

APPENDIX I

173

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

MAJOR MARGARET WITT,)
)
Plaintiff,)
)
v.)
)
UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF)
THE AIR FORCE, et al.,)
)
Defendants.)
_____)

COPY

No. C06-5195 RBL

DEPOSITION OF COLONEL MARY L. WALKER

* * *

January 8, 2010
1120 N.W. Couch
Portland, Oregon

Cheryl L. Vorhees, CSR, RPR
Court Reporter

174



400 Columbia, Suite 140
Vancouver, WA 98660
(360) 695-5554
Fax (360) 695-1737

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121 SW Morrison St., Suite 850
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slinc@qwestoffice.net

29

1 mingling with friends.

2 Q Well, would it be accurate or not to say,

3 then, when you retired from the Air Force that you

4 left the Air Force with sort of a bad taste or a bad

5 feeling?

6 A Repeat that again.

7 Q When you retired from the Air Force, would it

8 be fair to say that you left the Air Force with a bad

9 taste in your mouth about leaving the Air Force? I

10 know you were happy to go to the new civilian job but

11 would it be fair to say you were feeling sort of bad

12 about the Air Force as you're leaving?

13 A I was disappointed in the fact that I didn't

14 feel I had the support from upper management or upper,

15 you know, the higher -- the chain above me. I didn't

16 feel I had that support as far as trying to ensure

17 that I had a position to move into, so I was

18 disappointed in that aspect.

19 Q Is there a particular person you felt didn't

20 support you?

21 A I felt my boss, Colonel Mahan, didn't give me

22 the support that I thought should have happened. He

23 did go -- He did make some calls or send some e-mail

24 messages out. I saw the e-mail messages where he

25 spoke to one or two people in trying to line up a job

30

1 for me.

2 Q Well, you made it pretty clear that you liked

3 your civilian job that you've had since 2005, so I'm

4 happy for you for that. You've got a job that you

5 like now, right?

6 A Yes. I liked all my jobs.

7 Q I'm not sure I understood, you said that you

8 weren't there when Colonel Moore-Harbert assumed

9 command, you weren't there at McChord. Does that mean

10 there's a particular day, which is the first day that

11 Colonel Moore-Harbert assumes command and you weren't

12 there on that day? Is that what you mean by that?

13 A I do not recall being there when Colonel

14 Moore-Harbert assumed command.

15 Q Okay. But after she assumed command you

16 continued to go to McChord for duty, at least once a

17 month I assume, for several more -- well, another year

18 anyway, right?

19 A Seven, eight months, yes.

20 Q Would you run into Colonel Moore-Harbert?

21 A No. I never did.

22 Q You never did?

23 A I don't recall it. Because I planned my time

24 at McChord according to my schedule.

25 Q Okay. I'm going to go back in time here and

31

1 ask you some questions about your predecessor? Your

2 predecessor as the commander of the 446th was who?

3 A Say that again.

4 Q Who was your predecessor as the commander of

5 the 446th?

6 A Colonel Carneal.

7 Q That's Linda Carneal?

8 A Yes.

9 Q That's C-a-r-n-e-a-l?

10 A Yes.

11 Q Why was Colonel Carneal relieved of command

12 of the 446th?

13 MR. PHIPPS: Objection. Foundation.

14 Q (By Mr. Lobsenz) Why?

15 A She retired.

16 Q Why did she retire?

17 MR. PHIPPS: Objection. Foundation.

18 THE WITNESS: That I don't know.

19 Q (By Mr. Lobsenz) You have no knowledge of why

20 she was removed from the command?

21 A I do not have any knowledge of her being

22 removed from the command.

23 Q Do you have any knowledge of why she was

24 asked to retire?

25 A I do not have any knowledge of why she was

32

1 asked to retire.

2 Q Do you know an Officer Kevin Windsor?

3 A Yes.

4 Q How do you know him?

5 A He was a member in the squadron.

6 Q What was his position?

7 A He was a tech and also executive officer.

8 Q Who was his immediate supervisor?

9 A As executive officer, he reported to Colonel

10 Carneal.

11 Q He was her executive assistant, right?

12 A Yes.

13 Q Did you not at least hear from other people

14 that there was a relationship between Colonel Carneal

15 and, I don't know his rank, Officer Windsor? Major

16 Windsor?

17 A I did hear that.

18 Q What did you hear?

19 A Just what you just said.

20 Q That there was a relationship?

21 A A relationship.

22 Q What kind of relationship did you hear they

23 had?

24 A I heard that there was a relationship.

25 Q A romantic --

175

33

1 **A So as far as what kind, I don't think I**
 2 **actually heard a name attached to what kind of**
 3 **relationship.**
 4 Q Did you not hear that that was the reason why
 5 she was asked to retire?
 6 MR. PHIPPS: Objection, form.
 7 THE WITNESS: No.
 8 Q (By Mr. Lobsenz) No?
 9 A No.
 10 Q You didn't hear from any source that they
 11 were having an affair?
 12 A I did hear that.
 13 Q From who?
 14 A I don't know who I heard it from.
 15 Q Okay. What was Windsor's rank when he was
 16 executive assistant?
 17 A Major.
 18 Q He was a major when he was executive
 19 assistant to Carneal?
 20 A I recall major, yes.
 21 Q He was a married man at the time?
 22 A Based on what I know, yes.
 23 Q Do you recall that there were complaints in
 24 the unit that Colonel Carneal was showing favoritism
 25 to Major Windsor?

34

1 **A I recall that, yes.**
 2 Q And, did you feel that she was showing
 3 favoritism to Major Windsor?
 4 A Personally?
 5 Q Yeah.
 6 A I did not get into that.
 7 Q Okay. Would you have been working in
 8 proximity to Colonel Carneal such that you could have
 9 seen that?
 10 A I did not see or show favoritism.
 11 Q You were chief nurse under Carneal, right?
 12 A Right.
 13 Q Does that put you working -- When you were
 14 corporate weekend duty, does that put you working in
 15 the same building and same office as commander?
 16 A Yes. Same building.
 17 Q Do you know whether Colonel Carneal received
 18 any form of discipline for her relationship with Major
 19 Windsor?
 20 A No, I do not.
 21 Q Do you know whether she received a letter of
 22 admonishment?
 23 A No, I do not.
 24 Q Do you know whether anybody was assigned to
 25 investigate her relationship with Major Windsor?

