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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT SEATTLE

JOHN JURY,

Plaintiff,

v.

THE BOEING COMPANY,

Defendant.

No. C13-1921RSL

ORDER GRANTING IN PART  
DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR  
SUMMARY JUDGMENT

This matter comes before the Court on “Defendant The Boeing Company’s Motion for Summary Judgment.” Dkt. # 42. Plaintiff alleges that the termination of his employment from Boeing on November 3, 2010, violated the Washington Family Leave Act and the Washington Law Against Discrimination. Complaint (Dkt. # 4) at ¶¶ 4.1 and 5.1. Defendant seeks dismissal of all of plaintiff’s claims on the ground that plaintiff was fired because he violated Boeing’s attendance policies, not because he utilized his WFLA rights or was disabled.

Summary judgment is appropriate when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, there is no genuine issue of material fact that would preclude the entry of judgment as a matter of law. The party seeking summary dismissal of the case “bears the initial responsibility of informing the district court of the basis for its motion” (Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986)) and “citing to particular parts of materials in the record” that show the absence of a genuine issue of material fact (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c)).

ORDER GRANTING IN PART DEFENDANT’S  
MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

1 Once the moving party has satisfied its burden, it is entitled to summary judgment if the non-  
2 moving party fails to designate “specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial.”  
3 Celotex Corp., 477 U.S. at 324. The Court will “view the evidence in the light most favorable  
4 to the nonmoving party . . . and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor.” Krechman  
5 v. County of Riverside, 723 F.3d 1104, 1109 (9th Cir. 2013). Although the Court must reserve  
6 for the jury genuine issues regarding credibility, the weight of the evidence, and legitimate  
7 inferences, the “mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the non-moving party’s  
8 position will be insufficient” to avoid judgment. City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750  
9 F.3d 1036, 1049 (9th Cir. 2014); Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 252 (1986).  
10 Factual disputes whose resolution would not affect the outcome of the suit are irrelevant to the  
11 consideration of a motion for summary judgment. S. Cal. Darts Ass’n v. Zaffina, 762 F.3d 921,  
12 925 (9th Cir. 2014). In other words, summary judgment should be granted where the  
13 nonmoving party fails to offer evidence from which a reasonable jury could return a verdict in  
14 its favor. FreecycleSunnyvale v. Freecycle Network, 626 F.3d 509, 514 (9th Cir. 2010).

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16 Having reviewed the memoranda, declarations, and exhibits submitted by the  
17 parties,<sup>1</sup> the Court finds as follows:

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21 <sup>1</sup> Plaintiff’s request to strike evidence related to plaintiff’s use of a company credit card, sobriety  
22 issues, and/or a June 2009 corrective action memo (Dkt. # 47 at 2) is GRANTED. This information is  
23 not relevant to the issues raised in defendant’s motion and is unduly prejudicial.

24 Plaintiff’s request to strike arguments raised in and evidence submitted with defendant’s reply  
25 memorandum (Dkt. # 55) is DENIED. Defendant had previously asserted that the Ninth Circuit’s  
26 “negative factor” analysis should not be applied in this case: the argument was not new. With regards to  
the attendance audit, plaintiff submitted the audit with his response memorandum and made arguments  
based thereon. Defendant replied. Plaintiff does not explain why defendant should be expected to  
critique a document in its opening memorandum that has not yet been submitted to the Court for  
consideration.

