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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON

JAMES S. GORDON, JR., an individual  
residing in Benton County, Washington,

Plaintiff,

v.

IMPULSE MARKETING GROUP, INC., a Nevada  
Corporation,

Defendant.

No. CV-04-5125-FVS

ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS  
TO DISMISS THIRD-PARTY  
DEFENDANTS'  
COUNTERCLAIMS

IMPULSE MARKETING GROUP, INC.,

Third-Party Plaintiff,

BONNIE GORDON, JAMES S. GORDON, III,  
JONATHAN GORDON, JAMILA GORDON, ROBERT  
PRITCHETT and EMILY ABBEY,

Third-Party Defendants.

**BEFORE THE COURT** is Defendant/Third-Party Plaintiff Impulse Marketing's Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Defendants' Counterclaims (Ct. Rec. 320) and Motion to Dismiss Third-Party Defendants' Amended Counterclaims (Ct. Rec. 365). Impulse Marketing is represented by Floyd Ivey, Sean Moynihan and Peter Glantz. Third-Party Defendants are proceeding *pro se*.

**BACKGROUND**

On November 18, 2005, Impulse Marketing filed a Second Amended Third-Party Complaint ("SATC") against each of the Third-Party

1 Defendants. Third-Party Defendants did not file timely Answers, but  
2 filed separate motions to dismiss the SATC. The Court denied those  
3 motions to dismiss, holding that the SATC stated claims for  
4 indemnity and contribution, breach of contract, tortious  
5 interference with business relations, fraud and deceit and  
6 injunctive relief. Thereafter, Third-Party Defendants answered the  
7 SATC and asserted 15 identical counterclaims against Impulse  
8 Marketing.<sup>1</sup> Impulse Marketing filed a motion to dismiss these  
9 counterclaims. Without seeking permission from the Court, Third-  
10 Party Defendants filed an Answer and Amended Counterclaims. Impulse  
11 Marketing then filed a second Motion to Dismiss Third-Party  
12 Defendants' Amended Counterclaims.

13 Third-Party Defendants assert the following counterclaims  
14 against Impulse Marketing: (1) Intimidation of Witnesses in  
15 violation of RCW 9A.72.110(1)(a) and Obstruction of Justice in  
16 violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1514(c); (2) Fraud and related activity in  
17 connection with electronic email in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1037;  
18 (3) violation of Washington's Anti-SLAPP Statute, RCW 4.24.510; (4)  
19 Identity Theft in violation of RCW 9.35.005; (5) Harassment in  
20 violation of RCW 10.14; (6) Promotional Advertising of Prizes in  
21 violation of RCW 19.170; (7) Vicarious Liability, RCW 18.86.090, RCW  
22 9A.08.010(1)(b)(c)(d), and RCW 9A.08.030(2); (8) Criminal  
23 Impersonation in the First Degree in violation of RCW 9A.60.040; (9)

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24  
25 <sup>1</sup> Third-Party Defendant Robert Pritchett only alleges the  
26 first six (6) counterclaims, which are identical to the  
counterclaims of every other Third-Party Defendant.

1 Unclean Hands and Estoppel and Cyberstalking in violation of RCW  
2 9.61.260(1); (10) Libel in violation of RCW 9.58.010; (11) violation  
3 of RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. § 96<sup>2</sup>; (12) violation of the Can-Spam Act,  
4 15 U.S.C. § 7705<sup>3</sup>; (13) violation of Washington's Commercial  
5 Electronic Mail Statute, RCW 19.190 et seq.; (14) violation of  
6 Washington's Consumer Protection Act, RCW 19.86 et seq.; and (15)  
7 Permanent Injunction.

8 Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b), Impulse  
9 Marketing requests the Court dismiss Third-Party Defendants'  
10 counterclaims for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be  
11 granted. Further, Impulse Marketing requests the Court impose  
12 sanctions pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c).

### 13 **STANDARD OF REVIEW**

14 A complaint should not be dismissed for failure to state a  
15 claim upon which relief may be granted under Federal Rule of Civil  
16 Procedure 12(b)(6) unless it "appears beyond doubt that the  
17 plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which  
18 would entitle him to relief." *Conley v. Gibson*, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46,  
19 78 S.Ct. 99, 101-02, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957). When the legal  
20 sufficiency of a complaint's allegations are tested with a motion  
21 under Rule 12(b)(6), "[r]eview is limited to the complaint."  
22 *Cervantes v. City of San Diego*, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993).

