

1 should have been U.S. Bank Trust. (ECF No. 1, p. 1-2).

2 Ocwen filed the Motion to Dismiss on behalf of itself and U.S. Bank. Therein, Ocwen stated that it "services the Loan on behalf of U.S. Bank Trust, N.A.". (ECF No. 3 6, p. 3). The Motion also stated the Loan at issue was transferred to Wilmington Trust 4 5 by Assignment dated March 10, 2015. (Id. at 3). The Motion does not state when the Loan was allegedly transferred from Wilmington Trust to U.S. Bank. A Notice of 6 Default, prepared by North Cascade on November 9, 2015, and attached to Plaintiff's 7 Complaint at Exhibit P, lists Wilmington Trust, N.A., as Trustee of ARLP Securitization 8 Trust, Series 2014-2, as the Note Owner. (ECF No. 1-1, Ex P). Two weeks after filing 9 the Motion to Dismiss, Ocwen filed a Supplement (ECF No. 12), in which it seeks to 10 correct the Motion by eliminating the contention that it is the current servicer of the Loan, 11 12 and instead states "Caliber Home Loans, Inc." is the servicer.

Plaintiff filed a Response (ECF No. 14) to the Motion on July 1, 2016, and therein
argues that U.S. Bank should not be heard on the Motion as it has "not established that
it has any interest in the loan". (*Id.* at 6). Concerning the proper holder of the note,
Plaintiff's Response states: "as of June 27, 2016, the Spokane County Auditor's records
show no assignment from Wilmington Trust to U.S. Bank." (*Id.* at 7).

Just hours after Plaintiff's Response was filed, Defendant North Cascade filed a 18 Notice of Joinder (ECF No. 16) in Ocwen's Motion. North Cascade also filed over 100 19 pages of additional exhibits. On July 22, 2016, Plaintiff filed a Response to the Notice 20 21 of Joinder. (ECF No. 24). This Response raises additional issues about the uncertainty of the proper parties: "Adding to the already unclear interests of the parties that have 22 appeared, North Cascade now states in its brief that the loan in question is owned by 23 Deutsche Bank." (ECF No. 24, p. 2). Plaintiff further contends that Wilmington Trust, 24 25 N.A., has failed to appear and is in default.

Neither Ocwen or North Cascade filed a reply brief, and thus neither Defendant
 responded to Plaintiff's claims that U.S. Bank lacks standing and that Deutsche Bank's
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interest is unsubstantiated. After the conclusion of the hearing, at which North Cascade
 could not at that time provide an answer the court's inquiry as to why Deutsche Bank was
 named in its brief, counsel filed a Declaration (ECF No. 28) stating that the reference to
 Deutsche Bank was in error. It appears from Plaintiff's Response (ECF No. 24), that
 Plaintiff may seek to file an Amended Complaint to add or remove parties.

II. Discussion

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The uncertainty of the record, specifically concerning the proper parties, and the 7 8 procedural irregularities with the filing of the Motion preclude the court from issuing a dispositive ruling. Both Ocwen and North Cascade supplemented the record after the 9 Motion was filed with new information concerning factual allegations, and neither Ocwen 10 or North Cascade filed a reply brief addressing Plaintiff's contention that U.S. Bank is 11 12 not a party and therefore cannot advance a motion. "The art of advocacy is not one of mystery. Our adversarial system relies on the advocates to inform the discussion and 13 raise the issues to the court." Independent Towers of Washington v. Washington, 350 F.3d 14 925, 929 (9th Cir. 2003). The parties' briefing to date has not presented a cogent picture 15 of the entities involved in this dispute. 16

17 The three attorneys who appeared at the hearing in this matter should be able to confer and determine the current holder of the note and the current loan servicer. Plaintiff 18 has stated documentary evidence of such has not been forthcoming. As Ocwen contends 19 Wilmington Trust, N.A., is no longer the holder of the note and that Ocwen is no longer 20 21 the servicer, replaced by Caliber Home Loans, the court expects that counsel for Ocwen has conducted an adequate factual investigation to support those contentions. 22 Documentary evidence supporting those contentions should have been provided as part 23 of the Rule 26(a)(1) initial disclosures. Pursuant to the court's Scheduling Order, initial 24 25 disclosures were to have been made by July 11, 2016. Plaintiff has stated that he has not received any documentation confirming that U.S. Bank is the holder of the note, and the 26 letter he received "ostensibly" confirming Caliber Home Loans is not the servicer 27 28 ORDER - 3

actually referenced "an unknown borrower not involved in this action." (ECF No. 32, p.
2). As outlined above, the uncertainty as to the proper parties, incomplete briefing, and
untimely factual supplementation of the Motion to Dismiss, do not make a dispositive
ruling appropriate at this time. The court will not discuss the merits of the Motion as to
the state law claims, but will briefly address the only federal claim, the Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act claim.

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A. Failure to State a Claim under Fair Debt Collection Practices Act

Defendant Ocwen argues that non-judicial foreclosure proceedings are not attempts 8 to collect a debt under the FDCPA, 15 U.S.C. § 1692 et seq. The court indicated at oral 9 argument that there was potential merit to Defendants' argument. The FDCPA claim is 10 the only federal claim, and if dismissed, the court would likely decline supplemental 11 jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. Ocwen relies on Mansour v. Cal-12 Western Reconveyance, 618 F.Supp.2d 1178 (D.Arizona 2009). Plaintiff argues that this 13 is not controlling authority, and the Mansour opinion acknowledged the Ninth Circuit had 14 not resolved the issue. The Mansour opinion relies on Fifth Circuit authority, Perry v. 15 Stewart Title, 756 F.2d 1197, 1208 (5th Cir. 1985)("The legislative history of 1692a(6) 16 indicates conclusively that a debt collector does not include the consumer's creditors, a 17 mortgage servicing company, or an assignee of a debt, as long as the debt was not in 18 default at the time it was assigned"). Other courts have agreed with the Fifth Circuit. See 19 for example Fenello v. Bank of America, 577 Fed.Appx. 899 (11th Cir. 2014)(loan 20 servicer, Bank of America, was not a "debt collector" under 1692g because its debt 21 collection activity involved a debt that was not in default at the time Bank of America 22 became the servicer). 23

Mansour was decided in 2009, and at oral argument the court raised the Ninth
 Circuit's opinion in Schlegel v. Wells Fargo Bank, 720 F.3d 1204 (9th Cir. 2013), which
 had not been addressed in the briefing. Plaintiff asked to submit supplemental briefing,
 and the court allowed both sides to submit additional briefs. (ECF No. 31). In Schlegel
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the Ninth Circuit found the Plaintiff had failed to make sufficient allegations that Wells
Fargo was a debt collector to state a claim under the FDCPA. The court stated: "The
complaint's factual matter, viewed in the light most favorable to the [Plaintiffs],
establishes only that the debt collection is some part of Wells Fargo's business, which is
insufficient to state a claim under the FDCPA." *Id.* at 1208.

Plaintiff now concedes that it cannot state an FDCPA claim against the note holder. 6 (Plaintiff's Supp. Brief, ECF No. 32 at p. 3)("Plaintiff's FDCPA claims against banks 7 that hold or have held the note on the home should, therefore be dismissed."). However, 8 Plaintiff maintains that its FDCPA claim against Ocwen and North Cascade is properly 9 stated. The issue of the viability of FDCPA claims in the context of mortgage foreclosure 10 is not settled. See for example *Glazer v. Chase Home Fin. LLC*, 704 F.3d 646 (6th Cir. 11 12 2013)("we hold that mortgage foreclosure is debt collection under the Act."). Additionally, there are cases where FDCPA claims have been allowed to go forward 13 against loan servicers. See for example Lang v. Ocwen Fin. Serv. Inc., 2011 WL 1303749 14 at *8 (D.Mont. 2011)("The Court concludes that these allegations are sufficient to state 15 a plausible claim under the FDCPA. Whether Ocwen is a debt collector or instituted debt 16 17 collection activities raises legal and factual questions not properly determined on a motion to dismiss."). 18

Ocwen's Supplemental Brief (ECF No. 33) requests the court to dismiss the 19 20 FDCPA claims with prejudice. However, even if the court were to agree the Complaint 21 should be dismissed as to Ocwen and North Cascade, it would dismiss with leave to amend. It is not clear given the authorities cited, that amendment would be futile. 22 Further, it is not clear, given the lack of clarity in the instant record, whether the proper 23 parties are before the court, or whether Ocwen's argument as to FDCPA claim is 24 25 meritorious. Plaintiff has conceded the issue as to Wilmington Trust, N.A., and therefore the court will dismiss that claim. 26

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1	IT IS HEREBY ORDERED:
2	1. The Motion to Dismiss (ECF No. 6) is GRANTED only as to the FDCPA claim
3	against Defendant Wilmington Trust, N.A., and is OTHERWISE DENIED for the
4	reasons set forth herein.
5	2. The court hereby grants Plaintiff leave to file an Amended Complaint. Any
6	such Amended Complaint shall be filed within 14 days of the date of this Order.
7	3. The parties are directed to meet and confer within 7 days of the date of this
8	Order in an effort to identify the proper parties to this action. Such meeting may be
9	telephonic. The parties are also directed, in accord with Rule 26 Initial Disclosure
10	requirements, to exchange any non-privileged documentation supporting their contentions
11	as to the proper parties.
12	IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk shall enter this Order and furnish copies to
13	counsel.
14	Dated this 26 th day of August, 2016.
15	<u>s/ Justin L. Quackenbush</u> JUSTIN L. QUACKENBUSH
16	SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE
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