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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE

EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA

Alexandria Division

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ROSETTA STONE, LTD,

Plaintiff,

VS.

April 23, 2010

GOOGLE, INC.,

Defendant.

## REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT

### MOTIONS HEARING

BEFORE: THE HONORABLE GERALD BRUCE LEE UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

#### APPEARANCES:

FOR THE PLAINTIFF: SKADDEN ARPS SLATE MEAGHER & FLOM LLP

BY: WARREN ALLEN, ESQ.

MITCHELL ETTINGER, ESQ.

DAVID LELAND, ESQ.

JENNIFER SPAZIANO, ESQ.

FOR THE DEFENDANT: ODIN FELDMAN & PITTLEMAN PC

BY: JONATHAN D. FRIEDEN, ESQ.

STEPHEN COBB, ESQ.

QUINN EMANUEL URQUHART OLIVER

BY: MARGRET CARUSO, ESQ.

JONATHAN OBLAK, ESQ.

ADAM BAREA, ESQ.

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OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER: RENECIA A. SMITH-WILSON, RMR, CRR

U.S. District Court

401 Courthouse Square, 5th Floor

Alexandria, VA 22314

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ARGUMENT BY THE PLAINTIFF 4, 33

ARGUMENT BY THE DEFENDANT 25, 35

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1
                      (Thereupon, the following was heard in open
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       court at 12:39 p.m.)
                     THE CLERK: 1:09 civil 736 Rosetta Stone,
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       LTD versus Google, Incorporated.
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                     Would counsel please note your appearances
       for the record.
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                     MR. ALLEN: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
       name is Warren Allen. I'm here on behalf of plaintiff
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       Rosetta Stone.
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                     With me are Mitchell Ettinger, David Leland
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       and Jennifer Spaziano from Skadden Aps.
                     THE COURT: All right, good afternoon.
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                     MR. FRIEDEN: Good morning, Your Honor.
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       John Frieden, Oden Feldman & Pittleman for Google.
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                     With me are Steven Cobb, Margret Caruso,
16
       Adam Barea who is the general counsel for Google and
       Jonathan Oblak.
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                     THE COURT: Good afternoon.
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                     I realize that there are several motions
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       here, and I have read and I think that what I would like
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       to do is to take up the plaintiff's motion for partial
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       summary judgment and the defendant's motion for summary
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       judgment, take them up both first. I can't tell who filed
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       first?
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                                     They were filed
                     MR. ETTINGER:
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1 simultaneously. 2 THE COURT: They were filed simultaneously. 3 All right, then plaintiff goes first. 4 MR. ETTINGER: Thank you, Judge. 5 Mitchell Ettinger on behalf of Rosetta 6 Stone, Your Honor. 7 As is my practice when I appear before you, I have a handout instead of a demonstrative if I might 8 9 provide it. 10 THE COURT: All right. I'm open to 11 receiving it. MR. ETTINGER: Copies have been provided to 12 13 opposing counsel, Judge, and there's a copy here for your 14 clerk as well. 15 THE COURT: Thank you. 16 We're taking up now Rosetta Stone's motion 17 for partial summary judgment as a liability; is that 18 right? 19 MR. ETTINGER: That's correct, Your Honor. 20 Your Honor, relying on the undisputed facts that have been 2.1 established through the filings of the motions for summary 2.2 judgment and the legal precedent, in other cases involving 23 the very same practices of Google, Inc, Rosetta Stone has 24 established that summary judgment as to liability should 25 be entered on its behalf.

And before I just walk through that analysis to show you how the undisputed facts meet the elements of trademark infringement if I might just spend five minutes of the Court's time to introduce you to the lingo that we've been living with in this case now for couple months. It might help make it easier for the Court, and I might confess that this may be all known to you, and I'll go very quickly if it is. But for me it was all new lingo. And so, if I could get you just to turn to tab one of the handout, Your Honor. This is a Google search home page. So if you were to type in www.Google.com, this is what would come up on your computer. It basically is a page that allows a user to enter a search term, and here you'll see that the terms "Rosetta Stone" are entered in order to conduct a search

The next page, Your Honor, is what is known as search results pages.

THE COURT: I don't want you to think that I am computer illiterate. I do use Google. I use Yahoo, and I actually own a copy of Rosetta Stone.

MR. ETTINGER: Excellent. I can't speak to you in a foreign language today, but.

THE COURT: ¿Sí, habla Español?

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on Google.

1 MR. ETTINGER: Nein. 2 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 3 MR. ETTINGER: Judge, if I can get you to 4 turn to the third page, I'll go very quickly and just 5 explain to you what I'm going to be talking about. The key words that are highlighted in red, 6 7 those are the words that are sold at Google AdWords 8 auction. They admittedly are bid on by companies so that 9 when users like yourself or myself enter those key words, 10 a sponsored link will come up. A sponsored link, Judge, 11 is Google's version of a paid advertisement. 12 The sponsored links appear as you see on 13 this page on the top portion of the screen and in the kind 14 of a pale yellow box and all along the right-hand side. Those sponsored links are the basis for this lawsuit. 15 That is what we are focused on. 16 17 THE COURT: So your view is that companies like Google that sell space like a newspaper that sells --18 19 the Washington Post sells full page ads may not use a 20 trademark term to determine where to place an 2.1 advertisement. And if they do so without the permission 2.2 of the trademark holder, that violates the Lanham Act and 23 unfair competition; is that right? 24 MR. ETTINGER: No, Your Honor. You've 25 stated Google's position quite well. That is not Rosetta

Stone's position. Google is not like an advertiser, like a newspaper.

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What Google does is Google offers trademark terms both branded and unbranded for sale to third parties so that their ads may be triggered when a user enters the trademark term in its search engine. It's very different.

THE COURT: All right. But your fundamental premise is that in connection with auctions of the words that that violates Rosetta Stone's trademark rights.

MR. ETTINGER: It violates it when it creates confusion as to the search results page. That's what the Lanham Act holds.

THE COURT: Are we focused here on confusion in general or confusion as to the source or origin of goods and services?

MR. ETTINGER: The Lanham Act 1114 provides for confusion. Confusion can be as to source or sponsorship. It can be source of sponsorship of the goods which we have in this case when we talk about pirates which I'll get to in a moment. It can also talk about sponsorship of the ads themselves and what is being offered on the Internet. And we have survey evidence to that effect to show that consumers are confused when they see the sponsored links come up with the Rosetta Stone trademark.

1 Not only -- Your Honor, not only is it 2 triggered by that, by the terms Rosetta Stone but the 3 marks themselves appear in the ads, and that's what 4 creates the confusion. 5 And that, Your Honor, is the 2009 policy change at Google. And I want to make sure I walk you 6 7 through that quickly because that's really what's at heart 8 here. 9 So the sponsored links, every time someone 10 clicks on one of these sponsored links, Google gets paid. 11 They get paid. 12 Today if you went on and opened an AdWords 13 account, it would take you five to seven minutes. And if 14 you type in Rosetta Stone as your key word that you want 15 to advertise on, you would find that Google would get paid 16 somewhere between \$1.50 and \$3.30 every time someone 17 clicked on that sponsored link. That's how they make 18 90 percent of their income which is \$24 billion a year. 19 The organic search results which is depicted 20 on this page appears directly below the sponsored links. 2.1 That is not at issue in this case. 2.2 THE COURT: What does organic search results 23 mean? 24 MR. ETTINGER: This is the results that are

nonpaid. They are generated by Google's algorithm which

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1 is I understand a trade secreted process that they use to 2 generate search results. 3 So Google's business model is to generate 4 search results in the organic section and above it to 5 place paid advertisements that are also relevant to the 6 search term or key word entered by the computer user. 7 THE COURT: So what is a search engine? MR. ETTINGER: A search engine is Google. 8 9 Google is -- is the company that owns the search engine. THE COURT: Well, I'm asking that because I 10 11 want your definition as a lawyer what a search engine is 12 in the context of the Internet. I just told you I 13 understand what Yahoo and Google are, but I want to hear 14 what your determination of what the term search engine 15 means. 16 Search engine is a mechanism MR. ETTINGER: 17 through which information is sorted, gathered and 18 displayed in response to a key word trigger. 19 THE COURT: So then the user has to be 20 motivated to search -- to go to one of these search 2.1 engines; that is right? 2.2 MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, yes, that's true. 23 THE COURT: So then a person going to a 24 search engine would not necessarily be going there to buy 25 products or services. They would be looking to identify

1 products and services; is that right? 2 MR. ETTINGER: That's one possibility, Your 3 Honor. The confusion witnesses in this case have 4 testified that they went there for the purpose of finding 5 product. 6 THE COURT: I understand. Well, Amazon is 7 distinct from Google, isn't it? Amazon is where you go to buy books and things; isn't that right? 8 9 MR. ETTINGER: Amazon does sell products, 10 yes, sir. 11 THE COURT: You don't go to Amazon to search 12 for terms like DNA or thing like that. You go there to 13 find books, products, right? 14 MR. ETTINGER: I think consumers in most 15 parts, yes, but I believe Amazon has it's one search 16 engine that might be powered by Google. I'm not certain, 17 Judge. 18 THE COURT: All right. But the point that 19 I'm trying to focus in on is if the object of going to a 20 search engine is to look for products, your view is that 2.1 the search engine may not employ any terms that are 2.2 trademark terms without the permission of the trademark 23 holder. Is that right? 24 MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, under the unjust 25 enrichment claim that is correct. Under the trademark

claim we say you may not use trademark terms. You may not sell them at auction to trigger third party ads where they are likely to create confusion.

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THE COURT: So if it was free there would be no violation?

MR. ETTINGER: No, sir, there would not be. It would not be.

THE COURT: So your objection is to the business model here. And the business model in your view exploits your trademark terms for which the trademark owner ought to be compensated.

MR. ETTINGER: Ought to be compensated and there should be no confusion as to consumer's choice. when someone goes on the Internet and knows the trademark Rosetta Stone and the goodwill established in that mark, that it means language learning software and they type in those specific words instead of learn Spanish or learn a foreign language, that they receive results on the search results pages that are not confusing to the consumer.

And Judge, the question you just asked if you could flip to the -- skip the next page. It's just the landing page which is the page that you would go to if you clicked on Rosetta Stone.com. You'll see there are two types of searches that are identified on that page. One is called branded search and one is called non-branded

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search.

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Branded search are searches that are based on trademark terms. That is what is at issue in this case.

Rosetta Stone is not claiming that non-branded search which deal with generic terms violates their rights as a trademark holder.

THE COURT: So then in your view, if someone typed "Xerox" into the Google box, then Xerox -- the holder of the trademark Xerox ought to be compensated; is that right?

MR. ETTINGER: Under the unjust enrichment theory if a user types in Xerox and Google displays sponsored links, whether they relate to Xerox or not and someone clicks on that link and pays Google, Google is trading on the goodwill of Xerox's mark and earning money on that mark and the trademark owner should be compensated under unjust enrichment.

With respect to trademark law, Xerox would have a cause of action if the sponsored links displayed -- the sponsored links displayed by Google create confusion to the consumer. That's what the trademark law provides, and that's what this case is about.

And if Your Honor can --

THE COURT: Confusion as it relates to

advertising?

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2 MR. ETTINGER: That's correct, Judge.

3 THE COURT: All right.

MR. ETTINGER: If I could take you to the next page, I'm going to walk through quickly the Google policies at issue and I'll get right into the meat of the argument.

The Google's trademark policy has evolved over time. Between 2000 and 2004, it did not permit trademarks to be used as key words or to be used in the sponsored link ads text at all. And during that time period, they honored the trademark owner's right.

In 2004 -- in 2004 -- in March of 2004, they conducted some experiments. And these experiments were designed to determine whether or not there would be user confusion if they used key words, trademark key words and if they allowed trademarks to appear in ad texts.

Those internal experiments, Judge, conducted by Google determined that there be high likelihood, high likelihood of confusion if the trademark appeared in ad text.

They changed their policy in 2004 after those experiments opened up the market to keywords including trademark terms. And when they did that, two things significantly happened and these are all in the

undisputed facts.

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There was -- they recognized there was a significant potential for additional revenues which makes sense because the branded terms are worth more than the non-branded terms because they're well known and it's the goodwill of those marks.

And secondly they told the public, the people that bought Google stock that this may cause us problems in the trademark world and we may be sued.

So as of 2004, that's one registration. So as of 2004, now anybody can bid on a trademark key term, including Rosetta Stone.

They went five years like that, went through several lawsuits which we'll talk about in just a moment because there's finding of law on use and commerce with respect to their AdWords programs including one in this court.

They go to 2009 and they say we can make literally up to a billion dollars more a year, conservatively a hundred million, but up to a billion dollars more if we just let people put those trademarks in ad texts. And they changed it.

In June of 2009, they went to a policy that allows people to put trademarks in ad texts, non-trademark owners as well as bid on them.

And Your Honor, within two months of that change, the pirates and counterfeiters that began appearing on the Google pages relating to my client's trademark are overwhelming.

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Between September of 2009 and February 28th of 2010 during the pendency of this suit, 183 instances of trademark infringement by pirates were noted to Google by Rosetta Stone, 183 times, Judge.

Those are the ones that Rosetta Stone could find. And so that is why we're here today. We're here today to talk about why we're entitled to summary judgment as a matter of law with respect to the infringement by Google.

The Fourth Circuit teaches us in the PETA case that there are four elements that the Court must find in order to enter summary judgment.

THE COURT: Well, you should assume that I've read your brief, and I'm not going to invite you to read it to me now.

MR. ETTINGER: I won't do that.

about the confusion. So, your view is that the confusion focuses in on whether the person searching thinks that the use of the trademark term confuses the consumer as to who's conducting the advertisement, whether or not it's

1 been sponsored by Rosetta Stone or some pirate? 2 MR. ETTINGER: Yes, sir. That is one form 3 of the confusion. And the other form of the confusion is 4 that if they assume based on the Rosetta Stone marks 5 appearing in the ad links, that the goods being offered for sale are authorized or manufactured by Rosetta Stone. 6 7 And, in fact, Your Honor, we have five 8 confusion witnesses, all of whom typed in the words 9 "Rosetta Stone" into the Google search engine, pressed 10 enter, saw links that said Rosetta Stone, buy it for \$148, 11 \$158 and I'll show you a couple of those in just a moment, 12 believing that they were buying software that had been 13 manufactured, endorsed and supported by Rosetta Stone. 14 THE COURT: But Google wasn't selling the 15 actual products, was it? It was these companies, whether 16 or not they were authorized or not that was selling them. 17 So your view is that this search engine is 18 responsible for the actual sales. If the sales were 19 pirated then, it was the search engine's fault. 20 If they were directed to Amazon.com and they 2.1 got an authorized version of Rosetta Stone, then that was 2.2 also Google's fault and Google is liable for that. 23 that right? 24 Judge, with a little twist, MR. ETTINGER: 25 okay, because that's not what I'm saying.

1 THE COURT: If you would focus in and tell 2 me what you are saying. 3 MR. ETTINGER: Okay, and that's fair enough. 4 What we're saying is that Google's business practice of 5 selling trademarks to third parties that display them in sponsored links that create confusion is in and of itself 6 7 trademark infringement, end of case. 8 You do not need to establish that it's 9 counterfeit. You just need to show confusion. And that's 10 why I was going to PETA. PETA says there's four elements, 11 right, one that the plaintiff has a mark that's federally 12 registered and protected. 13 THE COURT: Well, I think the focus here 14 really is likelihood of confusion; isn't it? 15 MR. ETTINGER: Yes. 16 THE COURT: Isn't that where we're going? 17 MR. ETTINGER: Yes. THE COURT: Well, let's go there fast 18 19 because I'm not going to -- you know, I don't need three 20 hours of oral argument on this. I want you to focus on 2.1 what you think your argument is. 2.2 MR. ETTINGER: Okay. The reason I was 23 saying that is because all of the elements other than 2.4 likelihood of confusion are in the undisputed facts, done. 2.5 THE COURT: I understand. But your theory

is that by having a search engine where a person is looking for products, that the ultimate sale, if it's counterfeit, is as a result of the exploitation of the trademark term that was placed in the search engine.