1 **A. Washington Family Leave Act (“WFLA”), RCW 49.78 et seq.**

2 The parties agree that the WFLA mirrors the provisions of the federal Family  
3 Medical Leave Act (“FMLA”) and must, therefore, be construed to the extent possible in a  
4 manner that is consistent with the federal law. Dkt. # 42 at 10; Dkt. # 47 at 1 n.1. Plaintiff  
5 alleges that Boeing impermissibly used his WFLA-protected leave as a factor in the decision to  
6 terminate him. Adverse employment actions taken against an employee for exercising rights to  
7 which he is entitled under the medical leave act are construed as a claim that the employer has  
8 interfered with plaintiff’s rights under the statute. See 29 U.S.C. § 2615(a)(1); Cheeks v. Gen.  
9 Dynamics, 22 F. Supp.3d 1015, 1040 (D. Ariz. 2014). In the Ninth Circuit, an employee will  
10 prevail on an interference claim if he shows “by a preponderance of the evidence that [the]  
11 taking of FMLA-protected leave constituted a negative factor in the decision to terminate [him.  
12 He] can prove this claim, as one might any ordinary statutory claim, by using either direct or  
13 circumstantial evidence, or both.” Bachelor v. Am. W. Airlines, Inc., 259 F.3d 1112, 1125  
14 (9th Cir. 2001). See also Golez v. U.S. Postal Serv., 585 Fed. Appx. 365, 366 (9th Cir. 2014)  
15 (affirming judgment in favor of employer where employee failed to prove that his use of FMLA  
16 leave was “a negative factor in terminating his employment”).<sup>2</sup>

17 Although it is a very close question, there is evidence from which a reasonable jury  
18 could conclude that Boeing considered FMLA-protected leave as a negative factor when it made  
19 the decision to fire plaintiff. On Monday, October 11, 2010, plaintiff’s manager submitted a  
20 “Manager Intake Form” to Human Resources noting a number of unexcused absences in the  
21 preceding six weeks. Dkt. # 43-1 at 43. Human Resources reviewed plaintiff’s employment  
22 records between May 3, 2010, and October 8, 2010, and found fourteen full or partial absences,  
23 including six days for which plaintiff had provided medical documentation but had not followed  
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25 <sup>2</sup> Defendant argues that the Court is free to pick and choose amongst the FMLA causation  
26 analyses used in various circuits and should not follow Ninth Circuit precedent on this issue. No  
authority is cited for this proposition.

1 the specified procedures for requesting FMLA leave. Dkt. # 44-1 at 47; Decl. of Kathryn  
2 Lykken (Dkt. # 44) at ¶ 8.<sup>3</sup> According to Boeing's records, none of the fourteen absences was  
3 covered by vacation time, sick leave, FMLA, or an approved leave of absence. Decl. of  
4 Kathryn Lykken (Dkt. # 44) at ¶ 8. Boeing deemed these absences unacceptable and terminated  
5 plaintiff's employment, citing all of plaintiff's absences, including the ones for which medical  
6 documentation had been provided, in the notice of termination. Dkt. # 44-1 at 47.

7 Plaintiff argues that Boeing should have realized that all of the absences for which  
8 medical documentation had been provided qualified for coverage under the FMLA and that  
9 defendant improperly counted these absences as a negative factor when determining whether  
10 termination was appropriate. It is undisputed that Boeing was aware of and considered the  
11 medically-documented absences in its decision to terminate plaintiff. Dkt. # 52-1 at 23.  
12 Defendant argues, however, that those absences were not protected by the FMLA because  
13 plaintiff did not provide notice in compliance with Boeing's policies.

14 The Department of Labor's FMLA regulations require an employee to "comply  
15 with the employer's usual and customary notice and procedural requirements for requesting  
16 leave, absent unusual circumstances." 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c).<sup>4</sup> Boeing's Leaves of Absence  
17 Policy Handbook applies to a number of types of leave, but sets forth the following procedures  
18 with regards to FMLA leave:

19 If the need for leave is foreseeable, the employee must provide 30 days advance  
20 notice to the Boeing Leave Service Center through Boeing TotalAccess before an  
21 FMLA absence is to begin. If the need for the absence is not foreseeable, the  
22 employee must provide notice to Boeing TotalAccess within two business days after

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23 <sup>3</sup> This calculation and the termination notice were in error: plaintiff was not absent on May 5,  
24 2010. Decl. of Kathryn Lykken (Dkt. # 44) at ¶ 10. The correct dates of and documented reasons for  
25 the absences are set forth in defendant's memorandum (Dkt. # 42 at 8).

26 <sup>4</sup> The FMLA regulations were revised in March 2013. Citations are to the regulations that were  
in force at the time of the events giving rise to plaintiff's claims.

1 the start of the absence or per collective bargaining agreement. If timely notice is not  
2 received, FMLA coverage will be denied, and corrective action may be taken for  
3 unexcused absences, up to and including discharge . . .

4 Dkt. # 44-1 at 19. Plaintiff acknowledges that he did not submit a leave request through  
5 TotalAccess regarding his May and June absences, but argues that the failure should be excused  
6 because (a) he was unaware that FMLA leave could be used for short periods of time and  
7 (b) despite having provided medical documentation to excuse the absences, he was not advised  
8 that an additional step would be necessary to have the absence covered by the FMLA.

9 There is surprisingly little guidance on what circumstances qualify as “unusual” for  
10 purposes of 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c). The regulations explain that, while an employer may  
11 require employees to call a designated number or a specific individual to request leave, such  
12 requirements have to give way until an employee’s “condition is stabilized and he or she has  
13 access to, and is able to use, a phone.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(c). Courts have deemed  
14 circumstances “unusual” when the medical condition or illness prevents compliance with the  
15 normal procedures (Howard v. VT Halter Marine, Inc., 2011 WL 2414672 (S.D. Miss. June 10,  
16 2011)), the employee is unable to access a phone (Flores v. Murphy Co., 2014 WL 584553, at  
17 \*6 (D. Or. Feb. 12, 2014)), the employer’s policies conflict with the law (Millea v. Metro-North  
18 R. Co., 658 F.3d 154, 161-62 (2nd Cir. 2011)), or the employer has misled the employee in  
19 some way regarding the proper procedures (Uselton v. CSX Transp., Inc., 2014 WL 4388272, at  
20 \*5 (N.D. Ohio Sept. 5, 2014)). “Other courts, without invoking the unusual-circumstances  
21 exception specifically, have nonetheless excused the employee for failing to comply with the  
22 employer’s procedures where a fact issue existed about whether the employee gave adequate  
23 notice of the need for leave.” Villegas v. Albertsons, LLC, 2015 WL 1137415, at \*7 (W.D.  
24 Tex. Mar. 11, 2015) (collecting cases).

25 To the extent plaintiff is arguing that an employee’s subjective misunderstanding or  
26 lack of awareness of an available procedure for requesting leave, unrelated to any ambiguity in

1 the written policy or misstatements on the part of the employer, satisfies the “unusual  
2 circumstances” exception, he has not identified, and the Court has not found, any case law  
3 supporting that proposition. The Court declines to adopt such a rule in this case. Boeing’s  
4 FMLA notice procedures were available to plaintiff, specify the procedures to be used to give  
5 notice of the need for leave, and specifically state that FMLA leave can be “taken in separate  
6 increments of time due to a single illness or injury, rather than for one continuous period of  
7 time.” Dkt. # 44-1 at 18-19. Even if, as plaintiff speculates, plaintiff’s managers and the  
8 reviewing Human Resources specialists were unfamiliar with the definition of “serious health  
9 condition” under the FMLA, there is no indication that they communicated with plaintiff  
10 regarding this issue or misled him in this or any other regard.

11 The better argument, given the facts of this case, is that plaintiff did not understand  
12 that the FMLA might apply and therefore did not realize that he needed to submit a request for  
13 leave in TotalAccess.<sup>5</sup> Employees are not expected to be familiar with the intricacies of the law:  
14 “[i]t is the employer’s responsibility to determine when FMLA leave is appropriate, to inquire  
15 as to specific facts to make that determination, and to inform the employee of his or her  
16 entitlements.” Xin Liu v. Amway Corp., 347 F.3d 1125, 1134 (9th Cir. 2003). Plaintiff  
17 maintains that the information he provided regarding his absences on May 3, May 4, May 6,  
18 June 1, and June 15 indicated that the FMLA applied and that Boeing failed to meet its  
19 obligations to confirm its applicability and to advise him how to obtain coverage.

20 Employees bear the initial burden of providing “sufficient information for an  
21 employer to reasonably determine whether the FMLA may apply to the leave request.” 29  
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23 <sup>5</sup> In the introductory sections, the Leaves of Absence Policy Handbook defines “leaves of  
24 absence” as “all types of leaves and absences lasting more than seven consecutive calendar days.” Dkt.  
25 # 44-1 at 15. The FMLA section of the handbook applies to leaves that are taken intermittently, rather  
26 than consecutively, but the employee would have to know that the leave was FMLA-qualifying in order  
to realize that notice of a one or two day absence had to be provided through TotalAccess. As discussed  
in the text, it is the employer’s obligation to characterize a particular leave request as FMLA-qualifying.

1 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). If the employee is seeking leave to address a new FMLA-qualifying  
2 condition or illness, he “need not expressly assert rights under the FMLA or even mention the  
3 FMLA.” Id. Rather, he must “explain the reasons for the needed leave so as to allow the  
4 employer to determine whether the leave qualifies under the Act.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.301(b). See  
5 also Bachelder, 259 F.3d at 1130 (employees “need only notify their employers that they will be  
6 absent under circumstances which indicate that the FMLA might apply”). “When an employee  
7 seeks leave due to a qualifying reason, for which the employer has previously provided the  
8 employee FMLA-protected leave, the employee must specifically reference either the qualifying  
9 reason for leave or the need for FMLA leave.” 29 C.F.R. § 825.303(b). As applied to this case,  
10 the regulations required plaintiff to provide information indicating that his May absences were  
11 the result of a serious health condition and that the June absences arose out of that same  
12 condition. To the extent plaintiff satisfied this initial burden, the employer’s obligations to  
13 investigate and characterize the leave would come into play. Simply requesting to use accrued  
14 leave or stating that the employee is “‘sick’ without providing more information will not be  
15 considered sufficient notice to trigger an employer’s obligations under the Act.” 29 C.F.R.  
16 § 825.301(b) and § 825.303(b).

17 Plaintiff was absent on May 3 and May 4, 2010. When he returned to work, he  
18 provided a doctor’s note stating that he had a cervical strain, had missed two days of work, and  
19 was cleared to return on May 5. Dkt. # 50-1 at 2. This information is insufficient to trigger  
20 Boeing’s duty to investigate. “For purposes of FMLA, serious health condition entitling an  
21 employee to FMLA leave means an illness, injury, impairment or physical or mental condition  
22 that involves inpatient care . . . or continuing treatment by a health care provider . . . .” 29  
23 C.F.R. § 825.113(a). Plaintiff was not an inpatient at any point during May or June 2010, so the  
24 first part of the definition is not applicable. With regards to serious health conditions involving  
25 continuing treatment, a variety of illnesses and conditions that fall into that category are  
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1 described in great detail in 29 C.F.R. § 825.115, including:

2 (a) Incapacity and treatment. A period of incapacity of more than three consecutive,  
3 full calendar days, and any subsequent treatment or period of incapacity relating to  
4 the same condition, that also involves:

5 (1) Treatment two or more times, within 30 days of the first day of  
6 incapacity, unless extenuating circumstances exist . . . ; or

7 (2) Treatment by a health care provider on at least one occasion, which  
8 results in a regimen of continuing treatment under the supervision of the  
9 health care provider.

10 As of May 5, 2010, the record shows that Boeing would have had no reason to suspect that  
11 plaintiff had missed work because of a “serious health condition” as that term is defined. The  
12 period of incapacity had lasted only two days, and none of the other categories of illness or  
13 conditions set forth in the regulations were relevant. Having no indication that the FMLA might  
14 apply to the absences, there was no obligation to inquire further or to invite plaintiff to apply for  
15 FMLA leave through TotalAccess.

