

The Honorable James L. Robart

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**UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON**

STATE OF WASHINGTON; STATE  
OF CALIFORNIA; STATE OF  
MARYLAND; COMMONWEALTH  
OF MASSACHUSETTS; STATE OF  
NEW YORK; and STATE OF  
OREGON,

Plaintiffs,

v.

DONALD TRUMP, in his official  
capacity as President of the United  
States; U.S. DEPARTMENT OF  
HOMELAND SECURITY; JOHN F.  
KELLY, in his official capacity as  
Secretary of the Department of  
Homeland Security; REX W.  
TILLERSON, in his official capacity  
as Secretary of State; and the UNITED  
STATES OF AMERICA,

Defendants.

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2:17-cv-00141-JLR

**JOINT STATUS REPORT &  
DISCOVERY PLAN**

Plaintiffs, State of Washington (“Washington”), State of California (“California”), State  
of Maryland (“Maryland”), Commonwealth of Massachusetts (“Massachusetts”), State of New  
York (“New York”), and State of Oregon (“Oregon”) (collectively, the “States”), and  
Defendants, Donald Trump, in his official capacity as President of the United States; the U.S.  
Department of Homeland Security; John F. Kelly, in his official capacity as Secretary of

1 Homeland Security; Rex W. Tillerson, in his official capacity as Secretary of State; and the  
2 United States of America, by and through their undersigned counsel, respectfully submit this  
3 Joint Status Report and Discovery Plan.

4 **1. Nature and Complexity of the Case**

5 Plaintiffs: The States bring this action for declaratory and injunctive relief against  
6 Defendants, arising from Executive Order 13769, issued on January 27, 2017 (“First Executive  
7 Order”), and Executive Order 13780, issued on March 6, 2017 (“Second Executive Order”).

8 The First Executive Order, which was implemented immediately after being signed,  
9 implemented several changes to policies governing admission to the United States by  
10 noncitizens, including (1) suspending entry into the United States for ninety (90) days by all  
11 immigrants and nonimmigrants from seven countries: Iran, Iraq, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria,  
12 and Yemen, (2) suspending the U.S. Refugee Admissions Program (“USRAP”) for one hundred  
13 twenty (120) days, (3) ordering that, upon resumption of the suspended USRAP, the refugee  
14 claims of religious minorities be prioritized, and (4) indefinitely suspending entry into the United  
15 States by Syrian refugees. The States allege wide-reaching and serious harms resulted from the  
16 First Executive Order: families were separated, long-time residents and visa holders were  
17 stranded and prevented from traveling, state universities lost students and faculty and saw others  
18 forced to cancel important travel plans, states began losing tax revenue, and businesses braced  
19 for significant impacts to their operations and recruitment.

20 Washington and the State of Minnesota,<sup>1</sup> brought suit to challenge the First Executive  
21 Order and requested a temporary restraining order. The Court granted the requested injunctive  
22 relief on February 3, 2017. Defendants appealed and requested an emergency stay of the  
23 temporary restraining order, pending appeal, from the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals. The  
24 appellate Court denied the request for a stay, and in doing so, construed the temporary restraining  
25 order as a preliminary injunction.

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26 <sup>1</sup> The State of Minnesota is no longer a party to this action.

1 On March 6, 2017, the President issued the Second Executive Order. The Second  
2 Executive Order (1) suspends entry into the United States for ninety (90) days by nationals from  
3 six countries (Iran, Libya, Somalia, Sudan, Syria, and Yemen), this time excluding Iraq, legal  
4 permanent residents, and visa holders, and (2) suspends the USRAP for one hundred twenty  
5 (120) days, except as to those individuals already scheduled for travel. The Second Executive  
6 Order was set to take effect on March 16, 2017, but the above-mentioned provisions have been  
7 enjoined by federal district courts in Hawaii and/or Maryland.

8 The Court granted leave for the States to file a Second Amended Complaint on March  
9 15, 2017. The Second Amended Complaint includes allegations related to the Second Executive  
10 Order and alleges violations of (1) the equal protection guarantee of the Fifth Amendment; (2)  
11 the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment; (3) the due process guarantee of the Fifth  
12 Amendment; (4) the Immigration and Nationality Act; (5) the Religious Freedom Restoration  
13 Act, (6) procedural provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act, (7) substantive provisions  
14 of the Administrative Procedure Act; (8) the Tenth Amendment reservation of unenumerated  
15 powers to the States.

16 A substantial portion of the evidence regarding the underlying factual basis, intent,  
17 design, issuance, and effects of the Executive Order resides with Defendants and may also reside  
18 with third party witnesses located outside the Western District of Washington. Defendants may  
19 raise executive privileges which could result in complexity due to meet-and-confer discussions  
20 and discovery motions. Additionally, the States will likely need to issue, serve, and possibly  
21 enforce third party subpoenas around the country. All of these elements contribute to the  
22 complexity of the case.

23 Defendants: Consistent with the Executive's broad constitutional authority over foreign  
24 affairs and national security, Section 1182(f) of Title 8 expressly authorizes the President to  
25 suspend entry of any class of aliens when in the national interest. Section 1185(a) also authorizes  
26 the President to proscribe "reasonable rules, regulations, and orders" governing entry of aliens,

1 “subject to such limitations and exceptions as [he] may prescribe.” The President lawfully  
2 exercised this broad authority in the Second Executive Order. The Second Executive Order is  
3 neutral with respect to religion, and Plaintiffs cannot demonstrate that it infringes any of the  
4 constitutional or statutory provisions on which they rely. Furthermore, Plaintiffs’ claims are not  
5 justiciable because the States lack standing to sue on their own behalf or on behalf of their  
6 residents. Plaintiffs’ challenge to the First Executive Order is moot, as that order has been  
7 revoked.

8 As explained more fully below, Defendants do not believe any discovery is appropriate  
9 in this case—much less the sweeping and intrusive discovery Plaintiffs seek. Defendants  
10 anticipate that there will be numerous discovery disputes if this case moves forward now, which  
11 will contribute to the complexity of the case. Defendants believe the Ninth Circuit’s resolution  
12 of Defendants’ appeal of the preliminary injunction entered in *Hawaii v. Trump*, No. CV 17-  
13 00050 (D. Haw.), is likely to provide substantial guidance to this Court and the parties in  
14 resolving (or eliminating) these forthcoming discovery disputes. Accordingly, Defendants have  
15 moved the Court to stay proceedings in this case pending resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal.

## 16 **2. Proposed Deadline for the Joining of Additional Parties**

17 Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs propose that the deadline for joining additional parties shall be  
18 August 31, 2017. This reasonable period of time will allow the States to complete their  
19 assessment and determination whether to seek to add potential additional parties.

20 Defendants: As noted above, Defendants have moved to stay proceedings in this case  
21 pending resolution of the appeal in *Hawaii*. Defendants do not believe the Court should establish  
22 any deadlines, including a deadline for joining additional parties, until after any stay is lifted, as  
23 resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal will likely inform what deadlines are appropriate. If the Court  
24 decides to establish deadlines at this time, Defendants believe thirty (30) days is sufficient for  
25 joining any additional parties.

## 26 **3. Consent to Assignment of Case to a Full Time United States Magistrate Judge**

1 No.

2 **4. Discovery Plan Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 26(f)(3)**

3 **(A) Initial Disclosures:** The parties exchanged their initial disclosures pursuant to  
 4 FRCP 26(a)(1)(a) on March 29, 2017, per the Order Regarding Initial Disclosures, Joint Status  
 5 Report, and Early Settlement (ECF 87) and the March 1, 2017, Minute Entry extending those  
 6 deadlines (ECF 107).

7 **(B) Subjects, Timing, and Potential Phasing of Discovery:**

8 **Plaintiffs:** The States may need discovery regarding the underlying factual basis, intent,  
 9 design, issuance, and effects of the First and Second Executive Orders, including, but not limited  
 10 to, the motivations for issuing the Executive Orders; the factual basis for issuing the Executive  
 11 Orders; their design; the steps and process leading to their issuance; the persons, agencies, and/or  
 12 departments involved and/or consulted prior to their issuance; their implementation;  
 13 communications to air, land, and sea ports of entry into the United States, U.S. Customs and  
 14 Border Protection agents and other component sub-agencies of the U.S. Department of  
 15 Homeland Security, United States consular offices abroad, and others concerning the  
 16 implementation of the Executive Orders; and the immigrants, nonimmigrants, and visas affected  
 17 by the Executive Orders, including by visa revocation, detention, and/or removal or deportation.

18 The States do not believe discovery should be conducted in phases or be limited to or  
 19 focused on particular issues.

20 The States believe discovery should be completed by March 16, 2018.

21 **Defendants:** Defendants believe that discovery and trial are inappropriate in this case,  
 22 which involves the Executive's discretionary national security and immigration authority. The  
 23 Supreme Court has made clear in the immigration context that courts may not "look behind the  
 24 exercise of [Executive] discretion" taken "on the basis of a facially legitimate and bona fide  
 25 reason." *Kleindienst v. Mandel*, 408 U.S. 753, 770 (1972); *see Fiallo v. Bell*, 430 U.S. 787, 796  
 26 (1977). As those cases recognize, discovery and trial would thrust courts into the untenable

1 position of probing the Executive’s judgments on foreign affairs and national security. And it  
2 would invite impermissible intrusion on Executive Branch deliberations, which are  
3 constitutionally “privilege[d]” against such inquiry, *United States v. Nixon*, 418 U.S. 683, 708  
4 (1974), as well as litigant-driven discovery that would disrupt the President’s ongoing execution  
5 of the laws. Searching for governmental purpose outside official pronouncements and the  
6 operative terms of governmental action is fraught with practical “pitfalls” and “hazards” that  
7 courts should avoid. *Palmer v. Thompson*, 403 U.S. 217, 224 (1971).

8 Defendants do not anticipate that discovery from Plaintiffs will be necessary, but  
9 Defendants reserve the right to propound discovery if it becomes necessary in light of Plaintiffs’  
10 discovery requests and/or this Court’s rulings.

11 Defendants do not believe the Court should establish any deadlines, including a deadline  
12 for discovery, until after any stay is lifted, as resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal will likely inform  
13 what deadlines are appropriate. If the Court decides to establish deadlines at this time, and the  
14 Court further determines that discovery is appropriate (notwithstanding Defendants’ arguments  
15 to the contrary), Defendants believe discovery can be completed in six (6) months.

16 **(C) Electronically Stored Information:**

17 Plaintiffs: The States anticipate that information of the underlying factual basis, intent,  
18 design, issuance, and implementation of the Executive Orders may be contained in email  
19 communications among Defendants and third parties, before and after President Trump took  
20 office, and that drafts of, and other documents related to, the Executive Orders were created  
21 electronically. The States further anticipate that information regarding the effects of the  
22 Executive Orders, including visa revocations, detention, and or removal or deportation of  
23 immigrants and nonimmigrants, may be documented and/or evidenced in databases or other  
24 electronic records created and maintained by the U.S. Department of State and U.S. Department  
25 of Homeland Security, and its component sub-agencies. The States request Defendants’  
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1 assistance in identifying additional sources of electronically stored information that may contain  
2 relevant information.

3 All such electronically stored information should be preserved during the pendency of  
4 litigation. The States further request that Defendants take steps to ensure the preservation of  
5 relevant electronically stored information by third parties who were involved in and/or consulted  
6 regarding the design of the Executive Orders, before and after President Trump took office.

7 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not believe that discovery is appropriate  
8 in this case, including discovery of electronically stored information. If the Court determines  
9 that discovery is appropriate, Defendants believe the relevant time period is no earlier than  
10 January 20, 2017 (the date Donald Trump took office) to the present.

11 Defendants also do not believe they have an obligation to ensure that third parties  
12 preserve information that is outside of the possession, custody, or control of Defendants—  
13 including electronically stored information. Relatedly, Defendants are not required to ensure  
14 that an individual preserves information that was created or obtained by the individual at a time  
15 when he/she was not an employee or official of the Federal Government, or his/her information  
16 was not within the control of Defendants, even if the individual subsequently became a Federal  
17 Government employee or official. A party's preservation obligations are limited to records in  
18 the party's possession, custody, or control. "Control" is defined as "the legal right to obtain  
19 documents on demand," *United States v. Int'l Union of Petroleum & Indus. Workers, AFL-CIO*,  
20 870 F.2d 1450, 1452 (9th Cir. 1989); a purported practical ability to obtain records, or to ensure  
21 the preservation of records, is not sufficient, *In re Citric Acid Litig.*, 191 F.3d 1090, 1107-08  
22 (9th Cir. 1999). *See, e.g., Quest Integrity USA, LLC v. A.Hak Indus. Servs. US, LLC*, No. C14-  
23 1971RAJ, 2016 WL 4533062, at \*4 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 23, 2016).

24 **(D) Privilege Issues:**

25 Plaintiffs: The States believe they will be able to make a sufficient showing of need to  
26 overcome any qualified privilege asserted by Defendants. Should Defendants seek discovery

1 from the States, the States may assert any applicable privileges, including attorney client  
2 privilege, the common interest in litigation privilege, and the work product doctrine.

3 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not believe that discovery is appropriate  
4 in this case. If the Court determines that discovery is appropriate, Defendants believe much of  
5 the information Plaintiffs seek is protected by various privileges, including, but not limited to,  
6 the Presidential communications privilege, the deliberative process privilege, the law  
7 enforcement privilege, the attorney client privilege, and the work product doctrine.

8 **(E) Proposed Limitations on Discovery:**

9 Plaintiffs: The States propose that the parties be permitted to take up to thirty (30)  
10 depositions per side. Each deposition shall be limited to one (1) day of eight (8) hours.

11 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not believe that discovery is appropriate  
12 in this case. If the Court determines that discovery is appropriate, at the very least, the limitations  
13 on discovery imposed by the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply. In particular,  
14 Defendants do not believe either side should be permitted to take more than ten (10) depositions,  
15 of seven (7) hours each, including any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions. *See*  
16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 30(d). Defendants also believe further limitations on discovery (beyond  
17 those in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure) may be appropriate. Resolution of the appeal in  
18 *Hawaii* may provide guidance on the appropriateness of such limitations.

19 **(F) Need for Any Discovery Related Orders:**

20 The States request that the Court enter the following orders pursuant to Federal Rules of  
21 Civil Procedure 16(b)(3)(B)(vii) and 26(c). Defendants do not believe any discovery related  
22 orders are necessary or appropriate at this time. If Plaintiffs believe a discovery related order is  
23 necessary, they should file a motion seeking specific relief so that the parties can provide the  
24 Court with full briefing on the issue. Defendants' position with respect to each order proposed  
25 by Plaintiffs is set forth below.  
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- 1           1. Preservation of Evidence. Plaintiffs: Defendants shall take steps to ensure the  
2           preservation of relevant documents and information by themselves, their  
3           agents, and third parties who were involved in and/or consulted regarding the  
4           design of the Executive Orders, before and after President Trump took office.  
5           Defendants: The parties are aware of their obligation to preserve information  
6           in their possession, custody, or control that may be relevant to the claims and  
7           defenses in this case; thus, an order is unnecessary. In addition, if the Court  
8           determines that discovery is appropriate, Defendants believe the relevant time  
9           period is no earlier than January 20, 2017 (the date Donald Trump took office)  
10          to the present. Finally, as explained above, Defendants do not believe they  
11          have an obligation to ensure that third parties preserve information that may  
12          be relevant to the case.
- 13          2. Number and Length of Depositions. Plaintiffs: Plaintiffs and Defendants  
14          shall be permitted to take up to 30 depositions per side. Each deposition shall  
15          be limited to one (1) day of eight (8) hours.  
16          Defendants: As explained above, if the Court determines that discovery is  
17          appropriate, at the very least, the limitations on discovery imposed by the  
18          Federal Rules of Civil Procedure should apply. In other words, neither side  
19          should be permitted to take more than ten (10) depositions, of seven (7) hours  
20          each, including any Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 30(b)(6) depositions. *See*  
21          Fed. R. Civ. P. 30(a)(2), 30(d).
- 22          3. Touhy Procedures Not Required. Plaintiffs: The States do not believe they  
23          are required to request discovery, in advance, from any federal entity under  
24          *United States ex rel. Touhy v. Ragen*, 340 U.S. 462 (1951), its implementing  
25          regulations, and interpretive caselaw, as *Touhy* does not apply when the  
26          United States is a party to the litigation. *See, e.g., Exxon Shipping co. v. U.S.*

1            *Dept. of Interior*, 34 F.3d 774, 779, n.4, 5 (9th Cir. 1994) (government took  
2            the position that *Touhy* allows agency heads to prohibit their employees from  
3            testifying in litigation “in which the United States is not a party,” and Court  
4            noted that “[w]hen the government is named as a party to an action, it is  
5            placed in the same position as a private litigant, and the rules of discovery in  
6            the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure apply”) (citing *United States v. Procter*  
7            *& Gamble Co.*, 356 U.S. 677, 681 (1958); *Mosseller v. United States*, 158  
8            F.2d 380 (2d Cir. 1946)); *Alexander v. F.B.I.*, 186 F.R.D. 66, 70 (D.C. Cir.  
9            1998) (“The Supreme Court’s holding in *Touhy* is applicable only in cases  
10           where the United States is not a party to the original legal proceeding. . . .  
11           *Touhy* simply holds that a subordinate government official will not be  
12           compelled to testify or to produce documents in private litigation, in which  
13           the federal government or any of its agencies is not a party in cases where a  
14           departmental regulation prohibits disclosure in the absence of consent by the  
15           head of the department. In cases originating in federal court in which the  
16           federal government is a party to the underlying litigation, the *Touhy* problem  
17           simply does not arise.”).

18           Defendants: As Defendants explained to Plaintiffs during the parties’ Rule  
19           26(f) consultations, *Touhy* procedures are not required when requesting  
20           discovery from the specifically-named Defendants. If Plaintiffs seek  
21           information from other federal government agencies or their officials, then  
22           the question of whether Plaintiffs must utilize the agency’s *Touhy* procedures  
23           will be determined by what that agency’s *Touhy* regulations say. Defendants  
24           believe the most efficient approach to address this issue is for Defendants to  
25           inform Plaintiffs if any information they seek in a specific discovery request  
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1 must be pursued through the *Touhy* process at the same time that Defendants  
2 assert other objections to a specific discovery request.

- 3 4. Cooperation re: Service of Subpoenas on Defendants, White House Staff, and  
4 Witnesses with Federal Security Detail. Plaintiffs: To the extent the States  
5 seek to serve subpoenas on Defendants, White House Staff, or witnesses with  
6 a federal security detail, Defendants shall cooperate in the States' efforts to  
7 effectuate service of any such subpoenas, subject to any objections or  
8 defenses to compliance with any said subpoenas.

