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3 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
4 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
5 AT TACOMA

6 LOUISE ROSE JOOST,

7 Plaintiff,

8 v.

9 CAROLYN W. COLVIN, Acting  
10 Commissioner of Social Security,

11 Defendant.

Case No. 2:15-cv-01714-RBL

ORDER REVERSING AND  
REMANDING DEFENDANT'S  
DECISION TO DENY BENEFITS

Dkt. #1

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13 THIS MATTER is before the Court on Plaintiff Joost's Complaint [Dkt. 1] for review of  
14 the Social Security Commissioner's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits.

15 Joost suffers from degenerative disc disease, asthma, chronic neck pain, and chronic  
16 lumbar pain. *See* Dkt. 4, Administrative Record 538. She applied for disability insurance benefits  
17 in April 2006, alleging she became disabled beginning in March 2005. *See* AR 535-36. Those  
18 applications were denied upon initial administrative review and on reconsideration. *See* AR 535.  
19 Joost was found to be not disabled after a hearing, but the case was remanded by this Court. *See*  
20 *id.* Joost was found to be not disabled after a second hearing, but the Appeals Council remanded  
21 the case. *See id.* A third hearing was held before Administrative Law Judge Larry Kennedy in  
22 November 2014. *See id.* Joost, represented by counsel, appeared and testified, as did a vocational  
23 expert. *See* AR 555-93.  
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25 The ALJ determined Joost to be not disabled. *See* AR 535-47. The Appeals Council  
26 denied Joost's request for review, making the ALJ's decision the final decision of the

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1 Commissioner of Social Security. *See* AR 500–04; 20 C.F.R. § 404.981. In October 2015, Joost  
2 filed a complaint in this Court seeking judicial review of the Commissioner’s final decision. *See*  
3 Dkt. 1.

4 Joost argues the Commissioner’s decision to deny benefits should be reversed and  
5 remanded for an award of benefits, because the ALJ erred: (1) in evaluating the medical evidence  
6 in the record; (2) in evaluating Joost’s credibility; (3) in evaluating the lay witness testimony;  
7 and (4) in finding her to be capable of performing work available in the national economy based  
8 on vocational expert testimony. Specifically, Joost argues the ALJ failed to give sufficient  
9 reasons for discounting the opinions of treating physician David Buscher, M.D., and evaluating  
10 physician Carl Andrew Brodtkin, M.D. Joost argues the errors affected the ultimate disability  
11 determination and are therefore not harmless. Joost further argues the case should be remanded  
12 for an immediate award of benefits.  
13

14  
15 The Commissioner argues the ALJ did not err in evaluating Buscher’s and Brodtkin’s  
16 opinions, Joost’s credibility, or the lay witness testimony, so the ALJ’s RFC and step-five  
17 finding that Joost could perform work were supported by substantial evidence and should be  
18 affirmed.

## 19 DISCUSSION

20 The Commissioner’s determination that a claimant is not disabled must be upheld by the  
21 Court if the Commissioner applied the “proper legal standards” and if “substantial evidence in  
22 the record as a whole supports” that determination. *See Hoffman v. Heckler*, 785 F.2d 1423, 1425  
23 (9th Cir. 1986); *see also Batson v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 359 F.3d 1190, 1193 (9th Cir.  
24 2004); *Carr v. Sullivan*, 772 F.Supp. 522, 525 (E.D. Wash. 1991) (“A decision supported by  
25 substantial evidence will, nevertheless, be set aside if the proper legal standards were not applied  
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1 in weighing the evidence and making the decision.”) (citing *Brawner v. Sec’y of Health and*  
2 *Human Services*, 839 F.2d 432, 433 (9th Cir. 1987)).

3 Substantial evidence is “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as  
4 adequate to support a conclusion.” *Richardson v. Perales*, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (citation  
5 omitted); *see also Batson*, 359 F.3d at 1193 (“[T]he Commissioner’s findings are upheld if  
6 supported by inferences reasonably drawn from the record.”). “The substantial evidence test  
7 requires that the reviewing court determine” whether the Commissioner’s decision is “supported  
8 by more than a scintilla of evidence, although less than a preponderance of the evidence is  
9 required.” *Sorenson v. Weinberger*, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975). “If the evidence  
10 admits of more than one rational interpretation,” the Commissioner’s decision must be upheld.  
11 *Allen v. Heckler*, 749 F.2d 577, 579 (9th Cir. 1984) (“Where there is conflicting evidence  
12 sufficient to support either outcome, we must affirm the decision actually made.”) (quoting  
13 *Rhinehart v. Finch*, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971)).<sup>1</sup>

#### 16 **I. The ALJ’s Evaluation of the Medical Evidence in the Record**

17 The ALJ determines credibility and resolving ambiguities and conflicts in the medical  
18 evidence. *See Reddick v. Chater*, 157 F.3d 715, 722 (9th Cir. 1998). Where the medical evidence  
19 in the record is not conclusive, “questions of credibility and resolution of conflicts” are solely the  
20 functions of the ALJ. *Sample v. Schweiker*, 694 F.2d 639, 642 (9th Cir. 1982). In such cases, “the  
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22 <sup>1</sup> As the Ninth Circuit has further explained:

23 . . . It is immaterial that the evidence in a case would permit a different conclusion than that  
24 which the [Commissioner] reached. If the [Commissioner]’s findings are supported by  
25 substantial evidence, the courts are required to accept them. It is the function of the  
26 [Commissioner], and not the courts to resolve conflicts in the evidence. While the court may  
not try the case de novo, neither may it abdicate its traditional function of review. It must  
scrutinize the record as a whole to determine whether the [Commissioner]’s conclusions are  
rational. If they are . . . they must be upheld.

*Sorenson*, 514 F.2d at 1119 n.10.

1 ALJ's conclusion must be upheld." *Morgan v. Comm'r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 169 F.3d 595, 601 (9th  
2 Cir. 1999). Determining whether inconsistencies in the medical evidence "are material (or are in  
3 fact inconsistencies at all) and whether certain factors are relevant to discount" the opinions of  
4 medical experts "falls within this responsibility." *Id.* at 603.

5 In resolving questions of credibility and conflicts in the evidence, an ALJ's findings  
6 "must be supported by specific, cogent reasons." *Reddick*, 157 F.3d at 725. The ALJ can do this  
7 "by setting out a detailed and thorough summary of the facts and conflicting clinical evidence,  
8 stating his interpretation thereof, and making findings." *Id.* The ALJ also may draw inferences  
9 "logically flowing from the evidence." *Sample*, 694 F.2d at 642. Further, the Court may draw  
10 "specific and legitimate inferences from the ALJ's opinion." *Magallanes v. Bowen*, 881 F.2d  
11 747, 755 (9th Cir. 1989).

12  
13 The ALJ must provide "clear and convincing" reasons for rejecting the uncontradicted  
14 opinion of either a treating or evaluating physician. *Lester v. Chater*, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir.  
15 1996). Even when a physician's opinion is contradicted, that opinion "can only be rejected for  
16 specific and legitimate reasons that are supported by substantial evidence in the record." *Id.* at  
17 830-31. More weight is given to a treating physician's opinion than to the opinions of those who  
18 do not treat the claimant. *See Lester*, 81 F.3d at 830.

19  
20 Joost argues the ALJ erred by giving little weight to treating physician Buscher's opinion  
21 on regarding Joost's environmental limitations. *See* Dkt. 8, p. 10. Buscher opined that Joost  
22 benefits from minimized exposure to several environmental triggers, including air deodorizers,  
23 smoke, paint, bleach, cleaning agents, perfumes, and hairsprays. *See* AR 443. The ALJ partially  
24 incorporated this opinion into the RFC, limiting Joost to work in a climate-controlled indoor  
25 environment, avoiding even moderate exposure to fumes, gases, odors, and poor ventilation, with  
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1 only incidental contact with the public. *See* AR 540. However, the ALJ partially discounted  
2 Buscher’s opinion because Buscher “did not provide any support or basis for such significant  
3 limitations,” which the ALJ found to be inconsistent with Joost’s activities, her minimal  
4 complaints, and the lack of objective findings. *See* AR 544.

5         This reason is not supported by substantial evidence. The ALJ refers to Joost’s ability to  
6 travel and garden as inconsistent with Buscher’s opined limitations, but these limited activities  
7 are not necessarily inconsistent with the environmental limitations, particularly because Buscher  
8 stated Joost must use a charcoal mask or respirator to travel and can only comfortably wear it for  
9 short periods of time. *See* AR 443, 542. Joost’s subjective complaints were far from minimal;  
10 She testified that her impairments demanded that she work in a controlled environment free from  
11 triggers and without contact with other people. *See* AR 38-39. Buscher’s reports contain  
12 objective findings, including positive allergy tests and physical examinations finding supraorbital  
13 tenderness and allergic circles. *See* AR 449. Buscher specifically stated Joost’s diagnosis of  
14 multiple chemical sensitivity was made according to published criteria established by physicians  
15 of occupational and environmental medicine. *See* AR 449-50. Therefore, the ALJ failed to  
16 provide a specific and legitimate reason supported by substantial evidence to discount Buscher’s  
17 well-supported opinion.  
18

19         Joost also argues the ALJ erred by failing to incorporate in full examining physician  
20 Brodtkin’s opinion on Joost’s environmental limitations. *See* Dkt. 8, pp. 10-11. Brodtkin opined  
21 that Joost required a controlled work environment that would allow her to minimize exposure to  
22 irritant triggers. *See* AR 332. The ALJ stated that Brodtkin’s opinion suggested no limitations  
23 greater than those in the RFC and that the jobs identified at step five did not require exposure to  
24 such irritants. *See* AR 544. However, Brodtkin stated that the basis for his opinion that Joost  
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1 could not perform her work as a school nurse was exposure to other people because she  
2 experienced severe reactions to low-level irritants such as perfumes and deodorants. *See* AR 332.

3         The RFC allowed for incidental contact with the public and did not limit contact with co-  
4 workers and supervisors. *See* AR 540. The Commissioner does not argue that Brodkin’s opinion  
5 is consistent with the RFC assessed, as the ALJ asserted. Instead, the Commissioner argues that  
6 even crediting Brodkin’s opinion as true, it would not establish disability because Brodkin found  
7 Joost’s symptoms to be reasonably well-controlled on medications. *See* Dkt. 9, p. 4. However,  
8 Brodkin stated that while Joost’s symptoms were reasonably well-controlled on medications,  
9 “they are prominently exacerbated by environmental triggers,” which is consistent with the rest  
10 of his opinion. AR 312. The ALJ erred by failing to fully account for Brodkin’s opinion in the  
11 RFC.  
12

13         The Ninth Circuit has “recognized that harmless error principles apply in the Social  
14 Security Act context.” *Molina v. Astrue*, 674 F.3d 1104, 1115 (9th Cir. 2012) (citing *Stout v.*  
15 *Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 454 F.3d 1050, 1054 (9th Cir. 2006) (collecting cases)). It “adhere[s]  
16 to the general principle that an ALJ’s error is harmless where it is ‘inconsequential to the  
17 ultimate nondisability determination.’” *Id.* (quoting *Carmickle v. Comm’r, Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 533  
18 F.3d 1155, 1162 (9th Cir. 2008)) (other citations omitted). Courts must review cases “‘without  
19 regard to errors’ that do not affect the parties’ ‘substantial rights.’” *Id.* at 1118 (quoting *Shinseki*  
20 *v. Sanders*, 556 U.S. 396, 407 (2009) (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 2111) (codification of the harmless  
21 error rule)). Courts “look at the record as a whole to determine [if] the error alters the outcome of  
22 the case.” *Molina*, 674 F.3d at 1115.  
23

24         The ALJ’s improper rejection of the physicians’ opinions affected the case’s outcome.  
25 Had the ALJ fully credited Buscher’s and Brodkin’s opinions, the RFC would have included  
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1 additional limitations. Instead, the ALJ posed hypothetical questions to the vocational expert  
2 based on an incomplete RFC. *See* AR 574–84. Based on the vocational expert’s answers to those  
3 questions, the ALJ found Joost could perform work available in the national economy. *See* AR  
4 545–47. As the ALJ’s ultimate determination regarding disability was based on the testimony of  
5 a vocational expert on the basis of an improper hypothetical question, these errors affected the  
6 ultimate disability determination and are not harmless.

## 8 **II. The ALJ’s Assessment of Joost’s Residual Functional Capacity**

9 Defendant employs a five-step “sequential evaluation process” to determine whether a  
10 claimant is disabled. *See* 20 C.F.R. § 404.1520. If the claimant is found disabled or not disabled  
11 at any step, the disability determination is made at that step, and the sequential evaluation  
12 process ends. *See id.* If a disability determination “cannot be made on the basis of medical  
13 factors alone at step three of that process,” the ALJ must identify the claimant’s “functional  
14 limitations and restrictions” and assess her “remaining capacities for work-related activities.”  
15 SSR 96-8p, 1996 WL 374184 at \*2. A claimant’s RFC assessment is used at step four to  
16 determine whether she can do her past relevant work, and at step five to determine whether she  
17 can do other work. *See id.*

19 Residual functional capacity is what the claimant can still do despite her limitations. *See*  
20 *id.* It is the maximum work that the claimant can perform based on all of the relevant evidence in  
21 the record. *See id.* However, an inability to work must result from the claimant’s “physical or  
22 mental impairment(s).” *Id.* The ALJ must consider only those limitations and restrictions  
23 “attributable to medically determinable impairments.” *Id.* In assessing a claimant’s RFC, the ALJ  
24 also must discuss why the claimant’s “symptom-related functional limitations and restrictions  
25 can or cannot reasonably be accepted as consistent with the medical or other evidence.” *Id.* at \*7.

1           However, because the ALJ erred in evaluating Buscher’s and Brodkin’s opinions, the  
2 RFC assessed by the ALJ does not necessarily completely and accurately describe all of Joost’s  
3 capabilities. As a result, the ALJ erred.

