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**IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE DISTRICT OF UTAH**

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<p>TIMOTHY SHAWN STEVENS, Plaintiff, v. WEBER COUNTY et al., Defendants.</p>	<p><b>MEMORANDUM DECISION &amp; ORDER TO CURE DEFICIENT COMPLAINT</b></p> <p>Case No. 1:18-CV-128-DAK</p> <p>District Judge Dale A. Kimball</p>
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Plaintiff, inmate Timothy Shawn Stevens, brings this *pro se* civil-rights action, *see* 42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2019),<sup>1</sup> *in forma pauperis*, *see* 28 id. § 1915. Having now screened the Complaint, (Doc. No. 4), under its statutory review function,<sup>2</sup> the Court orders Plaintiff to file an amended complaint to cure deficiencies before further pursuing claims.

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<sup>1</sup>The federal statute creating a “civil action for deprivation of rights” reads, in pertinent part:

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State or Territory . . . , subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress, except that in any action brought against a judicial officer for an act or omission taken in such officer’s judicial capacity, injunctive relief shall not be granted unless a declaratory decree was violated or declaratory relief was unavailable.

42 U.S.C.S. § 1983 (2019).

<sup>2</sup> The screening statute reads:

(a) Screening.—The court shall review . . . a complaint in a civil action in which a prisoner seeks redress from a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.

(b) Grounds for dismissal.—On review, the court shall identify cognizable claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the complaint, if the complaint—

(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted; or

(2) seeks monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief.

28 U.S.C.S. § 1915A (2019).

## **COMPLAINT'S DEFICIENCIES**

Complaint:

- (a) does not properly affirmatively link defendants to civil-rights violations.
- (b) does not adequately state a conditions-confinement claim by a pretrial detainee (see below).
- (c) does not appear to state a proper legal-access claim by a pretrial detainee (see below).
- (d) states § 1983 claims in violation of municipal-liability doctrine (see below).
- (e) improperly names Weber County Sheriff's Department as § 1983 defendant, though it is not an independent legal entity that can sue or be sued.
- (f) appears to inappropriately allege civil-rights violations on respondeat-superior theory.
- (g) alleges possible constitutional violations resulting in injuries that appear to be prohibited by 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(e) (2019), which reads, "No Federal civil action may be brought by a prisoner . . . for mental or emotional injury suffered while in custody without a prior showing of a physical injury or the commission of a sexual act."
- (h) evinces confusion about what constitutes a cause of action under the American with Disabilities Act (ADA) (see below).

## **GUIDANCE FOR PLAINTIFF**

Rule 8 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure requires a complaint to contain "(1) a short and plain statement of the grounds for the court's jurisdiction . . .; (2) a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief; and (3) a demand for the relief sought." Rule 8's requirements mean to guarantee "that defendants enjoy fair notice of what the claims against them are and the grounds upon which they rest." *TV Commc'ns Network, Inc. v ESPN, Inc.*, 767 F. Supp. 1062, 1069 (D. Colo. 1991).

Pro se litigants are not excused from complying with these minimal pleading demands. "This is so because a pro se plaintiff requires no special legal training to recount the facts surrounding his alleged injury, and he must provide such facts if the court is to determine

whether he makes out a claim on which relief can be granted." *Hall v. Bellmon*, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir. 1991). Moreover, it is improper for the Court "to assume the role of advocate for a pro se litigant." *Id.* Thus, the Court cannot "supply additional facts, [or] construct a legal theory for plaintiff that assumes facts that have not been pleaded." *Dunn v. White*, 880 F.2d 1188, 1197 (10th Cir. 1989).

Plaintiff should consider these general points before filing an amended complaint:

- (1) The revised complaint must stand entirely on its own and shall not refer to, or incorporate by reference, any portion of the original complaint. *See Murray v. Archambo*, 132 F.3d 609, 612 (10th Cir. 1998) (stating amended complaint supersedes original). The amended complaint may also not be added to after it is filed without moving for amendment.<sup>3</sup>
- (2) The complaint must clearly state what each defendant--typically, a named government employee--did to violate Plaintiff's civil rights. *See Bennett v. Passic*, 545 F.2d 1260, 1262-63 (10th Cir. 1976) (stating personal participation of each named defendant is essential allegation in civil-rights action). "To state a claim, a complaint must 'make clear exactly *who* is alleged to have done *what* to *whom*.'" *Stone v. Albert*, 338 F. App'x 757, (10th Cir. 2009) (unpublished) (emphasis in original) (quoting *Robbins v. Oklahoma*, 519 F.3d 1242, 1250 (10th Cir. 2008)).

