

APR 19 2012

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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA  
ROANOKE DIVISION

JOHN CAMYN,  
Plaintiff,

v.

UNKNOWN,  
Defendant.

) Civil Action No. 7:12-cv-00143  
)  
)  
)

) MEMORANDUM OPINION  
)

) By: Hon. Jackson L. Kiser  
) Senior United States District Judge

John Camyn, a Virginia inmate proceeding pro se, filed a letter describing multiple ailments he believes he suffered throughout his life while incarcerated at various facilities in Virginia. Plaintiff does not relate specific actors to particular acts or omissions to constitute a complaint. Instead, plaintiff repeatedly lists numerous ailments and speculates that a grand conspiracy of known and unknown inmates, correctional officers, and medical staff could have caused the ailments in various ways. This matter is before me for screening, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915.

I must dismiss any action or claim filed by an inmate if I determine that the action or claim is frivolous or fails to state a claim on which relief may be granted. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e)(2), 1915A(b)(1); 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(c). The first standard includes claims based upon “an indisputably meritless legal theory,” “claims of infringement of a legal interest which clearly does not exist,” or claims where the “factual contentions are clearly baseless.” Neitzke v. Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 327 (1989). The second standard is the familiar standard for a motion to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), accepting a plaintiff’s factual allegations as true. A complaint needs “a short and plain statement of the claim showing that the pleader is entitled to relief” and sufficient “[f]actual allegations . . . to raise a right to relief above the speculative level. . . .” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (internal quotation

marks omitted). A plaintiff's basis for relief "requires more than labels and conclusions. . . ." Id. Therefore, a plaintiff must "allege facts sufficient to state all the elements of [the] claim." Bass v. E.I. Dupont de Nemours & Co., 324 F.3d 761, 765 (4th Cir. 2003).

Determining whether a complaint states a plausible claim for relief is "a context-specific task that requires the reviewing court to draw on its judicial experience and common sense." Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, \_\_\_, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1950 (2009). Thus, a court screening a complaint under Rule 12(b)(6) can identify pleadings that are not entitled to an assumption of truth because they consist of no more than labels and conclusions. Id. Although I liberally construe pro se complaints, Haines v. Kerner, 404 U.S. 519, 520-21 (1972), I do not act as the inmate's advocate, sua sponte developing statutory and constitutional claims the inmate failed to clearly raise on the face of the complaint. See Brock v. Carroll, 107 F.3d 241, 243 (4th Cir. 1997) (Luttig, J., concurring); Beaudett v. City of Hampton, 775 F.2d 1274, 1278 (4th Cir. 1985). See also Gordon v. Leeke, 574 F.2d 1147, 1151 (4th Cir. 1978) (recognizing that a district court is not expected to assume the role of advocate for a pro se plaintiff). District courts are not required "to conjure up questions never squarely presented to them" or "to construct full blown claims from sentence fragments." Beaudett, 775 F.2d at 1278.

Plaintiff's letter presents information too attenuated and unsubstantial to give notice to any possible defendant, and plaintiff clearly fails to raise any legal claim. Plaintiff's litany of ailments and conspirators is devoid of any useful information to liberally construe facts into an actionable claim against a specific actor, and I decline to construct a complaint for plaintiff. Accordingly, I grant plaintiff leave to proceed in forma pauperis and dismiss the complaint

without prejudice for failing to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii).

The Clerk is directed to send copies of this Memorandum Opinion and the accompanying Order to plaintiff.

ENTER: This 19<sup>th</sup> day of April, 2012.

  
Senior United States District Judge