

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
AUSTIN DIVISION**

<b>KEITH BERNARD PAYNE #95671</b>	§	
	§	
<b>V.</b>	§	<b>A-11-CA-342-SS</b>
	§	
<b>DR. INMAN, JEFF BLUM, and</b>	§	
<b>ASHLEY WEITZ</b>	§	

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

TO: THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(f) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates, as amended, effective December 1, 2002.

Before the Court are Plaintiff's complaint and more definite statement. Plaintiff, proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis.

**STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

At the time he filed his complaint pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, Plaintiff was hospitalized at the Austin State Hospital. Plaintiff alleges his Eighth and Fourteenth Amendment rights were violated when Plaintiff's blood was removed from him. Plaintiff sues Dr. Inman, Jeff Blum and Ashley Weitz.

After consideration of Plaintiff's complaint, the Court ordered Plaintiff to file a more definite statement. Plaintiff indicates he is currently a patient at the Austin State Hospital due to his "mental

state stability check-up.” Plaintiff explains in his more definite statement that Dr. Inman ordered her staff to withdraw Plaintiff’s blood for testing. Accordingly to Plaintiff, Jeff Blum withdrew the blood from Plaintiff’s left arm on April 18, 2011, and Ashley Weitz helped hold Plaintiff while the blood was withdrawn. Plaintiff alleges a “blood knot” formed as a result of the withdrawal of blood. Plaintiff seeks \$90,000.00 in damages due to the “blood knot.”

### DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS

#### A. Standard Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)

An in forma pauperis proceeding may be dismissed sua sponte under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e) if the court determines the complaint is frivolous, malicious, fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted or seeks monetary relief against a defendant who is immune from suit. A dismissal for frivolousness or maliciousness may occur at any time, before or after service of process and before or after the defendant’s answer. Green v. McKaskle, 788 F.2d 1116, 1119 (5th Cir. 1986).

When reviewing a plaintiff’s complaint, the court must construe plaintiff’s allegations as liberally as possible. Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 92 S. Ct. 594 (1972). However, the petitioner’s pro se status does not offer him “an impenetrable shield, for one acting pro se has no license to harass others, clog the judicial machinery with meritless litigation and abuse already overloaded court dockets.” Ferguson v. MBank Houston, N.A., 808 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1986).

#### B. Eleventh Amendment Immunity

Being sued in their official capacities for monetary damages, Defendants are immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment because such an action is the same as a suit against the sovereign. Pennhurst State School Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 104 S. Ct. 900 (1984). The Eleventh Amendment generally divests federal courts of jurisdiction to entertain suits directed

against states. Port Auth. Trans-Hudson v. Feeney, 495 U.S. 299, 304, 110 S. Ct. 1868, 1871 (1990).

The Eleventh Amendment may not be evaded by suing state agencies or state employees in their official capacity because such an indirect pleading remains in essence a claim upon the state treasury.

Green v. State Bar of Texas, 27 F.3d 1083,1087 (5th Cir. 1994).

### C. Negligence

Plaintiff's claims are merely based on negligence or a disagreement with treatment. He has not adequately alleged that he has been deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States. "Section 1983 imposes liability for violation of rights protected by the Constitution, not for violations of duties of care arising out of [state] tort law." Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 146, 99 S. Ct. 2689 (1979). Mere negligence is not actionable under § 1983. Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 328, 106 S. Ct. 662 (1986) (concluding that "the Due Process Clause is simply not implicated by a negligent act of an official causing unintended loss of or injury to life, liberty, or property"); Davidson v. Cannon, 474 U.S. 344, 347-48, 106 S. Ct. 668 (1986) (stating that "[r]espondents' lack of due care ... simply does not approach the sort of abusive government conduct that the Due Process Clause was designed to prevent"); Lemoine v. New Horizons Ranch & Ctr., Inc., 174 F.3d 629, 635 (5th Cir. 1999) (stating that "negligence on the part of state officials does not suffice to make out any due process violation under the Fourteenth Amendment"). Negligence is simply insufficient to impose liability under § 1983. Oliver v. Collins, 914 F.2d 56, 60 (5th Cir. 1990). In addition, "[d]isagreement with medical treatment alone cannot support a claim under § 1983." Gibbs v. Grimmette, 254 F.3d 545, 549 (5th Cir. 2001).

## RECOMMENDATION

It is therefore recommended that Plaintiff's complaint be dismissed with prejudice as frivolous pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e).

It is further recommended that the Court include within its judgment a provision expressly and specifically warning Plaintiff that filing or pursuing any further frivolous lawsuits may result in (a) the imposition of court costs pursuant to Section 1915(f); (b) the imposition of significant monetary sanctions pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 11; (c) the imposition of an order barring Plaintiff from filing any lawsuits in this Court without first obtaining the permission from a District Judge of this Court or a Circuit Judge of the Fifth Circuit; or (d) the imposition of an order imposing some combination of these sanctions.

## OBJECTIONS

Within 14 days after receipt of the magistrate judge's report, any party may serve and file written objections to the findings and recommendations of the magistrate judge. 28 U.S.C. § 636 (b)(1)(C). Failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained within this report within 14 days after service shall bar an aggrieved party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and recommendations and from appellate review of factual findings accepted or adopted by the district court except on grounds of plain error or manifest injustice. Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 148 (1985); Rodriguez v. Bowen, 857 F.2d 275, 276-277 (5th Cir. 1988).

To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is

ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return receipt requested.

SIGNED this 29<sup>th</sup> day of August, 2011.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. Austin", written over a horizontal line.

ANDREW W. AUSTIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE