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2		FILED IN THE U.S. DISTRICT COURT
3		EASTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
4		SEAN F. MCAVOY, CLERK
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6	UNITED STATES DISTR	ICT COURT
7	EASTERN DISTRICT OF W	VASHINGTON
8		
9	MOUNTAIN WEST FARM BUREAU	No. 2:18-cv-00396-SAB
10	MUTUAL INSURANCE COMPANY, a	
11	Wyoming corporation,	
12	Plaintiff,	
13	v.	
14	J. TIM JACKSON and ROBERTA JACKSON,	ORDER GRANTING
15	husband and wife; IBEX CONSTRUCTION,	PLAINTIFF'S MOTION
16	INC., a Washington corporation; STEVEN O.	FOR SUMMARY
17	ANDERSON as personal representative of the	JUDGMENT
18	ESTATE OF EDWARD K. DUMAW, on	
19	behalf of the Estate and surviving family	
20	members, CARRIE DUMAW, KRISTEN	
21	DUMAW, MEGAN DUMAW, and ANNA	
22	DUMAW, individually; RICHARD	
23	WAGONER and VALERIE	
24	WAGONER, husband and wife; THEODORE	
25	LISTER; DALE RANDALL HILL; JACK	
26	STEGALL, JR.; FELIX W. SCHUCK;	
27	INLAND NORTHWEST EQUIPMENT	
28	AUCTION, INC., d/b/a REINLAND	
	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOT JUDGMENT ~ 1	TON FOR SUMMARY
		Dockets

1	AUCTIONEERS, a Washington corporation;		
2	REINLAND, INC., d/b/a REINLAND		
3	EQUIPMENT AUCTION, an Idaho		
4	corporation; REINLAND PROPERTIES, LLC,		
5	an Idaho limited liability company; THOMAS		
6	REINLAND and KUNYA REINLAND,		
7	husband and wife; ASHLY REINLAND and		
8	JOHN DOE REINLAND, husband and wife;		
9	PACIFIC HIDE & FUR DEPOT, d/b/a		
10	PACIFIC STEEL & RECYCLING, a		
11	Montana corporation; PACIFIC HIDE & FUR		
12	DEPOT, INC., a Washington corporation;		
13	GORDON BECK and JANE DOE BECK,		
14	husband and wife,		
15	Defendants.		
16			
17	Before the Court are Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No.		
18	26, and the parties' Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment in Favor of		
19	Plaintiff, ECF No. 33. The motions were heard without oral argument.		
20	This is an action for declaratory judgment brought by the insurance compar	ıy	
21	that insured Defendants J. Tim and Roberta Jackson. This lawsuit arises out of the)	
22	explosion at a recycling facility of a 55-gallon unmarked metal tank that contained	d	
23	chlorine gas, causing significant and injuries and death to persons who were		
24	working at the recycling facility.		
25	Motion Standard		
26	Summary judgment is appropriate "if the movant shows that there is no		
27	genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a	l	

matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). There is no genuine issue for trial unless
 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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there is sufficient evidence favoring the non-moving party for a jury to return a
verdict in that party's favor. *Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.*, 477 U.S. 242, 250
(1986). The moving party has the initial burden of showing the absence of a
genuine issue of fact for trial. *Celotex Corp. v. Catrett*, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986).
If the moving party meets its initial burden, the non-moving party must go beyond
the pleadings and "set forth specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for
trial." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 248.

8 In addition to showing there are no questions of material fact, the moving 9 party must also show it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Smith v. Univ. of Wash. Law Sch., 233 F.3d 1188, 1193 (9th Cir. 2000). The moving party is entitled 10 11 to judgment as a matter of law when the non-moving party fails to make a 12 sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on which the non-moving 13 party has the burden of proof. *Celotex*, 477 U.S. at 323. The non-moving party cannot rely on conclusory allegations alone to create an issue of material fact. 14 15 Hansen v. United States, 7 F.3d 137, 138 (9th Cir. 1993).

When considering a motion for summary judgment, a court may neither
weigh the evidence nor assess credibility; instead, "the evidence of the non-movant
is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." *Anderson*, 477 U.S. at 255.

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Background Facts

This case is a companion case to three cases proceeding in Spokane County
Superior Court. Plaintiff Mount West Farm Bureau Mutual Insurance Company
comes to federal court seeking a declaratory judgment that it does not have a duty
to defend or otherwise provide coverage for any claims asserted against its insured,
Defendant J. Tim and Roberta Jackson.

The Jackson Defendants own Defendant Ibex Construction, which is located
 in Spokane, Washington. The Jackson Defendants contracted with Defendant
 Reinland Auctioneers to clear the Ibex Construction property of scrap metal and
 ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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old equipment. Defendant Reinland Auctioneers contracted with Defendant
Gordon Beck to remove certain pieces of scrap metal off the property. Defendant
Beck loaded the bigger pieces of the scrap metal, including a 55-gallon unmarked
metal tank, into a dump truck owned by Defendant Pacific Steel & Recycling.
("PS&R"). An employee of Defendant PS&R drove the truck to its recycling
facility. The metal, including the unmarked tank, was loaded into a crusher. When
the tank was crushed, it exploded and chlorine gas was released, causing
considerable injuries and death to nearby employees.

Interpreting Insurance Contracts

Montana law applies to the interpretation of the insurance contract.¹ The 10 11 interpretation of an insurance contract is a question of law. *Fisher v. State Farm* 12 Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 305 P.3d 861, 865 (Mont. 2013). When interpreting an 13 insurance contract, Montana courts accord the usual meaning to the terms and the 14 words used and construe them using common sense. *Id.* An insurance contract is 15 ambiguous if it is "reasonably subjected to two different interpretations." *Id.* 16 (citation omitted). Whether a provision of an insurance contract is "reasonably susceptible to two different interpretations," is determined from "the viewpoint of 17 18 a consumer with average intelligence, but untrained in the law or the insurance 19 business." Id. (citation omitted). That said, a provision is not ambiguous "just because a claimant says so or just because the parties disagree as to its meeting." 2021 *Id.* (citation omitted). *Id.* at 866. "Courts should not ... 'seize upon certain and definite covenants expressed in plain English with violent hands, and distort them 22 23so as to include a risk clearly excluded by the insurance contract." Id. (citation

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25 25. Terms of Policy to Conform to Statute

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 4

^{State of Montana—The provisions of this policy conform to the minimum requirements of Montana law and control over any conflicting statutes of any state in which the "insured" resides on or after the effective dates of the policy. ECF No. 1, Ex. 1.}

omitted). Because insurers draft the language of insurance contracts and the object
 of an insurance contract is to give protection to the insured, Montana courts
 construe ambiguous provisions "against the insurer and in favor of extending
 coverage." *Id.*

5 "Exclusions from coverage will be narrowly and strictly construed because
6 they are contrary to the fundamental protective purpose of an insurance policy."
7 *Revelation Indus., Inc. v. St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co.*, 206 P.3d 919, 929
8 (Mont. 2009).

Insurance Policy at Issue

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10 The Jackson Defendants purchased an insurance policy from Plaintiff. ECF 11||No. 1, Ex. 1. The policy included property coverage, liability coverage, automobile 12 coverage, and an umbrella coverage, although only the scope of the liability 13 coverage and umbrella coverage are at issue in this case. *Id.* at 23.² The policy 14 declarations indicate the Insured Location was S20, T3S, R1W, Madison County, 15 MT--330 Sterling Rd., Norris MT 59745. Id. Under Additional Policy Declaration 16 Schedule of Coverage – Section II – Liability Coverages, it lists the "Insured 17 Location" as s20, T3S, R1W, Madison County, Montana. Id. at 28. 18 The policy provided: 19 **Farm Liability** Under Section II- "Farm" Liability Coverage, the policy states: 20 "We" will pay all sums for which an "insured" is legally liable 21 because of "bodily injury" or "property damages" caused by an "occurrence" to which this coverage applies. 22 *Id.* at 58. 23 Under the **Exclusions section**, damages for bodily injury or property 24 damages are not covered for any of the following: 25 26 ²Plaintiff did not provide Bates stamps when it attached the policy to the 27 Complaint. The Court will cite to the page number of the policy itself for ease of 28reference. **ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY** JUDGMENT ~ 5

1	6. "Business" activities. Any "business" activities of an insured.		
2	22. Locations Not Insured. Any location that an "insured:"		
3	a. owns; b. ronta langas; or		
4	b. rents, leases; or c. controls		
5	other than the "insured location."		
6	<i>Id.</i> at 61-62.		
7	Umbrella Policy		
8	Under Section V – Umbrella, the policy states:		
9	"We" will pay all sums for which an "insured" is legally liable,		
	because of "bodily injury," property damage" or "personal and		
10	advertising injury" caused by an "occurrence" to which this coverage		
11	applies. <i>Id.</i> at 84.		
12	Under the Exclusions section, damages for bodily injury or property		
13	damages are not covered for any of the following:		
14			
15	8. "Business" activities. Any "business" activities of an "insured," except to the extent that coverage is provided by the "underlying		
16	insurance" for "business' activities coverage as shown in the		
17	"Declarations."		
18	28. Locations Not Insured. Any location that an "insured:"		
19	a. owns; b. rents, leases; or		
20	c. controls		
21	other than the "insured location."		
22	<i>Id.</i> at 85, 87.		
	The following terms are defined in the policy:		
23	"Business" means a full-time, part-time or occasional trade, profession or		
24	occupation regardless of compensation. Id. at 32.		
25	"Business personal property" means personal property owned by an		
26	"insured" and used in the continuing and regular course of the "insured's"		
27	"business operations." This does not include merchandise held for sample or sale.		
28			
	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 6		

1	Id.	
2	"Insured Locations" means all locations shown in the "Declarations" where	
3	"you" maintain a "farm" or "residence premises." This also includes:	
4 5	 Locations acquired by "you" during the policy period for "your" use as a "residence premises." "Your" cemetery plots or burial vaults. 	
6 7 8	 3. A location at which "you" temporarily reside but do not own. 4. Vacant land owned by "you" and shown in the "Declarations" or acquired by "you" during the policy period. <i>Id.</i> at 34. 	
9	"Residence premises" means a residence shown in the "Declarations" that	
10	is:	
11	1. A one-two-three- or four-family dwelling that is "your" principal	
12	residence, including its grounds and private garages. 2. Part of any other building that is "your" principal residence.	
13	<i>Id.</i> at 35.	
14	Defendants' Argument	
15	Defendant Felix Schuck was injured by the explosion. Defendant Steven	
16	Anderson is the personal representative of the Estate of Edward K. Dumaw, who	
17	was a PS&R employee killed by the explosion. These Defendants are the only	
18	named Defendants who are opposing Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment.	
19	Defendants assert it is undisputed that "bodily injury" caused by an	
20	"occurrence," as defined by the contract, occurred. Thus, there is coverage under	
21	the policy unless an exclusion to the coverage applies. Defendants make a myriad	
22	of arguments as to why none of the exclusions apply. First, they maintain that	
23	because the Jacksons split their time in 2015 between the Spokane property where	
24	Ibex Construction was located and their Norris, Montana property, it can be	
25	reasonable to assume the umbrella coverage policy extends to the Jacksons'	
26	monetary and real property assets in both locations. ³ Defendants believe the	
27		
28	³ The Jacksons would stay on the Spokane property in a recreational trailer for weeks at a time.	
	ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT ~ 7	

Spokane property is a residence because the Jacksons resided there part-time. They
 argue that the ambiguity of the definition of "principal residence" begs the
 question of whether the Jacksons' Spokane property where they resided in a trailer
 qualifies as a principal residence, and thus, coverage must be extended pursuant to
 Montana law.

6 Defendants argue the "Location Not Insured" exclusion does not apply
7 because the location where the explosion occurred (PS&R) is not owned, rented,
8 leased, or controlled by the Jacksons.

9 Defendants assert the business exception does not apply because the 10 Jacksons had shut down their business several years earlier and prior to August 12, 11 2015, when the explosion occurred. Defendants rely on the fact that the Jacksons 12 declined to renew their construction contractors license for IBEX as a construction entity, so it officially expired on April 22, 2015. Defendants maintain the sole 13 14 reason the Jacksons were present on the property was to sell their personal 15 property. They maintain this activity cannot be construed in any way as a business 16 activity. They also argue that because the Jacksons were never in business where chlorine was used, the tank must be considered personal property, rather than any 17 18 business interest/property. They argue it is reasonable to assume that the Jacksons 19 saw the tank on their property when they stayed in their trailer.

Finally, Defendants argue that because Plaintiff's website boasts about the
quality of their umbrella coverage, the Court should find the umbrella policy
covers the damages caused by the explosion. The catch phrases from the website
include "increased protection," "Personal injury coverage," and "worldwide
coverage."

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Analysis

Here, the Court finds declaratory judgment in favor of Plaintiff is
appropriate. "Insured Location" requires that the covered locations be shown in the
Declarations or meet four criteria that are not applicable here. It is undisputed that
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY
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 The Spokane property is not covered because it meets the definition of L Not Insured and does not qualify as a "residence premises." It was not at during the policy in question and a residence premises must be included Declarations. While the Jackson Defendants owned the Spokane propert the tank was located, that property is not an "Insured Location" and the applies. An average consumer would not find the Policy ambiguous. The definitions precluding coverage apply to both the Liability Policy and th Policy. Consequently, there is no coverage for the Spokane location and coverage for any claim against the Jackson Defendants as a result of the that occurred in Spokane, Washington. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, is GF Plaintiff's Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment in Fa Plaintiff, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED. // // // // // // // // // // // // //		
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 coverage for any claim against the Jackson Defendants as a result of the that occurred in Spokane, Washington. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, is GH Plaintiff's Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment in Fa Plaintiff, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED. // // // // // // // RANTED. RANTED. RANTED. // ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY 	8 d	lefinitions precluding coverage apply to both the Liability Policy and the Umbrella
 that occurred in Spokane, Washington. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, is GF Plaintiff's Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment in Fa Plaintiff, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED. // // <	9 P	Policy. Consequently, there is no coverage for the Spokane location and no
12 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 13 1. Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment, ECF No. 26, is GH 14 2. Plaintiff's Stipulation for Entry of Declaratory Judgment in Fa 15 Plaintiff, ECF No. 33, is GRANTED. 16 // 17 // 18 // 19 // 20 // 21 // 22 // 23 // 24 // 25 // 26 // 27 // 28 // ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY	10 co	overage for any claim against the Jackson Defendants as a result of the explosion
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ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY	27 //	
	28 //	
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