IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS CORPUS CHRISTI DIVISION

JUAN HERMOSILLO,	§	
Plaintiff,	§	
	§	
v.	§	C.A. NO. C-11-306
	§	
MRS. HUDSON, ET AL.,	§	
Defendants.	§	

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER DENYING SECOND MOTION FOR APPOINTMENT OF COUNSEL

Plaintiff is an inmate previously assigned to the McConnell Unit of TDCJ-CID. He alleges in this lawsuit filed pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 that certain defendants were deliberately indifferent to his serious medical needs (D.E. 1). Pending is plaintiff's second motion for appointment of counsel (D.E. 23).

In <u>Bounds v. Smith</u>, the Supreme Court held that a prisoner's constitutional right of access to the courts requires that the access be meaningful; that is, prison officials must provide pro se litigants with writing materials, access to the law library, or other forms of legal assistance. <u>Bounds v. Smith</u>, 430 U.S. 817, 829 (1977). There is, however, no constitutional right to appointment of counsel in civil rights cases. <u>Akasike v. Fitzpatrick</u>, 26 F.3d 510, 512 (5th Cir. 1994); <u>Branch v. Cole</u>, 686 F.2d 264, 266 (5th Cir. 1982). Further, <u>Bounds</u> did not create a "free-standing right to a law library or legal assistance." <u>Lewis v. Casey</u>, 116 S. Ct. 2174, 2180 (1996). It is within the Court's discretion to appoint counsel, unless the case presents "exceptional circumstances," thus requiring the appointment. 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1); Cupit v. Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987).

A number of factors should be examined when determining whether to appoint counsel. <u>Jackson v. Dallas Police Department</u>, 811 F.2d 260, 261-62 (5th Cir. 1986) (citing <u>Ulmer v. Chancellor</u>, 691 F.2d 209 (5th Cir. 1982)). The first is the type and complexity of the case. <u>Id.</u> Though serious, plaintiff's allegations are not complex. He has alleged that Dr. Stein and Nurse Hudson failed to diagnose his severe degenerative disc disease of the lumbar spine, and Wardens Herrera and Staples ignored his medical condition and assigned him work that was not consistent with the condition of his back (D.E. 1).

The second and third factors are whether the plaintiff is in a position to adequately investigate and present his case. Plaintiff's pleadings demonstrate that he is reasonably intelligent, articulate, and able to describe the facts underlying his claims. He appears, at this stage of the case, to be in a position to adequately investigate and present his case.

The fourth factor which should be examined is whether the evidence will consist in large part of conflicting testimony so as to require skill in the presentation of evidence and in cross-examination. Examination of this factor is premature. Service of process was ordered, answers have been filed, and dispositive motions are not due until April 6, 2012 (D.E. 12, 17, 21, 22).

Plaintiff has not shown that exceptional circumstances require the appointment of counsel. In addition, there is no indication that appointed counsel would aid in the efficient and equitable disposition of the case. The Court has the authority to award attorneys' fees to a prevailing plaintiff. 42 U.S.C. § 1988. Plaintiff is not prohibited from hiring an attorney on a contingent-fee arrangement. Plaintiff's motion for appointment of counsel (D.E. 23) is

denied without prejudice at this time. This order will be *sua sponte* reexamined as the case proceeds.

ORDERED this 23rd day of January, 2012.

B. JANICE ELLINGTON

UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE