

The Honorable Thomas S. Zilly

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT SEATTLE**

OMNI INNOVATIONS, LLC, a
Washington limited liability company;
Emily Abbey, an individual,

Plaintiffs,

v.

ASCENTIVE, LLC, a Delaware limited
liability company; ADAM SCHRAN,
individually and as part of his marital
community; JOHN DOES, I-X,

Defendants.

No. 06-CV-01284 TSZ

**DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS AND TO STAY THIS
LITIGATION**

NOTE FOR MOTION CALENDAR:
March 16, 2007

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1 **I. INTRODUCTION**

2 Defendants Ascentive, LLC (“Ascentive”) and Adam Schran (“Schran”) (together,
3 “Defendants”) hereby move to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P 12(b)(6). Plaintiff
4 Emily Abbey’s (“Abbey”) has not alleged sufficient facts to establish standing under the
5 CAN-SPAM Act of 2003, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 *et seq.* (“CAN-SPAM”). Moreover, all three
6 of her causes of action are based on her status as an Internet access service, yet Plaintiffs’
7 First Amended Complaint (“FAC”, Dkt. #2) fails to allege Abbey provides an Internet
8 access service. Consequently, all Abbey’s claims must be dismissed. Furthermore,
9 Plaintiffs’ Washington state law claims based upon immaterial violations of email header
10 protocol should be dismissed as a matter of law because they are preempted by CAN-
11 SPAM.

12 Additionally, Defendants move to stay this case pending resolution of the lawsuit
13 brought by Plaintiff Omni alleging precisely the same claims before Judge Coughenour.
14 Case No. CV06-0204JCC, W.D.Wash. (“Omni”). Omni is scheduled for trial on April
15 16, 2007. The complaints and causes of action alleged by Plaintiff Omni Innovations,
16 LLC’s (“Omni Innovations”) are virtually identical in each case. If the court rules that
17 Omni Innovations does not have standing under CAN-SPAM and the Washington
18 Commercial Electronic Mail Act (RCW 19.190) (“CEMA”), that ruling will have a
19 dispositive issue preclusion/collateral estoppel effect on this case. Omni Innovations
20 seeks only statutory damages and is, therefore, not suffering irreparable harm from the
21 emails in question. In contrast, without a stay of proceedings in this case, the Court’s
22 resources are likely to be wasted and the parties will incur unnecessary legal fees and
23 costs.

24
25 **II. FACTS**

26 **A. Abbey Does Not Allege She Is an Internet Access Service.**

27 Both Plaintiffs seek damages allegedly resulting from the receipt of unsolicited
28 commercial email (aka “spam”). (FAC ¶¶ 11, 15.) For all their causes of action,

1 Plaintiffs allege Defendants caused damage “to Plaintiff as the provider of the Internet
2 access service” or “to Plaintiff as the interactive computer service”(emphasis added). (Id.
3 ¶¶ 17, 19, 20.) However, the FAC only alleges Omni Innovations is an “Internet access
4 service” or “interactive computer service” – it does not allege Abbey provides such
5 services. (Id. ¶ 8.)

6 **B. Identical Theories have been Alleged by Plaintiff Omni in Related**
7 **Lawsuits in this District.**

8 In this case, Plaintiffs seek damages based upon the following theories of email
9 header protocol:

10 13. Each of the E-mails misrepresents or obscures information in identifying
11 the point of origin or the transmission path thereof, and contains header
12 information that is materially false or materially misleading. The
13 misrepresentations include without limitation: IP address and host name
14 information do not match, or are missing or false, in the "from" and "by"
15 tokens in the Received header field; and dates and times of transmission are
16 deleted or obscured.

17 14. On information and belief, Plaintiff alleges that some of the E-mails used
18 the Internet domain name of a third party or third parties without permission
19 of that third party or those third parties.

20 (FAC at ¶ 13-14.)

21 Omni Innovations brought essentially identical claims in Omni. (*See Omni*, Case
22 No. CV06-0204JCC, First Amended Complaint (Dkt. # 15).) In that case, the defendants
23 moved for summary judgment alleging, *inter alia*, that Omni Innovations (i) does not
24 have standing because it is not, and never was, an Internet access service adversely
25 affected by the subject emails; and (ii) that Omni Innovations’s theories regarding email
26 header protocol cannot give rise to a violation under CAN-SPAM or CEMA. (*See Omni*,
27 Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 98).)

