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negligence, and for violations of the Washington Consumer Protection Act ("CPA"), RCW 19.86 *et seq.*, and Washington's Insurance Fair Conduct Act ("IFCA"), RCW 48.30, *et. seq.* In their complaint, plaintiffs explicitly requested treble damages pursuant to the CPA and the IFCA. In pre-litigation correspondence, plaintiffs demanded \$31,783.30 in damages, plus tax and licensing. Plaintiffs are also seeking punitive damages, reasonable attorney's fees, and other relief that the Court deems just and appropriate. Defendant timely removed this action to this Court.

This Court has original jurisdiction over actions in which diversity exists among with parties, which plaintiffs do not dispute, and the amount in controversy exceeds \$75,000 exclusive of interest and costs. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a). When defendant has removed a diversity case, it bears the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence that the amount in controversy requirement is satisfied. See, e.g., Sanchez v. Monumental Life Ins. Co., 102 F.3d 398, 403 (9th Cir. 1996). In breach of contract cases, the jurisdictional minimum may be satisfied by all amounts for which defendant is allegedly liable, including attorney's fees and exemplary damages. See, e.g., Kroske v. U.S. Bank Corp., 432 F.3d 976, 980 (9th Cir. 2005).

In this case, plaintiffs have explicitly alleged that their damages exceed \$31,000, and they have sought trebling of their damages. Those amounts alone exceed \$90,000 and exceed the jurisdictional threshold. Plaintiffs nevertheless argue that this Court lacks jurisdiction because defendant disputes the applicability of the IFCA. A dispute over the merits of plaintiffs' claim does not change the amount *in controversy*. Plaintiffs have not cited any authority to support their position. Regardless of the applicability of the IFCA, plaintiffs have also sought treble damages under the CPA. The damages plaintiffs seek exceed \$75,000. Accordingly, defendant has established the jurisdictional requirements by a preponderance of the evidence.

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III. CONCLUSION For the foregoing reasons, the Court DENIES plaintiffs' motion to remand (Dkt. #4). DATED this 31st day of August, 2009. MMS Casuik Robert S. Lasnik United States District Judge

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