9 Defendants: The Department of Justice cannot accept service of subpoenas  
10 on behalf of any person without that person's consent. Therefore, as  
11 Defendants explained to Plaintiffs during the parties' Rule 26(f)  
12 consultations, if Plaintiffs want assistance serving a specific subpoena, they  
13 should make an inquiry with the Department of Justice, which can then  
14 determine whether the person to be subpoenaed will or will not allow the  
15 Department to accept service on their behalf. (When serving discovery  
16 requests on specifically-named Defendants, those Defendants can be served  
17 through Department of Justice counsel.)

18 In addition, Defendants oppose the deposition of any high-ranking  
19 government officials. It is well-established that, absent extraordinary  
20 circumstances, high-ranking government officials should not be subjected to  
21 depositions. *See, e.g., United States v. Morgan*, 313 U.S. 409, 422 (1941);  
22 *Kyle Eng'g Co. v. Kleppe*, 600 F.2d 226, 231 (9th Cir. 1979) ("Heads of  
23 government agencies are not normally subject to deposition."); *In re FDIC*,  
24 58 F.3d 1055, 1060 (5th Cir. 1995) (granting writ of mandamus to prevent  
25 deposition of high-level government official); *In re U.S.*, 985 F.2d 510, 513  
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1 (11th Cir. 1993) (same); *Simplex Time Recorder Co. v. Sec’y of Labor*, 766  
 2 F.2d 575, 586 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

3 Defendants further note that Plaintiffs cannot satisfy the “exacting  
 4 standards of ‘(1) relevancy; (2) admissibility; [and] (3) specificity’ that are  
 5 required before obtaining discovery of the White House. *Cheney v. U.S.*  
 6 *District Court for the District of Columbia*, 542 U.S. 367, 386 (2004).

7 5. Protective Order. Plaintiffs: To the extent Defendants seek information  
 8 regarding individual students, employees or residents that may be protected  
 9 by FERPA, HIPPA, or which concerns immigration status, the States intend  
 10 to seek a protective order by stipulation or motion.

11 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not anticipate the need to  
 12 seek discovery, but if they do, they will work with Plaintiffs to try to reach  
 13 agreement on an appropriate protective order.

14 6. Pretrial Deadlines. Plaintiffs: The States propose the following pretrial  
 15 deadlines:

16	Deadline for joining additional parties:	August 31, 2017
17	Deadline for amending pleadings:	September 29, 2017
18	Disclosure of expert testimony under FRCP 26(a)(2):	January 31, 2018
19	Discovery completed by:	March 16, 2018
20	All motions related to discovery must be filed by:	March 30, 2018
21	All motions related to discovery must be noted for	
22	consideration/hearing by:	April 20, 2018
23	All dispositive motions must be filed by:	May 31, 2018
24	Settlement conference held no later than:	N/A
25	All motions in limine must be filed by:	July 30, 2018
26	Agreed pretrial order due:	August 20, 2018

1 Pretrial conference to be held at 2:00PM on: August 27, 2018

2 Trial briefs, proposed findings of fact and conclusions

3 of law, and designations of deposition testimony

4 pursuant to LCR 32(e) by: September 4, 2018

5 Bench trial date: September 10, 2018

6  
7 Defendants: As noted above, Defendants have moved to stay proceedings in  
8 this case pending resolution of the appeal in *Hawaii*. Defendants do not  
9 believe the Court should establish any pretrial deadlines until after any stay  
10 is lifted, as resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal will likely inform what deadlines  
11 are appropriate. If the Court decides to establish deadlines at this time,  
12 Defendants believe the parties should have thirty (30) days to join additional  
13 parties and/or amend their pleadings; discovery should be completed in six  
14 (6) months; and all dispositive motions should be filed sufficiently in advance  
15 of any trial date to obtain a ruling before trial. Defendants do not believe  
16 expert testimony is necessary or appropriate.

17 **5. The Parties' Views, Proposals, and Agreements (Local Civil Rule 26(f)(1))**

18 (A) **Prompt Case Resolution:** The nature of the States challenge to the First and  
19 Second Executive Orders – that they are unconstitutional, in violation of federal statutes, and are  
20 the product of unlawful intent – makes the case unamenable to settlement or other informal  
21 resolution.

22 (B) **Alternative Dispute Resolution:** The parties do not plan to engage in ADR.  
23 The nature of the States challenge to the First and Second Executive Orders makes the case  
24 unamenable to settlement or other informal resolution.

25 (C) **Related Cases:** Plaintiffs: There are no related cases pending before this  
26 Court or in another jurisdiction as defined by LCR 3(f), (g), and (h). While other legal challenges

1 to the First and Second Executive Orders have been filed in this and other federal courts, none  
2 of those actions presently involve “all” or “substantially the same parties.” *See* LCR 3(f), (g).

3 Defendants: Defendants agree that there are no related cases pending before this Court  
4 or in another jurisdiction as defined by LCR 3(g) or (h), because no other cases involve “all” or  
5 “substantially the same parties.” Defendants note that the plaintiffs in *Doe v. Trump*, Case No.  
6 2:17-cv-00178 (W.D. Wash), which is pending before this Court, have designated that case as a  
7 related case on the Civil Cover Sheet pursuant to LCR 3(f).

