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8	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
9	AT SEATTLE		
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11	STEVEN MICHAEL RINDAL,	CASE NO. 2:24-cv-00890-TL	
12	Plaintiff, v.	ORDER ON MOTION FOR CHANGE	
13	JAY ROBERT INSLEE, et al.,	OF VENUE	
14	Defendants.		
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16	This matter is before the Court on Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue. Dkt. No. 32		
17	("Demand for Change of Venue"). Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a), Plaintiff seeks to have this		
18	case transferred to the United States District Court for the District of Columbia. Id. at 2. Having		
19	reviewed the Plaintiff's motion, Defendants' Response (Dkt. No. 36), and the relevant record, the		
20	Court DENIES the Motion.		
21	I. BACKO	GROUND	
22	This case arises from Plaintiff Steven Michael Rindal's allegations that the State of		
23	Washington violated his federal constitutional rights; committed against him the torts of tortious		
24	interference, defamation, and invasion of privacy; and violated Washington's Administrative		
	Order on Motion for Change of Venue - 1		

Procedure Act, RCW 34.05, when it revoked his license to practice chiropractic medicine during
the COVID-19 pandemic. *See* Dkt. No. 18 at 2–6. On October 16, 2024, Plaintiff filed the instant
motion, asserting that the "unique circumstances of this case and the potential conflicts of
interest within the 9th Circuit" require that the Court transfer this case to the U.S. District Court
for the District of Columbia. Dkt. No. 32 at 2.

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## II. LEGAL STANDARD

"For the convenience of parties and witnesses, in the interest of justice, a district court 8 may transfer any civil action to any other district or division where it might have been brought or 9 to any district or division to which all parties have consented." 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). As evidenced by their Response to Plaintiff's Motion, Defendants do not consent to such a transfer. 10 11 See generally Dkt. No. 36. Therefore, transfer is only appropriate to a district where this case 12 might have been brought, and not to "any other district or division." See 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a). The movant must show that the transferee district or division is one in which the suit 13 14 could have been brought in the first instance—*i.e.*, that venue is proper in the transferee district. 15 See Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v. Savage, 611 F.2d 270, 279 (9th Cir. 1979). Venue is 16 proper in:

(1) a judicial district in which any defendant resides, if all defendants are residents of the State in which the district is located;
(2) a judicial district in which a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred, or a substantial part of property that is the subject of the action is situated; or (3) if there is no district in which an action may otherwise be brought as provided in this section, any judicial district in which any defendant is subject to the court's personal jurisdiction with respect to such action.

28 U.S.C. § 1391(b).

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## **III. DISCUSSION**

The Court must determine whether the District of Columbia is a proper venue for this case. Because Plaintiff is the movant, it is Plaintiff's burden to demonstrate as much. *See Savage*, 611 F.2d at 279. Upon application of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), it is clear that Plaintiff has not met his burden.

As an initial matter, the Court notes that, in his Second Amended Complaint, Plaintiff pleaded that, "Venue is proper in [the Western District of Washington] pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b) because all Defendants are residents of the State of Washington and a substantial part of the events or omissions giving rise to the claim occurred in this district." Dkt. No. 18 ¶ 20. As to whether the District of Columbia is *also* a proper venue, § 1391(b)(1) does not apply, because Plaintiff has not shown that any party to this case is a resident of the District of Columbia. Likewise, § 1391(b)(2) does not apply, because Plaintiff's Second Amended Complaint indicates that the proceedings surrounding the suspension of his chiropractic license took place in the State of Washington, and Plaintiff's Motion does not suggest that anything relevant to his causes of action took place in the District of Columbia. *See generally* Dkt. Nos. 18, 32. Third, § 1391(b)(3) only applies where venue cannot be brought pursuant to § 1391(b)(1) or (2). As discussed—and as Plaintiff asserted in his Second Amended Complaint—this is plainly not the case here.

Moreover, even if venue could not be established under § 1391(b)(1) or (2), Plaintiff has
not demonstrated that "any defendant is subject to the [District Court for the District of
Columbia's] personal jurisdiction with respect to" the instant case. *See* 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)(3).
As to general personal jurisdiction, it exists "where a defendant has continuous and systematic
contacts with the forum state such that the defendant is essentially at home in the forum." *Miley V. Hard Rock Hotel & Casino Punta Cana*, 537 F. Supp. 3d 1, 6 (D.D.C. 2021) (quoting *Goodyear Dunlop Tires Operations, S.A. v. Brown*, 564 U.S. 915, 919 (2011) (internal quotation)

1	marks omitted). None of the Defendants in the instant case is "essentially at home" in the District
2	of Columbia. As to specific personal jurisdiction, the court may exercise it over a nonresident
3	defendant where there is an "affiliation between the forum and the underlying controversy."
4	Livnat v. Palestinian Auth., 851 F.3d 45, 56 (D.C. Cir. 2017). Here, no such affiliation exists:
5	The state government has conducted its business from Olympia, Washington, and its agencies
6	and officers have exclusively directed their inquiries and correspondence regarding the subject
7	matter of the instant complaint toward Plaintiff and his business in Washington. See, e.g., Dkt.
8	No. 18 at 10, 67–111. In short, Plaintiff has not alleged any plausible connection between any
9	Defendant and the District of Columbia.
10	Therefore, because the instant complaint could not have been brought in the District of

Columbia, the Court finds it inappropriate to transfer the case there now. Accordingly, the Court DENIES Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue (Dkt. No. 32).

## IV. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, the Court orders as follows:

Plaintiff's Motion for Change of Venue (Dkt. No. 32) is DENIED.

Dated this 25th day of November 2024.

and K.

Tana Lin United States District Judge