

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

“AMY”,

Plaintiff,

v.

JOSHUA OSMUN KENNEDY

Defendant.

**CONSOLIDATED**

LEAD CASE NO. C13-17 RAJ

MEMBER CASE NO. C13-762 RAJ

AMENDED\* ORDER

This matter comes before the court on its order to show cause why this case should not be stayed (Dkt. # 53), and the motions for writ of attachment filed by plaintiffs “Amy”<sup>1</sup> and “Vicky” prior to consolidation<sup>2</sup> (Dkt. # 31; Case No. 13-762, Dkt. # 8). The court ordered the parties to show cause why this case should not be stayed to determine

\* The court amends its prior order at Dkt. # 60. The court has made two clerical amendments based on plaintiffs’ motion for correction of clerical mistake (Dkt. # 63 at 6), and defendant’s request to correct an error (Dkt. # 65 at 3), to which plaintiffs do not object (Dkt. # 66 at 3).

<sup>1</sup> “Amy” and “Vicky” are pseudonyms for victims depicted in child pornography images.

<sup>2</sup> The court will address Amy and Vicky as “plaintiffs” since their cases have been consolidated.

1 whether the proximate cause requirement<sup>3</sup> in 18 U.S.C. § 2259 attaches to plaintiffs’ civil  
2 claim for damages under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2252A and 2255. Dkt. # 53.

3 Having reviewed the parties’ responses to the order to show cause, the briefing  
4 regarding prejudgment writ of attachment, evidence, and the record herein, and having  
5 held a hearing to provide defendant with the opportunity to show cause why a writ of  
6 attachment should not issue, the court declines to enter a stay and grants the motions for  
7 prejudgment writ of attachment.

8 **A. No Stay is Warranted**

9 In determining whether all losses under section 2259 require a showing of  
10 proximate cause, the Ninth Circuit and Fifth Circuit relied on the statutory text. *See*  
11 *Kennedy*, 643 F.3d at 1260-61; *In re Unknown*, 697 F.3d at 316. Section 2259(b)(3)  
12 defines the term “full amount of the victim’s losses,” and includes, among other things,  
13 “any other losses suffered by the victim as a proximate result of the offense.” 18 U.S.C.  
14 § 2259(b)(3)(F). The *Kennedy* court noted that it has interpreted section 2259(b)(3) “as  
15 allowing restitution only for losses that were ‘proximately’ caused by the defendant’s  
16 conduct.” *Kennedy*, 643 F.3d at 1261 (citing *United States v. Laney*, 189 F.3d 954, 965  
17 (9th Cir. 1999)). The Fifth Circuit came to a different conclusion and held that the  
18 proximate result language is limited to the category of “other losses” found in section  
19 2259(b)(3)(F). *In re Unknown*, 697 F.3d at 318-19.  
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23 <sup>3</sup> The Ninth Circuit has held that section 2259 contains a proximate cause requirement to  
24 all kinds of losses described in § 2259(b)(3), but the Fifth Circuit disagreed, finding that the  
25 proximate cause requirement only applies to the catchall category of “other losses” in section  
26 2259(b)(3)(F). *Contrast United States v. Kennedy*, 643 F.3d 1251, 1261 (9th Cir. 2011) *with In*  
27 *re Unknown*, 697 F.3d 306, 329 (5th Cir. 2012). The Supreme Court granted certiorari from the  
Fifth Circuit case to determine the causal relationship between the defendant’s conduct and the  
victim’s harm or damages that the government or victim must establish to recover restitution  
under section 2259.

1 In contrast to section 2259(b)(3)(F), sections 2255 and 2252A(f) do not contain  
2 the term “proximate.” Section 2255 provides:

3 Any person who, while a minor, was a victim of a violation of section . . .  
4 2252A . . . of this title and who suffers personal injury as a result of such a  
5 violation, regardless of whether the injury occurred while such person was  
6 a minor, may sue in any appropriate United States District Court and shall  
7 recover the actual damages such person sustains and the cost of the suit,  
8 including reasonable attorney’s fee. Any person as described in the  
9 proceeding sentence shall be deemed to have sustained damages of no less  
10 than \$150,000 in value.

11 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). Section 2252A(f) provides that “[a]ny person aggrieved by reason  
12 of” possessing and transporting child pornography “may commence a civil action” and  
13 seek “compensatory and punitive damages” and “the costs of the civil action and  
14 reasonable fees for attorneys and expert witnesses.” 18 U.S.C. § 2252A(f).