8 To the parties’ knowledge, and pursuant to LCR 26(f)(1)(C), other pending actions  
9 challenging the First and/or Second Executive Orders include:

10 *Ali v. Trump*, Case No. 2:17-cv-00135 (W.D. Wash.);

11 *Doe v. Trump*, Case No. 2:17-cv-00178 (W.D. Wash);

12 *Wagafe v. Trump*, Case No. 2:17-cv-00094 (W.D. Wash);

13 *Asgari v. Trump*, Case No. 17-10182 (D. Mass.);

14 *Darweesh v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00480 (E.D.N.Y.);

15 *Aziz v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00116 (E.D. Va.);

16 *Sarsour v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00120 (E.D. Va.);

17 *Vayeghan v. Kelly*, Case No. 2:17-cv-00702 (C.D. Cal.);

18 *Mohammed v. United States*, Case No. 2:17-cv-00786 (C.D. Cal.);

19 *Arab American Civil Rights League v. Trump*, Case No. 2:17-cv-10310 (E.D. Mich.);

20 *Al-Mowafak v. Trump*, Case No. 3:17-cv-00557 (N.D. Cal.);

21 *Unite Oregon v. Trump*, Case No. 3:17-cv-00179 (D. Or.);

22 *Hagig v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00289 (D. Colo.);

23 *Abou Asali v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, Case No. 5:17-cv-00447 (E.D.  
24 Penn.);

25 *Doe, John v. Trump*, Case No. 3:17-cv-00112 (W.D. Wisc.);

26 *State of Hawaii v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00050 (D. Haw.);

1 *Pars Equality Center v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00255 (D.D.C.);

2 *Int'l Refugee Assist. Project v. Trump*, Case No. 8:17-cv-00361 (D. Md.);

3 *Tawfeeq v. U.S. Department of Homeland Security*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00353 (N.D.  
4 Ga.);

5 *Universal Muslim Association of America v. Trump*, Case No. 1:17-cv-00537  
6 (D.D.C.);

7 *Huff v. Trump*, Case No. 17-cv-02081 (N.D. Ill.);

8 *Keeble v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-00127 (S.D. Ohio); and

9 *People of the United States v. Trump*, No. 17-cv-00457 (N.D. Cal.).

10 **(D) Discovery Management:**

11 (i) **Forgoing or Limiting Depositions or Exchanging Documents**

12 **Informally:** The parties are amenable to exchanging documents (if any)  
13 informally in connection with their initial disclosures. Furthermore, the  
14 parties have consented to electronic service pursuant to Federal Rule of  
15 Civil Procedure 5(b)(2)(E) to streamline service of pleadings and papers  
16 in the litigation.

17 (ii) **Agreeing to Share Discovery From Third Parties and Cost:** The  
18 parties shall bear their own costs with respect to third party discovery.

19 (iii) **Scheduling Discovery or Case Management Conferences:** The  
20 parties are amenable to scheduling discovery or case management  
21 conferences with Judge Robart, as necessary.

22 (iv) **Requesting Assistance of Magistrate Judge for Settlement**  
23 **Conferences:** The parties do not presently anticipate participating in a  
24 Settlement Conference. The nature of the States challenge to the  
25 Executive Orders makes the case unamenable to settlement or other  
26 informal resolution.

1 (v) **Requesting to Use an Abbreviated Pretrial Order:** The parties  
2 do not believe an abbreviated pretrial order is necessary.

3 (vi) **Requesting Other Orders Court Should Enter Under LCR 16(b) and**  
4 **(c):** The parties do not request any orders under LCR 16(b) or (c) apart  
5 from those discussed at Paragraph 4(F) above.

6 (E) **Anticipated Discovery Sought:** See Paragraph 4(B) above.

7 (F) **Phasing Motions:** The parties anticipate filing motions for summary  
8 judgment/adjudication. The parties do not request that those motions be phased.

9 (G) **Preservation of Discoverable Information:** The parties are aware of  
10 their duty to take reasonable and proportional steps to preserve potentially  
11 relevant information relating to the claims and defenses in this case. *See* Fed. R.  
12 Civ. P. 26(b)(1).

13 (H) **Privilege Issues:** See Paragraph 4(D) above.

14 (I) **Model Protocol for Discovery of ESI:**

15 (i) **Nature, Location, and Scope of Discoverable ESI:**

16 **Plaintiffs:** The States anticipate that information of the underlying factual  
17 basis, intent, design, issuance, and implementation of the First and Second  
18 Executive Orders may be contained in email communications among  
19 Defendants and third parties, before and after President Trump took  
20 office, and that drafts of, and other documents related to, the First and  
21 Second Executive Orders were created electronically. The States further  
22 anticipate that information of the effects of the First and Second Executive  
23 Orders, including visa revocations, detention, and or removal or  
24 deportation of immigrants and nonimmigrants, may be documented  
25 and/or evidenced in databases or other electronic records created and  
26 maintained by Defendants, including the U.S. Department of State and



1 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and its component sub-agencies.  
2 The States request Defendants' assistance in identifying additional  
3 sources of electronically stored information that may contain relevant  
4 information.

5 The States do not have information regarding the scope of  
6 discoverable ESI. However, the States believe the relevant time period is  
7 June 16, 2015, (the date Donald Trump declared his presidential  
8 candidacy) to the present.

9 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not believe that  
10 discovery is appropriate in this case, including discovery of electronically  
11 stored information. If the Court determines that discovery is appropriate,  
12 Defendants believe the relevant time period is no earlier than January 20,  
13 2017 (the date Donald Trump took office) to the present.

14 (ii) **Whether Parties Agree to Adopt Model ESI Agreement:** The  
15 parties do not wish to adopt the Model ESI Agreement, but the parties are  
16 working together to try to reach an alternative agreement.

17 (J) **Alternatives to Model Protocol:**

18 (i) **Nature, Location, and Scope of ESI to be Preserved by Parties:**

19 Plaintiffs: The States anticipate that information of the underlying factual  
20 basis, intent, design, issuance, and implementation of the First and Second  
21 Executive Orders may be contained in email communications among  
22 Defendants and third parties, before and after President Trump took  
23 office, and that drafts of, and other documents related to, the First and  
24 Second Executive Orders were created electronically. The States further  
25 anticipate that information of the effects of the First and Second Executive  
26 Orders, including visa revocations, detention, and or removal or

1 deportation of immigrants and nonimmigrants, may be documented  
 2 and/or evidenced in databases or other electronic records created and  
 3 maintained by Defendants, including the U.S. Department of State and  
 4 U.S. Department of Homeland Security, and its component sub-agencies.  
 5 The States request Defendants' assistance in identifying additional  
 6 sources of electronically stored information that may contain relevant  
 7 information.

8 The States do not have information regarding the scope of  
 9 discoverable ESI. However, the States believe the relevant time period is  
 10 June 16, 2015, (the date Donald Trump declared his presidential  
 11 candidacy) to the present.

12 Defendants: As explained above, Defendants do not believe that  
 13 discovery is appropriate in this case, including discovery of electronically  
 14 stored information. If the Court determines that discovery is appropriate,  
 15 Defendants believe the relevant time period is no earlier than January 20,  
 16 2017 (the date Donald Trump took office) to the present.

17 (ii) **Formats for Production of ESI (TIFF with companion text file,**  
 18 **native, or some other reasonably usable format):** The parties are  
 19 working together to try to reach an agreement on these issues.

20 (iii) **Methodologies for Identifying Relevant and Discoverable ESI for**  
 21 **Production:**

22 (a) **Methods for Identifying Initial Subset of ESI Sources Most Likely**  
 23 **to Contain Relevant & Discoverable Information, Methodologies**  
 24 **for Culling Relevant & Discoverable ESI from Initial Subset:**

25 The parties are working together to try to reach an agreement on  
 26 these issues.

1                   **(b) Identifying Custodians & Non-Custodial Data Sources, Including**  
2                   **Third Party Data Sources, Most Likely to Have Discoverable**

3                   **Info:**       The parties are working together to try to reach an  
4                   agreement on these issues.

5                   **(c) Plans to Filter Data Based on File Type, Date Ranges, Sender,**  
6                   **Receiver, Custodian, Search Terms, or Other Similar**

7                   **Parameters:**    The parties are working together to try to reach an  
8                   agreement on these issues.

9                   **(d) Use of Any Computer- or Technology-Assisted Review, Including**  
10                   **Plans to Use Keyword Searching, Mathematical or Thesaurus**

11                   **Based Topic or Concept Clustering, or Other Advanced Culling**  
12                   **Technologies:**    The parties are working together to try to reach an  
13                   agreement on these issues.

14                   **(iv) Whether ESI Stored in a Database or Database Management System**  
15                   **Can be Identified and Produced by Querying Database for**

16                   **Discoverable Information, Resulting in a Report or Reasonably**  
17                   **Usable and Exportable Electronic File for Review by Requesting**

18                   **Counsel / Party:**    The parties are working together to try to reach an  
19                   agreement on these issues.

20                   **6. Date by Which Discovery Can be Completed:**

21                   **Plaintiffs:** The States believe that discovery can be completed by March 16, 2018.

22                   **Defendants:** As noted above, Defendants have moved to stay proceedings in this case  
23                   pending resolution of the appeal in *Hawaii*. Defendants do not believe the Court should  
24                   establish any deadlines, including a deadline for the completion of discovery, until after  
25                   any stay is lifted, as resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal will likely inform what deadlines  
26                   are appropriate. If the Court decides to establish deadlines at this time, and the Court

1 further determines that discovery is appropriate (notwithstanding Defendants' arguments  
2 to the contrary), Defendants believe any discovery can be completed in six (6) months.

3 **7. Bifurcation:** The parties do not believe any trial of the issues should be  
4 bifurcated.

5 **8. Dispensing with Pretrial Statements and Pretrial Order Called for by Local**  
6 **Civil Rules 16(e), (h), (i), and (k), and 16.1 (in whole or in part):** The parties wish to  
7 proceed with any necessary pretrial statements and pretrial order as contemplated by LCR 16(e),  
8 (h), (i), and (k), and 16.1.

9 **9. Intent to Utilize Individualized Trial Program (Local Civil Rule 39.2) or any**  
10 **ADR Options (Local Civil Rule 39.1):** The parties do not intend to utilize the  
11 Individualized Trial Program. For the reasons mentioned above, the parties do not intend to  
12 participate in ADR.

13 **10. Suggestions for Shortening or Simplifying the Case:** None at this time.

14 **11. Date Case Will be Ready for Trial:**  
15 **Plaintiffs:** The case will be ready for trial by September 10, 2018.  
16 **Defendants:** As noted above, Defendants have moved to stay proceedings in this case pending  
17 resolution of the appeal in *Hawaii*. Defendants do not believe the Court should establish any  
18 deadlines, including a trial date, until after any stay is lifted, as resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal  
19 will likely inform what deadlines are appropriate.

20 In addition, as explained above, Defendants do not believe a trial is appropriate in this  
21 case. Instead, Defendants anticipate that the case can be resolved on a motion to dismiss or  
22 motion for summary judgment.

23 **12. Jury or Non-Jury Trial:** Any trial will be a non-jury trial.

24 **13. Number of Trial Days Required:**  
25 **Plaintiffs:** The States anticipate 14 trial days.

1 Defendants: Defendants anticipate that this case can be resolved on a motion to dismiss or  
2 motion for summary judgment, and thus, trial will be unnecessary. If the Court determines that  
3 a trial is necessary and appropriate, the number of trial days required will depend on the type of  
4 evidence the Court determines is relevant. Resolution of the *Hawaii* appeal will likely inform  
5 this issue.

6 **14. Names, Addresses, and Telephone Numbers of All Trial Counsel:**

7 Washington's lead trial counsel is Colleen Melody, Assistant Attorney General,  
8 Washington State Attorney General's Office, 800 Fifth Avenue, Suite 2000, Seattle, WA 98104,  
9 (206) 464-5342.

10 California's lead trial counsel is Alexandra Robert Gordon, Deputy Attorney General,  
11 California Attorney General's Office, 455 Golden Gate Avenue, Suite 11000, San Francisco,  
12 CA 94102-7004, (415) 703-5509.

13 Maryland's lead trial counsel is Steven M. Sullivan, Solicitor General, Maryland  
14 Attorney General's Office, 200 St. Paul Place, 20th Floor, Baltimore, Maryland 21202, (410)  
15 576-6325.

16 Massachusetts' lead trial counsel is Genevieve Nadeau, Chief, Civil Rights Division,  
17 Massachusetts Attorney General's Office, One Ashburton Place, Boston, MA 02108, (617) 727-  
18 2200.

19 New York's lead trial counsel is Lourdes M. Rosado, Bureau Chief, Civil Rights Bureau,  
20 New York Attorney General's Office, 120 Broadway, New York, New York 10271, (212)  
21 416-8252.

22 Oregon's lead trial counsel is Scott J. Kaplan, Senior Assistant Attorney General, Trial  
23 Division, Oregon Department of Justice, 100 Market Street, Portland, OR 97201, (971) 673-  
24 1880.

1 Defendants' lead trial counsel is Michelle R. Bennett, Trial Attorney, U.S. Department  
2 of Justice, Civil Division, Federal Programs Branch, 20 Massachusetts Avenue, NW,  
3 Washington, D.C. 20530, (202) 305-8902.

4 **15. Dates on Which Trial Counsel May Have Complications to be Considered in**  
5 **Setting Trial Date:** The parties' lead trial counsel are available for any trial when scheduled.

6 **16. Status of Service of Defendants:** All defendants have been served.

7 **17. Whether Parties Wish a Scheduling Conference Before Court Enters a**  
8 **Scheduling Order:** The parties request a scheduling conference.

9 **18. Dates(s) Each Nongovernmental Corporate Party Filed Disclosure**  
10 **Statement Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 7.1 and Local Rule 7.1:** Not applicable.

11  
12 DATED this 5th day of April, 2017.

13 Respectfully submitted,

14  
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**CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE**

I hereby certify that on April 5, 2017, I electronically filed the foregoing Joint Status Report & Discovery Plan using the Court's CM/ECF system, causing a notice of filing to be served upon all counsel of record.

Dated: April 5, 2017  
/s/Colleen Melody

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