

**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF TEXAS  
AUSTIN DIVISION**

**JOHN TODD,**

§

**V.**

§

**A-12-CA-048-SS**

§

§

**RICK THALER, Director, Texas Dept. of  
Criminal Justice- Correctional Institutions  
Division,**

§

§

§

**REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION  
OF UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE**

TO: THE HONORABLE SAM SPARKS  
UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

The Magistrate Judge submits this Report and Recommendation to the District Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §636(b) and Rule 1(e) of Appendix C of the Local Court Rules of the United States District Court for the Western District of Texas, Local Rules for the Assignment of Duties to United States Magistrates, as amended, effective December 1, 2002.

Before the Court are Petitioner's Application for Habeas Corpus Relief under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 (Document 1) and Respondent's Answer (Document 12). Petitioner, proceeding pro se, has been granted leave to proceed in forma pauperis. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's application for writ of habeas corpus should be dismissed. Alternatively, the undersigned finds that Petitioner's application should be denied.

**I. STATEMENT OF THE CASE**

**A. Petitioner's Criminal History**

According to Respondent, the Director has custody of Petitioner pursuant to a judgment and sentence of the 167th Judicial District Court of Travis County, Texas. Petitioner was convicted of burglary of a building and was sentenced to ten years in prison on September 15, 1988. Petitioner

does not challenge his holding conviction. Rather, Petitioner argues he was wrongfully denied “street time” sentence credits upon his return to TDCJ custody as a parole violator.

Petitioner was released on parole on October 24, 1989. A warrant initiating parole revocation proceedings was issued on January 23, 1990. The warrant was not executed until January 5, 2008. Following a parole revocation hearing, on February 19, 2008, the hearing officer concluded that Petitioner had violated four conditions of his parole. Consequently, Petitioner’s parole was revoked on February 28, 2008. Respondent asserts Petitioner’s return to TDCJ custody caused him to forfeit eighteen years, two months, and eleven days of “street time” accrued during his release on parole.

Petitioner filed a time dispute resolution (“TDR”) form with the Classification and Records Department (“CRD”) of TDCJ on March 4, 2009. The CRD responded on August 28, 2009, that there was no error in Petitioner’s time calculation.

On April 28, 2010, Petitioner filed an application for state writ of habeas corpus, asserting a time credit dispute related to his parole revocation. Ex parte Todd, Appl. No. 74,148-01 at 8. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied the application without written order on the findings of the trial court without a hearing on June 30, 2010. Id. at cover.

On November 10, 2011, Petitioner filed a second application for state writ of habeas corpus, again asserting a time credit dispute related to his parole revocation. Ex parte Todd, Appl. No. 74,148-02 at 6. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals dismissed the application pursuant to Section 501.0081(b)-(c) of the Texas Government Code on December 21, 2011.<sup>1</sup>

---

<sup>1</sup>A Texas prison inmate may not file an application for a writ of habeas corpus in state court in order to exhaust his state habeas corpus remedies regarding time credit disputes until he has complied with the requirements of Texas Government Code § 501.0081, requiring him to first file a time credit dispute resolution form with prison officials. The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals will dismiss any application for a writ of habeas corpus about time credit issues where an inmate failed

**B. Exhaustion of State Court Remedies**

Respondent does not contest that Petitioner has exhausted his state court remedies regarding the claims brought in this application. A review of the state court records submitted by Respondent shows that Petitioner has properly raised these claims in previous state court proceedings. However, Respondent does argue Petitioner’s application is time-barred.

**II. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS**

**A. Statute of Limitations**

The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”) establishes a one-year statute of limitations for state inmates seeking federal habeas corpus relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2244(d). That section provides, in relevant part:

(d)(1) A 1-year period of limitation shall apply to an application for a writ of habeas corpus by a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court. The limitation period shall run from the latest of—

(A) the date on which the judgment became final by the conclusion of direct review or the expiration of the time for seeking such review;

(B) the date on which the impediment to filing an application created by State action in violation of the Constitution or laws of the United States is removed, if the applicant was prevented from filing by such State action;

(C) the date on which the constitutional right asserted was initially recognized by the Supreme Court, if the right has been newly recognized by the Supreme Court and made retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review; or

(D) the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.

