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6	UNITED STATES DI	STRICT COURT
7	EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON	
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9	RICHARD N. BATSON and BEVERLY J.	No. 2:15-cv-00329-SAB
10	JONES-BATSON,	
11	Plaintiffs,	ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS
12	v.	TO DISMISS
13	DEUTSCHE BANK TRUST AMERICAS,	
14	As Indentured Trustee for SASTA 2005-3	
15	Mortgage Backed Assets 2005-3;	
16	MORGAN STANLEY; OCWEN LOAN	
17	SERVICING; and NORTH CASCADE	
18	TRUSTEE SERVICES,	
19	Defendants.	
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21	Introduction	
22	Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, filed by Defendants	
23	Ocwen Loan Servicing, LLC ("Ocwen") and Deutsche Bank Trust Company	
24	Americas as Indenture Trustee for the registered holders of Saxon Asset Securities	
25	Trust 2005-3 Mortgage Loan Asset Backed Notes, Series 2005-3 ("Deutsche"),	
26	and the Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, ECF No. 6, filed by	
27	Defendant Morgan Stanley. Ocwen and Deutsche filed their motion on January 11,	
28	2016, and Morgan Stanley filed its motion of	on January 29, 2016. The Plaintiffs

1 have responded to both motions, though untimely. In the interests of justice,2 however, the Court endeavored to resolve these motions on the merits.

Though oral argument was scheduled for April 21, 2016, in Spokane,
Washington, these motions are proper to hear without oral argument. See Local
Rule 7.1(h)(3)(B)(iii). The Court reviewed the motions, as well as the related
filings and documents, including those submitted for judicial notice, as well as the
record for the prior federal action involving these parties and claims, which this
Court presided over. See Batson et al. v. Deutsche Bank Trust Americas et al.,
2:15-cv-00193-SAB (E.D. Wash. July 24, 2015). For the reasons discussed below,
the Court grants both motions to dismiss and denies the motion to stay.

Material Facts

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On April 16, 2005, the Batsons entered an agreement to purchase the
property contested in the instant action, 12910 East Sinto Avenue, Spokane Valley
Washington 99216. Plaintiffs executed a deed of trust to secure the purchase on
July 3, 2005. Plaintiffs noted discrepancies with their payments, and notified
Saxon Mortgage, and later Ocwen, and contested the terms of the deed for many
years.

18 Plaintiffs eventually defaulted on their loan payments. A Notice of Trustee 19||Sale was posted on the property on March 28, 2015, which was filed on June 1, 20 2015 with the Spokane County Auditor. The Plaintiffs' filed a complaint on June 26, 2015 in Spokane County Superior Court, alleging Wrongful Foreclosure, 2122 Intent to Defraud, Wrongful Claim to Debt Secured by Deed, Violation of 23 Consumer Rights, and Violation of Plaintiffs' Civil Rights. The case was removed to this Court's jurisdiction on July 24, 2015 and given cause number 2:15-cv-24 25 00193-SAB ("'193 case"). Plaintiffs' moved for a preliminary injunction on 26 August 21, 2015 to halt the trustee's sale. The Court denied the motion and 27|| granted motions to dismiss, ending all claims except a cause of action under the 28 federal Real Estate Procedures Act, 12 U.S.C. § 2601. The '193 case is pending.

Plaintiffs filed a second complaint, beginning the instant case, in Spokane
 County Superior Court on November 12, 2015, six days after this Court granted
 the motions to dismiss. The complaint included claims for Wrongful Non-Judicial
 Foreclosure and Fraud. Defendants removed the complaint to this Court on
 December 1, 2015, and the motions to dismiss followed shortly.

Standard

A motion to dismiss for failure to state a claim may be granted only when the plaintiff's allegations, taken as true, demonstrate the plaintiff is not entitled to relief as a matter of law. Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Mendocino Environ. Cntr. v. Mendocino Cnty., 14 F.3d 457, 460 (9th Cir. 1994). The Court accepts all allegations in the complaint as true, and draws reasonable inferences in favor of the plaintiff. Hays v. City of Spokane, No. CV-11-0010-LRS, 2011 WL 4852311, at *2 (E.D. Wash. Oct. 13, 2011). Furthermore, the complaint must be construed in the light most favorable to Plaintiffs. Parks Schl. of Bus., Inc. v. Symington, 51 F.3d 1480, 1484 (9th Cir. 1995). However, the Court need not take legal conclusions as factual allegations. Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. Overall, the claims for relief must be plausible on their face. Id.

The Court may take judicial notice of and consider filed litigation
documents as public records. Lee v. City of Los Angeles, 250 F.3d 668, 689 (9th
Cir. 2001). The Court hereby takes notice of the docket in the '193 case, and the
documents contained therein.

Analysis

This case is governed by the law of claim preclusion, which prevents the relitigation of claims that have already been brought to court. Because this Court sits in diversity and considers Plaintiffs' state law claims for wrongful foreclosure and fraud, Washington law on claim preclusion applies. *Semtek Int'l v. Lockheed* Martin Corp., 531 U.S. 497, 509 (2001).

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The doctrine of claim preclusion "treats a judgment, once rendered, as the
 full measure of relief to be accorded between the same parties on the same claim
 or cause of action." McClain v. Apodaca, 793 F.2d 1031, 1033 (9th Cir. 1986).
 Claim preclusion "bars all grounds for recovery which could have been asserted,
 whether they were or not, in a prior suit between the same parties on the same
 cause of action." Clark v. Bear Stearns & Co., 966 F.2d 1318, 1320 (9th Cir.
 1992).

8 The rule applies when two cases are identical in respect to "(1) subject matter; (2)
9 cause of action; (3) persons and parties; and (4) the quality of the persons for or
10 against whom the claim is made." Sprinkle v. SB&C Ltd., 472 F. Supp. 2d 1235,
11 1241 (W.D. Wash. 2006) (citing Rains v. State, 100 Wn.2d 660, 663 (1983)).

Because the rule applies to all grounds for recovery which could have been
asserted, there is no need for the Court to analyze the substantive merit of
Plaintiffs' new claims;¹ the Court need only examine the four factors listed above
to discern if the previously-adjudicated claims are being brought once more. Noel
v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1171 (9th Cir. 2003).

There can be no doubt that claim preclusion applies. The Batsons, plaintiffs
in the '193 case and here, bring claims for an identical factual pattern: the
allegedly improper and fraudulent foreclosure of the house in Spokane Valley,
Washington. The subject matter is identical. The '193 complaint brought causes of
action under wrongful foreclosure, fraud, civil rights violations, and a variety of
federal statutory claims. The instant case brings claims under fraud and wrongful
foreclosure, so there is an identity between causes of action. Indeed, the causes

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¹ The Court notes that one reason it dismissed the wrongful foreclosure claim under RCW 61.24.130(1) in the '193 case, Order Granting in Part and Denying in Part Motions to Dismiss, 2:15-cv-00193-SAB, ECF No. 59 at 4, is that the Washington Deed of Trust Act does not allow damages before a foreclosure sale is completed. Pfau v. Wash.
Mutual, Inc., No CV-08-00142-JLQ, 2009 WL 484448, at *12 (E.D. Wash. Feb. 24, 2009). The previous suit was initiated before the foreclosure sale occurred. Plaintiffs could plausibly argue that because the sale has now taken place, they are entitled to damages. However, as the '193 order makes clear, Plaintiffs did not allege an actual violation of the Deed of Trust Act in the '193 case. Even if the instant complaint alleges new issues, under the rule of claim preclusion, "all grounds for recovery which could have been asserted" are moot. Clark, 966 F.2d at 1320 (emphasis added).

arise from the same nucleus of fact, entail the infringement of the same rights, are
 based on the same evidence, and would impact determinations and rights
 established under the '193 case. Constantini v. Trans World Airlines, 681 F.2d
 199, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 1982).

In the '193 case, Richard Batson and Beverly Jones-Batson sued Deutsche,
Morgan Stanley, Ocwen, Cascade National Trust, and various anonymous parties,
in their roles as loan originators, trustee, and loan servicer. In this case, Richard
Batson and Beverly Jones-Batson again sue Deutsche, Morgan Stanley, Ocwen,
and Cascade for the same actions and roles in the '193 case. The parties are
therefore identical. The fact that the anonymous parties are not included in this
suit does not prevent a finding of identity. See, e.g., Sunshine Anthracite Coal Co.
v. Adkins, 310 U.S. 381, 402 (1940) ("[P]arties nominally different may be, in
legal effect, the same.").

The Court's order in the '193 action dismissing the claims served as a judgment on the merits of Plaintiffs' claims, and so precluded their refiling in any court, state or federal. This case presents a paradigmatic example of claim preclusion, and the Court applies it to Plaintiff's complaint. And because the standard for claim preclusion applies to all facts or claims that should have been considered in the former case, any new information or claims Plaintiffs plead are precluded. This renders any future amendment of the complaint futile, and thus this case is dismissed with prejudice. See Reddy v. Litton Indus., Inc., 912 F.2d 291, 296 (9th Cir. 1990).

Plaintiffs styled their responses to Defendants' motions to dismiss as
motions for summary judgment. ECF Nos. 8 & 9. The Court construed them
properly as responses. Plaintiffs are correct that Defendants have not shown a
dispute as to any material fact; indeed, under the standard of a motion to dismiss,
the Court and the Defendants, have assumed all facts pled by Plaintiffs as true.

Defendants have shown that the facts alleged in the instant complaint are identical to those in the '193 case, and that the causes of action are identical. This is confirmed by a review of both complaints, and Defendants' request for judicial notice of the '193 case materials accomplishes the same. Plaintiffs never provide any information on how the claims or facts are different in any way, instead baldly asserting that there are "differences in governing law, Defendant [sic] named, and legal theories." ECF No. 8 at 4:20-5:1. Plaintiffs allege no different governing law; the Defendants are identical; and styling a "fraud" claim as "intent to defraud" does not create a new cause of action. It strains credulity that the Plaintiffs argue in good faith that this case differs in any way from the '193 case.

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Conclusion

The Court hereby dismisses this case with prejudice. The '193 case is the
only vehicle where Plaintiffs can vindicate any legal rights resulting from the
foreclosure of their house.

Given the emotional nature of the claims involved in this case, as well as
Plaintiffs' pro se status, the Court declines to sanction Plaintiffs at this time. The
Court notes that any future complaints relating to these claims could be met with
sanctions and attorneys' fees for Defendants.

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3	Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:	
4	1. Defendants Deutsche and Ocwen's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 5, is	
5	GRANTED.	
6	2. Defendant Morgan Stanley's Motion to Dismiss, ECF No. 6, is	
7	GRANTED.	
8	3. Plaintiff's Motion to Stay Pending Disposition of a Motion to Grant	
9	Amendment, ECF No. 10, is DENIED .	
10	4. All claims are dismissed with prejudice . Because Plaintiffs can plead no	
11	set of facts that would entitle them to relief, leave to amend would be futile, and is	
12	denied.	
13	5. The hearing scheduled for April 21, 2016, in Spokane, Washington, is	
14	VACATED.	
15	IT IS SO ORDERED. The District Court Executive is hereby directed to	
16	file this Order, provide copies to counsel and pro se Plaintiffs, and close the file.	
17	DATED this 22nd day of March, 2016.	
18	A DECEMBER OF THE OWNER OF	
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21 22	Stankey U. Sestran	
22	Stanley A. Bastian	
23 24	United States District Judge	
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	ORDER GRANTING MOTIONS TO DISMISS ^ 7	