15 While there appears to be some causal connection necessary in Section 2252A(f)  
16 (“by reason of”) and section 2255 (“as a result of”), neither of these sections explicitly  
17 require proximate cause as required by section 2259 (“as a proximate result of”). Where  
18 “Congress includes particular language in one section of a statute but omits it in another  
19 section of the same Act, it is generally presumed that Congress acts intentionally and  
20 purposefully in the disparate inclusion or exclusion. *Russello v. United States*, 464 U.S.  
21 16, 23 (1983). Accordingly, the court presumes that Congress acted intentionally in  
22 omitting the term “proximate” in reference to civil damages available to victims of child  
23 pornography.

24 The court finds that the Supreme Court’s resolution of the circuit split on whether  
25 proximate cause is required to demonstrate all losses to award restitution under section  
26 2259 will have no affect on this court’s determination regarding whether plaintiffs are  
27 entitled to civil damages under section 2255 and 2252A(f). Accordingly, the court  
declines to enter a stay.

1 **B. Motions for Prejudgment Writ of Attachment**

2 Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 64 provides: “At the commencement of and  
3 throughout an action, every remedy available that, under the law of the state where the  
4 court is located, provides for seizing a person or property to secure satisfaction of the  
5 potential judgment. But a federal statute governs to the extent it applies.” Fed. R. Civ.  
6 Proc. 64(a). To prevail on a motion for issuance of prejudgment writ of attachment,  
7 plaintiffs must establish that (1) there is probable cause to believe that the alleged  
8 statutory ground for attachment exists, and (2) the probable validity of the claims. RCW  
9 6.25.070(1); *see L.C. v. Gilbert*, Case No. C09-5586 BHS, 2010 WL 2650603 (W.D.  
10 Wash. 2010).

11 1. Probable Cause regarding Statutory Grounds for Attachment

12 Under Washington law, a plaintiff may obtain a prejudgment writ of garnishment  
13 if the writ is issued for a purpose other than garnishing a defendant’s earnings “(a) on the  
14 ground that an attachment has been issued in accordance with chapter 6.25 RCW, (b) on  
15 the ground that the plaintiff sues on a debt that is due and owing and unpaid, or (c) on one  
16 or more of the grounds for issuance of attachment stated in RCW 6.25.030 or 6.25.040.”  
17 RCW 6.26.010. Section 6.25.030 allows the court to issue a writ of attachment on the  
18 grounds that, among others, “the damages for which the action is brought are for injuries  
19 arising from the commission of some felony, gross misdemeanor, or misdemeanor[.]”  
20 RCW 6.25.030(9). Additionally, the plaintiff or someone on plaintiff’s behalf must apply  
21 for a writ of attachment by affidavit,

22 alleging that the attachment is not sought and the action is not prosecuted to  
23 hinder, delay, or defraud any creditor of the defendant and also alleging that  
24 affiant has reason to believe and does believe<sup>[4]</sup> the following, together with  
25 specific facts on which affiant’s belief in the allegations is based: (a) That  
26 the defendant is indebted to the plaintiff (specifying the nature of the claim

27 <sup>4</sup> The court deleted the term “not” to correct a clerical mistake.

1 and the amount of such indebtedness over and above all just credits and  
2 offsets), and (b) that one or more of the grounds stated in RCW 6.25.030  
3 for issuance of a writ of attachment exists.

4 RCW 6.25.060.

5 The Washington Supreme Court has held that the statute is broad and general.  
6 *Buob v. Ochs*, 33 Wn. 2d 732, 734, 207 P.2d 189 (Wn. 1949). The Washington Supreme  
7 Court has also interpreted the term “indebtedness” broadly to encompass tort cases,  
8 equity cases, or cases involving unliquidated claims. *Id.* at 734-35.

9 Here, plaintiffs seek civil damages for personal injuries resulting from Kennedy’s  
10 possession and transportation of child pornography, a felony. The court finds that the  
11 claims alleged here fall within the term “indebtedness” as interpreted broadly by the  
12 Washington Supreme Court. Defendant does not challenge the remaining requirements  
13 of the statute, but rather focuses on RCW 6.25.040. However, RCW 6.26.010 makes  
14 clear that there are a number of alternate grounds by which prejudgment attachment may  
15 be sought. Plaintiffs have satisfied the requirements for one of those grounds under  
16 RCW 6.25.030.<sup>5</sup>

17 Accordingly, the court finds probable cause that statutory grounds for issuing a  
18 prejudgment writ of attachment exists.

