Adams v. Lumpkin Doc. 4

United States District Court Southern District of Texas

#### **ENTERED**

February 28, 2024
Nathan Ochsner, Clerk

# UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS HOUSTON DIVISION

ALEX ADAMS, \$
TDCJ # 01181239, \$

Petitioner, \$

VS. \$
CIVIL ACTION NO. 4:24-0694

\$
BOBBY LUMPKIN, \$

### MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER

State inmate Alex Adams has filed a petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Dkt. 1). Having reviewed this matter under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, *et seq.*, and Rule 4 of the Rules Governing § 2254 Cases in the United States District Courts, and having considered the pleadings, the applicable law, and all matters of record, the Court will **DISMISS** this case for the reasons explained below.

### I. BACKGROUND

Respondent.

Adams' petition challenges his conviction and life sentence for capital murder imposed on October 23, 2002, in the 208th District Court of Harris County, Case No. 878065. On July 9, 2003, Adams was convicted of attempted capital murder in the same court, Case No. 878066, and received another life sentence. *See* Dkt. 1; Inmate Information Search, Texas Department of Criminal Justice, available at https://inmate.tdcj.texas.gov/InmateSearch (last visited Feb. 27, 2024); Record Search, Harris County District Clerk, https://www.hcdistrictclerk.com/ (last visited Feb. 27, 2024).

Adams previously filed a federal habeas petition challenging his convictions for capital murder and attempted capital murder. *See Adams v. Davis*, Civil Action No. 4:17-0576 (S.D. Tex.) In that case, Adams claimed that he was actually innocent of the crimes for which he had been convicted, citing to untested evidence and uncalled witnesses. On April 28, 2017, the court dismissed his petition as time-barred. *Id.* (Dkt. 5; Dkt. 6). In 2021, Adams filed another federal petition challenging the same convictions and claiming actual innocence. *See Adams v. Lumpkin*, Civil Action No. 4:21-3920 (S.D. Tex.). On September 30, 2022, the court dismissed the petition as successive, noting that his claims could have been raised in his earlier petition or could have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence. *Id.* (Dkt. 13; Dkt. 14).

Adams' current petition claims that he is actually innocent based on DNA evidence from 2017, among other claims (Dkt. 1, at 5-11).

## II. <u>DISCUSSION</u>

This case is governed by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241 *et seq.* AEDPA imposes restrictions on "second or successive" applications for habeas relief. Before a second or successive application permitted by AEDPA may be filed in the district court, the applicant must move in the appropriate court of appeals for an order authorizing the district court to consider the application. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A). If a pending petition qualifies as a successive writ application, this court has no jurisdiction to consider it absent prior authorization from the Fifth Circuit. "Indeed, the purpose of [28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)] was to eliminate the need for the district courts to repeatedly consider challenges to the same conviction unless an 2/5

appellate panel first found that those challenges had some merit." *United States v. Key*, 205 F.3d 773, 774 (5th Cir. 2000) (citing *In re Cain*, 137 F.3d 234, 235 (5th Cir. 1998)).

A prisoner's application is not "second or successive" merely because it follows an earlier petition, but rather when it either: (1) "raises a claim challenging the petitioner's conviction or sentence that was or could have been raised in an earlier petition"; or (2) "otherwise constitutes an abuse of the writ." *Cain*, 137 F.3d at 235; see *Adams v. Thaler*, 679 F.3d 312, 322 (5th Cir. 2012). If a claim in a second or successive petition was presented in a previous petition, it must be dismissed. 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). If a claim in a second or successive petition was not presented in a previous petition, it must be dismissed unless the petitioner satisfies the following standard:

- (A) the applicant shows that the claim relies on a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive to cases on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable; *or*
- (B) (i) the factual predicate for the claim could not have been discovered previously through the exercise of due diligence; *and* 
  - (ii) the facts underlying the claim, if proven and viewed in light of the evidence as a whole, would be sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that, but for constitutional error, no reasonable factfinder would have found the applicant guilty of the underlying offense.

## 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) (emphasis added).

Adams' current petition challenging his 2002 conviction meets the second-or-successive criteria. *See Crone v. Cockrell*, 324 F.3d 833, 837-38 (5th Cir. 2003). To the extent his petition re-urges habeas claims that were dismissed in his earlier federal proceedings, his claims must be dismissed under 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(1). To the extent he

argues that he brings new claims that could not have been previously discovered, this Court lacks jurisdiction over his claims because he has not directed the Court's attention to any order from the Fifth Circuit authorizing the filing of his petition. Therefore, even assuming that the petitioner could satisfy the strict standards in 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2) for new claims, this Court would lack jurisdiction over the claims. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(3)(A); *Adams*, 679 F.3d at 321; *Crone*, 324 F.3d 837-38.

For the reasons stated above, the Court will dismiss this habeas action as an unauthorized successive writ.

## III. <u>CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY</u>

Habeas corpus actions under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 or § 2255 require a certificate of appealability to proceed on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(1); *Miller-El v. Cockrell*, 537 U.S. 322, 335-36 (2003). Rule 11 of the Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases requires a district court to issue or deny a certificate of appealability when entering a final order that is adverse to the petitioner.

A certificate of appealability will not issue unless the petitioner makes "a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right," 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2), which requires a petitioner to demonstrate "that reasonable jurists would find the district court's assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong." *Tennard v. Dretke*, 542 U.S. 274, 282 (2004) (quoting *Slack v. McDaniel*, 529 U.S. 473, 484 (2000)). Under the controlling standard, a petitioner must show "that reasonable jurists could debate whether (or, for that matter, agree that) the petition should have been resolved in a different manner or that the issues presented were adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed further." *Miller-El*, 4/5

537 U.S. at 336 (cleaned up). Where denial of relief is based on procedural grounds, the

petitioner must show not only that "jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the

district court was correct in its procedural ruling" but also that the jurists "would find it

debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right."

Slack, 529 U.S. at 484; see Pierre v. Hooper, 51 F.4th 135, 137 (5th Cir. 2022) (a certificate

of appealability may not issue based solely on a debatable procedural ruling).

A district court may deny a certificate of appealability, *sua sponte*, without requiring

further briefing or argument. Alexander v. Johnson, 211 F.3d 895, 898 (5th Cir. 2000).

After careful review of the pleadings and the applicable law, the Court concludes that

reasonable jurists would not find its assessment of the claims debatable or wrong. Because

the petitioner does not allege facts showing that his claims could be resolved in a different

manner, a certificate of appealability will not issue in this case.

IV. **CONCLUSION** 

Based on the foregoing, the Court **ORDERS** as follows:

1. This habeas action is **DISMISSED** without prejudice as an unauthorized

successive petition.

2. All pending motions are **DENIED** as moot.

3. A certificate of appealability is **DENIED**.

The Clerk will provide copies of this order to the parties.

SIGNED at Houston, Texas, on February 28

. 2024.

UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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