35

1 **A I do not recall that.**
 2 Q Were you close to Colonel Carneal?
 3 A In a professional manner, yes.
 4 Q But not in a personal manner?
 5 A No.
 6 Q Did she ever discuss her personal life with
 7 you?
 8 A No.
 9 Q In your mind, was there a morale problem in
 10 the unit related to her relationship to Major Windsor?
 11 A There was.
 12 Q Tell me about that.
 13 A There were rumors about her affair. You
 14 know, there was a lot of talk. I mean, there was --
 15 You know, I could be in the midst of whatever and I
 16 would hear that they were having an affair.
 17 Q Was there a group of officers who made a
 18 complaint to the wing commander about this affair or
 19 about this favoritism that they perceived?
 20 MR. PHIPPS: Objection.
 21 THE WITNESS: The wing commander you said?
 22 Q (By Mr. Lobsenz) Well --
 23 A I don't know that, the wing commander. I
 24 don't know.
 25 Q Was there a group of officers who made a

36

1 complaint to somebody above Carneal?
 2 MR. PHIPPS: Objection. Foundation.
 3 THE WITNESS: I recall hearing that, yes.
 4 Q (By Mr. Lobsenz) Do you know who they made
 5 their complaint to?
 6 A To my boss that I heard.
 7 Q Who was your boss then?
 8 A Colonel Mahan. Mahan. Mahan. I got it now.
 9 Mahan.
 10 Q M-a-h-a-n maybe?
 11 A Yes.
 12 Q Oh good. Okay. So you heard that a group of
 13 officers complained to Colonel Mahan about this
 14 relationship between Carneal and Windsor. Were you a
 15 part of this group that made this complaint to Mahan?
 16 A No. Can I just clarify?
 17 Q Yeah.
 18 A I heard that a group went to Colonel Mahan.
 19 But to say that they complained about the
 20 relationship, I do not know that.
 21 Q You heard it but you don't know it?
 22 A Right.
 23 Q Okay. I got it. So, you became commander of
 24 the squadron in July or August of '03. So I take it
 25 Carneal was relieved of command immediately prior to

176

145

1 Q Let me read her comments from this OER from
 2 Exhibit 13 into the record. "Exceptional flight nurse
 3 sith superb clinical skills in the aeromedical
 4 evacuation patient movement system; always ready to
 5 volunteer and support the mission whether in-garrison
 6 at home station or at deployed location; exhibited
 7 remarkable leadership skills as chief of Stan Eval,
 8 meticulously monitoring crew members, currency,
 9 qualification and proficiency ensuring 100 percent of
 10 squadron taskings met and outstandingly performed;
 11 member is unable to participate since November 2004
 12 due to pending administrative discharge."
 13 Is there anything in those comments that of
 14 your personal knowledge you can say I disagree with?
 15 A No.
 16 Q Okay. Have you ever held the opinion that
 17 Major Witt's presence in the 446 has a negative impact
 18 on unit cohesion or morale?
 19 A No.
 20 Q Have you ever held an opinion that if she
 21 were reinstated to the unit that she would by being
 22 reinstated have a negative impact on unit cohesion or
 23 morale?
 24 A Never thought about it.
 25 Q I think that I'm done. My practice is now if

146

1 we could just take a real short break I could consult
 2 with my co-counsel. Don't get your hopes up,
 3 sometimes I have a few more questions, but for the
 4 moment I don't think I do.
 5 (Break taken 1:30 to 1:34 p.m.)
 6 MR. LOBSENZ: I have no further questions.
 7 MR. PHIPPS: Okay. If I could have just a
 8 minute to see what I have.
 9 (Break taken 1:34 to 1:37 p.m.)
 10
 11 EXAMINATION
 12 BY MR. PHIPPS:
 13 Q Good afternoon, Ms. Walker. I just have a
 14 few questions to ask you. Some of these are going to
 15 seem pretty straight forward, maybe things you already
 16 testified to, but I just want to ask these. First,
 17 how long did you serve in terms of number of years in
 18 the 446 aeromedical evacuation squad, the 446 AES?
 19 A I retired with 28 years, nine months, six
 20 days.
 21 Q Okay. And, you previously testified that you
 22 were the commander of the 446 AES for a period of
 23 time. How long were you commander of the 446 AES?
 24 A Around July '03 until October --
 25 September/October of '05.

147

1 Q So between two and three years?
 2 A Yes.
 3 Q And while you were in the 446 AES as the
 4 commander and beforehand, was the unit subject to
 5 deployment?
 6 A Yes.
 7 Q And where to? Where was it subject to
 8 deployment?
 9 A I'm drawing a blank of all the places, but
 10 Iraq, Germany, Saudi, I mean just, it was just
 11 worldwide. I can't remember. Air evac was always
 12 subject to deployment in that sense.
 13 Q And do you know if Major Witt, while she was
 14 in the 446 AES, if she was subject to deployment on
 15 that worldwide basis?
 16 A Yes.
 17 Q And what was the purpose of these deployments
 18 that the 446 went on?
 19 A Air evac would go out as the group or the
 20 crew to facilitate transport of patients in the plane,
 21 so it would be in-flight care. And so that would
 22 apply to all the members that were actually deployed.
 23 So the mission always was train to then be able to
 24 provided in-flight care when called upon.
 25 Q And while the 446 AES was deployed, do you

148

1 know what the living conditions were like during
 2 deployment?
 3 A In thinking about Desert Shield/Desert Storm,
 4 we were in tents and so it could be tents as well as
 5 housing, base housing. And so the tents would be
 6 separated out for designated female, designated male.
 7 Q Was there any guarantee about the quality of
 8 the living conditions or the bathing conditions that
 9 members of the 446 AES would receive when they were on
 10 deployment in terms of high quality or that you would
 11 go in and get base housing or a tent or your own tent?
 12 Were there any guarantees like that made?
 13 A When you were deployed, whatever the housing
 14 living conditions were at that point, you pretty much
 15 went into that housing. So you couldn't go out and do
 16 special requests.
 17 Q And while deployed, do you know if members of
 18 the 446 AES worked with other units?
 19 A Yes. There was a lot of integrating of other
 20 units.
 21 Q Like what other units?
 22 A There could be air evac, it could be the
 23 front line people, the -- let me think of a name -- we
 24 called it aeromedical staging units where the patients
 25 would come out to the front line, close to the flight

177

APPENDIX J

178

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Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans toward Gay and Lesbian Service Members

Bonnie Moradi and Laura Miller

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179

Attitudes of Iraq and Afghanistan War Veterans toward Gay and Lesbian Service Members

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Bonnie Moradi¹ and Laura Miller²

Abstract

U.S. policy banning openly gay and lesbian personnel from serving in its military rests on the belief that heterosexual discomfort with lesbian and gay service members in an integrated environment would degrade unit cohesion and readiness. To inform this policy, data from a 2006 survey of Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans are analyzed in this study. Views of these war veterans are consistent with prior surveys of military personnel showing declining support for the policy: from about 75 percent in 1993 to 40 percent in this survey. Among the demographic and military experience variables analyzed, comfort level with lesbian and gay people was the strongest correlate of attitudes toward the ban. War veterans indicated that the strongest argument against the ban is that sexual orientation is unrelated to job performance and that the strongest argument in favor of the ban is a projected negative impact on unit cohesion. However, analyses of these war veterans' ratings of unit cohesion and readiness revealed that knowing a gay or lesbian unit member is not uniquely associated with cohesion or readiness; instead, the quality of leaders, the quality of equipment, and the quality of training are the critical factors associated with unit cohesion and readiness.

Keywords

don't ask, don't tell, lesbian, gay, military cohesion, military readiness, sexual orientation

Key justifications for banning openly gay and lesbian service members from the U.S. military have rested on the beliefs that heterosexual service members' discomfort around openly lesbian and gay personnel would undermine cohesion, readiness, and

¹University of Florida, Gainesville

²RAND Corporation, Arlington, VA

Corresponding Author:

Bonnie Moradi, University of Florida, Department of Psychology, P.O. Box 112250, Gainesville, FL 32611-2250
Email: moradib@ufl.edu

performance in integrated units. To offer empirical data regarding these assumptions, we examine Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans' attitudes about allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve. Moving beyond a simplistic framework of whether troops are "for or against" the ban, we explore which arguments are considered strongest and whether general demographic and military experience variables are associated with differences in attitudes toward allowing open service. We also examine whether serving with open lesbian or gay unit members is associated with war veterans' perceptions of unit cohesion and readiness when the quality of officers, equipment, and training are taken into account.

The Origins of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue"

Gay and lesbian personnel have served in the U.S. military throughout its history, although policy regarding their service has changed over time.¹ A national debate over the policy ignited when presidential candidate Bill Clinton made a campaign promise that, once elected, he would remove the legal ban on the open service of lesbian and gay service members as a form of discrimination. This promise was met with a range of criticisms, including objections based on moral and religious grounds.² Once elected, President Clinton directed the Secretary of Defense to review the policy. Secretary Les Aspin directed a compromise position between the existing policy and the proposed complete lifting of the ban in the name of civil rights. In 1993, Congress enacted as law the compromise policy of "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" (for brevity, referred to as DADT hereafter).

Under DADT, the stated intention was that (1) applicants for military service would not be asked to reveal their sexual orientation, (2) inquiries or investigations solely to determine a service member's sexual orientation would not be initiated, but inquiries or investigations could be initiated when credible information indicates a basis for discharge or disciplinary action (e.g., homosexual conduct), and (3) "a statement by a service member that he or she is homosexual or bisexual creates a reputable presumption that the service member is engaging in homosexual acts or has the propensity or intent to do so."³ As such, those who identify as lesbian or gay are presently barred from openly serving in the U.S. military and from engaging in "homosexual conduct" (which includes "telling") while serving as a member of the military. Secretary Aspin provided the following rationale for adopting this new middle-ground policy:

The Department of Defense has long held that, as a general rule, homosexuality is incompatible with military service because it interferes with the factors critical to combat effectiveness, including unit morale, unit cohesion, and individual privacy. Nevertheless, the Department of Defense also recognizes that individuals with a homosexual orientation have served with distinction in the armed services of the United States.⁴

At that time, no scientific evidence existed to support or challenge the claim that combat effectiveness in any previous conflicts or in any exercises at the Combat Training Centers (the military's training proxy for war) was diminished in any units because of the presence of open gays or lesbians. Yet this presumption has led to discharges of thousands of military personnel.

At the center of the rationale for DADT, then, are the perceived attitudes of military personnel: their morale, their cohesion, their desire or need for individual privacy, and the perceived impact of those attitudes on combat performance. Either implicitly or explicitly, these arguments tend to rest on the perceived attitudes of *heterosexual men* toward *gay men*, with men composing about 85 percent of the service overall (from 82 percent in the Air Force up to 94 percent in the Marine Corps in 2008) and 100 percent by policy and/or law in most ground combat units such as armor, infantry, and special operations units.⁵ Individual morale and unit cohesion ("bonding") are believed to be key for combat motivation and success, which in turn affect overall military readiness for war and, when put into practice, affect effectiveness as well. Anything that lowers morale significantly or prohibits bonding within units is treated as harmful to military operations and thus viewed as a risk to national security.⁶ DADT aims to keep lesbian and gay service members "in the closet" so that presumably negative peer attitudes toward same-sex sexual orientation do not harm unit cohesion and military effectiveness.

DADT in War

Despite the policy justification that openly gay and lesbian military personnel would harm unit cohesion and effectiveness, enforcement of the policy in the form of discharges typically drops during times of war.⁷ This pattern has held during the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, with discharges dropping from peak rates of 1,241 and 1,273 in 2000 and 2001, respectively, to 612 in 2006.⁸ For the years 2002 to 2006 combined, available data suggest that 3,715 service members have been discharged under the exclusionary policy.⁹ This reduced enforcement of the policy during wartime calls into question whether military commanders agree with the policy that the impact of lesbian and gay service members outweighs the contributions those service members make to their units' mission.

There is a substantial cost, even in peacetime, for discharging personnel who have been recruited, trained, and assigned to posts in which they have performed their jobs at least satisfactorily; but this cost is even more dramatic in times of war when the demand for military personnel is not met by the supply and service members are also lost because of wartime injury or death. The Army, in particular, has faced recruiting challenges since the "Global War on Terror" began, causing them to increase enlistment bonuses and lower quality standards for entrants (e.g., increasing the number of waivers to admit recruits with prior criminal activity).¹⁰ The demand for scarce and critical skills such as Arab language capability raises the question of which has the higher negative impact on military effectiveness when Arab linguists are discharged

for being gay: the known impact of the lack of those critical skills or the projected but never documented impact of retaining open gay and lesbian service members.¹¹ Despite these potential costs, DADT persists without empirical data about the performance of units with known lesbian and gay members relative to units without such members.

Although there may be cultural differences between American attitudes toward modesty, sexuality, and sexual orientation and those of its Western partners, the experiences of other militaries warrant consideration. Over the past decade and as part of civil rights initiatives, the armed forces of Canada, Great Britain, and Australia have lifted bans against homosexuals with little to no perceptible change in military effectiveness or day-to-day operations.¹² Despite variation in their social and political climates, numerous other militaries throughout Europe and in other democracies (Israel, South Africa, New Zealand) also do not exclude citizens from service on the basis of sexual orientation; some even have antidiscriminatory policies regarding sexual orientation.¹³

As other nations lifted their bans and U.S. forces deployed to fight the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, American service members' attitudes about DADT appear to have shifted as well. The earliest polls of military personnel in 1993 showed approximately 70 percent to 74 percent agreeing with the ban on homosexuals in the armed forces, 8 percent to 9 percent unsure, and 18 percent to 20 percent opposing the ban, although support for the ban was much weaker among women than among men (only about half of women favored the ban).¹⁴ Focus group data from military personnel at that time also showed strong objections to integration.¹⁵ But opposition to integration has declined steadily over the years.¹⁶ For example, by 2004, one Annenberg poll found that service members were "divided 57 to 34 percent against allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly."¹⁷ Interestingly, even among the 57 percent who opposed integration, only 13 percent said inclusion would harm morale, 12 percent said it would disrupt teamwork, and 5 percent reported "close quarters" as their rationale; 20 percent thought it would be a distraction and cause problems.¹⁸

The Present Study: Evidence from Military Personnel Who Served in Iraq and Afghanistan

Because DADT prohibits the military from systematically gathering data about the sexual orientation of service members, it presents a challenge to comparing the actual performance of units with and without gay or lesbian members. In lieu of such comparisons, research on the perceptions of military personnel who have served in a theater of war and can make judgments based on their own experiences can be informative. To this end, the present study examines data from a 2006 Zogby poll of a sample of military personnel who served in Iraq and Afghanistan. A prior report summarized some of the Zogby data in primarily descriptive and cross-tabular form.¹⁹ This study provides new analyses of relationships involving the following variables: general demographic characteristics, military experiences variables, attitudes toward lesbian

and gay service members, knowledge of the presence of gay or lesbian unit members, ratings of leadership, training, and equipment quality, and perceptions of unit cohesion and readiness. Specifically, to provide empirical evidence that can inform military policy and practice, this study uses the Zogby data to examine the following research questions and hypotheses:

1. What are Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans' attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve in the military? To answer this question, descriptive data from the Zogby poll are interpreted within the context of prior polls indicating decreasing support for the ban since 1993.
2. What arguments do Iraq and Afghanistan war veterans view as the strongest for and against allowing lesbian and gay individuals to openly serve? Descriptive data from the Zogby poll are expected to parallel arguments made in the public debates on DADT, namely, the potential impact on unit cohesion versus the civil rights of sexual minorities.
3. Do attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve differ across war veterans of different demographic (i.e., age, gender, race/ethnicity, religious affiliation, political party) and military experience (i.e., duty status, service branch, years of service, rank or grade, unit type, shower privacy, prior training on prevention of antigay harassment) backgrounds? Prior analyses have yielded mixed results regarding demographic differences in attitudes toward lesbian and gay people, with the exception that women tend to report more affirmative attitudes than men.²⁰ Given limited research with military populations, however, we test the hypotheses that war veterans' attitudes toward allowing open service will differ across demographic and military experience factors, for example, that those who live in closer proximity to one another with little privacy (e.g., those in ground combat units or those who routinely have to use group showers) will be more likely to support the ban than their counterparts.
4. Do attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve differ according to war veterans' comfort with lesbian and gay people and knowledge of a gay or lesbian unit member? Based on prior research indicating that contact with lesbian and gay people is associated with more affirmative attitudes toward these populations,²¹ we test the hypothesis that those who are comfortable with gay and lesbian people and know a lesbian or gay unit member support open service more so than those who are not comfortable with and do not know a gay or lesbian unit member.
5. Is knowing a lesbian or gay unit member associated with differences in perceived unit cohesion and readiness, when other general unit quality predictors (i.e., quality of officers, NCOs, equipment, training) are accounted for? The military invests billions of dollars annually in recruiting, selecting, educating, and developing its leaders; in training both individuals and units for combat operations; and in developing, procuring, and maintaining military equipment—all in the name of improving military effectiveness. For this reason, we hypothesize that quality of officers,

NCOs, equipment, and training will account for unique differences in ratings of unit cohesion and readiness. The rationale for DADT suggests the hypothesis that beyond these unit quality indicators, those who know a gay or lesbian unit member will report lower unit cohesion and readiness than those who do not know a lesbian or gay unit member.

Method

In October of 2006, Zogby International conducted a voluntary online poll of 545 U.S. service members who had served in the Iraq or Afghanistan theaters of operations since 2001. Initial attempts to secure a list of military personnel from the Department of Defense to draw a random sample for this survey were unsuccessful. Thus, Zogby obtained this nonrandom sample from a national survey panel composed of over one million members and developed for general survey purposes (not for any particular issue or subpopulation). Each panelist is defined by over four hundred variables, and the panel is continually maintained to be representative of the U.S. population. For this study, Zogby sent invitations to those panelists whose variables on file identified them as among the military population. After logging in with a single-use password, respondents were screened with an initial question to ensure that they had served in the Iraq or Afghanistan theaters of operations. The demographic and military experience characteristics of the sample and descriptive statistics for the variables of interest are presented in the tables corresponding to their respective analyses.

Results and Discussion

Overview of Attitudes about DADT

This study builds on previous polls of service members' attitudes about DADT and shares their limitation of being unable to assess sexual orientation because, under DADT, disclosing sexual orientation presents substantial risk to participants.²² Asked, "Do you agree or disagree with allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military?" about 10 percent of the Zogby survey respondents strongly agreed, 18 percent agreed, 33 percent were neutral or not sure, 17 percent disagreed, and 23 percent strongly disagreed with allowing gays and lesbians to openly serve.²³ Table 1 displays these results (collapsed) relative to other polls of military populations since 1993. Given the variability in methods and samples, the data from these polls are not necessarily representative or directly comparable with one another. Nevertheless, the trend in these data suggests that strong support for the policy when it was created has shifted somewhat toward the direction of uncertainty or opposition. Thus, in terms of the first research question, the Zogby data fit within the broader trend of decreasing support for the ban.

In addition to this general question about the policy, respondents were asked to select the strongest arguments for and against allowing lesbian and gay persons to

Table 1. Polls of Military Personnel Regarding the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" Policy

Source	Date	Question	Support Open Service (%)	Oppose Open Service (%)	Unsure, Neutral, No Opinion (%)	Method
Miller/Moskos ^a	February 1992– June 1993	Gays and lesbians should be allowed to enter and remain in the military.	20	70	9	Nonrandom stratified sample administered at stateside and overseas posts to 3,543 soldiers. Reported results have been adjusted to reflect gender balance in the military.
Los Angeles Times ^b	February 1993	How do you feel about lifting the ban on gays in the armed forces?	18	74	8	Poll sampled 2,346 enlistees. Administered in commercial areas and residential housing near 38 military installations across the United States. Results weighted to reflect age, race, gender, service, marital status, and education of this population.
Triangle Institute for Security Studies ^c	Fall 1998– Spring 1999	Do you think gay men and lesbians should be allowed to serve openly in the military?	18	73	9	Survey administered to 2,901 military officers at military educational institutions. The sample includes active-duty and reserve officers who are likely to be promoted and emerge as top military leaders.

(continued)

Table 1. (continued)

Source	Date	Question	Support Open Service (%)	Oppose Open Service (%)	Unsure, Neutral, No Opinion (%)	Method
Annenberg National Election Survey ^d	October 2004	Should gays and lesbians be allowed to serve openly in the military, or shouldn't they be allowed to serve openly?	34	57	9	Poll of 655 adults who served on active duty between February and October or who were family members of those who served but were not available to be interviewed. Results here reflect responses of military members only.
Zogby International ^e	October 2006	Do you agree or disagree with allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military?	28	40	33	Poll of 545 U.S. service members who had served in the Iraq or Afghanistan theaters of operations since 2001.
Military Times ^f	December 2007	Do you think openly homosexual people should be allowed to serve in the military?	31	57	12	Survey of a select group of subscribers to the <i>Air Force Times</i> , <i>Army Times</i> , <i>Marine Times</i> , and <i>Navy Times</i> weekly newspapers. Results here are for active-duty respondents. <i>N</i> not provided.

a. Laura Miller, "Fighting for a Just Cause: Soldiers' Attitudes on Gays in the Military," in *Gays and Lesbians in the Military: Issues, Concerns, and Contrasts*, ed. W.J. Scott and S. Carson Stanley (New York: Aldine, 1994), 69-85.
 b. Melissa Healy, "The Times Poll: 74% of Military Enlistees Oppose Lifting Gay Ban," *Los Angeles Times*, February 28, 1993.
 c. Laura Miller and John Allen Williams, "Do Military Policies on Gender and Sexuality Undermine Combat Effectiveness?" in *Soldiers and Civilians: The U.S. Military, American Society, and National Security*, ed. P. Feaver and R. Kohn (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 361-402.
 d. Annenberg Public Policy Center, NAES 04, *National Annenberg Election Survey*, press release (Washington, DC: Annenberg Public Policy Center, October 16, 2009).
 e. John Zogby, John Bruce, Rebecca Whittman, and Sam Rodgers, *Opinions of Military Personnel on Sexual Minorities in the Military* (New York: Zogby International, December 2006).
 f. http://www.militarycity.com/polls/2007activepoll_politics.php (accessed July 20, 2009).

openly serve in the military (up to three arguments for and up to three arguments against). As summarized in Table 2, among possible reasons against allowing open service, the argument endorsed most frequently was the publicized rationale for the ban that "open gays and lesbians would undermine unit cohesion" (42 percent). This may reflect service members' backing of the current military position or their personal views and experience; but as we note below, analyses of respondents' actual ratings of unit cohesion challenge this rationale for the ban. The second and third most frequently endorsed arguments against integration reflected concerns about harassment and abuse of gay and lesbian service members (27 percent) and moral or religious objections to homosexuality (26 percent). Among possible reasons in support of allowing open service, war veterans most frequently selected "sexual orientation has nothing to do with job performance" (38 percent), that "it is wrong to discriminate based on sexual orientation" (30 percent), and that every qualified individual is needed during wartime (24 percent). Thus, with regard to the second research question, the top arguments for and against integration reflected arguments articulated in public debates on DADT, with the top arguments for integration prioritizing performance and qualifications over exclusionary practices.