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So that means that if someone is looking for a Sony television and they type in Google "Sony televisions", so they can find out who sells Sony televisions, and it turns out that one of the persons selling Sony televisions is selling knockoffs, that the search engine is liable.

That's very different than a case where

Amazon which may be selling Sony televisions is selling

out of their warehouse counterfeit televisions for which
they could perhaps be held liable for trademark
infringement.

Help me with how I distinguish those two different business models because I'm having difficulty understanding.

MR. ETTINGER: Fair enough. The difference is that with Google, Google says to its clients, you may bid on this trademark term and you may use it in ad text. And if you turn to page five, I'll give you the perfect example, tab five.

Its policy change in 2009 said that any one who they believe sells products associated with Rosetta

Stone can put it in ad text. So if you look under tab 1 2 five, the trademark infringement, our theory is very 3 simple, that upon the entry of Rosetta Stone and the 4 serving of this results page which this is a real results 5 page, Judge, the serving of this results page results in confusion, and that is because you cannot tell from 6 7 looking at these links which of these particular companies 8 are offering legitimate authorized original Rosetta Stone 9 software. You can't tell. 10 THE COURT: So is Google making a statement 11 to the public that that's what this is? 12 MR. ETTINGER: Google's trademark policy 13 says as follows --14 THE COURT: No, no. My question was very 15 precise. Is the representation of this page by Google a 16 statement to the consumer that these links are to genuine 17

authorized products owned by Rosetta Stone?

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MR. ETTINGER: Both direct and implied. They do it directly, Judge, by saying this is our trademark policy. Only authorized resellers -- only authorized resellers may display the trademark term and ad text. That is their public policy.

So, anyone who goes on the Internet is comforted by knowing that only authorized resellers are supposed to be here, number one.

1 Number two is implied is that they, Google 2 touts, and this is why they make so much money, that they 3 give you the most relevant responses to your searches. 4 And if you're looking for Rosetta Stone, 5 here it is. So now when a user goes in, types "Rosetta Stone", presses enter, I can't tell which of these links 6 7 are selling genuine. And in fact, Your Honor, this very page, this search page was shown to two senior trademark 8 9 counsel at Google during their depositions and they could 10 not tell. 11 It turns out, Judge, that the second link --12 THE COURT: Well, they couldn't tell -- as I 13 understand it from reading the briefs, Rosetta Stone can't 14 tell unless it actually has a software to examine; is that 15 right? 16 That is not correct, Judge. MR. ETTINGER: 17 THE COURT: It's not. So then you're able 18 to online just look at a version of Rosetta Stone to 19 determine if it's genuine or not? 20 MR. ETTINGER: Judge, the question is not 2.1 copyright infringement. 2.2 THE COURT: No, I've asked you a specific 23 question. Can you answer my question? 24 MR. ETTINGER: Yes, sir. 25 THE COURT: Can Rosetta Stone go online and

determine whether or not a copy being offered for sale of 1 2 Rosetta Stone software is authentic or not? 3 MR. ETTINGER: They can tell you from 4 looking at the link whether it's an authorized reseller or 5 not. 6 THE COURT: You did not answer my question. 7 If you think you've answered my question, it's okay. 8 question is very precise and that was whether Rosetta 9 Stone could go online, look at a version of software that 10 is on a disc and ascertain online whether or not it was authentic? Can you answer that question? 11 MR. ETTINGER: I think I can. 12 13 THE COURT: All right, I'm listening. 14 MR. ETTINGER: I think I have, but I'll try 15 again. They cannot do the physical examination, Judge, 16 because they don't have it. That's given. I accept --17 THE COURT: But Windows can actually do 18 these examinations online and tell you whether or not 19 you're using an authorized version of Windows. You're 20 saying Rosetta Stone does not have that capacity; is that 2.1 right? 2.2 MR. ETTINGER: No, Judge, because when you 23 get to this point on the search page, you don't get access 2.4 to the software. 25 THE COURT: No, but you're saying that there

1 were pirates out there selling your product. And I assume 2 that you have some way of know who is a pirate and who is 3 not, which means at some point, you either are able to 4 secure the product from the alleged pirate and examine it 5 or you have some way of doing it online. Am I inferring inaccurately about that 6 7 process? MR. ETTINGER: No, sir. In fact, these are 8 9 not downloadable products. They're sold in boxes. And I 10 think that's our disconnect. 11 Once Rosetta Stone gets a copy of the 12 pirated product, of course, they can tell because they can 13 look at the code and see that it's counterfeit. 14 THE COURT: So how would Google ascertain 15 whether or not the seller was selling authorized copies? 16 MR. ETTINGER: Simple. All they need to do 17 is ask the trademark owner whether or not they're selling 18 their mark to an authorized reseller. It's a simple task. 19 THE COURT: So then the only people can 20 resell Rosetta Stone are individuals -- companies 2.1 authorized by Rosetta Stone? 2.2 MR. ETTINGER: That is their policy, Judge. 23 That is Google's policy. 24 THE COURT: All right. Now I'm asking you 25 what Rosetta Stone's policy is.

1 MR. ETTINGER: Of course. 2 THE COURT: And my question is whether only 3 a Rosetta Stone authorized seller can sell their products? 4 MR. ETTINGER: That is correct, Judge. 5 THE COURT: All right. MR. ETTINGER: And so Google, its business 6 7 model and its policy is only authorized resellers are 8 allowed to bid on the marks, only authorized resellers use 9 the marks in the ad text. 10 And in practice it does not work, and if I 11 can get you to turn just for a moment to the -- and this 12 will bring it home, to tab three. 13 Tab three, Judge, is a synopsis of the 183 14 complaints that were made to Google between the time 15 period of September 2009 and February 2010. 16 Okay. If you turn to the second page, it 17 shows you a Google search result that has a pirated software in the top right-hand side. 18 19 If you turn to the next page, Judge, that is 20 the landing page, in other words the page that you go to 2.1 when you click on that link, for Language Tools Mall.com. 2.2 And you see the Rosetta Stone yellow box. You see a 23 slashed price for the pricing and consumers are absolutely 24 confused as to whether or not that's genuine.