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<sup>3</sup> The rule on amending a pleading reads:

- (a) Amendments Before Trial.
  - (1) Amending as a Matter of Course. A party may amend its pleading once as a matter of course within:
    - (A) 21 days after serving it, or
    - (B) if the pleading is one to which a responsive pleading is required, 21 days after service of a responsive pleading or 21 days after service of a motion under Rule 12(b), (e), or (f), whichever is earlier.
  - (2) Other Amendments. In all other cases, a party may amend its pleadings only with the opposing party's written consent or the court's leave. The court should freely give leave when justice so requires.

Plaintiff should also include, as much as possible, specific dates or at least estimates of when alleged constitutional violations occurred.

(3) Each cause of action, together with the facts and citations that directly support it, should be stated separately. Plaintiff should be as brief as possible while still using enough words to fully explain the “who,” “what,” “where,” “when,” and “why” of each claim.

(4) Plaintiff may not name an individual as a defendant based solely on his or her supervisory position. *See Mitchell v. Maynard*, 80 F.2d 1433, 1441 (10th Cir. 1996) (stating supervisory status alone does not support § 1983 liability).

(5) Grievance denial alone with no connection to “violation of constitutional rights alleged by plaintiff, does not establish personal participation under § 1983.” *Gallagher v. Shelton*, No. 09-3113, 2009 U.S. App. LEXIS 25787, at \*11 (10th Cir. Nov. 24, 2009).

(6) “No action shall be brought with respect to prison conditions under . . . Federal law, by a prisoner confined in any jail, prison, or other correctional facility until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C.S. § 1997e(a) (2019). However, Plaintiff need not include information regarding grievances in his complaint. Exhaustion of administrative remedies is an affirmative defense that must be raised by Defendants to apply to this case. *Jones v. Bock*, 549 U.S. 199, 216 (2007).

#### • **Conditions of Confinement**

This passage from a Tenth Circuit case should be observed by Plaintiff in preparing his amended complaint:

Due process requires that a pretrial detainee not be punished prior to a lawful conviction. *Bell v. Wolfish*, 441 U.S. 520, 535 (1979); *Littlefield v. Deland*, 641 F.2d 729, 7331 (10th Cir. 1981). However, the government may subject those awaiting trial to the

conditions and restrictions of incarceration so long as those conditions and restrictions do not amount to punishment. *Bell*, 441 U.S. at 536-37.

The determination of whether a condition of pretrial detention amounts to punishment turns on whether the condition is imposed for the purpose of punishment or whether it is incident to some other legitimate government purpose. *Id.* at 538. If an act by a prison official, such as placing the detainee in segregation, is done with an intent to punish, the act constitutes unconstitutional pretrial punishment. *Id.* Similarly, "if a restriction or condition is not reasonably related to a legitimate [governmental] goal--if it is arbitrary or purposeless--a court permissibly may infer that the purpose of the governmental action is punishment." *Id.* at 539. On the other hand, restraints that "are reasonably related to the institution's interest in maintaining jail security do not, without more, constitute unconstitutional punishment, even if they are discomforting." *Id.* at 540. Obviously, "ensuring security and order at the institution is a permissible nonpunitive objective, whether the facility houses pretrial detainees, convicted inmates, or both." *Id.* at 561. Thus, "no process is required if [a pretrial detainee] is placed in segregation not as punishment but for managerial reasons." *Higgs v. Carver*, 286 F.3d 437, 438 (7th Cir. 2002).

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A detention center, however, has a legitimate interest in segregating individual inmates from the general population for nonpunitive reasons, including "threats to the safety and security of the institution." *Brown-El v. Delo*, 969 F.2d 644, 647 (8th Cir. 1992) (citing *Hewitt v. Helms*, 459 U.S. 460, 474-76 (1983)); see also *Bell*, 441 U.S. at 540.