Demographic and Military Experience Factors and Attitudes toward Lesbian and Gay Service Members

Analysis of variance (ANOVA) was used to test the third research question and hypotheses that demographic and military experience factors would account for differences in attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve.²⁴ Table 3 shows that, of the general demographic variables, age group and racial/ethnic status (categorized as majority or minority) were not associated significantly with attitudes about allowing lesbian and gay personnel to openly serve. By contrast, significant but small main effects emerged for gender, religious affiliation, and political party affiliation. Consistent with previously observed gender differences in attitudes toward sexual minorities,²⁵ women expressed significantly more support for open service than did men. Also, those who identified as atheist, realist, or humanist agreed with allowing gay and lesbian personnel to openly serve significantly more so than those who identified as Protestant or Muslim. These comparisons should be interpreted with caution, however, because there were only eighteen and four individuals in the atheist, realist, or humanist and Muslim groups, respectively. Finally, those who identified as Democrat, Independent or minor party, or "not sure" agreed with allowing open service significantly more so than those who identified as Republican. Effect sizes indicated that the significantly associated demographic variables (i.e., gender, religious affiliation, and political party) each explained about 4 percent to 6 percent of the variance in attitudes.²⁶

Of the military experience variables, duty status (veteran, active duty, reserves), service branch, unit type (combat, combat support, combat service support), and shower privacy level were not significantly associated with attitudes about allowing

Table 2. Endorsement of Strongest Arguments For and Against Allowing Open Service

Arguments For and Against Allowing Lesbian and Gay Personnel to Openly Serve	% Selected
Arguments against allowing open service	
Open gays and lesbians would undermine unit cohesion	42.4
Open gays and lesbians would get beat up or abused	27.0
Homosexuality violates religious/moral beliefs	26.1
Straights would not respect gay or lesbian leaders	24.4
There are no strong arguments for keeping gays from serving openly	23.3
Straights should not have to share foxholes, showers, etc. with open gays and lesbians	21.1
Not sure	12.5
Other reason	8.8
Open gays and lesbians would be more likely to pursue one another than they do now	7.5
Gays and lesbians would increase the spread of HIV/AIDS	6.1
Open gays and lesbians would be more likely to pursue straights	3.1
More gays and lesbians would join or remain in the military	2.0
Gays and lesbians cannot perform their military jobs as well as heterosexuals	0.6
Arguments for allowing open service	
Sexual orientation has nothing to do with job performance	37.8
It is wrong to discriminate based on sexual orientation	29.5
During wartime, the armed forces need every qualified service member regardless of sexual orientation	23.7
There are no strong arguments for allowing gays and lesbians to openly serve	20.2
Discharging service members for being gay is a waste of recruiting, education and training dollars	19.8
No one should be able to avoid a service obligation by claiming to be gay	18.5
Gays already make valuable contributions to the military	18.3
Not sure	11.9
No one should be forced to lie about who they are as a condition of military service	11.0
The government should not pry into people's private lives	9.9
Discharging service members for being gay undermines military readiness	5.7
Other reason	2.2

lesbian and gay personnel to openly serve, but significant effects emerged for years of service, rank, and prior training on the prevention of antigay harassment (see Table 4). Specifically, those who served one to four years and five to ten years reported significantly more agreement with allowing open service than did those who served eleven to twenty years and twenty-one to thirty years. Also, midgrade enlisted personnel (E5 to E6) agreed with open service more so than those immediately senior to them (E7 to E9). Differences were not significant among other grades, but the data pointed to a general pattern of high-grade enlisted personnel and officers being more supportive of

Table 3. Comparisons of General Demographic Groups on Agreement with Allowing Lesbian and Gay Personnel to Openly Serve in the Military

Independent variable	%	n	Level of Agreement ^a		df	F	Effect Size η_p^2
			M	SD			
Age group					2, 536	2.53	.009
18–29	22	119	3.03	1.21			
30–49	68	364	3.33	1.26			
50–64	10	56	3.23	1.35			
Gender					1, 529	24.51***	.044
Male	78	413	3.39 _a	1.21			
Female	22	118	2.75 _a	1.31			
Race/ethnicity					1, 515	6.38	.012
Majority (white)	79	408	3.33	1.29			
Minority (all others)	21	109	2.98	1.16			
Religious affiliation					6, 512	3.98***	.045
Atheist, realist, humanist	3	18	2.39 _{ab}	1.24			
Catholic	30	157	3.27	1.22			
Jewish	1	7	3.00	1.00			
Latter-day Saints	2	8	3.75	1.58			
Muslim	1	4	4.75 _b	0.50			
Protestant	40	208	3.42 _a	1.27			
Other, no affiliation	23	117	3.02	1.25			
Political party					3, 483	10.44***	.061
Democrat	18	90	2.82 _a	1.24			
Republican	53	256	3.54 _{abc}	1.19			
Independent, minor party	23	112	3.08 _c	1.38			
Not sure	6	29	2.76 _b	0.91			

Note: Means with same subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$.

a. Lower means indicate greater support for open service.

*** $p < .005$.

the ban than low- and midgrade enlisted personnel. Finally, respondents who reported no training on the prevention of antigay harassment agreed with integration more so than those who reported receiving training. Effect sizes suggested that the significantly associated military experience variables (i.e., years of service, rank, antigay harassment prevention training) each explained about 2 percent to 3 percent of the variance in attitudes.