28 Omni Innovations’s novel theories of email header protocol asserted in Omni are
unsupported by case law, FTC rule or regulation, or express statutory language. (*See*
Omni, Defendants’ Motion for Summary Judgment (Dkt. # 98) at 16-28.) Omni
Innovations alleges violations of CAN-SPAM and CEMA from emails sent by the
defendants which allegedly have an improper IP address and host name protocol, transfer

1 token information and other immaterial email header information. (Id.) The basis of
2 Omni Innovations's claims are technical in nature and involve the intricacies and inner-
3 workings of email transmission over the Internet. (Id.)
4

5 **III. ABBEY'S CLAIMS SHOULD ALL BE DISMISSED**

6 As a matter of law, Abbey's damages are all predicated on her status as an Internet
7 access service. As a matter of fact, however, the FAC does not allege she provides such a
8 service. Accordingly, all of her claims should be dismissed.

9 **A. CR 12(b)(6) Standards.**

10 A complaint should be dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief may
11 be granted under FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) if it "appears beyond doubt that the plaintiff can
12 prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief." Conley v.
13 Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957). When the legal sufficiency of a complaint's
14 allegations are tested with a motion under Rule 12(b)(6), "[r]eview is limited to the
15 complaint." Cervantes v. City of San Diego, 5 F.3d 1273, 1274 (9th Cir. 1993). All
16 factual allegations set forth in the complaint are taken as true and construed in the light
17 most favorable to the plaintiff. Epstein v. Wash. Energy Co., 83 F.3d 1136, 1140 (9th
18 Cir. 1996). However, "[w]hile a court must accept all material allegations in the
19 complaint as true and construe them in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,
20 conclusory allegations of law or unwarranted inferences of fact urged by the nonmoving
21 party are insufficient to defeat a motion to dismiss." Segal Co. v. Amazon, 280 F. Supp.
22 2d 1229, 1232 (W. D. Wash. 2003).

23 **B. Abbey's Claimed Damages Are All Based on Her Legal Status as an 24 Internet Access Service, with No Supporting Factual Allegation.**

25 Even viewed in the light most favorable to Abbey, the FAC provides no factual
26 support for the causes of action she alleges. She is not an Internet access service, so her
27 CAN-SPAM claim fails. Her other two claims are preempted by CAN-SPAM. In
28 addition, the FAC provides no factual basis for the damages Abbey seeks. Consequently,

1 all her causes of action must be dismissed.

2 1. *CAN-SPAM Only Provides Relief to Internet Access Service*
3 *Providers.*

4 In enacting the CAN-SPAM act, 15 U.S.C. § 7701 et seq., Congress expressly
5 recognized that commercial email offers “unique opportunities for the development and
6 growth of frictionless commerce.” 15 U.S.C. § 7701(a)(1). Congress enacted a system
7 to:

- 8 1) create a nationwide standard for commercial email;
9 2) prohibit senders of commercial electronic mail from misleading recipients
10 as to the source or content of such mail; and
11 3) ensure that recipients of commercial electronic mail have the right to
12 decline additional email from a particular source.

13 15 U.S.C. § 7701(b). The Act does not create any private cause of action for individual
14 recipients of unsolicited commercial email, even if those emails violate the requirements
15 of the Act. Rather, the Act is enforceable only by the Federal Trade Commission and
16 other specified federal agencies, by state Attorneys General; and by “provider(s) of
17 Internet access service” who are “adversely affected by a violation of section 7704 (a)(1),
18 (b), or (d) of [the Act], or a pattern or practice that violates paragraph (2), (3), (4), or (5)
19 of section 7704 (a).” 15 U.S.C. § 7706(g)(1) (emphasis added).

20 CAN-SPAM defers to section 231(e)(4) of title 47 for the definition of “Internet
21 access service”:

22 The term “Internet access service” means a service that enables users to access
23 content, information, electronic mail, or other services offered over the
24 Internet, and may also include access to proprietary content, information, and
25 other services as part of a package of services offered to consumers. Such term
26 does not include telecommunications services.

27 The FAC does not allege Abbey provides any such service. Accordingly, Abbey’s CAN-
28 SPAM claim should be dismissed pursuant to FED. R. CIV. P. 12(b)(6) for failure to allege
29 facts sufficient to establish standing.

30 2. *Abbey’s Claimed Damages Under CEMA and WCPA Are Based on*
31 *Her (Nonexistent) Status as an Internet Service Provider.*

32 Abbey’s other causes of action allege Defendants violated CEMA and the

1 Washington Consumer Protection Act (“WCPA”), RCW 19.86.010 *et seq.* However,
2 with respect to both claims, the only damage she alleges is “damage to Plaintiff as the
3 interactive computer service.” (FAC ¶¶ 19-20.) Abbey does not claim to be an
4 interactive computer service, so the FAC does not provide any factual basis for her to
5 claim damages. Without damages, her claims are meritless and must be dismissed. *See,*
6 *e.g., In re Cray Inc. Derivative Litig.*, 431 F. Supp. 2d 1114, 1134 (W.D.Wash. 2006)
7 (granting a motion to dismiss claims which “fail to identify recoverable damages for loss
8 of goodwill or business reputation”) (Zilly, J.).