And there is no question that that makes

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1 sense because their own trademark counsel can't tell you. 2 If you go to the next page, Judge, it shows 3 you all of the dates in February where this ad appeared on 4 Google search pages, February 1, February 7, February 11 5 through 19, February 20th, 21st, 22nd, 23rd and 24th. Every day that this occurs, Rosetta Stone 6 7 calls Google and says infringement is happening. Infringement is happening. 8 9 THE COURT: I just have one additional 10 question then I want to hear from the other side. 11 Is Rosetta Stone required to establish any damages in connection with its trademark dilution claim? 12 13 And if so, how are you damaged? 14 MR. ETTINGER: We do not need to establish 15 monetary damages under dilution. We just need to show 16 that the mark could be tarnished. And certainly, when 17 there is counterfeiters involved, tarnishment is presumed by law. We do not have to diminution in value of the 18 19 mark. We just need to show that it's either becoming 20 generic or it's being hurt in some way because of the 2.1 association with the counterfeiters. 2.2 THE COURT: So is the tarnishment taking 23 place by the pirate seller or is it taking place by the 24 advertisement on Google?

MR. ETTINGER: Both, Your Honor, because the

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       confusion created as to the association of these pirates
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       with Rosetta Stone.
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                     THE COURT: Thank you. I've asked you all
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       the questions I have. I'll give you a chance to respond.
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       Thank you.
                     MR. ETTINGER: Thank you, Judge.
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                     MS. CARUSO: Good afternoon, Your Honor.
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       Just for the record, I'd like to clarify that --
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                     THE COURT: And tell me your name again,
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       please.
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                     MS. CARUSO: Margret Caruso.
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                     THE COURT: Yes, Ms. Caruso.
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                     MS. CARUSO: That Mr. Berea is senior
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       litigation counsel at Google. However, he's not general
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       counsel.
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                     THE COURT: All right, thank you.
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                     MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, Rosetta Stone is
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       attempting to use trademark law to inhibit competition.
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       It's very clear what it wants. It's what you started out
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       with in your questions to Mr. Ettinger. It wants Google
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       to stop any advertiser from displaying an advertisement
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       when content is shown on Google's search results page that
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       includes Rosetta Stone's name.
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                     It's remarkable because it is quite similar
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       to what happens in the non-Internet world. For example,
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if a company wanted to contact the Washington Post and run an advertisement that said we're selling great plasma screen televisions and we want those to be featured next to every story you run about the Super Bowl that's coming up. That's where we want them to appear.

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And in telling that to the Washington Post, they're of course saying I want this keyed to -- I want you to use this with the licensed registered trademark of the NFL, the Super Bowl, and that's where I want this to shown up.

And of course when companies contact the television stations that are broadcasting the Super Bowl, they say I want my advertisement to appear during the Super Bowl. That's the group of people that I want to reach.

And Rosetta Stone is saying on the Internet, that's not okay. The only advertising that can show up is advertising that we say, Rosetta Stone says is okay. It doesn't matter if what the consumer enters is a search for reviews of Rosetta Stone or best price for Rosetta Stone, discounts for Rosetta Stone.

#### Consumer --

THE COURT: Well, help me with the confusion issue here because I think that we all need to focus on what the confusion is.

1 Is it sufficient to show that consumers are 2 confused about whether or not the product was endorsed by 3 Rosetta Stone or is the Court to focus on confusion as to 4 the source or origin of goods? 5 MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, the Court should here focus on confusion as to the source or origin of 6 7 goods. 8 THE COURT: Or services. 9 MS. CARUSO: Yes. And I don't think that I 10 heard an argument from Rosetta Stone that there's 11 confusion as to whether Rosetta Stone is endorsing 12 Google's searches. The confusion that they're asserting 13 is that consumers will be confused as to the source of the 14 advertisements --15 THE COURT: Well, I think that --16 MS. CARUSO: -- and the product advertised. 17 THE COURT: I think that Rosetta Stone is 18 saying that the confusion in the consumer's mind is that 19 they will think that they're being linked to authorized 20 versions of Rosetta Stone when they're not, and that is a 2.1 source of confusion about the advertisement of the sources 2.2 of goods. 23 MS. CARUSO: Right, a couple of things 24 there. First, Google's 2009 policy, even though the case

starts in 2004 and they have damages they're asserting for

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that whole 2004 to mid 2009 period, the 2009 policy allows the resellers of a product to use the trademark in the text of their ad to identify what they're selling.

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I want to clarify that it's not just authorized resellers, not just who Rosetta Stone says we approve this person, but it's any person who is selling a genuine good.

And so, for example, Amazon is an authorized reseller of Rosetta Stone, but there could quite possibly be resellers of Rosetta Stone products, for example, purchased Rosetta Stone off of Amazon and are reselling it themselves or perhaps someone received it as a gift and have decided that they don't want to learn that language and they're going to resell the product that they purchased.

So, even though that person isn't an authorized reseller that would be consistent with Google's policy for that genuine copy to be advertised.

The -- as to the ads they claim are for counterfeit products, it's very important in this case to understand the scope of what we're talking about here.