16 Plaintiff’s absence on May 6 was addressed in a second doctor’s note stating, “John  
17 C Jury was seen in our office today, by Dr. Bradley Olson, for evaluation of cervical strain,  
18 upper back strain, and trapezius strain. Please excuse his absence from work or school today.”  
19 Dkt. # 50-1 at 4. Again, the information provided to the employer did not satisfy the  
20 introductory clause of 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a). Even if the May 6 absence is considered in  
21 conjunction with the May 3 and May 4 absences, the period of incapacity was not “more than  
22 three consecutive, full calendar days.”

23 Plaintiff was subsequently absent from May 17 - May 27 and requested leave  
24 through the TotalAccess system. His doctor provided medical documentation of neck and  
25 shoulder strain and noted that the first office visit for the condition was May 3, 2010. Plaintiff’s  
26 objective findings included nerve impingement in his neck and a loss of strength in his right



1 arm. He was released to go back to work after May 27, but advised to avoid neck extension  
2 (such as occurs when one crawls or works overhead). Follow-up treatment with a spine center  
3 was prescribed. Dkt. # 49-1 at 10-12. At that point, plaintiff had a condition that satisfied the  
4 requirements of 29 C.F.R. § 825.115, and FMLA leave was approved on June 2, 2010.

5 Plaintiff apparently returned to work as scheduled on Friday, May 28, but was  
6 absent on June 1. On June 15, plaintiff was again absent and submitted a note from his doctor  
7 indicating that he had a contusion on his face, a sprained knee, and C7 radiculopathy. He was  
8 released back to work “with the same restrictions to overhead work as previously stated.” Dkt.  
9 # 50-1 at 11. At or about the same time, plaintiff requested that the doctor change the  
10 paperwork that had been submitted in support of his May FMLA request to extend the end date  
11 so that it covered his June 1 absence. Dkt. # 48-1 at 54. The doctor’s office contacted Boeing  
12 on June 15 (Dkt. # 48-1 at 57) and was told that the change could be made over the phone (Dkt.  
13 # 48-1 at 54). Given plaintiff’s recent FMLA leave, Boeing had enough information about the  
14 two June absences to know that they potentially qualified for FMLA protection. Plaintiff’s  
15 doctor had notified Boeing that plaintiff’s acknowledged “serious health condition” caused him  
16 to miss work through June 1, and the June 15 absence was related to treatment of that same  
17 condition. See 29 C.F.R. § 825.115(a). If Boeing needed a written amendment to the physician  
18 statement that was submitted on May 28 or more information regarding the June 15 treatment, it  
19 should have requested it or otherwise attempted to ascertain whether those absences were  
20 FMLA-qualifying.

21 The question, then, is whether a reasonable jury could find that these two absences  
22 were negative factors in the decision to terminate plaintiff. While there is ample evidence in the  
23 record to suggest that plaintiff would have been terminated regardless of his June absences, a  
24 reasonable jury could conclude that, having specifically remarked on the absences, they were a  
25 factor that weighed against plaintiff. See Hudson v. Home Depot, U.S.A., Inc., 2015 WL  
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1 409672, at \*6 (D. Idaho Jan. 29, 2015) (“From the termination letter, which notes FMLA-  
2 protected leave as grounds for dismissal, the jury could reasonably conclude that Home Depot  
3 used the leave as a negative factor, even if plaintiff[’s] other attendance occurrences would  
4 have, in theory, been sufficient for plaintiff’s dismissal.”). Under the Ninth Circuit’s causation  
5 analysis, that is all that is required for an interference claim to survive a motion for summary  
6 judgment. As discussed in Bachelder:

7       The question here is not whether America West had additional reasons for the  
8 discharge, but whether Bachelder’s taking of the 1996 FMLA-protected leave was  
9 used as a negative factor in her discharge. . . . America West does not seriously  
10 contend that, even though it considered an impermissible reason in firing Bachelder,  
11 it would have fired her anyway for the other two reasons alone. Even had it made  
12 such an argument, of course, the regulations clearly prohibit the use of FMLA-  
13 protected leave as a negative factor at all. Therefore no further inquiry on the  
14 question whether America West violated the statute in discharging Bachelder is  
15 necessary.

16 259 F.3d at 1131. There remain material issues of fact regarding whether the June absences  
17 qualified for FMLA protection and, if so, whether Boeing considered those absences as a  
18 negative factor when deciding to terminate plaintiff’s employment.

19 **B. Washington Law Against Discrimination (“WLAD”), RCW 49.60 *et seq.***

20       Plaintiff argues that his cervical strain was a “substantial factor” in the decision to  
21 terminate his employment and that Boeing failed to accommodate his disability with a short  
22 leave of absence. Dkt. # 47 at 23-24.<sup>6</sup> Neither claim can survive summary judgment. There is  
23 no direct or circumstantial evidence that Boeing discriminated against plaintiff because he hurt  
24 his neck or that the injury was a substantial factor in the termination decision. Plaintiff was  
25 fired because of his attendance problems. Simply listing unexcused absences on a termination  
26 notice, some of which may have been the result of a disability, does not give rise to an inference

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<sup>6</sup> Plaintiff does not oppose defendant’s motion for summary judgment on his retaliation claim.

1 of discriminatory motive. See Bray v. King County, 2007 WL 2138754, at \*4 n.5 (W.D. Wash.  
2 July 22, 2007). Assuming, for purposes of this argument, that plaintiff can establish a prima  
3 facie case of discrimination using the burden-shifting analysis of McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.  
4 Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), defendant has identified a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for  
5 the termination, namely eight unexcused absences that had nothing to do with his cervical strain.  
6 As plaintiff acknowledges, it was those absences which prompted his manager to refer the  
7 matter to Human Resources and which ultimately led to his termination. Given the procedures  
8 used to generate the notice of termination, no reasonable jury could find that Boeing used  
9 plaintiff's attendance problems as a pretext to hide disability discrimination.


10 With regards to the accommodation claim under the WLAD, plaintiff has the  
11 burden of showing that (1) he had a disability, (2) he was qualified to perform the essential  
12 functions of his job, (3) the employer had notice of the disability and the limitations it imposed,  
13 and (4) upon notice, the employer failed to adopt reasonably available measures to  
14 accommodate the disability. See Riehl v. Foodmaker, Inc., 152 Wn.2d 138, 145 (2004).  
15 Plaintiff has not raised a genuine issue of fact regarding the second or fourth elements of his  
16 failure to accommodate claim. "Essential functions" are those that are fundamental to filling a  
17 particular position, and an employee's timely and reliable presence at the job site may be an  
18 essential job function which the employer is not required to waive or alter. Davis v. Microsoft  
19 Corp., 149 Wn.2d 521, 534 (2003). Plaintiff was an assembly installer at the Everett plant, and  
20 there is no indication that this job could be performed remotely. Plaintiff was expressly  
21 required to maintain acceptable attendance as a condition of his employment and to follow  
22 certain procedures if he were going to be absent. He did not do so – most of the time for  
23 reasons unrelated to his disability – and was not, therefore, performing an essential job function.

24 Plaintiff appears to be arguing that he should be permitted to take time off or leave  
25 early whenever his cervical strain caused pain, without regard to the policies and procedures  
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1 governing leave. An employer need not, however, waive its attendance policies simply because  
2 an employee has a disability. Samper v. Providence St. Vincent Med. Ctr., 675 F.3d 1233,  
3 1239-40 (9th Cir. 2012). In this case, the evidence shows that Boeing did accommodate the  
4 limitations and restrictions identified by plaintiff's doctors and granted FMLA leave whenever a  
5 properly submitted and supported request was made. There is no indication that plaintiff's  
6 cervical strain prevented him from following Boeing's attendance policies, and it was that  
7 failure which resulted in his termination. No additional accommodation was needed.

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9 For all of the foregoing reasons, defendant's motion for summary judgment (Dkt.  
10 # 42) is GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Plaintiff's WLAD claims fail as a matter of  
11 law and are hereby DISMISSED. The WFLA claim may proceed.

12 Dated this 22nd day of April, 2015.

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16 Robert S. Lasnik  
17 United States District Judge  
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