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24 <sup>2</sup> Third-Party Defendants withdrew their counterclaims for  
25 violation of RICO statute, 18 U.S.C. 96.

26 <sup>3</sup> Third-Party Defendants withdrew their counterclaims for  
violation of the Can-Spam Act, 15 U.S.C. § 7705.

1 All factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken as true  
2 and construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff. *Epstein*  
3 *v. Wash. Energy Co.*, 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th Cir. 1996). The Court  
4 must give the plaintiff the benefit of every inference that  
5 reasonably may be drawn from well-pleaded facts. *Tyler v. Cisneros*,  
6 136 F.3d 603, 607 (9th Cir. 1998). "However, the court is not  
7 required to accept legal conclusions cast in the form of factual  
8 allegations as true if those conclusions cannot reasonably be drawn  
9 from the facts alleged." *Clegg v. Cult Awareness Network*, 18 F.3d  
10 752, 754-55 (9th Cir. 1994) (citing *Papasan v. Allain*, 478 U.S. 265,  
11 286, 106 S.Ct. 2932, 2944, 92 L.Ed.2d 299 (1986)).

## 12 DISCUSSION

### 13 Obstruction of Justice in violation of 18 U.S.C. §1514(c)

14 Third-Party Defendants' original Answer and Counterclaims  
15 alleged Impulse Marketing violated 18 U.S.C. § 1514(c), which  
16 defines "harassment" for purposes of 18 U.S.C. § 1514, the federal  
17 statute creating a civil action to prevent the harassment of a  
18 victim or witness in a federal criminal case. Thus, technically,  
19 Third-Party Defendants have not pled a violation of any statute, but  
20 rather a violation of a definition. Further, 18 U.S.C. § 1514 is  
21 inapplicable because this is not a criminal case. However, even if  
22 they had pled a violation of an applicable statute creating a legal  
23 remedy, Third-Party Defendants lack standing to bring such a claim.

24 The Court is not aware of any authority for permitting a  
25 private individual to initiate a criminal prosecution in his own  
26 name in United States District Court. Generally, a private party

1 has no right to enforce federal criminal statutes. See *Bass Angler*  
2 *Sportsman Soc'y v. United States Steel Corp.*, 324 F.Supp. 412, 415  
3 (D.Ala.) (outlining "the firmly established principle that criminal  
4 statutes can only be enforced by proper authorities of the United  
5 States Government and a private party has no right to enforce these  
6 sanctions"), *aff'd*, 447 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir. 1971); *accord*, *Keenan v.*  
7 *McGrath*, 328 F.2d 610, 611 (1st Cir. 1964); *Cok v. Cosentino*, 876  
8 F.2d 1, 2 (1st Cir. 1989). Thus, Third-Party Defendants'  
9 counterclaims for obstruction of justice are dismissed. For these  
10 same reasons, the Court also dismisses Third-Party Defendants'  
11 counterclaims under 18 U.S.C. § 1037, which criminalizes fraud and  
12 related activity in connection with electronic email.

### 13 **Intimidation of Witnesses**

14 Third-Party Defendants' also assert counterclaims for  
15 violations of RCW 9A.72.110(1)(a), which states that a "person is  
16 guilty of intimidating a witness, if a person, by use of a threat  
17 against a current or prospective witness, attempts to: (a) Influence  
18 the testimony of that person; (b) Induce that person to elude legal  
19 process summoning him or her to testify; (c) Induce that person to  
20 absent himself or herself from such proceedings; or (d) Induce that  
21 person not to report the information relevant to a criminal  
22 investigation...." Intimidating a witness in violation of RCW  
23 9A.72.110 is a Class B felony. RCW 9A.72.110(4).

24 Third-Party Defendants lack standing to assert a claim under  
25 this criminal statute. See *Linda R.S. v. Richard D.*, 410 U.S. 614,  
26 619, 93 S.Ct. 1146 (1973) (noting that a "private citizen lacks a

1 judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution or nonprosecution  
2 of another"). In the State of Washington, if a private citizen is  
3 unhappy about a public official's refusal to investigate or  
4 prosecute criminal activity, the citizen has a right to petition the  
5 Washington state superior court to summon a grand jury. RCW  
6 10.27.030.<sup>4</sup> Thus, Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims for  
7 violations of RCW 9A.72.110 are dismissed because they lack standing  
8 to assert claims under Washington's criminal code.<sup>5</sup>

9 **Washington's Anti-SLAPP Statute, RCW 4.24.510**

10 Third-Party Defendants assert counterclaims under RCW 4.24.510,  
11 which is often characterized as Washington's anti-SLAPP statute.  
12 SLAPP is an acronym for Strategic Lawsuits Against Public  
13 Participation. *Gontmakher v. City of Bellevue*, 120 Wash.App. 365,  
14 85 P.3d 926, 927 n.1 (Div. 1, 2004). The statute provides:

15 A person who communicates a complaint or information to  
16 any branch or agency of federal, state, or local  
17 government ... is immune from civil liability for claims  
based upon the communication ... regarding any matter  
reasonably of concern to that agency....

18 The purpose of anti-SLAPP statutes is to protect the First  
19 Amendment right of citizens to petition the government for redress  
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21 <sup>4</sup> The Criminal Investigatory Act of 1971, RCW 10.27.030,  
22 states that a grand jury shall be summoned by the superior court,  
23 where the public interest so demands, whenever in its opinion  
24 there is sufficient evidence of criminal activity or corruption  
with in the country....

25 <sup>5</sup> In their response to Impulse Marketing's motion to dismiss  
26 Third-Party Defendants' Answer and Amended Counterclaims, Third-  
Party Defendants concede to the dismissal of all counterclaims  
asserted under Washington's criminal code.

1 of grievances. *Reid v. Dalton*, 124 Wash.App. 113, 126, 100 P.3d 349  
2 (Div. 3, 2004). The Anti-SLAPP statute protects "individuals who  
3 make good-faith reports to appropriate governmental bodies" from the  
4 threat of a "civil action for damages." RCW 4.24.500.

5 Third-Party Defendants allege they were sued by Impulse  
6 Marketing because they were prospective witnesses in this lawsuit.  
7 However, RCW 4.24.510 does not apply to Third-Party Defendants  
8 because there is no showing that they are being sued for making  
9 reports to "governmental bodies." Accordingly, Third-Party  
10 Defendants' counterclaims under Washington's Anti-SLAPP statute are  
11 dismissed.

#### 12 **Identity Theft in violation of RCW 9.35.005**

13 Third-Party Defendants assert counterclaims for violation of  
14 RCW 9.35.005, which sets forth the definitions for terms used in  
15 Chapter 9.35 of the RCW, which is entitled "Identity Crimes." Thus,  
16 technically, Third-Party Defendants have not pled a violation of any  
17 statute, but rather a violation of a statutory definition. Even if  
18 they had properly alleged a violation of RCW 9.35, the claim would  
19 be dismissed because as explained previously by the Court, Third-  
20 Party Defendants lack standing to institute claims under  
21 Washington's criminal code. Accordingly, Third-Party Defendants'  
22 counterclaims for violation of RCW 9.35 are dismissed.

#### 23 **Harassment in violation of RCW 10.14**

24 Third-Party Defendants assert counterclaims against Impulse  
25 Marketing for violation of RCW 10.14, which provides a mechanism for  
26

1 obtaining a civil<sup>6</sup> anti-harassment protection order. This Court is  
2 not the proper forum for obtaining relief under RCW 10.14. See  
3 *State v. Noah*, 103 Wash.App. 29, 38, 9 P.3d 858 (Div. 1, 2000)  
4 (noting that RCW 10.14.150 provides Washington state district and  
5 superior courts with concurrent jurisdiction over civil anti-  
6 harassment orders). Further, Third-Party Defendants have not  
7 complied with RCW 10.14.040, which provides the mechanism to  
8 petition for an order for protection from unlawful harassment. To  
9 obtain an order of protection under the anti-harassment statute, the  
10 petition for relief "shall allege the existence of harassment and  
11 shall be accompanied by an affidavit made under oath stating the  
12 specific facts and circumstances from which relief is sought." RCW  
13 10.14.040(1). Accordingly, Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims  
14 under RCW 10.14 are dismissed because they have not complied with  
15 the necessary procedural requirements and because this Court is not  
16 the proper forum to petition for an order for protection under RCW  
17 10.14.

