department of Criminal Justice - Correctional Institutions Division (TDCJ-CID), filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The respondent is Nathaniel Quarterman, Director of TDCJ-CID.

Petitioner was convicted of aggravated sexual assault of a child and was sentenced to 25 years imprisonment in Cause No.F98-47682-I. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on appeal. *See Agim v. State*, No. 05-99-00307-CR, 2000 WL 175122 (Tex. App. – Dallas, Feb. 16, 2000, pet. ref’d). He challenged his aggravated sexual assault of a child conviction in federal court by way of a § 2254 petition in 2002. *See Agim v. Cockrell*, 3:02-CV-338-H (N.D. Tex.) (Pet. received February 19, 2002). His prior petition was denied with prejudice. *See Agim v. Dretke*, 3:02-CV-338-H, 2004 WL 2381721 (N.D. Tex. Oct. 22, 2004). Because petitioner has previously challenged his conviction, the Court must determine whether this petition is a second or successive application within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b).

II. SECOND OR SUCCESSIVE APPLICATION

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1214 (AEDPA) limits the circumstances under which a state prisoner may file a second or successive application for habeas relief in federal court. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244 (b). Under Fifth Circuit precedent, “a later petition is successive when it: 1) raises a claim challenging the petitioner’s conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition; or 2) otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ.” *Crone v. Cockrell*, 324 F.3d 833, 836-37 (5th Cir. 2003); *accord United States v. Orozco-Ramirez*, 211 F.3d 862, 867 (5th Cir. 2000).¹ A petition that is literally second or successive, however, is not a second or successive application for purposes of AEDPA if the prior dismissal is based on prematurity or lack of exhaustion. *See Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 487 (2000) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to a failure to exhaust state remedies); *Stewart v. Martinez-Villareal*, 523 U.S. 637, 643-46 (1998) (declining to construe an application as second or successive when it followed a previous dismissal due to prematurity, and noting the similarities of such dismissal to one based upon a failure to exhaust state remedies). “To hold otherwise would mean that a dismissal of a first habeas petition for technical procedural reasons would bar the prisoner from ever obtaining federal habeas review.” 523 U.S. at 645.

In this case, petitioner’s prior petition was not dismissed because of any prematurity or lack of exhaustion. Under *Orozco-Ramirez* and *Crone*, petitioner was therefore required to present all available claims in his 2002 federal petition.

¹ Although the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals decided *Orozco-Ramirez* in the context of a motion to vacate under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, it also found it appropriate to rely upon cases decided under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in reaching its decision. *See* 211 F.3d at 864 n.4. In the present context, it is likewise appropriate to make no distinction between cases decided under § 2255 and those under § 2254.

“The requirement that all available claims be presented in a prisoner’s first habeas petition is consistent not only with the spirit of AEDPA’s restrictions on second and successive habeas petitions, but also with the preexisting abuse of the writ principle. The requirement serves the singularly salutary purpose of forcing federal habeas petitioners to think through all potential post-conviction claims and to consolidate them for a unitary presentation to the district court.”

Orozco-Ramirez, 211 F.3d at 870-71 (quoting *Pratt v. United States*, 129 F.3d 54, 61 (1st Cir. 1997)).

Because his petition raises claims that petitioner raised or could have raised in his 2002 petition, this petition is successive within the meaning of 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b). When a petition is second or successive, the petitioner must seek an order from the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals that authorizes this Court to consider the petition. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). The Fifth Circuit “may authorize the filing of a second or successive application only if it determines that the application makes a prima facie showing that the application satisfies the requirements of [§ 2244(b)].” *Id.* § 2244(b)(3)(C). To present a claim in a second or successive application that was not presented in a prior application, the application must show that it is based on: (1) newly discovered evidence that, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have found him guilty of the offense; or (2) a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. *Id.* § 2244(b)(2). Before petitioner files his application in this Court, a three-judge panel of the Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals must determine whether the application makes the requisite prima facie showing. *See id.* § 2244(b)(3)(A) and (B). Petitioner contends that he did not raise his current claims in his previous federal habeas petition because he has only recently become aware of the factual basis for the claims (Pet. at 8), but the Fifth Circuit has not issued an order authorizing the district court to consider this

successive application for habeas relief. Petitioner must obtain such an order before this case is filed.

III. RECOMMENDATION

The petition for writ of habeas corpus filed pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 should be **TRANSFERRED** to the United States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit pursuant to *Henderson v. Haro*, 282 F.3d 862, 864 (5th Cir. 2002) and *In re Epps*, 127 F.3d 364, 365 (5th Cir. 1997).

SIGNED this 21st day of September, 2009.


IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

INSTRUCTIONS FOR SERVICE AND NOTICE OF RIGHT TO APPEAL/OBJECT

A copy of these findings, conclusions and recommendation shall be served on all parties in the manner provided by law. Any party who objects to any part of these findings, conclusions and recommendation must file specific written objections within 10 days after being served with a copy. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1); Fed. R. Civ. P. 72(b). In order to be specific, an objection must identify the specific finding or recommendation to which objection is made, state the basis for the objection, and specify the place in the magistrate judge's findings, conclusions and recommendation where the disputed determination is found. An objection that merely incorporates by reference or refers to the briefing before the magistrate judge is not specific. Failure to file specific written objections will bar the aggrieved party from appealing the factual findings and legal conclusions of the magistrate judge that are accepted or adopted by the district court, except upon grounds of plain error. *See Douglass v. United Servs. Automobile Ass'n*, 79 F.3d 1415, 1417 (5th Cir. 1996).


IRMA CARRILLO RAMIREZ
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE