		FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON	
1		Feb 07, 2020	
2		SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK	
3	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
4	UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,	No. 2:17-cv-00361-SMJ	
5			
6	Plaintiff,	ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT	
7	V.		
/	BONNIE LYONS, individually and as		
8	distributee of the Estate of Robert C. Lyons; ESTATE OF ROBERT C.		
9	LYONS; and CHELAN COUNTY,		
10	WA,		
11	Defendants.		
12	Before the Court, without oral argument, is the Government's Motion for		
13	Default Judgment Against the Estate of Robert C. Lyons, ECF No. 44. The		
14	Government moves for entry of a default judgment against the Estate of Robert C.		
15	Lyons (the "Estate"), against which the Government brought suit to secure a		
16	judgment for outstanding federal trust fund recovery assessments and to foreclose		
17	on tax liens against real property in Washington. See ECF Nos. 1, 44. The Estate		
18	failed to file an answer to the Complaint, and on motion of the Government, the		
19	Clerk's Office entered an Order of Default. See ECF Nos. 29, 32. The Government		
20	now moves for entry of default judgment.		

1	Entry of default judgment is discretionary. Aldabe v. Aldabe, 616 F.2d 1089,
2	1092 (9th Cir. 1980). Where possible, cases should be resolved on their merits, and
3	the entry of default judgment is an extreme measure reserved for unusual
4	circumstances. Westchester Fire Ins. Co. v. Mendez, 585 F.3d 1183, 1189 (9th
5	Cir. 2009) (citing Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th
6	Cir. 1985)). In evaluating the propriety of default judgment, the Court is guided by
7	seven non-exclusive factors:
8	(1) [T]he possibility of prejudice to the plaintiff, (2) the merits of plaintiff's substantive claim, (3) the sufficiency of the complaint, (4) the
9	sum of money at stake in the action[,] (5) the possibility of a dispute concerning material facts[,] (6) whether the default was due to
10	excusable neglect, and (7) the strong policy underlying the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure favoring decisions on the merits.
11	Eitel v. McCool, 782 F.2d 1470, 1471–72 (9th Cir. 1986). The Court assumes the
12	facts alleged in the complaint are true. Geddes v. United Fin. Grp., 559 F.2d 557,
13	560 (9th Cir. 1977). Having reviewed the motion and the record in this matter in
14	light of the Eitel factors, the Court is fully informed and finds that entry of default
15	judgment is appropriate in this case.
16	First, the Court is persuaded that refusing to enter default judgment would
17	prejudice the Government. Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Prejudice results from denial
18	of a default judgment where it would provide the only reasonable avenue for a
19	plaintiff to recover. Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. Castworld Prods., Inc., 219 F.R.D.
20	494, 499 (C.D. Cal. 2003). Such is the case where, as here, the plaintiff could be

denied recovery "until such time as Defendant participates . . . in the litigation—
 which may never occur." Getty Images (US), Inc. v. Virtual Clinics, No. C13 0626JLR, 2014 WL 358412, at *3 (W.D. Wash. Jan. 31, 2014) (quoting United
 States v. Ordonez, No. 1:10-cv-01921-LJO-SKO, 2011 WL 1807112, at *2 (E.D.
 Cal. May 11, 2001)).

Here, the Government brought suit against both the Estate and Bonnie Lyons 6 and subsequently entered a stipulated judgment with Ms. Lyons for approximately 7 half the outstanding penalty assessments. See ECF Nos. 1, 42. Thus, as the 8 Government asserts, the only remaining possibility for recovering any of the 9 outstanding obligations is by way of the Estate "if it is later found to own property." 10 ECF No. 44 at 5. Declining to enter default judgment would in practical terms 11 necessitate an appropriate motion for judgment on the pleadings or a motion for 12 summary judgment. Given that the Estate did not file an answer or otherwise 13 participate in its defense, the Court finds such alternatives would be wasteful. 14

Second, the Court is satisfied based on a review of the record that the
Government's claims against the Estate are meritorious. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at
1471–72. The Complaint alleges Robert Lyons willfully failed to withhold required
taxes in his role as president of R&B Distribution, Inc., resulting in the assessment
of penalties totaling approximately \$461,156, inclusive of interest as of October 16,
2017. See ECF No. 1 at 5–8. The Government submitted the sworn declaration of

Richard Ped, a Revenue Officer employed by the Internal Revenue Service, 1 attesting to the validity of the assessments and providing supporting documentation. 2 See ECF Nos. 45, 45-1 & 45-2. Considering this evidence and taking the well-3 pleaded facts in the Complaint as true, the Court concludes the Government's 4 claims are substantively meritorious. Relatedly, the Court finds the Complaint is 5 sufficient; it invokes the Government's right to relief under a federal statute, 26 6 U.S.C. § 6672, and sets forth the essential facts necessary to substantiate that claim. 7 See generally ECF No. 1; see also Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. 8

Next, the Court considers the sum of money at stake in the action. See Eitel,
782 F.2d at 1471–72. Excepting the stipulated judgment entered against Bonnie
Lyons, the Government seeks entry of judgment against the Estate for \$263,651.60,
exclusive of statutory interest accrued after October 8, 2019. ECF No. 44 at 8–9.
This is a significant sum of money, which weighs in favor of resolving this matter
on the merits. Nevertheless, in view of the remaining factors and the circumstances
of this case, the Court finds this fact does not prevent entry of default judgment.

Next, the Court must consider whether there is a possibility of a dispute over
the material facts in this matter. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. Considering the
facts set out in the Complaint, the declaration of Richard Ped, and the supporting
documentation submitted with that declaration, the Court finds a genuine dispute as
to the validity or amount of the assessments against the Estate is unlikely. See ECF

1 Nos. 1, 45, 45-1 & 45-2.

The Court also considers the possibility that the Estate's default was due to 2 excusable neglect. See Eitel, 782 F.2d at 1471–72. There is no excusable neglect 3 where a defendant is "properly served with the complaint, the notice of entry of 4 default, [and] the papers in support of the [default judgment] motion." Shanghai 5 Automation Instrument Co. v. Kuei, 194 F. Supp. 2d 995, 1005 (N.D. Cal Nov. 2, 6 7 2001). Here, the taxpayer whose actions precipitated the penalty assessments at issue is deceased and, as the Government observes, the individual most likely to 8 intervene in the Estate's defense is Bonnie Lyons, who has been aware of this action 9 since early 2018, when she waived formal service. ECF No. 44 at 8; ECF No. 10. 10 No one has appeared or litigated on behalf of the Estate, and the Court considers it 11 unlikely that this is the result of excusable neglect. 12

Finally, the Court considers the strong preference, expressed in the Federal 13 Rules of Civil Procedure, for resolution of claims on the merits. See Eitel, 782 F.2d 14 at 1471–72; Pena v. Seguros La Comercial, S.A., 770 F.2d 811, 814 (9th Cir. 1985). 15 Although this factor "almost always disfavors the entry of default judgment," it is 16 not dispositive. Vawter v. Quality Loan Serv. Corp. of Wash., No. C009-1585JL R, 17 2011 WL 1584434, at *6 (W.D. Wash. Apr. 27, 2011). That strong preference 18 notwithstanding, the Court finds this is an appropriate case for entry of default 19 judgment. This matter has been pending since late 2017 and seeks to recover tax 20

obligations which appear well documented and not reasonably disputed. Because
the Estate has, to this time, taken no steps toward mounting a defense against the
suit, the Court finds entry of default judgment is the most appropriate, just, and
efficient resolution to this matter. As the Government observes, entry of judgment
against the Estate resolves all outstanding claims in this matter, and the case is now
closed.

Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 7 The Government's Motion for Default Judgment Against the Estate of 1. 8 Robert C. Lyons, ECF No. 44, is GRANTED. 9 2. The Clerk's office shall ENTER JUDGMENT in favor of the United 10 States of America against the Estate of Robert C. Lyons, in the amount 11 of \$263,651.60 as of October 8, 2019, with statutory interest and 12 additions continuing to accrue pursuant to 26 U.S.C. §§ 6601, 6621, 13 6622, and 28 U.S.C. § 1961(c) after October 8, 2019, for Trust Fund 14 Recovery Penalty assessments for the tax periods ending 03/31/2005; 15 06/30/2005; 09/30/2005; 12/31/2005; 06/30/2006; and 09/30/2006. 16 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 ORDER GRANTING MOTION FOR DEFAULT JUDGMENT - 6

1	3. All pending motions are DENIED AS MOOT.		
2	4. All hearings and other deadlines are STRICKEN .		
3	5. The Clerk's Office is directed to CLOSE this file.		
4	IT IS SO ORDERED. The Clerk's Office is directed to enter this Order and		
5	provide copies to all counsel and pro se Defendants.		
6	DATED this <u>7th</u> day of February 2020.		
7	SALVADOR MENDOZA, JR.		
8	United States District Judge		
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