18 **Promotional Advertising of Prizes, RCW 19.170.010**

19 Third-Party Defendants allege Impulse Marketing violated RCW  
20 19.170.010 by falsely advertising prizes without meeting statutory  
21 requirements "and by not fulfilling its obligations of the prizes  
22 claimed to have been won by Plaintiff and Third-Party Defendants."  
23 RCW 19.170.010 provides:

24 (1) The legislature finds that deceptive promotional

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25 <sup>6</sup> Impulse Marketing mistakenly argues that RCW 10.14 is a  
26 "criminal" statute.



1 advertising of prizes is a matter vitally affecting the  
2 public interest for the purpose of applying the consumer  
protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW.

3 (2) Deceptive promotional advertising of prizes is not  
4 reasonable in relation to the development and preservation  
of business. A violation of this chapter is an unfair or  
5 deceptive act in trade or commerce for the purpose of  
applying the consumer protection act, chapter 19.86 RCW, and  
constitutes an act of deceptive advertising.

6 (3) This chapter applies to a promotion offer:

7 (a) Made to a person in Washington;

8 (b) Used to induce or invite a person to come to the state  
of Washington to claim a prize ... or conduct any business  
9 in [Washington]; or

10 (c) Used to induce or invite a person to contact by any means  
a promoter, sponsor, salesperson, or their agent in  
[Washington].

11 Impulse Marketing moves to dismiss these counterclaims on the basis  
12 that Third-Party Defendants have not alleged "(1) what promotional  
13 advertisements they have personally received; and (2) what  
14 advertisements they have personally viewed."

15 The Court concludes that Third-Party Defendants have not  
16 asserted any factual allegations supporting their counterclaims  
17 under RCW 19.17.010. Therefore, these counterclaims claims are  
18 dismissed with leave to renew if Third-Party Defendants can assert  
19 sufficient factual allegations to state a claim for relief under RCW  
19.17.010.

20 **Vicarious Liability, RCW 18.86.090**

21 Chapter 18.86 of the RCW is entitled "Real Estate Brokerage  
22 Relationships" and is not applicable to the relationship between any  
23 of the parties in this action. Moreover, RCW 18.86.090 simply sets  
24 forth the definition of the term "vicarious liability" as it  
25 pertains to real estate brokerage relationships. Thus, RCW  
26 18.86.090 does not allege any specific statutory violation.

1 Accordingly, Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims under RCW  
2 18.86.090 are dismissed.

3 **RCW 9A.08.010(1)(b)(c)(d), and RCW 9A.08.030(2)**

4 Third-Party Defendants also assert counterclaims under RCW  
5 9A.08.010(1)(b)(c)(d) and RCW 9A.08.030(2) but the provisions  
6 located in these statutory sections simply set forth definitions for  
7 the general requirements of culpability under the Washington  
8 Criminal Code. Thus, Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims under  
9 these statutes are dismissed because the statutes don't specifically  
10 create any liability. Furthermore, as the Court has already noted,  
11 Third-Party Defendants lack standing to bring claims under  
12 Washington's criminal code.

13 **Criminal Impersonation in violation of RCW 9A.60.040**

14 RCW 9A.60.040, makes "criminal impersonation" in the first-  
15 degree a Class C Felony. As discussed previously, Third-Party  
16 Defendants lack standing to institute criminal charges under  
17 Washington's criminal code. Therefore, Third-Party Defendants'  
18 counterclaims under RCW 9A.60.040 are dismissed.

19 **Unclean Hands and Estoppel**

20 The doctrine of unclean hands and estoppel may be asserted by  
21 Third-Party Defendants as affirmative defenses, but are not separate  
22 causes of action. Thus, their counterclaims for unclean hands and  
23 estoppel are dismissed.

24 **Cyberstalking and Libel**

25 Third-Party Defendants assert counterclaims for cyberstalking,  
26 in violation of RCW 9.61.260(1)(a)(b)(4)(5), and libel, in violation

1 of RCW 9.58.010. The Court determines that these counterclaims are  
2 dismissed because Third-Party Defendants do not have standing to  
3 assert claims under Washington's criminal code.