Further study is necessary to investigate possible explanations for some of these patterns. For example, the significant effects for years of service and grade cannot be explained by their covariation with age since age was not associated with attitudes toward allowing open service. Thus, research is needed to explore potential explanatory factors underlying the effect for years of service and grade. For instance, those

Table 4. Comparisons of Military Experience Groups on Agreement with Allowing Lesbian and Gay Personnel to Openly Serve in the Military

Independent Variable	%	n	Level of Agreement ^a		df	F	Effect Size η_p^2
			M	SD			
Duty status					2,542	0.34	.001
Veteran	20	108	3.17	1.33			
Active duty	62	337	3.28	1.22			
Reserve, Guard	18	100	3.26	1.32			
Service branch ^b					3,536	1.44	.008
Air Force	30	162	3.32	1.27			
Army	46	250	3.30	1.21			
Marines	5	29	3.24	1.27			
Navy	18	99	3.02	1.32			
Years of service					3,541	5.18***	.028
4 or fewer	11	62	2.94 _{ab}	1.27			
5 to 10	27	146	3.01 _{cd}	1.26			
11 to 20	40	217	3.40 _{ac}	1.25			
21 to 30	22	120	3.45 _{bd}	1.19			
Rank, grade					5,536	3.75***	.034
E1 to E4 (junior enlisted)	8	42	2.86	1.35			
E5 to E6 (junior NCOs)	29	159	2.99 _a	1.24			
E7 to E9 (senior NCOs)	21	113	3.45 _a	1.21			
W1 to W5 (warrant officers)	3	18	3.72	0.96			
O1 to O4 (junior officers)	26	142	3.39	1.24			
O5 to O9 (senior officers)	13	68	3.32	1.29			
Unit type ^c					3,532	2.12	.012
Combat	26	139	3.47	1.22			
Combat support	32	173	3.25	1.25			
Combat service support	21	112	3.07	1.28			
Other	21	112	3.23	1.29			
Shower privacy level					4,523	1.89	.014
Almost always privately	51	271	3.17	1.26			
Usually privately	22	116	3.35	1.22			
About half and half	17	89	3.30	1.27			
Usually group shower	6	34	3.74	1.29			

(continued)

191

Table 4. (continued)

Independent Variable	%	n	Level of Agreement ^a		df	F	Effect Size η_p^2
			M	SD			
Always or almost always group	3	18	3.00	1.53			
Antigay harassment prevention training					2,542	6.32***	.023
Yes	56	305	3.42 _a	1.24			
No	34	184	3.01 _a	1.28			
Not sure	10	56	3.20	1.12			

Note: Means with same subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$.

a. Lower means indicate greater support for open service.

b. The composition of service members ever deployed to Iraq or Afghanistan for these wars as of 2007 is as follows: 49 percent Army, 19 percent Navy, 20 percent Air Force, and 13 percent Marine Corps. Compared to this composition, the Zogby sample is roughly representative of Army and Navy personnel but overrepresentative of Air Force personnel and underrepresentative of Marines. As seen in this table, however, service branch was not associated with attitudes toward lesbian and gay service members and did not warrant sample weighting. The 5 Coast Guard members were excluded from this analysis because of their small number and because the Coast Guard falls under the Department of Homeland Security (and, before that, the Department of Transportation) and not under the Department of Defense. For the deployed force composition statistics, see Terri L. Tanielian and Lisa Jaycox, *Invisible Wounds of War* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2008), 22.

c. This set of unit distinctions is most commonly used in ground forces. *Combat* includes infantry, armor, artillery, fighter aircraft, aircraft carriers, submarines, and special operations; *combat support* includes engineers, intelligence, communications, military police, and civil affairs; *combat service support* includes transportation, personnel, finance, medical, maintenance, and food service.

*** $p < .005$.

with more years of experience and higher ranks may have greater awareness of the attitudes of other military personnel and greater understanding of how the military and its units function. Similarly, acculturation to military policy and practice in the officer and enlisted ranks or the impact of the added responsibility for the behavior of subordinates (which falls most heavily on the senior NCOs) may shape the attitudes of more experienced and higher ranking groups toward the ban. Additional research is also necessary to explain why military personnel who received training on the prevention of antigay harassment expressed less support for open service compared to those who did not receive such training. One possibility worth exploring is whether the content of antigay harassment training teaches or reinforces the premise of DADT, that is, the presumption that open gay and lesbian service members are harmful to the military. Another possibility is that the training increases concern that integration will be accompanied by harassment of lesbian and gay service members.

The present findings regarding some of the military experience variables also address questions about whether those with limited privacy would be more opposed to

an integrated environment. Charles Moskos, creator of the DADT concept, argued that the ban protects the privacy rights of heterosexuals because "just as most men and women dislike being stripped of all privacy before the opposite sex, so do most heterosexuals dislike being exposed to homosexuals of their own sex."²⁷ To test that notion with the available survey data, service branch could be used as one possible indicator of a service member's level of privacy: ground troops in training exercises or on deployment would be more likely to have to share a "foxhole" or use group latrines or showers than those who do not deploy or who tend to serve in the "rear" or on ships where there are more established facilities. But service branch was not significantly associated with attitudes toward allowing open service: Army and Marine war veterans in this sample did not express any more support for the ban than did Air Force or Navy veterans. Also nonsignificant was whether one served in combat, combat support, or combat service support units, a distinction relevant for the ground forces, where people in the combat end of the spectrum are more likely to be the first to establish new camps and live away from major bases with individually divided facilities. Reported level of shower privacy also was not significantly associated with attitudes toward open service. These findings challenge the notion that privacy concerns engender support for the ban.

Comfort with and Knowledge of Lesbians and Gays and Attitudes toward Gay and Lesbian Service Members

As indicated in Table 5, three-quarters of those surveyed reported some level of comfort around lesbian and gay people (30 percent reported feeling very comfortable, 44 percent somewhat comfortable, 13 percent uncomfortable, and 4 percent very uncomfortable, with 8 percent not sure). Also, one-fifth of participants reported knowing a gay or lesbian person in their unit, with over half of these individuals reporting that the lesbian or gay person had personally disclosed to them and was well known to others (see Table 5). Because the survey did not ask about respondents' own sexual orientation, those who were the gay or lesbian unit member they were referencing cannot be distinguished from those who were referring to another unit member. Although we do not know the actual number of lesbian and gay service members or how many have disclosed their sexual orientation to others in their unit, these data clearly suggest that DADT has not kept all gay and lesbian service members "in the closet" as intended.

ANOVAs were used to examine the fourth research question and hypotheses that comfort with and knowledge of lesbians and gays would account for differences in attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian individuals to openly serve.²⁸ Significant main effects emerged for comfort with gay and lesbian persons in general and for personally knowing a lesbian or gay unit member (see Table 5). But among those who knew a gay or lesbian unit member, no significant difference emerged based on whether that person's sexual orientation was well known by others or based on whether the lesbian or gay unit member personally disclosed to the respondent. Follow-up

Table 5. Comparisons of Lesbian and Gay-Related Attitude and Experience Groups on Attitudes toward Allowing Lesbian and Gay Personnel to Openly Serve in the Military

Independent Variable	%	n	Level of Agreement ^a		df	F	Effect Size η_p^2
			M	SD			
"Personally, how comfortable are you in the presence of gays and lesbians?"					2,542	22.94**	.078
Very, somewhat comfortable	74	405	3.07 _a	1.25			
Uncomfortable, very uncomfortable	18	96	4.00 _{ab}	1.22			
Not sure	8	44	3.32 _b	0.71			
"Do you know for certain that someone is gay or lesbian in your unit?"					2,542	9.95**	.035
Yes	20	108	2.81 _a	1.41			
No	66	358	3.41 _a	1.21			
Not sure	15	79	3.15	1.08			
"Is the presence of gays or lesbians in the unit well-known by others?"					2,105	0.55	.010
Yes	53	57	2.95	1.44			
No	22	24	2.63	1.35			
Not sure	25	27	2.70	1.41			
Lesbian or gay person told you					1,106	0.07	.001
Yes	56	60	2.78	1.37			
No	44	48	2.85	1.47			

Note: Means with same subscripts are significantly different at $p < .05$.

a. Lower means indicate greater support for open service.

** $p < .02$.

comparisons revealed that those who indicated being very or somewhat comfortable in the presence of gay or lesbian people and those who were not sure of their level of comfort agreed with allowing open service more so than those who reported being uncomfortable or very uncomfortable. Follow-up comparisons also indicated that those who knew a lesbian or gay unit member agreed with allowing open service more so than those who did not know a gay or lesbian unit member (see Table 5). Effect sizes for these significant associations suggested that personal comfort accounted for about 8 percent and knowing a lesbian or gay unit member accounted for about 4 percent of variance in attitudes. As noted previously, political affiliation and rank—the demographic and military experience factors that yielded the biggest differences in

attitudes toward open service—accounted for about 6 percent and 3 percent of variance, respectively. Thus, among all of the demographic and military experience factors considered, war veterans' attitudes toward open service varied most according to their level of comfort with gay and lesbian people.

Knowing a Gay or Lesbian Unit Member and Unit Cohesion, Readiness, and Quality

Multivariate analysis of covariance (MANCOVA) was used to examine the fifth research question and hypotheses that quality of officers, NCOs, equipment, and training as well as knowing a lesbian or gay unit member each would account for unique differences in ratings of unit cohesion and readiness. Ratings of unit cohesion and readiness were the dependent variables, and knowing a gay or lesbian unit member (yes, no, unsure) was the independent variable. Ratings of the quality of officers, NCOs, training, and equipment were included as covariates. The survey questions assessing these variables along with the sample's averages are presented in Table 6. MANCOVA was appropriate for this analysis because ratings of cohesion and readiness, the two criterion variables, were correlated positively ($r = .51, p < .001$). The MANCOVA yielded the expected significant multivariate effects on cohesion and on readiness for each of the unity quality covariates but not for knowing a lesbian or gay person. Specifically, multivariate effects were significant for ratings of officer quality, $F(2, 524) = 37.22, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .124$, NCO quality, $F(2, 524) = 24.86, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .087$, training level, $F(2, 524) = 100.48, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .277$, and equipment available, $F(2, 524) = 43.20, p < .001, \eta_p^2 = .142$, but not for whether respondents knew that a gay or lesbian person was in the unit, $F(4, 1048) = 0.610, p = .656, \eta_p^2 = .002$.

Follow-up univariate results, with alpha adjusted to .025 (.05/2), indicated that ratings of the four unit quality variables were generally significantly associated with ratings of cohesion and readiness, with the exception that NCO ratings were not significantly related to ratings of readiness (see Table 7). Effect sizes indicated that ratings of leadership quality, that is, officers and NCOs, were substantially associated with perceived unit cohesion (accounting for 12 percent and 9 percent of variance, respectively) and that ratings of instrumental quality, that is, training and equipment, were substantially associated with perceived readiness (accounting for 28 percent and 13 percent of variance, respectively). Beyond these notable effects of leadership and instrument quality, knowing a lesbian or gay person did not have a significant unique multivariate (or univariate) effect, and the effect sizes for its links with cohesion and readiness were near 0 percent. Taken together, these findings suggest that a fruitful approach to fostering strong cohesion and readiness would be to direct military resources and efforts toward optimizing the quality of leadership, training, and equipment. Beyond the roles of these unit quality indicators, the present data indicate that the war veterans' ratings of unit cohesion or readiness were not associated with knowing a gay or lesbian unit member.

195

Table 6. Operationalization and Descriptive Statistics for Criterion Variables and Covariates

Variable and Survey Question	Rating Scale	M	SD
Attitudes toward open service			
"Do you agree or disagree with allowing gays and lesbians to serve openly in the military?"	1 = <i>strongly agree</i> to 5 = <i>strongly disagree</i>	3.26	1.26
Leadership quality			
"The NCOs in my unit are good leaders."	1 = <i>strongly agree</i> to 5 = <i>strongly disagree</i>	1.78	0.75
"The officers in my unit are good leaders."	1 = <i>strongly agree</i> to 5 = <i>strongly disagree</i>	2.08	0.93
Instrumental quality			
"How would you rate your unit's level of training for its wartime mission?"	1 = <i>very well trained</i> to 5 = <i>very poorly trained</i>	1.84	0.84
"How would you rate the equipment your unit has for its wartime mission?"	1 = <i>very well equipped</i> to 5 = <i>very poorly equipped</i>	2.24	0.95
Cohesion			
"There is a lot of teamwork and cooperation in my unit."	1 = <i>strongly agree</i> to 5 = <i>strongly disagree</i>	1.86	0.83
Readiness			
"How would you rate the readiness of your unit for its wartime mission?"	1 = <i>very high</i> to 5 = <i>very low</i>	1.92	0.86

Next, we examined whether the extent of knowledge within the unit and personal disclosure of sexual orientation were associated with perceptions of cohesion and readiness. Specifically, with those participants who reported knowing a lesbian or gay unit member, we conducted two auxiliary MANCOVAs to examine whether ratings of cohesion and readiness differed depending on (1) whether the presence of a gay or lesbian unit member was well known by others in the unit (yes, no, unsure) and (2) whether the lesbian or gay unit member personally disclosed to the respondent (yes, no). Again, ratings of officers, NCOs, training, and equipment were included as covariates. As in the previous analysis, multivariate effects were significant for each of the covariates but not for whether the presence of the gay or lesbian person was well known or whether the lesbian or gay person personally disclosed to the respondent. Follow-up univariate results were similar to the previously described findings with the full sample; that is, ratings of officers and NCOs were associated with perceptions of cohesion, ratings of training were associated with perceptions of readiness, and ratings of equipment were associated with both cohesion and readiness (details available from the first author). By contrast, neither the well-known presence of a lesbian or gay unit

Table 7. Follow-up Univariate ANOVAs for Levels of Readiness and Cohesion by Leadership Quality, Instrumental Quality, and Knowing a Lesbian or Gay Unit Member

Source	SS	df	MS	F	Effect Size η_p^2
Readiness					
Officer quality	2.30	1	2.30	7.82*	.015
NCO quality	0.40	1	0.40	1.36	.003
Training quality	59.05	1	59.05	201.02*	.277
Equipment quality	23.38	1	23.38	79.59*	.132
Know a lesbian or gay unit member	0.12	2	0.06	0.20	.001
Cohesion					
Officer quality	25.90	1	25.90	72.50*	.121
NCO quality	17.80	1	17.80	49.82*	.087
Training quality	2.91	1	2.91	8.15*	.015
Equipment quality	5.86	1	5.86	16.40*	.030
Know a lesbian or gay unit member	0.74	2	0.37	1.03	.004

Note: SS = Sum of squares; MS = Mean square.

* $p < .025$.

member nor personal disclosure of sexual orientation was significantly associated with ratings of cohesion or readiness.

Finally, with those participants who reported knowing a gay or lesbian unit member, we conducted two multivariate analyses of variance (MANOVAs) to examine whether the perceived impact of lesbian or gay unit members on personal morale and unit morale differed depending on (1) whether the presence of a gay or lesbian unit member was well known by others in the unit (yes, no, unsure) and (2) whether the lesbian or gay unit member personally disclosed to the respondent (yes, no). MANOVA was appropriate because ratings of personal and unit morale, the two criterion variables, were correlated positively ($r = .69, p < .001$). The multivariate effect was not significant for whether presence of a gay or lesbian unit member was well known by others but was nearly significant for whether that unit member personally disclosed to the respondent, $F(2, 98) = 3.06, p = .052, \eta_p^2 = .059$. Follow-up univariate analyses, with alpha adjusted to .025 (.05/2) indicated that perceived impact of the presence of the homosexual unit member on personal morale was more positive among participants who reported that they had been personally disclosed to ($M = 2.96, SD = 0.65$) than for those who had not ($M = 2.64, SD = 0.75$). The pattern of mean difference was the same for perceptions of impact on unit morale but did not reach statistical significance at the adjusted alpha level. Effect sizes indicated that personal disclosure accounted for approximately 5 percent of variance in each of personal and unit morale ratings.

As previously mentioned, the lack of unique association between knowing a lesbian or gay unit member and unit cohesion and readiness suggests that military efforts to screen out and remove personnel based on sexual orientation or to enforce concealment

may represent inefficient and ineffective uses of resources. The problematic nature of such efforts is further supported by the notable known presence of gay and lesbian personnel. Importantly, neither the well-known presence of lesbian or gay unit members nor personal disclosure to the respondent was associated with ratings of cohesion or readiness beyond the aforementioned unit quality indicators. The links of a well-known presence and a personal disclosure with personal and unit morale were also generally nonsignificant or reflected trends that gay or lesbian individuals' personal disclosure to the respondent was actually associated with more positive perceptions of impact on personal morale. Taken together, these findings are inconsistent with the assumptions underlying DADT, that the presence of lesbian or gay unit members, their open service, or their personal disclosure would harm unit cohesion, readiness, or morale.

Conclusions and Future Directions

The present study can inform discussions about the impact of gay and lesbian service members within the U.S. military by offering empirical data about the perspectives of military personnel who have served in war under DADT. Specifically, the present data build on other recent evidence showing declining support for the policy since its inception; 28 percent of the war veterans surveyed in this study opposed the ban, and 33 percent were neutral or not sure. These war veterans' views of the strongest arguments for and against the ban mirror arguments prominent in the public debates. The top endorsed argument in support of integration considered sexual orientation to be unrelated to job performance (38 percent), and the top endorsed argument against integration was the view that open gays and lesbians would harm unit cohesion (42 percent). Age group, racial/ethnic status, duty status (veteran, active duty, reserves), service branch, unit type (combat, combat support, combat service support), and shower privacy level were not significantly associated with attitudes toward allowing gay and lesbian personnel to openly serve; by contrast, gender, religious affiliation, political affiliation, years of service, rank, and prior training on the prevention of anti-gay harassment yielded small but significant effects.

About three-quarters of respondents indicated that they were personally comfortable in the presence of gays and lesbians. About 20 percent reported knowing a gay or lesbian person in their unit, and over half of these respondents indicated that the presence of the lesbian or gay person was well known by others in the unit. Feeling personally comfortable around gay and lesbian people and knowing a lesbian or gay unit member both were associated with opposing the ban. Analyses of these war veterans' ratings of unit cohesion and readiness revealed that knowing a gay or lesbian unit member was not uniquely associated with cohesion or readiness, but the quality of leaders, equipment, and training was. Thus, these data challenge the contention that openly serving lesbian and gay service members are detrimental to unit cohesion and readiness. Instead, the data point to the importance of leadership, training, and equipment quality for perceptions of unit cohesion and readiness. Fortunately, unlike the sexual orientation of service members, which the military cannot control, the military is well equipped to shape the quality of leadership, training, and equipment across its units.

198

Although the present findings can inform military policy and practice, it is important to consider these findings in light of some limitations. Specifically, as is the case with many survey studies, the present findings may reflect self-report bias. Perceptions and reports of military personnel are important and typical sources of data for informing military policy and practice. But studies that assess objective, observable indicators of cohesion and readiness and the actual presence of gay and lesbian service members would be useful. Such research would require identifying and linking lesbian and gay service members with the observed units, but DADT is a challenge to such research. An additional limitation is that the present data are cross-sectional. Thus, interpretations about direction of causality among the variables of interest cannot be made. The current policy precludes gathering of accurate identifying information about gay and lesbian service members or those who have served with them. Thus, tracking participants over time to collect longitudinal data that allow examination of prospective links among the variables of interest is not possible.

To address the limitations of the present study, efforts within the military to gather systematic data from randomly drawn samples about the presence of lesbian and gay personnel and their impact on objective indicators of unit cohesion, readiness, morale, and effectiveness would clearly be useful. Empirical data are critical for informing military policy and practice, and the present study represents a step in addressing the paucity of data addressing the rationale underlying DADT.

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Notes

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3. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum on Policy on Homosexual Conduct in the Armed Forces" (1993), <http://www.qrd.org/qrd/usa/military/1993/Aspin.Directive.On.Ban> (accessed May 1, 2007). As part of its effort to dissociate same-sex sexual orientation from

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4. Office of the Secretary of Defense, "Memorandum."
 5. Select demographic data on the armed forces are routinely posted by the Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute on its Web site, <http://www.deomi.org/EOEEOResources/DemographicReports.cfm>.
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 23. We cannot directly interpret the meaning of the third of the sample who selected the "neutral" option: they might not care about the issue either way, they might be unable to decide, or they might not feel they know enough about the issue to make a decision.
 24. Alpha for these analyses was adjusted to .005 (.05/12) to control for Type I error. Tukey's honestly significant difference follow-up comparisons were used to evaluate group differences underlying significant main effects. In the case of political party, the Games-Howell (GH) follow-up comparison was used because Levene's test of equality of error variances was significant, indicating unequal error variances across groups for this variable.
 25. Kerns and Fine, "Relation between Gender and Negative Attitudes"; Kite and Whitley, "Do Heterosexual Women and Men Differ in Their Attitudes towards Homosexuality?"; LaMar and Kite, "Sex Differences"; Schope and Eliason, "Thinking versus Acting."
 26. Effect sizes throughout this study reflect partial eta-squared η_p^2 , which is an indicator of the unique variance accounted for by a factor, while partialling out other factors included in the equation from the total nonerror variance. Charles A. Pierce, Richard A. Block, and Herman Aguinis, "Cautionary Note on Reporting Eta-Squared Values from Multifactor ANOVA Designs," *Educational and Psychological Measurement* 64 (2004): 916-24.
 27. Charles Moskos, Jr., "From Citizen's Army to Social Laboratory," in *Gays and Lesbians in the Military*, 64.
 28. Alpha for these tests was adjusted to .02 (.05/4) to control for Type I error. The GH follow-up comparison was used for comfort with gay and lesbian persons and for personal knowledge of gay and lesbian unit members because Levene's test of equality of error variances indicated unequal error variances across groups for these two variables.

Bios

Bonnie Moradi, PhD, is an associate professor of psychology at the University of Florida in Gainesville, FL. Her research focuses on minority stress experiences and mental health of women, racial/ethnic minority populations, and sexual minority populations.

Laura Miller, PhD, is a military sociologist at the RAND Corporation in Arlington, VA. Her research interests include military culture and organization, civil-military relations, service members' deployment experiences, and social inequality in the military.