9 **C. Plaintiffs’ CEMA Claims Are Preempted by CAN-SPAM as a Matter**
10 **of Law.**

11 To the extent that Plaintiffs allege causes of action under Washington Law for
12 immaterial falsehoods or deception – whether in the email header information or
13 otherwise – those claims are preempted by CAN-SPAM and must be dismissed.

14 CEMA prohibits transmitting a commercial email message that “misrepresents or
15 obscures any information in identifying the point of origin” of the message. RCW
16 19.190.020. Plaintiffs contend that each of Defendants’ allegedly misleading headers
17 “misrepresents or obscures” information in identifying the point of origin. (FAC ¶ 13.)
18 However, to the extent Plaintiffs rely on CEMA to recover for emails with headers that
19 contain an immaterial misrepresentation or obfuscation (or other non-tortious fraud or
20 misrepresentation), those claims are preempted by CAN-SPAM.

21 Congress intended CAN-SPAM to create a single national standard for commercial
22 email, and to that end it preempts state laws, subject to a narrow exception:

23 This chapter supersedes any statute, regulation, or rule of a State or political
24 subdivision of a State that expressly regulates the use of electronic mail to send
25 commercial messages, except to the extent that any such statute, regulation, or
26 rule prohibits falsity or deception in any portion of a commercial electronic
27 mail message or information attached thereto.

28 15 U.S.C. 7707(b)(1). In *Omega World Travel, Inc. v. Mummagraphics, Inc.*, 469 F. 3d
348 (4th Cir. 2006), the Fourth Circuit considered the CAN-SPAM preemption clause in
relation to an Oklahoma law that prohibits, among other things, sending a commercial

1 email that “misrepresents any information in identifying the point of origin or the
2 transmission path of the electronic mail message.” This is virtually identical to the CEMA
3 provision upon which Plaintiffs base their suit. (FAC ¶ 20.) *See* RCW 19.190.030
4 (prohibiting sending a commercial email that “misrepresents or obscures any information
5 in identifying the point of origin or the transmission path of a commercial electronic mail
6 message”). In Omega, the district court held that the Oklahoma statute created a cause of
7 action for immaterial errors and sought to govern email header protocol and was therefore
8 preempted. The Fourth Circuit affirmed, reasoning “[r]ather than banning all commercial
9 e-mails or imposing strict liability for insignificant inaccuracies, Congress targeted only
10 e-mails containing something more than an isolated error.” Omega, *supra*, 469 F.3d at
11 348.

12 The Fourth Circuit thus held that permitting claims under state law for immaterial
13 errors would subvert Congress' intent to create a national standard:

14 In sum, Congress' enactment governing commercial e-mails reflects a calculus
15 that a national strict liability standard for errors would impede “unique
16 opportunities for the development and growth of frictionless commerce,” while
more narrowly tailored causes of action could effectively respond to the
obstacles to “convenience and efficiency” that unsolicited messages present.

17 Id. Like the Oklahoma statute, CEMA is preempted to the extent it purports to impose
18 liability for immaterial errors and to set a national standard to govern proper email header
19 protocol. Plaintiffs claims under CEMA rely on such allegations and, therefore, are
20 preempted.

21
22 **IV. THIS LAWSUIT SHOULD BE STAYED PENDING RESOLUTION OF**
23 **DEFENDANTS' SUMMARY JUDGMENT MOTION IN OMNI**

24 **A. Standards for Granting a Stay of Proceedings.**

25 In the interests of judicial economy, the Court may exercise its inherent power to
26 stay proceedings until the resolution of a related case that would resolve a dispositive
27 issue. *See* Leyva v. Certified Grocers of California, 593 F.2d 857, 863-64 (9th Cir. 1979)
28 (“A trial court may, with propriety, find it is efficient for its own docket and the fairest

1 course for the parties to enter a stay of an action before it, pending resolution of
2 independent proceedings which bear upon the case.”); *see also* Silvaco Data Systems, Inc.
3 v. Technology Modeling Associates, Inc., 896 F. Supp. 973, 975 (N.D. Cal. 1995) (“in the
4 interest of wise judicial administration, a federal court may stay its proceedings where a
5 parallel state action is pending”) (internal citation omitted).

