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4 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
5 AT SEATTLE

6 STRIKE 3 HOLDINGS, LLC,

7 Plaintiff,

8 v.

9 JOHN DOE (73.225.38.130),

10 Defendant.

C17-1731 TSZ

MINUTE ORDER

11 The following Minute Order is made by direction of the Court, the Honorable  
12 Thomas S. Zilly, United States District Judge:

13 (1) In light of plaintiff's voluntary dismissal of its Amended Complaint, *see*  
14 Notice (docket no. 53), defendant's motion, docket no. 44, for a more definite statement,  
which was related solely to the Amended Complaint, docket no. 43, is STRICKEN as  
moot.

15 (2) After plaintiff was granted leave to and did file its Amended Complaint,  
16 *see* Minute Order (docket no. 36), defendant filed a responsive motion (for a more  
definite statement), but no responsive pleading, and defendant did not re-allege the  
17 previously asserted counterclaims for (i) declaration of non-infringement, (ii) declaration  
regarding misuse of copyright, and/or (iii) abuse of process. *See* Am. Counterclaims  
18 (docket no. 32). The Court nevertheless concludes plaintiff has been on notice that  
defendant continues to pursue the counterclaims, and plaintiff will not be unfairly  
19 prejudiced by a determination that defendant's failure to re-plead the counterclaims did  
not result in their abandonment. *See Davis v. White*, 794 F.3d 1008, 1015-16 (8th Cir.  
20 2015).

21 (3) Plaintiff's motion to dismiss defendant's counterclaims, docket no. 35, is  
GRANTED in part and DENIED in part. Defendant's second counterclaim for a  
22 declaratory judgment that plaintiff's copyright is unenforceable pursuant to the doctrine  
of copyright misuse is DISMISSED with prejudice. The doctrine of copyright misuse  
23

1 applies when a copyright holder attempts to leverage its exclusive right to copyrighted  
2 material as a means of controlling matters beyond the scope of the limited monopoly  
3 granted by the Copyright Office. *See A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc.*, 239 F.3d 1004,  
4 1026-27 (9th Cir. 2001); *Disney Enters., Inc. v. VidAngel, Inc.*, 2017 WL 6883685 at \*9  
5 (C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2017). For example, in *Practice Mgmt. Info. Corp. v. Am. Med.*  
6 *Ass’n*, 121 F.3d 516 (9th Cir. 1997), in which the Ninth Circuit first recognized misuse as  
7 a defense to a claim of copyright infringement, the American Medical Association was  
8 deemed to have misused its copyright in the Physician’s Current Procedural Terminology  
9 (“CPT”) by licensing the CPT to the Health Care Financing Administration (“HCFA”)<sup>1</sup>  
10 in exchange for HCFA’s agreement not to use a competing coding system. *Id.* at 520-21.  
11 In contrast, in this litigation, defendant makes no allegation that plaintiff has tried to use  
12 its copyright to restrain the development or dissemination of competing products; rather,  
13 defendant asserts that plaintiff has, in an effort to extort settlements, wrongfully accused  
14 defendant and myriad others across the nation of infringing plaintiff’s copyrighted works,  
15 while failing to take appropriate steps to otherwise protect its pornographic materials.  
16 *See* Am. Counterclaims at ¶¶ 37-39 (docket no. 32). These allegations are not the  
17 “proper subject of a copyright misuse claim.” *See VidAngel*, 2017 WL 6883685 at \*9.  
18 Plaintiff’s motion to dismiss is otherwise DENIED, and defendant’s counterclaims for a  
19 declaration of non-infringement and abuse of process remain pending in this action.

20 (4) Defendant’s motion to compel discovery, docket no. 51, is DENIED  
21 without prejudice. In its responses to defendant’s first set of requests for production,  
22 plaintiff indicated that it would supplement at “an appropriate, later date.” *See* Ex. 2 to  
23 Def.’s Mot. (docket no. 51-2). In light of the changes in the procedural posture of this  
case since plaintiff offered the above-quoted responses, the Court DIRECTS counsel to  
meet and confer,<sup>2</sup> within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Minute Order,  
concerning which, if any, of the previously propounded requests for production are  
pertinent to the remaining counterclaims, and how and when plaintiff will supplement its  
responses to the requests that are still of relevance. The Court DECLINES to award any  
attorney’s fees or costs in connection with the current motion to compel discovery.

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18 <sup>1</sup> HCFA is now known as the Centers for Medicare & Medicaid Services, an agency within the United  
19 States Department of Health and Human Services.

20 <sup>2</sup> The Court is troubled by plaintiff’s counsel’s statement in an email to defendant’s attorney that “[t]here  
21 will be no further telephonic communications in this matter.” Ex. 4 to Def.’s Mot. (docket no. 51-4). The  
22 rules of this Court require that good faith efforts to resolve discovery (and other) disputes must occur via  
23 “a face-to-face meeting or a telephone conference.” Local Civil Rule 37(a)(1); Local Civil Rule 7(d)(4).  
Letters and/or emails containing the types of accusations and insults that appeared in the correspondence  
between counsel dated August 3, 2018, docket no. 51-4, are not only insufficient to satisfy the meet and  
confer standards of this Court, they are unproductive and unprofessional. The Court expects the attorneys  
for both sides to conduct themselves more appropriately in the future.

1 (5) Counsel are further DIRECTED to meet and confer and to file an updated  
2 Joint Status Report within twenty-one (21) days of the date of this Minute Order. Such  
3 Joint Status Report shall include (i) a proposed date for trial, (ii) proposed deadlines for  
4 completing discovery and filing dispositive motions, (iii) a date by which the parties can  
5 be prepared to engage in mediation in advance of or contemporaneously with dispositive  
6 motion practice, (iv) an indication whether, in light of plaintiff's representation to the  
7 Court that defendant's son, rather than defendant, was the BitTorrent user associated with  
8 the Internet Protocol address at issue, *see* Pla.'s Resp. at 2 (docket no. 57), defendant is  
9 entitled to the declaration of non-infringement sought in the first counterclaim, (v) if so,  
10 whether any issues other than attorney's fees and costs under 17 U.S.C. § 505<sup>3</sup> remain for  
11 the Court's determination, and (vi) if no other issues remain, whether the Court should  
12 forego entering a scheduling order and simply set due dates for a motion and responsive  
13 and reply briefs concerning attorney's fees and costs.

14 (6) The Clerk is directed to send a copy of this Minute Order to all counsel of  
15 record.

16 Dated this 24th day of October, 2018.

17 William M. McCool  
18 Clerk

19 s/Karen Dews  
20 Deputy Clerk

21 <sup>3</sup> *See Elf-Man, LLC v. Lamberson*, 2015 WL 11112498 (E.D. Wash. Jan. 9, 2015) (awarding attorney's  
22 fees of \$100,961.00 to the defendant as the prevailing party after the plaintiff voluntarily dismissed its  
23 copyright infringement claims); *see also Fogerty v. Fantasy, Inc.* 510 U.S. 517, 534 (1994) (holding that  
prevailing plaintiffs and prevailing defendants must be treated alike under 17 U.S.C. § 505, and that  
attorney's fees are awarded to prevailing parties in connection with copyright matters "only as a matter of  
the court's discretion").