4 **III. The ALJ’s Step Five Determination**

5           If a claimant cannot perform his or her past relevant work, at step five of the disability  
6 evaluation process the ALJ must show there are a significant number of jobs in the national  
7 economy the claimant can do. *See Tackett v. Apfel*, 180 F.3d 1094, 1098-99 (9th Cir. 1999); 20  
8 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(d), (e), 416.920(d), (e). The ALJ can do this through the testimony of a  
9 vocational expert or by reference to defendant’s Medical-Vocational Guidelines. *See Osenbrock*  
10 *v. Apfel*, 240 F.3d 1157, 1162 (9th Cir. 2000); *see also Tackett*, 180 F.3d at 1100-1101.

11           Based on the testimony of a vocational expert, the ALJ found Joost capable of  
12 performing other work. *See AR 545-47*. Again, however, because the ALJ erred in evaluating  
13 Buscher’s and Brodkin’s opinions, and thus in assessing Joost’s RFC, the hypothetical question  
14 presented at the hearing did not completely and accurately describe all of Joost’s capabilities.  
15 Therefore, the ALJ’s step-five determination is not supported by substantial evidence and is in  
16 error.

17 **IV. This Matter Should Be Remanded for Further Administrative Proceedings**

18           Joost argues this case should be remanded for an immediate award of benefits. *See Dkt.*  
19 *8*, p. 17. Under the Social Security Act, “courts are empowered to affirm, modify, or reverse a  
20 decision by the Commissioner ‘with or without remanding the cause for a rehearing.’” *Garrison*  
21 *v. Colvin*, 759 F.3d 995, 1019 (9th Cir. 2014) (emphasis in original) (quoting 42 U.S.C.  
22 § 405(g)). Although a court should generally remand to the agency for additional investigation or  
23 explanation, a court may remand for immediate payment of benefits. *See Treichler v. Comm’r*,



1 *Soc. Sec. Admin.*, 775 F.3d 1090, 1099-1100 (9th Cir. 2014). The Ninth Circuit applies a three-  
2 step framework to “deduce whether this is one of the rare circumstances where we may decide  
3 not to remand for further proceedings.” *Treichler*, 775 F.3d at 1103. This is the “credit-as-true”  
4 rule. *Garrison*, 759 F.3d at 1019.

5 Under the first step, the Court must determine whether “the ALJ has failed to provide  
6 legally sufficient reasons” for discounting evidence. *Treichler*, 775 F.3d at 1103 (internal citation  
7 omitted). The Court concludes, for the reasons stated above, that the ALJ did not provide legally  
8 sufficient reasons for discrediting Buscher’s and Brodkin’s medical opinions.  
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
10 Under the second step, the Court must “turn to the question [of] whether further  
11 administrative proceedings would be useful.” *Id.* At this stage, the Court considers “whether the  
12 record as a whole is free from conflicts, ambiguities, or gaps, whether all factual issues have  
13 been resolved, and whether claimant’s entitlement to benefits is clear under the applicable legal  
14 rules.” *Id.* at 1103–04. Both Buscher and Brodkin opined that Joost required a controlled  
15 environment to minimize exposure to several environmental triggers, including personal  
16 products such as perfumes and deodorants. *See* AR 332, 443. The only conflicting medical  
17 opinion the ALJ gave substantial weight to was nonexamining physician Robert Bernandez-Fu,  
18 M.D.’s, who did not review Buscher and Brodkin’s findings. *See* AR 396, 400. The Court can  
19 find no basis to allow the Commissioner yet another opportunity to discount the opinions of  
20 treating and examining physicians for a nonexamining physician who did not have the full record  
21 to review. *See Garrison*, 759 F.3d at 1021. The Court concludes the record is clear that Joost has  
22 the environmental limitations Buscher and Brodkin opined she has, which demand Joost have  
23 only minimal exposure to low-level irritants, including personal products such as perfume and  
24 scented deodorant.  
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1 Under the third step, the Court must determine whether, “if the improperly discredited  
2 evidence were credited as true, the ALJ would be required to find the claimant disabled on  
3 remand.” *Id.* at 1020. The Court cannot determine with any certainty whether additional  
4 limitations regarding Joost’s ability to be in proximity with supervisors, coworkers, or the public  
5 due to exposure to low-level irritants would necessarily demand a finding of disability.  
6 Therefore, on remand, the Commissioner is instructed to credit Buscher and Brodtkin’s opinions  
7 and to take vocational expert testimony to determine whether Joost may still perform work  
8 available in the national economy despite these additional limitations.  
9

10 **CONCLUSION**

11 The Court finds the ALJ improperly concluded Alexander is not disabled. Defendant’s  
12 decision to deny benefits is REVERSED, and this matter is REMANDED for further  
13 administrative proceedings as detailed in this order.  
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15 DATED this 12<sup>th</sup> day of July, 2016.  
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20 Ronald B. Leighton  
21 United States District Judge  
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