---

to comply with the statute. Ex parte Shepherd, 65 S.W.2d 673, 674 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002); Ex parte Stokes, 15 S.W.3d 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2000).

(2) The time during which a properly filed application for State post-conviction or other collateral review with respect to the pertinent judgment or claim is pending shall not be counted toward any period of limitation under this subsection.

Subsection 2244(d)(1)(D) governs the timeliness of claims predicated on parole decisions.

Goodwin v. Dretke, 118 F. App'x 817, 818 (5th Cir. 2004). The limitations period begins on “the date on which the factual predicate of the claim or claims presented could have been discovered through the exercise of due diligence.” § 2244(d)(1)(D). Petitioner could have discovered the factual predicate of his claims on February 28, 2008, the date his parole was revoked. Therefore, Petitioner had until February 28, 2009, to timely file his federal application. Petitioner did not execute his federal application until December 30, 2011, more than two years after the limitations period had expired. Petitioner’s time-credit dispute filed March 4, 2009, and his two state applications for habeas corpus relief filed April 28, 2010, and November 10, 2011, did not operate to toll the limitations period, because they were filed after the limitations period had already expired. Scott v. Johnson, 227 F.3d 260, 263 (5th Cir. 2000).

The record does not reflect that any unconstitutional state action impeded Petitioner from filing for federal habeas corpus relief prior to the end of the limitations period. Furthermore, Petitioner has not shown that he did not know the factual predicate of his claims earlier. Finally, the claims do not concern a constitutional right recognized by the Supreme Court within the last year and made retroactive to cases on collateral review. Accordingly, Petitioner’s application should be dismissed as time-barred.

**B. The Claims Lack Merit**

Alternatively, Petitioner’s application should be denied. The Supreme Court recently had the opportunity to summarize the basic principles that have grown out of the Court’s many cases

interpreting the 1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act. See Harrington v. Richter, – U.S. –, 131 S. Ct. 770, 783-85 (2011). The Court noted that the starting point for any federal court in reviewing a state conviction is 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which states in part:

An application for a writ of habeas corpus on behalf of a person in custody pursuant to the judgment of a State court shall not be granted with respect to any claim that was adjudicated on the merits in State court proceedings unless the adjudication of the claim–

- (1) resulted in a decision that was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States; or
- (2) resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts in light of the evidence presented in the State court proceeding.

28 U.S.C. § 2254(d). The Court noted that “[b]y its terms § 2254(d) bars relitigation of any claim ‘adjudicated on the merits’ in state court, subject only to the exceptions in §§ 2254(d)(1) and (d)(2).” Harrington, 131 S. Ct. at 784.

One of the issues Harrington resolved was “whether § 2254(d) applies when a state court’s order is unaccompanied by an opinion explaining the reasons relief has been denied.” Id. Following all of the Courts of Appeals’ decisions on this question, Harrington concluded that the deference due a state court decision under § 2254(d) “does not require that there be an opinion from the state court explaining the state court’s reasoning.” Id. (citations omitted). The Court noted that it had previously concluded that “a state court need not cite nor even be aware of our cases under § 2254(d).” Id. (citing Early v. Packer, 537 U.S. 3, 8 (2002) (per curiam)). When there is no explanation with a state court decision, the habeas petitioner’s burden is to show there was “no reasonable basis for the state court to deny relief.” Id. And even when a state court fails to state

which of the elements in a multi-part claim it found insufficient, deference is still due to that decision, because “§ 2254(d) applies when a ‘claim,’ not a component of one, has been adjudicated.”

Id.

As Harrington noted, § 2254(d) permits the granting of federal habeas relief in only three circumstances: (1) when the earlier state court’s decision “was contrary to” federal law then clearly established in the holdings of the Supreme Court; (2) when the earlier decision “involved an unreasonable application of” such law; or (3) when the decision “was based on an unreasonable determination of the facts” in light of the record before the state court. Id. at 785 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d); Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362, 412, 120 S. Ct. 1495, 1523 (2000)). The “contrary to” requirement “refers to the holdings, as opposed to the dicta, of . . . [the Supreme Court’s] decisions as of the time of the relevant state-court decision.” Dowthitt v. Johnson, 230 F.3d 733, 740 (5th Cir. 2000) (quotation and citation omitted).