6 “Collateral estoppel” or “offensive nonmutual issue preclusion” generally prevents
7 a party from relitigating an issue that the party has litigated and lost. *See* Catholic Social
8 Servs., Inc. v. I.N.S., 232 F.3d 1139, 1152 (9th Cir. 2000). The application of “offensive
9 nonmutual issue preclusion” is appropriate only if:

- 10 1. there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the prior
11 action, *see* Fund for Animals, Inc. v. Lujan, 962 F.2d 1391, 1399 (9th Cir. 1992);
12 Resolution Trust Corp. v. Keating, 186 F.3d 1110, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999); Appling
13 v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ins. Co., 340 F.3d 769, 775 (9th Cir. 2003);
- 14 2. the issue was actually litigated in the prior action, *see* Appling, 340 F.3d at 775;
- 15 3. the issue was decided in a final judgment, *see* Resolution Trust Corp., 186 F.3d at
16 1114; and
- 17 4. the party against whom issue preclusion is asserted was a party or in privity with a
18 party to the prior action, *see* id.

19 *See also* Reyn's Pasta Bella, LLC v. Visa USA, Inc., 442 F.3d 741, 746 (9th Cir. 2006);
20 Robi v. Five Platters, Inc., 838 F.2d 318, 322 (9th Cir. 1988).

21 **B. A Stay Is Appropriate Because This Court Is Adjudicating Omni**
22 **Innovations’s Identical Claims in Omni.**

23 If there is a judgment that Omni Innovations does not have standing as an Internet
24 access service in Omni, then issue preclusion will be dispositive as to Omni Innovations’s
25 federal CAN-SPAM claims in the instant lawsuit. Alternatively, if the Court rejects Omni
26 Innovations’ theories regarding email protocol and whether immaterial violations can
27 entitle a plaintiff to recover statutory damages, then those findings will apply to Omni
28 Innovations’s theories in the instant matter.

1 First, Omni Innovations is the plaintiff in Omni and has had a full and fair
2 opportunity to litigate the identical issue in the related action. Omni Innovations has had
3 an opportunity to make a record in Omni and, if applicable, may advance any facts or
4 testimony at trial that supports its claim to be an Internet access service.

5 Second, the matters of (i) whether Omni Innovations has standing as an Internet
6 access service that is adversely affected; and (ii) whether Omni Innovations's novel
7 theories give rise to a claim for statutory damages under CAN-SPAM or CEMA are
8 before the Court in the Omni case.

9 Third, the matter is fully briefed and before the court in Omni on summary
10 judgment. Trial is scheduled for April 17, 2007. Plaintiffs merely request a stay pending
11 resolution of that case and a final judgment.

12 Finally, since Omni Innovations is a plaintiff in Omni, the fourth prong of issue
13 preclusion has been satisfied.

14 In the interest of judicial economy and avoiding the potential waste of hundreds of
15 hours of attorney time and unnecessary pretrial motion practice before the Court, this
16 Court should stay this lawsuit. In the event that the Court does not grant a stay, then the
17 parties will have no alternative but to commence discovery. Defendants will request
18 substantially the same documents and issue the same requests for admission as
19 propounded by the defendants' counsel in the Omni lawsuit. Plaintiffs will likely provide
20 the same answers and the same documents. In turn, the parties will take depositions and
21 develop much of the same record as in the related action. These efforts will take many
22 months and consume many thousands of dollars. However, all of that time and money
23 could be for naught if there is a judgment either that (i) Omni Innovations is not an
24 Internet access service adversely affected by emails or (ii) Omni Innovations's novel
25 theories concerning email protocol lack merit. Such rulings would eliminate Omni
26 Innovations's CAN-SPAM and CEMA claims in the instant lawsuit pursuant to the
27 doctrine of offensive nonmutual issue preclusion.

28 This case is in its nascent stages and the parties have not yet devoted resources to

1 conduct discovery and pretrial motion practice. Balancing the lack of actual damages to
2 Plaintiffs against the unnecessary expenditure of resources, this Court should grant a stay
3 until such time as it makes a final adjudication of whether Omni Innovations has standing
4 and whether its email header protocol theories will prevail.

5
6 **V. CONCLUSION**

7 Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6), Abbey's claims must all be dismissed because
8 her damages are based on a legal theory which has no factual support in the FAC. Claims
9 based upon immaterial violations of email header protocol are also preempted by CAN-
10 SPAM as a matter of law.

11 Furthermore, the Court should stay this litigation pending resolution of collateral
12 issues in Omni. This Court will resolve many of the same issues in that case as in this
13 case – including the threshold issue of whether Omni Innovations has standing – and it
14 would be a waste of judicial resources and the resources of the parties to litigate this case
15 when the Court is already deciding the same issues in another matter.

16 DATED this 21st day of February, 2007.

17 **NEWMAN & NEWMAN,**
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