4 **RCW 19.190 & RCW 19.86**

5 Third-Party Defendants assert counterclaims under Washington's  
6 Commercial Electronic Mail Statute, RCW 19.190 et seq., and  
7 Washington's Consumer Protection Act, and RCW 19.86 et seq. "To  
8 survive a motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6), a complaint must  
9 contain either direct or inferential allegations respecting all the  
10 material elements to sustain a recovery under some viable legal  
11 theory." *Advocacy Org. for Patients & Providers v. Auto Club Ins.*  
12 *Ass'n*, 176 F.3d 315, 319 (6th Cir. 1999). "Although this standard  
13 for Rule 12(b)(6) dismissals is quite liberal, more than bare  
14 assertions of legal conclusions is ordinarily required to satisfy  
15 federal notice pleading requirements." *Id.* Here, Third-Party  
16 Defendants' counterclaims contain only the summary conclusion that  
17 Impulse Marketing violated Washington's Anti-Spam statute, and  
18 thereby violated Washington Consumer Protection Act. Third-Party  
19 Defendants do not present any facts in their Answer and Amended  
20 Counterclaims or their responsive pleading concerning the elements  
21 required to prove violations of any of aforementioned statutes.  
22 Thus, the Court dismisses these counterclaims with leave to renew if  
23 Third-Party Defendants can assert sufficient factual allegations to  
24 state a claim for relief under these statutes.

25 **Permanent Injunction**

26 Third-Party Defendants seek the issuance of a permanent

1 injunction. "One who seeks relief by temporary or permanent  
2 injunction must show (1) that he has a clear legal or equitable  
3 right, (2) that he has a well-grounded fear of immediate invasion of  
4 that right, and (3) that the acts complained of are either resulting  
5 in or will result in actual and substantial injury to him." *Kucera*  
6 *v. Dept. of Transp.*, 140 Wash.2d 200, 209, 995 P.2d 63, 68 (2000)  
7 (citation omitted). Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims for  
8 permanent injunctions are dismissed for failure to plead factual  
9 allegations with respect to any of the three required elements.

#### 10 **Sanctions**

11 Impulse Marketing requests the Court to impose sanctions under  
12 Rule 11 on the basis that Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims are  
13 frivolous. Rule 11(c)(1)(A) provides strict procedural  
14 requirements. To comply with those requirements, Impulse Marketing  
15 was required to file a motion for sanctions under Rule 11 separately  
16 from any other motions. *Id.* Further, Impulse Marketing was  
17 required to serve its Rule 11 motion on Third-Party Defendants with  
18 a demand that they retract or suspend their allegedly offending  
19 behavior, and then allow at least 21 days before filing the Rule 11  
20 motion. *Id.* Here, Impulse Marketing did not follow these  
21 procedural requirements. It did not file a separate motion, but  
22 included the request for sanctions under Rule 11 within its motion  
23 to dismiss Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims. Therefore,  
24 Impulse Marketing served and filed its Rule 11 motion on the same  
25 day. The 21-day hold is a required prerequisite. *Radcliffe v.*  
26 *Rainbow Constr. Co.*, 254 F.3d 772, 789 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding 21-

1 day safe harbor mandatory). Since Impulse Marketing failed to  
2 follow the required procedure, it is not entitled to an award of  
3 sanctions under Rule 11. Accordingly,

4 **IT IS HEREBY ORDERED** that Impulse Marketing's Motion to Dismiss  
5 Third-Party Defendants' Counterclaims (**Ct. Rec. 320**) and Motion to  
6 Dismiss Third-Party Defendants' Amended Counterclaims (**Ct. Rec. 365**)  
7 are **GRANTED**. Third-Party Defendants' counterclaims are **DISMISSED**  
8 **with leave to renew** their claims for Promotional Advertising in  
9 violation of RCW 19.170.010, violations of Washington's Commercial  
10 Electronic Mail Statute, RCW 19.190 et seq., Washington's Consumer  
11 Protection Act, and RCW 19.86 et seq., and a permanent injunction if  
12 Third-Party Defendants can assert sufficient factual allegations to  
13 adequately state a claim upon which relief can be granted.

14 **IT IS SO ORDERED.** The District Court Executive is hereby  
15 directed to enter this Order and furnish copies to counsel and to  
16 the Third-Party Defendants proceeding *pro se*.

17 **DATED** this 19th day of May, 2006.

18 s/ Fred Van Sickle  
19 Fred Van Sickle  
United States District Judge