*Peoples v. CCA Detention Centers*, 422 F.3d 1090, 1106 (10th Cir. 2005).

#### • Legal Access

As Plaintiff fashions his amended complaint, he should also keep in mind that it is well-recognized that the Tenth Circuit has "held that availability of law libraries is only one of many constitutionally acceptable methods of assuring meaningful access to courts, and pretrial detainees are not entitled to law library usage if other available means of access to court exist."

*United States v. Cooper*, 375 F.3d 1041, 1051 (10th Cir. 2009). And “provision of legal counsel is a constitutionally acceptable alternative to a prisoner’s demand to access a law library. Id. at 1051-52. Further, if a pretrial detainee, like Plaintiff, waives his right to representation in his criminal case, “he is not entitled to access to a law library or other legal materials.” *Id.* at 1052.

• **Municipal Liability**

To establish liability of municipal entities, such as Weber County, under § 1983, "a plaintiff must show (1) the existence of a municipal custom or policy and (2) a direct causal link between the custom or policy and the violation alleged." *Jenkins v. Wood*, 81 F.3d 988, 993-94 (10th Cir. 1996) (citing *City of Canton v. Harris*, 489 U.S. 378, 385 (1989)). Municipal entities may not be held liable under § 1983 based on the doctrine of *respondeat superior*. See *Cannon v. City and County of Denver*, 998 F.2d 867, 877 (10th Cir. 1993); see also *Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of N.Y.*, 436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978).

Plaintiff has not so far established a direct causal link between his alleged injuries and any custom or policy of Weber County. Thus, the Court concludes that Plaintiff's complaint, as it stands, appears to fail to state claims against Weber County.

• **ADA**

This is some information that Plaintiff may consider in amending his complaint:

To state a failure-to-accommodate claim under [ADA], [Plaintiff] must show: (1) he is a qualified individual with a disability; (2) he was "either excluded from participation in or denied the benefits of some public entity's services, programs, or activities"; (3) such exclusion or denial was by reason of his disability; and (4) [Weber County] knew he was disabled and required an accommodation.

*Ingram v. Clements*, 705 F. App’x 721, 725 (10th Cir. 2017) (quoting *J.V. v. Albuquerque Pub. Sch.*, 813 F.3d 1289, 1295, 1299 (10th Cir. 2016)). Further,

"Courts have recognized three ways to establish a discrimination claim: (1) intentional discrimination (disparate treatment); (2) disparate impact; and (3) failure to make a reasonable accommodation." *J.V.*, 813 F.3d at 1295. "The ADA requires more than physical access to public entities: it requires public entities to provide '*meaningful* access' to their programs and services."

*Robertson v. Las Animas County Sheriff's Dep't*, 500 F.3d 1185, 1195 (10th Cir. 2007). To effectuate this mandate, "the regulations require public entities to 'make reasonable modifications in policies, practices, or procedures when the modifications are necessary to avoid discrimination on the basis of disability.'" *Id.* (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(b)(7)).

*Villa v. Dep't of Corrs.*, 664 Fed. App'x 731, 734 (10th Cir. 2016).

## **ORDER**


**IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that:

- (1) Plaintiff must within thirty days cure the Complaint's deficiencies noted above by filing a document entitled, "Amended Complaint."
- (2) The Clerk's Office shall mail Plaintiff the Pro Se Litigant Guide with a blank-form civil-rights complaint which Plaintiff must use if he wishes to pursue an amended complaint.
- (3) If Plaintiff fails to timely cure the above deficiencies according to this Order's instructions, this action will be dismissed without further notice.

(4) Plaintiff shall not try to serve the amended complaint on Defendants; instead the Court will perform its screening function and determine itself whether the amended complaint warrants service. No motion for service of process is needed. *See* 28 U.S.C.S. § 1915(d) (2019) (“The officers of the court shall issue and serve all process, and perform all duties in [*in forma pauperis*] cases.”).

DATED this 24th day of May, 2019.

BY THE COURT:



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JUDGE DALE A. KIMBALL  
United States District Court