## 19 2. Probable Validity of Claim

20 Defendant also argues that plaintiff has not proven the “probable validity” of her  
21 claim, citing RCW 6.25.060. However, that section does not contain any requirement to  
22 establish probable validity. Rather, RCW 6.25.070(3) contains the probable validity  
23 language. Defendant does not dispute (1) the “fact that Mr. Kennedy was found guilty of  
24 possession and transportation of pornographic images of” Amy and Vicky, (2) the fact

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26 <sup>5</sup> The court has already found that section 2252A and 2255 do not require a showing of  
27 proximate cause. Accordingly, the court has not addressed defendant’s argument regarding  
proximate cause.

1 that Amy and Vicky are “victims” of the Defendant’s criminal offense within the  
2 meaning of the applicable criminal statute, or (3) the fact that Amy and Vicky have been  
3 damaged by the sexual abuse and exploitation they suffered. Dkt. # 37 at 5; Case No. 13-  
4 762, Dkt. # 16 at 5. Defendant even concedes that “at best” Kennedy’s “actions were the  
5 cause of the generalized harm that [they] suffered, not that the Defendant’s actions were a  
6 material and proximate cause of [their] losses. Dkt. # 37 at 6; Case No. 13-762, Dkt. # 16  
7 at 6. Nevertheless, defendant argues that plaintiffs have failed to introduce any evidence  
8 of a causal connection between Mr. Kennedy’s conduct and any specific loss incurred or  
9 damage suffered by them. *Id.* at 5.

10           Unfortunately for Kennedy, the court has already found that the section 2252A(f)  
11 and 2255 do not require proximate cause, and the court is persuaded by the reasoning of  
12 the Sixth Circuit, and adopts it here. *Doe v. Boland*, 698 F.3d 877 (6th Cir. 2012), *cert*  
13 *denied*, 133 S.Ct. 2825 (2013). In *Boland*, plaintiffs sued defendant under section  
14 2252A(f) and 2255 for personal injury damages as a result of morphed pornographic  
15 images created and shared by Boland with court staff and parties to litigation. 698 F.3d  
16 at 880. Boland conceded that he violated section 2252A and that the plaintiffs were  
17 considered victims under section 2255. *Id.* The question left for the court was whether  
18 plaintiffs suffered a resulting “personal injury.” The court concluded that they did:  
19 “Like a defamatory statement, pornography injures a child’s reputation and emotional  
20 well-being, and violates the individual interest in avoiding disclosure of personal  
21 matters.” *Id.* (quoting *Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal.*, 535 U.S. 234, 249 (2002) and *New*  
22 *York v. Ferber*, 458 U.S. 747, 759 n.10 (1982)) (internal quotations and citations  
23 omitted). “And like defamation, those harms are ‘personal injuries.’” *Id.* at 881.

24           Amy and Vicky were real children with legally protected interests in their  
25 reputations. *Id.* at 882. They were real victims of child sex abuse and child pornography.  
26 Every day of her life, Amy lives “in constant fear that someone will see [her] picture and  
27 recognize [her] and that [she] will be humiliated all over again.” Dkt. # 32-2 (Ex. 2 to

1 Marsh Decl.). Vicky has also been traumatized by the knowledge that images of her rape  
2 are being circulated, causing her paranoia, wondering whether people she knows have  
3 seen the images, and by the fact that some individuals who have seen the images have  
4 tried to contact her. Case No. 13-762, Dkt. # 8-5 (Ex. 3 to Hepburn Decl.). At this early  
5 stage of the litigation, it appears to the court, based on the victim statements, Kennedy’s  
6 admissions in the criminal proceeding, and Kennedy’s concession regarding the  
7 generalized harm caused by his actions, that every time Kennedy viewed and transported<sup>6</sup>  
8 those pornographic images, Kennedy invaded those interests and harmed their emotional  
9 well-being and reputation.