Under the “contrary to” clause, a federal habeas court may grant the writ if the state court arrives at a conclusion opposite to that reached by . . . [the Supreme Court] on a question of law or if the state court decides a case differently than . . . [the Supreme Court] has on a set of materially indistinguishable facts.

Id. at 740-41 (quotation and citation omitted). Under the “unreasonable application” clause of § 2254(d)(1), a federal court may grant the writ “if the state court identifies the correct governing legal principle from . . . [the Supreme Court’s] decisions but unreasonably applies that principle to the facts of the prisoner’s case.” Id. at 741 (quotation and citation omitted). The provisions of § 2254(d)(2), which allow the granting of federal habeas relief when the state court made an “unreasonable determination of the facts,” are limited by the terms of the next section of the statute, § 2254(e). That section states that a federal court must presume state court fact determinations to

be correct, though a petitioner can rebut that presumption by clear and convincing evidence. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e)(1). But absent such a showing, the federal court must give deference to the state court's fact findings. Id.

### **1. Street-Time Credits**

Petitioner argues he is entitled to credit for the time he spent on parole, also known as “street time.” The law in this Circuit firmly establishes that time spent on parole or mandatory supervision does not operate to reduce the sentence of a parole or mandatory supervision violator returned to prison. The courts have consistently held that by violating parole or mandatory supervision a prisoner forfeits all credit of good conduct time accumulated prior to release and all credit for time on parole or mandatory supervision before the violation. See Cortinas v. United States Parole Comm’n, 938 F.2d 43 (5th Cir. 1991); Munguia v. United States Parole Comm’n, 871 F.2d 517, 521 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 493 U.S. 856, 110 S. Ct. 161 (1989); United States v. Newton, 698 F.2d 770, 772 (5th Cir. 1983); Starnes v. Cornett, 464 F.2d 524 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 987, 93 S. Ct. 341 (1972); Betts v. Beto, 424 F.2d 1299 (1970). Thus, Petitioner has no federal constitutional right to reduction of his sentence for time spent on parole. Additionally, the Court notes parole and mandatory supervision conditions are not additional to, but rather part of, the original sentence. See Coronado v. United States Board of Parole, 540 F.2d 216, 218 (5th Cir. 1976); Sturgis v. United States, 419 F.2d 390 (5th Cir. 1969). Petitioner is not being forced to serve more than his ten-year sentence. Petitioner violated the terms of his supervision, and as a result, lost any credit for the time he spent on parole.

Petitioner is also not entitled to his street-time credit under Texas law. The Texas parole statute in effect at the time the controlling offense was committed (August 5, 1988) provides in relevant part:

When a person's parole, mandatory supervision, or conditional pardon is revoked, that person may be required to serve the portion remaining of the sentence on which he was released, such portion remaining to be calculated without credit for the time from the date of his release to the date of revocation.

TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42.18 § 15(a) (West 1988) (currently TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.156(e) (West 2012). Accordingly, Petitioner was never entitled to receive a reduction of his sentence for the time he spent on parole. In addition, Petitioner does not deny he received notice prior to his release on parole that he would not receive credit for the time spent on parole if his parole was revoked.

Finally, even under the Texas statute addressing street-time credit in effect at the time of Petitioner's revocation in 2008, Petitioner is not entitled to credit. That statute read in pertinent part:

- (c) If the parole, mandatory supervision, or conditional pardon of a person other than a person described by Section 508.149(a) is revoked, the person may be required to serve the remaining portion of the sentence on which the person was released. For a person who on the date of issuance of a warrant or summons initiating the revocation process is subject to a sentence the remaining portion of which is greater than the amount of time from the date of the person's release to the date of issuance of the warrant or summons, the remaining portion is to be served without credit for the time from the date of the person's release to the date of revocation. For a person who on the date of issuance of the warrant or summons is subject to a sentence the remaining portion of which is less than the amount of time from the date of the person's release to the date of issuance of the warrant or summons, the remaining portion is to be served without credit for an amount to time equal to the remaining portion of the sentence on the date of issuance of the warrant or citation.



