

made. United States v. Raddatz, 447 U.S. 667, 673-75 (1980). The court need not address any nonspecific, frivolous, or conclusory objections. Battle v. United States Parole Comm'n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).

The Magistrate Judge recommends that Brown's petition be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred insofar as it seeks relief from the Bureau of Prison's ("BOP's") denials of mandatory supervision and/or parole on July 25, 2001, and August 10, 2004, and denied insofar as it seeks relief from the BOP's July 7, 2007 denial. Jones makes no specific objection to any findings of the magistrate judge, but instead cites to various case law and statutes. Petitioner cites case law suggesting that he is entitled to mandatory supervision. While Texas's mandatory supervision scheme does create a constitutional expectancy of early release, Malchi v. Thaler, 211 F.3d 953, 957 (5th Cir. 2000), Jones does not qualify for mandatory supervision because he is serving a sentence for aggravated assault. FC&R at 4. Accordingly, this objection is without merit. Even a liberal reading of petitioner's objections does not contain an objection to the magistrate's conclusion that two of Brown's claims are time-barred.¹

Therefore,

The court accepts the findings, conclusions, and recommendation of the Magistrate Judge and ORDERS that the

¹Brown includes case law relevant to the statute of limitations for tort, antitrust, and malpractice actions. Insofar as these references can be construed as an objection, the court finds it without merit.

petition of Jerome D. Brown for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 2254 be, and is hereby, dismissed with prejudice insofar as it seeks relief from the BOP's denials of mandatory supervision and/or parole in 2001 and 2004, and denied insofar as it seeks relief from the July 7, 2007 denial.

SIGNED October 3, 2008.



JOHN MCBRYDE
United States District Judge