And Rosetta Stone has identified 183 complaints they've made over the course of 179 days. This is in marked contrast to the 284,000 complaints that Tiffany made to eBay in the case recently affirmed by the Second Circuit

in which no liability was found.

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And Rosetta Stone does not argue that that case was wrongly decided. They don't argue what the Second Circuit's reasonings was for. They say it's factually distinguishable. And the reason they say that is because eBay didn't know the identity of the counterfeiters. And they cite in footnote eleven of both their reply brief and their opposition to summary judgment motion, they quote a sentence from the Tiffany decision in which the Court says that the demand letters, the cease and desist letters Tiffany sent didn't identify particular sellers.

The Court in the next sentence, however, immediately goes on to say that in Tiffany's notices of claimed infringement of which there were more than 284,000, the counterfeit listings were identified.

So here we're talking about a much more narrow scope. And unlike eBay, Google is not the venue for the sales. It's a step further even removed from that.

THE COURT: Well, that's something that I'm focused on and maybe it's time for you to tell me how I should distinguish between a search engine which does not sell products and one that does. You just referred to eBay, but you could use Amazon as well.

Is a search engine required to obtain a trademark owner's permission to sell those terms to those who might want to bid for placement on a search page?

MS. CARUSO: Absolutely not, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Why not?

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MS. CARUSO: There is -- they only would be if there was confusion that resulted. If for some reason consumers looked at all of those search result pages and -- search results, sponsored links and thought that they all were Rosetta Stone websites or they all were offering Rosetta Stone products when they all weren't offering Rosetta Stone products.

Google doesn't actually ever hold on to those products. It has its policies in place. It does its best to enforce them. But up and to the point where Google has actual knowledge or a reason to suspect a particular counterfeiter is infringing, it does not have any obligation under any case that Rosetta Stone has cited to take down that ad. And that is Hard Rock Cafe cites that, and --

THE COURT: But Google helps these advertisers design their ad, don't they? I mean, they can't just put anything on a Google page. It has to look a certain way. It has to confirm to Google's certain policies and doesn't Google suggest how the sponsored

links ought to present themselves? So doesn't that change it some to make Google a contributing force in the alleged trademark infringement?

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MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, it doesn't. To the extent that Google is involved with the overall appearance of ads at all, for example, and the fact that they have a title line, the fact that they have a URL link, the fact that they make suggestions generally to everyone saying it's a good idea to end with a call to action or if you have a discount to say so and don't use misspellings, things like that, that is a mere link in the chain along the lines.

To impose contributory or vicarious infringement basically Google needs to be in cahoots with these guys. They have to -- if you look at all the cases in which that level of liability is imposed and it's, you know, you got the Bauer Lamp case where the defendant was held to be liable for getting the manufacturer to make a lamp after he said to the plaintiff there is a personal vendetta between them and that I'm going to ruin your business. I'm going to copy your lamp and I'm going to sell it for cheaper price, and I'm going to put you out of business.

There is no evidence in the record remotely close to that here.

1 THE COURT: All right. I have one 2 additional question and that is with respect to the 3 dilution claim, trademark dilution claim, is the plaintiff required to sustain damages, that is to say diminution in 4 5 revenue or value in order to state a claim? MS. CARUSO: Your Honor, the antidilution 6 7 act does not require that they prove that they have. 8 have to prove that they are -- that the accused action is 9 likely to tarnish or dilute their trademark brand. 10 And we submit here it is not likely to do 11 that when this use has been going on for the past six 12 years and their brand awareness has gone through the roof. 13 Their brand equity has gone nothing but up. They can't 14 say it's likely to be harmed when it's just gone up and up 15 and up. 16 And even these confusion witnesses they talk 17 about who purchased the counterfeit products, they don't 18 even have a negative opinion of Rosetta Stone. 19 It's not a case where a fake Gucci handbag 20 or Prada bag, someone sees a shoddy work of craftsmanship 2.1 and thinks less of that trademark owner because of that. 2.2 THE COURT: All right. I've asked you the 23 questions I have. Thank you very much. 24 MS. CARUSO: Thank you, Your Honor. 2.5 THE COURT: Brief reply.

MR. ETTINGER: Just a brief one, Judge.

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You asked the question of counsel whether or not Google's involvement in the ad process. The answer is very much so. They have a tool called Quest, okay. And they call this the query suggestion tool internally. Externally it's called the search engine -- search inquiry tool. They don't use the word suggestion because they don't want to have trademark law cases brought because they're suggesting trademarks to their customers.

who wants to advertise on Google to enter into a search engine the name of the company that it wants to see its key words. In other words, if someone wants to sell Rosetta Stone software, pirated or otherwise, they can type into the little tool, www.RosettaStone.com and see all of the suggested search terms that they should use in order to trigger their ads.

Secondly they have what they call the key word insertion tool. When you open an AdWords account and you tell them what your key word is, Rosetta Stone, automatically it populates it for you in your domain. It tells you that's the best way, that's the best way to sell your product.

This case is about a company that makes a lot of money on these trademarks and all that -- a lot of

money on these trademarks.

THE COURT: I'm not focused on the amount of money. I'm focused on whether or not it violates the law.

MR. ETTINGER: Right, and that's exactly where I'm going, Judge. What you heard from Google today is it could only happen 189 times in six months. We have so many ads. We're selling so many ads. You can't hold us responsible for this. That's their business model.

Their policy states that they won't sell to people that are not selling authentic goods. They do it routinely and put the burden on the trademark owners to police their business that are making all this money. And that's what the trademark law does not permit.

That confusion is a direct infringement and the analysis stops as soon as that ad posts, as soon as you see that sponsored links and you press enter at Rosetta Stone and you see those links and the confusion exists then and there and that's what needs to be enjoined.

The scope of the -- the scope of any such remedy will be determined by the fairness of the actions. But what needs to be enjoined is them selling the marks to anybody and everybody for money. That's what has to stop and that's what this case is all about.

THE COURT: Thank you very much.

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1 Ms. Caruso, do you want to take up Google's 2 motion for summary judgment? I only have a few questions 3 about it. I think we've covered some of it already. 4 MS. CARUSO: Yes, Your Honor. I'm happy to 5 address your questions. THE COURT: Your keyword "bidding process" 6 7 does involve the use of trademark terms, right? 8 MS. CARUSO: Yes, Your Honor, it does. 9 THE COURT: So you are selling those words 10 in order to decide where ads are placed on a Google search 11 page; is that right? 12 MS. CARUSO: Not exactly. Those words are 13 used to determine where ads are placed. They -- but, the 14 words are not themselves sold. 15 Google makes money when ads are clicked 16 through. So it's the space and then the effectiveness of 17 the ad that determines when Google makes money. So, what Google is selling is the 18 19 advertising space. But the way the companies wind up 20 there is triggered by them telling Google when you do your search engine function and you do the commercial side of 2.1 2.2 it, we would like to appear there. 23 So, as Your Honor noted at the outset, the 24 search engine function returns relevant results. And 25 Mr. Ettinger distinguished between organic results and the sponsored links.

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And the organic results is almost like if you were to go into a building and ask for Tylenol. What you are told in response would depend on if you went into a drugstore or a library. And Google doesn't know which set of information you're looking for just because you asked, you know, that question.

But it will return how it identifies things in the organic results but then recognizes that there is a separate market on those for commercial responses. And it identifies the organic results by looking for those trademarks through its algorithmic process and on the commercial side it identifies those links, those advertisements through identification in the keyword tool.

THE COURT: So in the old world it might be like having a dictionary to search for words and then having a separate document called a Yellow Pages that is filled with commercial advertisement for which people pay a fee in order to be in that book.

MS. CARUSO: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: So in many ways, Google is like the Yellow Pages online.

MS. CARUSO: That's correct.

THE COURT: The only reason you're looking in the Yellow Pages is because you're looking as a

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       consumer for services; is that right?
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                     MS. CARUSO: That's right.
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                     THE COURT: And so the only reason to go to
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       Google would be to search for services?
                     MS. CARUSO: Yes.
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                     THE COURT: Now, would someone think that
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       the Yellow Pages themselves were the vendor of services or
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       qoods?
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                     MS. CARUSO: I certainly don't think so,
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       Your Honor. Nothing in the record here would support
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       that.
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                     THE COURT: All right. I don't think I need
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       you all to argue all these things in your briefs. I have
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       read your briefs. Hopefully, you believe that. Okay.
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       Thank you.
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                     Mr. Ettinger.
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                     MR. ETTINGER: May I, Your Honor?
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                     THE COURT: I want you to take up the
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       question I just asked Ms. Caruso.
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                     MR. ETTINGER: Very well.
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                     THE COURT: A dictionary and a Yellow Pages,
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       one is searching for something. Is that right? Is Google
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       in effect a dictionary and Yellow Pages online?
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                     MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, if you want to
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       characterize it that way, that's fine, but let's take the
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analogy all the way out.

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If you look up Rosetta Stone in a Yellow Page, do you expect to see competitors of Rosetta Stone there? Do you expect to see unauthorized users of the Rosetta Stone software? Do you expect to see people that don't have any right to use the mark under Rosetta Stone? That is the huge difference. It's like going --

THE COURT: Well, that is a -- that is a difference I will grant you. But the way the page is displayed as you showed it to me, there's something called a sponsored link --

MR. ETTINGER: Right.

THE COURT: -- which suggests that the person viewing the page should know that this is an ad being paid for by someone who has paid Google money to display their ad adjacent to a dictionary-type search result. Is that right?

MR. ETTINGER: The answer to that is twofold, Judge. One is you would hope that most people know that sponsored links means ads. But Google's own documents which we have in the papers before say there's great confusion between the organic search and the paid search. And the confusion witnesses to a T testified I didn't know what sponsored links meant.

One person thought that sponsored link,

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       instead of calling it an advertisement, thought it meant
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       it was sponsored by Google, actually testified. She's got
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       an MBA from Stanford. This is not a silly lady. It's not
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       very clear.
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                     THE COURT: Five people out of the thousands
       who I assume use Google every day to click on it and
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 7
       perhaps look for your company's ads.
                     Is there a way -- how much money does
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       Rosetta Stone pay Google for these ads that you pay for
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       that you've described in your complaint?
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                     MR. ETTINGER: I think the number of over
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       the course of years is about $3 million for the five-year
13
       period.
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                     THE COURT: Has the revenue increased during
15
       that five-year period for Rosetta Stone?
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                     MR. ETTINGER: Has the revenue, of course,
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       Your Honor.
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                     THE COURT: So the advertising has been very
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       effective? Is that what you're telling me?
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                     MR. ETTINGER: The Internet has been very
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       effective, of course, but that's not its source.
                     THE COURT: I know that you -- just give me
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23
       one second. I can't talk as fast as you can.
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                     MR. ETTINGER: I apologize.
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                     THE COURT: The question, though, is one of
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1 whether Rosetta Stone contends that the money you've spent 2 on advertising here was not beneficial where you in a 3 sponsored ad used your trademark term which appeared at 4 the top of the page you just showed me on -- I think of 5 page two of tab one where you showed me your Rosetta Stone trademark. 6 7 So I assume that first sponsored ad at the 8 top of that page is yours. Is that right? 9 MR. ETTINGER: Yes, sir. 10 THE COURT: So you wouldn't be wasting your 11 money to place it there. You put it there because you 12 want it to pop up at the same time your term was entered by the search; isn't that right? 13 14 MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, yes. And think 15 of the temerity of the argument that the trademark owner 16 has to pay to have its own name come when and bid against 17 people who are not authorized to use the term and pay more for that ad to come up because they're selling it to 18 19 unauthorized people. More people --20 THE COURT: Is it uncommon for an advertiser 2.1 in radio to pay more for an advertisement during drive 2.2 time than to pay for a midday advertising? MR. ETTINGER: I would hope so. 2.3 24 THE COURT: All right. Well, is there any 25 real difference here then in terms of the marketplace

