

the Washington Supreme Court to "define the difference between jurisdictional rule and claim
processing rules." Dkt. # 68 at 22].

Ramseyer's 38 page motion is a re-hash of the 1997 jury trial that led to his conviction
for murder. By his own count, Ramseyer has filed five petitions for post-trial relief, and he

concedes that he has failed at each step. This habeas case was filed in 2005, and Ramseyer's
 Petition was denied more than ten years ago. [See Dkt. #s 49 and 51]. The Ninth Circuit
 dismissed his appeal as moot because he was pursuing his claims in a different case. See Dkt. #s
 64 and 65].

5 The current Motion is both untimely and futile. This Court cannot "reverse" the Washington Supreme Court, and it cannot "remand" this federal case to that Court with 6 7 "instructions" on how to resolve it. This Court cannot and will not review or reverse decisions 8 made in state court. The Rooker-Feldman doctrine precludes "cases brought by state-court losers 9 complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments . . . and inviting district court review and 10 rejection of those judgments." Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus. Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284, 125 S. Ct. 1517, 1521, 161 L. Ed. 2d 454 (2005). [W]hen a losing plaintiff in state court 11 12 brings a suit in federal district court asserting as legal wrongs the allegedly erroneous legal 13 rulings of the state court and seeks to vacate or set aside the judgment of that court, the federal 14 suit is a forbidden de facto appeal. Noel v. Hall, 341 F.3d 1148, 1156 (9th Cir. 2003); Carmona 15 v. Carmona, 603 F.3d 1041, 1050 (9th Cir. 2008).

The Motion is DENIED.

IT IS SO ORDERED.

Dated this 15th day of November, 2017.

Ronald B. Leighton United States District Judge

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