10 It is true that most tort plaintiffs “must show the amount of their damages. But §  
11 2255 is no ordinary cause of action. The statute declares that any victim ‘shall be  
12 deemed to have sustained damages of no less than \$150,000 in value.’” *Boland*, 698 F.3d  
13 at 882 (quoting 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a)). “The point of a minimum-damages requirement is  
14 to allow victims of child pornography to recover *without* having to endure potentially  
15 damaging damages hearings. Were it otherwise, a fresh damages hearing might inflict  
16 fresh wounds, *increasing* the child’s suffering *and* increasing the compensatory damages  
17 to which she is entitled.” *Id.* (emphasis in original). Congress could rationally conclude  
18 that all children depicted in child pornography “are seriously injured and deserve a high  
19 threshold amount of damages.” *Id.* “Once a child has shown she was the victim of a sex  
20 crime, there is little point in forcing her to prove an amount of damages, only to have the  
21 court disregard that figure and award the statutory minimum.” *Id.* at 883. Plaintiffs are,  
22 of course, free to prove an amount of damages, as section 2252A(f) does not contain a  
23 minimum damages award. However, they are not required to do so under section 2255.

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27 <sup>6</sup> The court has substituted the terms “viewed and transported” for “shared” from the  
court’s prior order.

1           Accordingly, the court finds that plaintiffs have demonstrated the probable validity  
2 of their claims.

3           3. Fourteenth Amendment

4           Defendant also argues that the fact that section 2252 sets a minimum award of  
5 \$150,000 violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition on the imposition of grossly  
6 excessive or arbitrary punishments on a tortfeasor. Dkt. # 37 at 6. The court presumes  
7 that defendant intended to cite section 2255, which sets the \$150,000 minimum, rather  
8 than section 2252, which provides no remedy for civil damages.<sup>7</sup>

9           The Fourteenth Amendment prohibits states from imposing grossly excessive or  
10 arbitrary punishments on tortfeasors. *State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co. v. Campbell*, 538  
11 U.S. 408, 416 (2003). Compensatory damages are intended to redress the concrete loss  
12 that a plaintiff has suffered by reason of defendant’s wrongful conduct. *Id.* By contrast,  
13 punitive damages serve a broader function aimed at deterrence and retribution. *Id.*

14           Here, the \$150,000 minimum damages are deemed to be the “actual damages”  
15 sustained, not punitive damages. 18 U.S.C. § 2255(a). As stated above, the court is  
16 persuaded by the reasoning of the Sixth Circuit:

17           The point of a minimum-damages requirement is to allow victims of child  
18 pornography to recover *without* having to endure potentially damaging  
19 damages hearings. Were it otherwise, a fresh damages hearing might inflict  
20 fresh wounds, *increasing* the child’s suffering *and* increasing the  
21 compensatory damages to which she is entitled. . . . Once a child has shown  
22 she was a victim of a sex crime, there is little point in forcing her to prove  
23 an amount of damages, only to have the court disregard that figure and  
24 award the statutory minimum.

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26           <sup>7</sup> Section 2252A(f) provides the civil damages remedy that plaintiffs seek. The court  
27 notes that defendant has not challenged the constitutionality of section 2252A(f), the plaintiffs’  
second claim for relief.



1 *Boland*, 698 F.3d at 882. While plaintiffs are certainly free to prove an amount of  
2 damages in excess of \$150,000, they are not required to do so and simply seeking the  
3 statutory minimum for actual damages does not run afoul of the Fourteenth Amendment.

4 4. Seventh Amendment

5 Defendant also argues that the statutory minimum violates Kennedy’s Seventh  
6 Amendment right to a jury trial. Dkt. # 37 at 7-9. As an initial matter, the court finds  
7 that the Seventh Amendment<sup>8</sup> right to a civil jury trial applies here to plaintiffs’ claims  
8 seeking damages for injuries caused by wrongful conduct because the remedy of damages  
9 is the traditional form of relief granted by the common law courts. *See In re U.S. Fin.*  
10 *Sec. Lit.*, 609 F.2d 411, 422, 423 (9th Cir. 1979) (“it is too obvious to be doubted that the  
11 constitutional right to a jury trial attaches to statutory causes of action as long as they  
12 involve legal rights and remedies.”). Additionally, the Ninth Circuit has held that “there  
13 is no right to a jury trial when the judge awards the minimum statutory damages.”  
14 *GoPets LTD v. Hise*, 657 F.3d 1024, 1034 (9th Cir. 2011). Here, if plaintiffs decide to  
15 seek the statutory minimum of \$150,000 for their section 2255 claim, then defendant is  
16 not entitled to a jury trial. If plaintiffs decide to seek an amount greater than the  
17 minimum or seek damages under section 2252A(f), then defendant is entitled to a jury  
18 trial. Accordingly, the \$150,000 statutory minimum does not violate the Seventh  
19 Amendment.

20 5. Bond

21 Defendant also argues that a bond of only \$500 is not authorized by statute or  
22 reasonable. Amy requested a \$500 bond. Dkt. # 31 at 12.  
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25 <sup>8</sup> The Seventh Amendment provides: “In suits at common law, where the value in  
26 controversy shall exceed twenty dollars, the right of trial by jury shall be preserved, and no fact  
27 tried by a jury, shall be otherwise reexamined in any Court of the United States, than according  
to the rules of common law.” U.S. Const. amend. VII.

1 Before a writ of attachment issues, plaintiff must execute and file with the clerk a  
2 surety bond in an amount no less than \$3,000 in the superior court or \$500 in the district  
3 court, and double the amount for which plaintiff demands judgment, or such other  
4 amount as the court shall fix “conditional that the plaintiff will prosecute the action  
5 without delay and will pay all costs that may be adjudged to the defendant, and all  
6 damages that the defendant may sustain by reason of the writ of attachment or of  
7 additional writs issued[.]” RCW 6.25.080.

8 Here, this court is the functional equivalent of the state superior court, so the  
9 minimum bond would be \$3,000. Plaintiffs have indicated that they seek at least  
10 \$150,000.<sup>9</sup> The court believes that a \$300,000 bond, as defendant requests, for victims of  
11 child pornography is so cost-prohibitive that it would result in the inability of virtually  
12 any victim of child pornography to attach any property of a defendant. Such a result  
13 would fly in the face of the very statutes that provide a civil remedy for these vulnerable  
14 victims if defendants have the ability to creatively move assets to become judgment-  
15 proof. Section 6.25.080 provides a remedy for defendant if plaintiffs delay prosecution  
16 of this action and for costs sustained by defendant by reason of the writ. The court is  
17 cognizant of the fact that Kennedy shares equal ownership in the houseboat with his  
18 mother, and that they are currently attempting to sell that property. However, the court  
19 believes that attachment of the entire property is necessary to prevent transfer of  
20 Kennedy’s interest in the property for less than market value. The court is open to  
21 proposals from the parties regarding a procedure to quash the writ of attachment in the  
22 event that a purchase and sale agreement is entered into between Kennedy and his mother  
23 and a buyer for fair market value, and to attach Kennedy’s portion<sup>10</sup> of the sale proceeds.

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25 <sup>9</sup> Plaintiffs seek to attach a floating houseboat and the real property on which it sits  
26 located at 3236 ½ Portage Bay Pl. E., Seattle, WA 98102 (Tax Parcel No. #B3-4200-069589-04  
27 & 408880-1450-03) (Dkt. # 37-1 at 5).

<sup>10</sup> Kennedy represents that he has a one-half equal share in the property.

1 The court expects the parties to meet and confer before filing any such future motions,  
2 preferably, using the expedited procedure available in Local Civil Rule 37(a)(2)(I) if the  
3 parties cannot come to an agreement to file a stipulation.

4 Accordingly, the court exercises its discretion in entering a nominal bond of  
5 \$3,000.

6 6. RCW 6.25.170

7 Defendant's final argument is that plaintiffs have not made the requisite showing  
8 under RCW 6.25.170 to obtain additional discovery of his other assets. However,  
9 plaintiffs have not moved the court for examination of defendant as to his property.  
10 Accordingly, the court need not address this argument.

11 **C. Conclusion**

12 For all the foregoing reasons, the court declines to impose a stay, and GRANTS  
13 plaintiffs' motions for writ of attachment for the Portage Bay property, which consists of  
14 real and personal property. The Clerk is DIRECTED to issue the Writs of Attachment,  
15 and the United States Marshal may immediately execute them.<sup>11</sup> Plaintiffs are  
16 ORDERED to deposit a bond in the total amount of \$3,000 to the Clerk of Court no later  
17 than November 8, 2013.

18 Dated this 25th day of February, 2014.

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21 The Honorable Richard A. Jones  
22 United States District Judge

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<sup>11</sup> Because this order simply amends the prior order to correct clerical mistakes, the Clerk  
need not issue additional writs, and plaintiffs need not post additional bonds.