1 governing the placement of their ad? 2 MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, they're selling a 3 mark that they have no rights to. To --4 THE COURT: They're selling words that --5 and I agree with you. They're selling words that relate 6 to your mark. 7 MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, they're selling our mark. It's the mark. It's --8 9 THE COURT: Well, I have difficulty with 10 that argument. I understand why you say it, and I've read 11 your brief and I understand that. But they're not selling -- they're selling placement on a page according 12 13 to you through their bidding process that involves 14 exploitation of your mark; is that right? 15 MR. ETTINGER: No, sir. They're selling the 16 right to use -- to have this ad pop up when the mark is 17 entered. And in fact, Judge, they price it by the term. They don't price it by the ad space. They price it by the 18 19 value of that term. 20 THE COURT: I understand. That's the 2.1 I don't have any problem with that. I think marketplace. 2.2 that fundamentally we'll have to decide as a matter of law 23 whether or not they can do that or not. 24 And so as I understand your argument, 25 though, that means that someone like a used car dealer who

1 is selling Fords without the permission from Ford before 2 they could advertise that they were selling Ford Fusions 3 at their used car dealership. And in the absence of 4 permission from Ford to advertise that in a television ad, 5 then that used car company would be violating Ford's trademark rights; is that right? 6 7 MR. ETTINGER: No, Judge. They'd only be violating the trademark rights if they caused confusion. 8 9 And I bring you back to that because that's what 1114 10 requires. 11 THE COURT: Well, I've asked you about confusion and you're focused on five people who are 12 13 confused about a sponsored links when I assume given that 14 you spent \$23 million on these ads with Google --MR. ETTINGER: \$3 million. 15 THE COURT: \$3 million. And we're not 16 17 talking about five people on the Internet when there are millions of users. 18 19 So I know that that's not the substance of 20 your argument because that is a very weak argument. You 2.1 know that and I know that. 2.2 What I'm focused on is confusion as a source 23 or origin of goods where the search engine itself does not 24 sell products. And your view is that because there may be 25 links to pirated goods, that violates the law.

I think I understand your theory. And I don't know the answer to it, and I guess I'm going to have to decide this sooner or latter.

MR. ETTINGER: May I make one comment about the five confusion witnesses? I can't -- I don't want to talk about them. I just want to talk generally.

In this circuit, in this court, we get five nonparty depositions, five. If you want to give me ten more, I'll bring you ten more. If you want to give me 20 more, I'll bring you 20 more, Your Honor.

The point is --

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THE COURT: Well, you know, we're well passed that stage now. And I appreciate your argument and I know you have an issue involving the survey.

Let me tell you all I don't need to have an argument about the expert witness and Dr. Van Liere's report. I've read that and I'm going to give you all a ruling on that. I don't need to have argument on that.

I think that I've asked you all the questions that I have concerning the matters that have been briefed. And as I said at the outset, I did not plan to have you all reiterate every single thing that you said in every single brief.

MR. ETTINGER: Your Honor, it's always a pleasure to appear before you.

1	THE COURT: Thank you very much. I
2	appreciate your patience.
3	We're now in recess. Thank you.
4	MR. ETTINGER: Are we to stay here, Judge,
5	for your decision or are you going to
6	THE COURT: I'm good, but I'm not that good.
7	No, I'm not going to do that from the bench. This is way
8	too much. And whatever I do, I want you all to understand
9	what I'm doing and why, so I'm going to write an opinion.
10	But I'll give you a ruling soon because I
11	know we have a trial date on May 3rd.
12	MR. ETTINGER: We want to know whether to go
13	to work all weekend or not, but I assume we'll just go to
14	work.
15	THE COURT: I think that it's safe to
16	continue trial preparation. Thank you.
17	(Proceeding concluded at 1:30 p.m.)
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1 2 CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER 3 4 I, Renecia Wilson, an official court reporter 5 for the United State District Court of Virginia, Alexandria Division, do hereby certify that I reported by 6 machine shorthand, in my official capacity, the 7 8 proceedings had upon the motions in the case of Rosetta 9 Stone vs. Google. 10 I further certify that I was authorized and 11 did report by stenotype the proceedings and evidence in said motions, and that the foregoing pages, numbered 1 to 12 13 44, inclusive, constitute the official transcript of said 14 proceedings as taken from my shorthand notes. IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereto subscribed 15 my name this 5th day of May , 2010. 16 17 18 19 Renecia Wilson, RMR, 20 Official Court Reporter 2.1 22 23 24 25