TEX. GOV'T CODE ANN. § 508.283(West 2008). Under this section, Petitioner would have been entitled to credit for street time if on the date his warrant issued, he was “subject to a sentence the remaining portion of which [was] less than the amount of time from the date of the person’s release to the date of issuance of the warrant or summons.” According to Respondent, Petitioner’s midpoint calculation date was March 18, 1994. Because the pre-revocation warrant for Petitioner’s arrest was issued on January 23, 1990, Petitioner failed to make it to his midpoint calculation date. As a result, Petitioner is not entitled to receive street-time credit under Section 508.283. Having independently reviewed the entire state court record, this Court finds nothing unreasonable in the state court’s application of clearly established federal law or in the state court’s determination of facts in light of the evidence.

### **III. RECOMMENDATION**

It is recommended that Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be dismissed with prejudice as time-barred. It is alternatively recommended that Petitioner’s application for writ of habeas corpus be denied.

### **IV. CERTIFICATE OF APPEALABILITY**

An appeal may not be taken to the court of appeals from a final order in a habeas corpus proceeding “unless a circuit justice or judge issues a certificate of appealability.” 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c) (1)(A). Pursuant to Rule 11 of the Federal Rules Governing Section 2254 Cases, effective December 1, 2009, the district court must issue or deny a certificate of appealability when it enters a final order adverse to the applicant.

A certificate of appealability may issue only if a petitioner has made a substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right. 28 U.S.C. § 2253(c)(2). The Supreme Court fully explained

the requirement associated with a “substantial showing of the denial of a constitutional right” in Slack v. McDaniel, 529 U.S. 473, 484, 120 S. Ct. 1595 (2000). In cases where a district court rejected a petitioner’s constitutional claims on the merits, “the petitioner must demonstrate that reasonable jurists would find the district court’s assessment of the constitutional claims debatable or wrong.” Id. “When a district court denies a habeas petition on procedural grounds without reaching the petitioner’s underlying constitutional claim, a COA should issue when the petitioner shows, at least, that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the petition states a valid claim of the denial of a constitutional right and that jurists of reason would find it debatable whether the district court was correct in its procedural ruling.” Id.

In this case, reasonable jurists could not debate the dismissal or denial of the Petitioner’s section 2254 petition on substantive or procedural grounds, nor find that the issues presented are adequate to deserve encouragement to proceed. Miller-El v. Cockrell, 537 U.S. 322, 327, 123 S. Ct. 1029 (2003) (citing Slack, 529 U.S. at 484). Accordingly, it is respectfully recommended that the Court shall not issue a certificate of appealability.

## **V. OBJECTIONS**


The parties may file objections to this Report and Recommendation. A party filing objections must specifically identify those findings or recommendations to which objections are being made. The District Court need not consider frivolous, conclusive, or general objections. Battles v. United States Parole Comm’n, 834 F.2d 419, 421 (5th Cir. 1987).

A party’s failure to file written objections to the proposed findings and recommendations contained in this Report within fourteen (14) days after the party is served with a copy of the Report shall bar that party from de novo review by the district court of the proposed findings and

recommendations in the Report and, except upon grounds of plain error, shall bar the party from appellate review of unobjected-to proposed factual findings and legal conclusions accepted by the district court. See 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(C); Thomas v. Arn, 474 U.S. 140, 150-153, 106 S. Ct. 466, 472-74 (1985); Douglass v. United Servs. Auto. Assoc., 79 F.3d 1415 (5th Cir. 1996)(en banc).

To the extent that a party has not been served by the Clerk with this Report and Recommendation electronically, pursuant to the CM/ECF procedures of this District, the Clerk is ORDERED to mail such party a copy of this Report and Recommendation by certified mail, return receipt requested.

SIGNED this 30<sup>th</sup> day of May, 2012.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "A. Austin", written over a horizontal line.

ANDREW W. AUSTIN  
UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE