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THE HONORABLE RICARDO S. MARTINEZ

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

GINA KIM, on behalf of a class consisting  
of herself and all other persons similarly  
situated,

Plaintiffs, and as to Ms.  
Kim, counterclaim  
defendant,

v.

COACH, INC., a Maryland corporation,  
and COACH SERVICES, INC., a  
Maryland corporation,

Defendants, and, as to  
Coach, Inc., counterclaim  
plaintiff.

NO. 2:11-cv-00214-RSM

**COACH, INC.’S OPPOSITION TO  
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO COMPEL  
RULE 26(f) INITIAL DISCOVERY  
CONFERENCE**

**NOTED FOR CONSIDERATION:  
APRIL 1, 2011**

Coach, Inc. (“Coach”) hereby submits its opposition to the motion to compel a Rule 26(f) initial discovery conference filed by plaintiff Gina Kim. As is further explained in this brief and the accompanying Declaration of Patrick Eagan in Support of Defendant Coach, Inc.’s Opposition to Motion to Compel (“Eagan Dec.”), the motion to compel has been mooted by the scheduling of a Rule 26(f) conference. Counsel for Coach requested that counsel for Ms. Kim withdraw this motion, in light of the parties’ having agreed on a time for their initial discovery conference. Counsel for Ms. Kim refused. Counsel for Coach then requested that counsel for Ms. Kim agree to a one-week continuance of this motion so that the Rule 26(f)

1 conference could take place. But counsel for Ms. Kim would only agree in exchange for  
2 money. Out of an abundance of caution, Coach submits this unnecessary brief in response to a  
3 mooted motion.

#### 4 I. INTRODUCTION

5 Ms. Kim's motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference must be denied for several  
6 reasons. First, the motion is moot because the parties have agreed to hold a Rule 26(f)  
7 conference on March 31, 2011. Counsel for Ms. Kim should have withdrawn the motion.  
8 Second, counsel for Ms. Kim failed to satisfy their meet and confer requirement under  
9 Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(a)(1), as the "conference" cited in the motion to compel took place on  
10 February 28, 2011, and the motion was filed on March 16, 2011. In the intervening seventeen  
11 days, the parties filed *three* additional pleadings and agreed to a confidentiality order, yet, in all  
12 that time, counsel for Ms. Kim did not even attempt to confer by telephone or in person before  
13 filing this motion to compel. Third, although Coach has agreed to a Rule 26(f) conference,  
14 counsel for Ms. Kim have not articulated a reason why a Rule 26(f) conference is necessary  
15 right now and why discovery must commence immediately. This is especially perplexing  
16 because counsel for Coach have repeatedly informed counsel for Ms. Kim that only 18 cease-  
17 and-desist letters were sent to Washington residents in connection with online sales of  
18 purported Coach products. Counsel for Ms. Kim refuses to acknowledge that these  
19 representations may be right, and are no doubt eager to deluge Coach with burdensome  
20 discovery requests. Fourth, this case involves the temporary removal from eBay of a bag with  
21 a list price of \$8.50. Counsel for Ms. Kim have given no consideration to the expense incurred  
22 in litigating frivolous motions, considering the *de minimis* amount at issue in this case. If  
23 counsel for Ms. Kim had done so, they would not have filed a motion to compel, they would  
24 not have left that motion on the Court's docket after the scheduling of a Rule 26(f) conference,  
25 and they would not have demanded a \$750.00 payment in exchange for their agreement to  
26 continue the hearing on the motion to compel by one week. The motion to compel must

1 therefore be denied.

2 **II. THE MOTION TO COMPEL MUST BE DENIED**

3 **A. The Motion To Compel Is Moot**

4 There is no reason for the Court even to entertain the motion to compel. The parties  
5 have already scheduled a Rule 26(f) conference for March 31, 2011. Eagan Dec. ¶ 32.  
6 Counsel for Coach first indicated that Coach was prepared to hold a Rule 26(f) conference on  
7 March 24, 2011, but, despite their earlier eagerness to hold such a conference, Counsel for Ms.  
8 Kim did not agree to a conference until March 28, 2011. *Id.* at ¶¶ 25-32. Coincidentally, this  
9 was also the date that Coach’s opposition to the motion to compel was due. When counsel for  
10 Coach requested that counsel for Ms. Kim withdraw their motion to compel, counsel for Ms.  
11 Kim refused. *Id.* at ¶ 31-32. When counsel for Coach requested that counsel for Ms. Kim  
12 agree to continue the hearing on their motion by one week, counsel for Ms. Kim indicated that  
13 they would not agree to a continuance unless Coach would agree to pay \$750.00. *Id.* at ¶ 33-  
14 34. This demonstrates, conclusively, that counsel for Ms. Kim have no principled or strategic  
15 basis for refusing to continue the hearing. The only reason is that, by refusing to continue the  
16 hearing, counsel for Ms. Kim have succeeding in forcing Coach to file this opposition brief and  
17 driving up the cost of litigating this case for Coach and this Court.

18 **B. Counsel For Ms. Kim Failed To Confer**

19 Counsel for Ms. Kim failed to satisfy their obligation to meet and confer before filing  
20 the motion to compel. The conference cited by counsel for Ms. Kim in support of their motion  
21 to compel took place on February 28, 2011. *See* Declaration of Jay Carlson in Support of  
22 Plaintiff’s Motion to Compel Rule 26(f) Initial Discovery Conference (“Carlson Dec.”) at ¶ 4.  
23 Subsequent to that conference, the following occurred: (1) counsel for Ms. Kim filed an  
24 amended complaint (Dkt. No. 4) adding new parties and a new cause of action unrelated to Ms.  
25 Kim’s claims; (2) counsel for Coach filed their notice of appearance (Dkt. No. 5); (3) Coach  
26 filed its answer and counterclaims (Dkt. No. 6); (4) counsel for Ms. Kim filed their answer to

1 Coach’s counterclaims (Dkt. No 7); (5) counsel for Ms. Kim filed a motion to strike Coach’s  
2 counterclaims under the Washington anti-SLAPP statute (Dkt. No. 9); and (6) counsel for  
3 Coach filed a motion for a protective order (Dkt. No. 10). The motion for a protective order  
4 was later resolved by agreement of the parties. (Dkt. No. 17.)

5 Despite the occurrence of significant intervening events – which added claims,  
6 defenses, and parties, resolved disputes regarding confidentiality that were critical to Coach,  
7 and generally expanded the scope of the litigation – counsel for Ms. Kim never requested  
8 another conference to discuss the propriety of a Rule 26(f) conference before filing their motion  
9 to compel. Eagan Dec. ¶ 20. Counsel will undoubtedly argue that such a conference would  
10 have been futile, but it is only because of counsel’s failure even to attempt to confer in a good  
11 faith attempt to resolve this matter without Court intervention that we will never know.

12 **C. Counsel For Ms. Kim Have Not Demonstrated Why An Immediate Rule**  
13 **26(f) Conference Is Necessary**

14 Coach has agreed to hold a Rule 26(f) conference in part because of counsel for Ms.  
15 Kim’s frivolous motion, but counsel for Ms. Kim have not articulated a reason why a  
16 conference is necessary at this time and why discovery must commence immediately. Indeed,  
17 the pleadings are still not closed, as counsel for Ms. Kim have not filed an answer to Coach’s  
18 amended counterclaim. (Dkt. No. 21.) One of two defendants still has not been served. Eagan  
19 Dec. ¶ 6. In addition, counsel for Ms. Kim recently attempted to file a second amended  
20 complaint, expanding the class definition to include former employees of Coach. (Dkt. No.  
21 20.) This second amended complaint has not yet been entered. In short, the pleadings are in  
22 considerable flux.

23 Rule 26(f) requires the parties to discuss the nature of their claims and defenses, explore  
24 possible settlement, arrange for initial disclosures, and create a discovery plan. Fed.R.Civ.P.  
25 26(f). The purposes of the conference are best served when the parties have had an opportunity  
26 to conduct a full investigation of the claims and defenses. Crucial to that investigation is that  
the claims, defenses, and *parties* have been identified in the applicable pleadings. Counsel for

1 Ms. Kim have not even attempted to state a reason why a Rule 26(f) conference before the  
2 close of the pleadings is necessary.

3 Even though counsel for Coach has agreed to a Rule 26(f) initial discovery conference,  
4 such conference is premature in light of plaintiff naming, but never serving (or even attempting  
5 to serve) the other defendant, Coach Services, Inc. Nor will plaintiff's counsel answer the  
6 simple question: is plaintiff dropping Coach Services, Inc. from the lawsuit?

7 Even though counsel for Coach has agreed to a Rule 26(f) initial discovery conference,  
8 such conference is premature in light of the pleadings being in considerable flux. For example,  
9 only on March 21, 2011 did plaintiff file a purported amended complaint that, for the first time,  
10 would allow plaintiff Ms. Kim to be a member of the "class" she purports to represent. Rule  
11 26(f) conferences are not generally productive (and are not generally conducted) when the  
12 pleadings are in such a state of flux.

13 Even though counsel for Coach has agreed to a Rule 26(f) initial discovery conference,  
14 such conference is premature in light of the serious obligations triggered by the initial Rule  
15 26(f) conference. Pursuant to Rule 26(a)(1)(C), initial disclosures are due two weeks from the  
16 time of the Rule 26(f) conference. And Rule 26(g)(1)(A) mandates that initial disclosures be  
17 complete and correct. It may be easy for counsel for an individual to be prepared  
18 instantaneously to serve initial disclosures. Not so for a corporate entity such as Coach. With  
19 the pleadings still in flux, even now is too early a time for a Rule 26(f) conference. Even more  
20 clearly, plaintiff's counsel's effort to conduct a Rule 26(f) conference just *six days* after filing  
21 the initial complaint was grossly premature. Similarly, as of the date plaintiff's counsel  
22 purported to conduct a pre-motion meet-and-confer, a Rule 26(f) conference would plainly  
23 have been premature.

24 **D. The Court Should Consider The Minimal Amount At Issue**

25 This case involves the brief removal of a listing from eBay, followed by complete  
26 reinstatement of the listing. Eagan Dec. ¶ 35. The list price of the bag was \$8.50. *Id.* The

1 brief interruption of Ms. Kim’s eBay listing – which was undertaken in good faith and with  
2 reason – simply cannot form the basis of a federal claim. And it is the obligation of the Court  
3 under Fed.R.Civ.P. 1, and the parties under General Rule 3(d) of the General Rules of the  
4 United States District Court for the Western District of Washington to ensure that Court  
5 business is discharged efficiently and inexpensively, and that unnecessary, unreasonable, and  
6 vexatious proceedings are avoided. It is hard to imagine a more unnecessary motion than a  
7 motion to compel a Rule 26(f) conference that was not the subject of a proper, good faith  
8 conference, that has been mooted by agreement of the other party to hold a conference, that  
9 seeks without support to compel an unusually early Rule 26(f) conference before even the close  
10 of pleadings, and that has already cost both parties hundreds of times the maximum damages in  
11 the case. If the immediate resolution of this matter was so vital to counsel for Ms. Kim’s case  
12 that they are entitled to an immediate order compelling a Rule 26(f) conference, then they  
13 would not have offered to agree to a continuance for only \$750.00. Eagan Dec. ¶ 34-37. The  
14 conduct of counsel for Ms. Kim merely confirms what was already widely known – that this is  
15 a case in which procedural manipulation is far more valuable to counsel for Ms. Kim than the  
16 underlying merits ever could be. For this reason alone, the motion to compel should be denied.

17 **III. CONCLUSION**

18 For all of the foregoing reasons, the motion to compel must be denied.  
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1 Respectfully submitted this 28th day of March, 2011.

2 DLA Piper LLP (US)

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4 By: *s/ Stelman Keehnel*

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1 **CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

2 I hereby certify that on March 28, 2011, I electronically filed the foregoing with the  
3 Clerk of the Court using the CM/ECF system which will send notification of such filing to all  
4 counsel of record.

5 Dated this 28th day of March, 2011.

6 */s/ Stelman Keehnel*  
7 \_\_\_\_\_  
8 Stelman Keehnel, WSBA No. 9309

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