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7	UNITED STATES I	DISTRICT COURT
8	WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON AT SEATTLE	
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10	ROBERT LYNN JACKSON, JR., et	CASE NO. C16-1282JLR
11	al.,	ORDER REGARDING PLAINTIFFS' RESPONSE TO
12	Plaintiffs, v.	THE CITY'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
13	CITY OF MOUNTLAKE	
14	TERRACE, et al.,	
15	Defendants.	
16	The court has received Plaintiffs' response (Resp. (Dkt. # 29)) to Defendants City	
17	of Mountlake Terrace ("the City"), Brian Moss and Matt Porter's motion for summary	
18	judgment (SJ Mot. (Dkt. # 19)). In their response, Plaintiffs state that they "seek[] to	
19	drop their remaining claims pursuant to [Federal Rule of Civil Procedure] 41." (Resp. at	
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Rule 41(a)(2) provides that "an action may be dismissed at the plaintiff's request only
 by court order, on terms that the court considers proper." Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(2).¹

3 The court should grant a motion for voluntary dismissal unless the defendant 4 shows it will suffer some plain legal prejudice as a result. See Waller v. Fin. Corp. of 5 Am., 828 F.2d 579, 583 (9th Cir. 1987); Hamilton v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 679 6 F.2d 143, 145 (9th Cir. 1982). A defendant may show plain legal prejudice by 7 demonstrating that voluntary dismissal threatens actual legal rights or may result in 8 extreme or unreasonable monetary or other burdens. See Watson v. Clark, 716 F. Supp. 9 1354, 1356 (D. Nev.1989), aff'd, 909 F.2d 1490 (9th Cir. 1990). Factors to consider in 10 determining legal prejudice may include: (1) the defendant's effort and expense in 11 preparing for trial; (2) the plaintiff's excessive delay and lack of diligence in prosecuting the action; (3) insufficient explanation of the need to take a dismissal; and (4) the fact that 12 13 the defendant has moved for summary judgment. See Fischer v. Zespri Fresh Produce N. Am., Inc., No. 1:07-CV-00610LJO, 2007 WL 2385074, at *9 (E.D. Cal. Aug. 17, 2007) 14 15 (citing Paulucci v. City of Duluth, 826 F.2d 780, 783 (8th Cir. 1987); Grover v. Eli Lilly & Co., 33 F.3d 716, 718 (6th Cir. 1994); and United States v. Outboard Marine Corp., 16 17 789 F.2d 497, 502 (7th Cir. 1986)).

The court construes Plaintiffs' response as a motion to dismiss their complaint under Rule 41(a)(2), and DIRECTS the Clerk to note it as such on the court's docket for

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^{Plaintiffs are not eligible to dismiss this action by filing a notice of dismissal because the remaining Defendants have filed both an answer and a motion for summary judgment.} *See*Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i). In addition, the parties have not filed a joint stipulation of dismissal. *See* Fed. R. Civ. P. 41(a)(1)(A)(i).

Thursday, March 30, 2017. In addition, the court notes that Defendants have a pending
motion for summary judgment. (*See* SJ Mot.) Accordingly, the court ORDERS
Plaintiffs to file a memorandum stating whether they seek a voluntary dismissal with
prejudice or without prejudice no later than Thursday, March 23, 2017. If Plaintiffs seek
a dismissal without prejudice, the court further ORDERS Plaintiffs to explain in the same
memorandum why they are so entitled. *See Pace v. S. Express Co.*, 409 F.2d 331, 334
(7th Cir.1969) (citing 5 Moore's Federal Practice § 41.05(1) (2d ed. 1968)) (holding that
the district court properly denied dismissal without prejudice where discovery was
considerably advanced and defendant's motion for summary judgment was pending).
Plaintiffs shall limit their memorandum to no more than six pages.

The court ORDERS Defendants to respond to Plaintiffs' Rule 41(a)(2) motion to dismiss and supplemental memorandum within seven days of the filing date of this order and indicate if they have any objection to the dismissal of this case. Defendants shall limit their response to no more than six pages. Plaintiffs may file a reply to Defendants' response no later than Thursday, March 30, 2017. Plaintiffs shall limit their reply to more than three pages.

Dated this 21st day of March, 2017.

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JAMES L. ROBART United States District Judge