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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
7 AT SEATTLE

8 ANNA POLONSKY,

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10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 DAN CAWDREY and LILLIAN CAWDREY,  
13 and all other occupants,

14 Defendants.

Case No. C16-1896 RSM

ORDER GRANTING IN PART  
PLAINTIFF'S REQUEST FOR FEES AND  
COSTS

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16 **I. INTRODUCTION**

17 This matter initially came before the Court on Plaintiff's Emergency Motion to Remand  
18 pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). Dkt. #4. On February 7, 2017, the Court granted Plaintiff's  
19 motion, finding that there was no subject matter jurisdiction in this Court. Dkt. #11. In  
20 addition, the Court granted Plaintiff's request for attorney's fees and costs, and directed  
21 Plaintiff to file a supplemental motion, appending the evidence necessary to support her  
22 request. *Id.* Plaintiff has since filed that supplemental motion, to which Defendants have  
23 objected. Dkts. #12 and #13. Plaintiff asks the Court for a total award of \$5,217.61. For the  
24 reasons discussed below, the Court now GRANTS IN PART AND DENIES IN PART  
25 Plaintiff's motion.  
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## II. DISCUSSION

### A. Legal Standard

“When it sets a fee, the district court must first determine the presumptive lodestar figure by multiplying the number of hours reasonably expended on the litigation by the reasonable hourly rate.” *Intel Corp. v. Terabyte Int’l, Inc.*, 6 F.3d 614, 622 (9th Cir. 1993). The reasonable hourly rate is determined with reference to the prevailing rates charged by attorneys of comparable skill and experience in the relevant community. *See Blum v. Stetson*, 465 U.S. 886, 895 (1984). In determining the reasonable number of hours expended on the litigation, the Court may exclude any excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours billed. *Hensley v. Eckerhart*, 461 U.S. 424, 434 (1983). The Court may also adjust the lodestar with reference to factors set forth in *Kerr v. Screen Extras Guild, Inc.*, 526 F.2d 67, 69-70 (9th Cir. 1975). The relevant Kerr factors here are: (1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; and (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal services properly. “The lodestar amount presumably reflects the novelty and complexity of the issues, the special skill and experience of counsel, the quality of representation, and the results obtained from the litigation.” *Intel*, 6 F.3d at 622.

### B. Reasonableness of Rates

The Court first examines the hourly rate for time billed by her counsel requested by Plaintiff. Plaintiff seeks a billing rate of \$245 per hour. Dkt. #12-1 at ¶ 3. “The party seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and must submit evidence supporting... the rates claimed.” *Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 480 F.3d 942, 945-46 (9th Cir. 2007) (citing *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 433). In the Ninth Circuit, “the determination of a

1 reasonable hourly rate ‘is not made by reference to the rates actually charged the prevailing  
2 party.’” *Welch*, 480 F.3d at 946 (quoting *Mendenhall v. Nat’l Transp. Safety Bd.*, 213 F.3d  
3 464, 471 (9th Cir. 2000)). “Rather, billing rates should be established by reference to the fees  
4 that private attorneys of an ability and reputation comparable to that of prevailing counsel  
5 charge their paying clients for legal work of similar complexity.” *Id.* (internal quotation  
6 omitted). “Affidavits of the plaintiffs’ attorney and other attorneys regarding prevailing fees in  
7 the community, and rate determinations in other cases, particularly those setting a rate for the  
8 plaintiffs’ attorney, are satisfactory evidence of the prevailing market rate.” *United*  
9 *Steelworkers of Am. v. Phelps Dodge Corp.*, 896 F.2d 403, 407 (9th Cir. 1990). “Generally,  
10 when determining a reasonable hourly rate, the relevant community is the forum in which the  
11 district court sits.” *Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc.*, 523 F.3d 973, 979 (9th Cir. 2008)  
12 (vacating award of attorneys’ fees in Fair Debt Collection Practices Act case where district  
13 court failed to identify the relevant community or address the prevailing market rate).

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16 In this case, Plaintiff has presented neither evidence of her attorney’s experience nor  
17 evidence supporting the reasonableness of the rate requested for the Seattle market. *See* Dkt.  
18 #12-1. A review by this Court of unlawful detainer actions in states in the Ninth Circuit in  
19 which attorney’s fees were awarded reveals that rates awarded range from \$150 (primarily in  
20 Washington, Idaho and Montana) on the lower end to \$350 (primarily in California) on the  
21 higher end. Defendants have also opposed the hourly rate proposed by Plaintiff, and argue that  
22 \$175 per hour is more appropriate, particularly because they are *pro se*. Dkt. #13 at 4.  
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25 Given the absence of proper evidence from Plaintiff as to comparable attorney rates in  
26 the community, and considering Defendants’ arguments and the Court’s own review of  
27 comparable cases, the Court finds that Plaintiff has failed to meet her burden to establish a  
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1 reasonable hourly rate of \$245 per hour, and will therefore calculate the lodestar using the  
2 hourly rate of \$200 per hour for her attorney's time.

### 3 **C. Reasonableness of Hours**

4 Now turning to the reasonableness of the hours requested, the Court notes that "[t]he  
5 party seeking fees bears the burden of documenting the hours expended in the litigation and  
6 must submit evidence supporting" the request. *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 433. As noted above, the  
7 Court excludes those hours that are not reasonably expended because they are "excessive,  
8 redundant, or otherwise unnecessary." *Hensley*, 461 U.S. at 434. Further, the Ninth Circuit has  
9 held it is reasonable for a district court to conclude that the party seeking attorney's fees fails to  
10 carry its burden of documenting the hours expended when that party engages in "block billing"  
11 because block billing makes it more difficult to determine how much time was spent on  
12 particular activities. *Welch v. Metro. Life Ins. Co.*, 480 F.3d 942, 948 (9th Cir. 2007).  
13 Likewise, intra-office conferences between experienced counsel, absent persuasive justification  
14 by the moving party, may be excluded from an award as unnecessary and duplicative. *See id.*  
15 at 949.

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19 Plaintiff has presented a detailed description of the time spent defending this action.  
20 Dkt. #12-1. The Court has reviewed her attorney's billing entries. *Id.* As an initial matter, the  
21 Court will not award fees for the time Plaintiff's counsel spent discussing the case between  
22 either attorneys in his own or with "outside" counsel, as that activity constitutes intra-office  
23 conferences or is analogous to intra-office conferences. Further, counsel has partially engaged  
24 in block billing time entries, which has left the Court unable to attribute some of the time spent  
25 on a particular activity. Dkt. #12-1; *Welch*, 480 F.3d at 948. Accordingly, where the Court  
26 cannot discern from the time entry itself the amount of time to attribute to a particular activity,  
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1 it will reduce those entries by half. For all of these reasons, the Court will deduct the following  
2 time from its award of attorney's fees:

3 12/13/16 0.875 hours (0.875 x \$200/hr = \$175.00)

4 12/13/16 1.15 hours (1.15 x \$200/hr = \$230.00)

5 12/27/16 0.7 hours (0.7 x \$200/hr = \$140.00)

6 12/28/16 0.1 hours (0.1 x \$200/hr = \$100.00)

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8 Dkt. #12-1.

9 Likewise, the Court will deduct all time billed that appears to be purely administrative  
10 in nature:

11 12/29/16 0.10 hours

12 1/5/17 0.60 hours

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14 Dkt. #12-1.

15 The Court notes that Defendants object to the hours requested by Plaintiff's counsel on  
16 the basis that they are excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. Dkt. #13 at 3-4. In  
17 particular, they complain about the time Plaintiff's counsel billed for attending a Show Cause  
18 hearing in State court that was ultimately canceled, and the hours counsel spent preparing the  
19 motion to remand. *Id.* In light of the rate reduction already imposed, and the time reductions  
20 noted above, the Court disagrees with Defendants that the remaining time spent on this case by  
21 Plaintiff's counsel was excessive, redundant or otherwise unnecessary. Thus, the Court finds  
22 that the remaining hours requested by Plaintiff's counsel are reasonable, and will award the  
23 fees associated with those hours, again noting that the hourly rate has been reduced to \$200 per  
24 hour. Accordingly, **the total amount of attorney's fees awarded is \$1905.00.**

1                   **D. Lodestar Adjustment**

2                   The Court finds that the time set forth above, less the reductions noted by the Court,  
3 reflects the reasonable time spent defending this matter and does not find it necessary to make  
4 any lodestar adjustments.

5                   **E. Costs**

6                   Finally, Plaintiff also seeks \$2,559.36 in costs. Dkt. #12-1. These costs include  
7 mortgage payments on the subject property for the two months that Plaintiff’s motion for  
8 remand was pending in this Court, plus \$30 in postage fees. *Id.* Defendants object to the  
9 mortgage payment request, but do not object to an award for postage fees. Dkt. #13.

10                   The Court declines to award any costs to Plaintiff. As for the costs related to Plaintiff’s  
11 mortgage payments, the Court notes that Plaintiff, as the home owner, would have incurred  
12 those costs regardless of whether this matter proceeded in State court or this Court. While the  
13 Court appreciates that Plaintiff was unable to proceed with any eviction process while this  
14 matter was pending here, any recovery she seeks from Defendants for their alleged failure to  
15 pay her rent or vacate the property should be handled in conjunction with her unlawful detainer  
16 action.

17                   The Court also will not award Plaintiff postage costs. A review of Plaintiff’s counsel’s  
18 Declaration reveals that Plaintiff is seeking a “combined administrative fee[] and postage  
19 charged” in the amount of \$30.00 for mailing the Motion for Remand and Reply to Defendants.  
20 Dkt. #12-1 at ¶ 4. Neither of these costs are separately detailed, nor are any of these costs  
21 contained on the billing records provided by Plaintiff in support of the request. *See* Dkt. #12-1.  
22 Accordingly, the Court will not award any costs requested in this matter.

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**III. CONCLUSION**

Having considered Plaintiff's Supplemental Motion for Fees and Costs, the Declarations and Exhibits in support thereof, and the Opposition thereto, along with the remainder of the record, the Court hereby finds and ORDERS that Plaintiff's motion (Dkt. #12) is GRANTED IN PART AND DENIED IN PART for the reasons discussed above. Plaintiff is awarded **fees in the amount of \$1905.00 in fees and \$0 in costs.**

DATED this 30<sup>th</sup> day of March 2017.



**RICARDO S. MARTINEZ**  
**CHIEF UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE**