

APPENDIX A

Homosexuals in the U.S. Military

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Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness

During the 1992 presidential campaign, Bill Clinton pledged to lift the ban on homosexuals in the U.S. armed services. Once in office, he met with enormous resistance from the U.S. military and its congressional allies, and by the summer of 1993, the original policy proposal was dead. Instead, Congress enacted the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue" policy: gays and lesbians can now serve in the military, but they must keep their sexual orientation private. Opponents of the open integration of gays and lesbians have discarded many of the standard justifications for excluding homosexuals from military service. For example, the Pentagon and its allies no longer argue that gays and lesbians are security risks because of the threat of blackmail. As early as 1957, a study commissioned by the U.S. Navy was unable to uncover any evidence that homosexuals were security risks.¹ Thirty years later, another Department of Defense (DoD) commissioned report repeated this finding.² Since [1957] no new data have been presented that would refute [the] conclusion that homosexuals are not greater security risks than heterosexuals."² Nor do opponents of allowing homosexu-

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1. The Crittenden report, officially entitled *Report of the Board Appointed to Prepare and Submit Recommendations to the Secretary of the Navy for the Revision of Policies, Procedures, and Directives Dealing with Homosexuals*, is discussed in General Accounting Office (GAO), *DOD's Policy on Homosexuality: Report to Congressional Requester on Defense Force Management* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, B-247235, June 1992), p. 30.
 2. Theodore R. Sarbin and Kenneth E. Karola, *Nonconforming Sexual Orientation in the Military and Society* (Washington, D.C.: Defense Personnel Security Research and Education Center, PERS-TR-89-002, December 1988), p. 29 (known as the *PERSEREC report*).

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als to serve openly argue that gays and lesbians are poor soldiers. For example, although both the former chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Colin Powell and the renowned military sociologist Charles Moskos oppose the open integration of homosexuals in the military, they acknowledge that gays and lesbians are effective soldiers.³ Discharge proceedings against homosexuals are filled with testimony of many of these individuals' outstanding records, dependability, and dedication to their jobs.⁴

The issue is not whether gays and lesbians are good soldiers as *individuals*, but instead, the effect of these individuals on the group. Opponents of lifting all restrictions on homosexual service argue that the open integration of gays and lesbians would block the development of *primary group cohesion*, which they say is critical to military effectiveness.⁵ During the 1993 congressional hearings on homosexuality in the military, both Senate and House testimony focused on the issue of unit cohesion. In July 1993, for example, then Senator Sam Nunn (D-Ga.), chairman of the Senate Armed Services Committee, asked each of the six joint chiefs of staff to discuss unit cohesion and its significance in developing combat capability.⁶ Army Chief of Staff General Gordon R. Sullivan responded that "cohesion is enhanced by uniformity, by adherence to a common sense of values and behavior. The introduction into any small unit

3. U.S. House of Representatives, Committee on Armed Services, *Assessment of the Plan to Lift the Ban on Homosexuals in the Military*, July 21, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1994), p. 31; and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "From Citizens' Army to Social Laboratory," *Wilson Quarterly*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Winter 1993), p. 93.

4. ~~U.S. District Judge Thomas Zilly~~; ~~Margaret Cammermeyer~~, Plaintiff, v. Les Aspin, Secretary of Defense, et al., Defendants, "850 Federal Supplement (Washington, D.C., June 1, 1994), pp. 912-913, 922; Randy Shiltz, *Conduct Unbecoming: Gays and Lesbians in the U.S. Military* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1993), pp. 218-219, 242, 309, 397; and the section "Examples of Expulsions for Which Performance Was Not an Issue," in GAO, *DOD's Policy on Homosexuality*, pp. 46-53.

5. A "primary group" is a small group characterized by intimate face-to-face relations. Charles H. Cooley first used the term in 1909 in *Social Organization: A Study of the Larger Mind* (New York: C. Scribner's, 1909). In 1950 Leon Festinger and his colleagues at the Research Center for Group Dynamics at the University of Michigan developed the most widely used definition of cohesion: "The resultant of all the forces acting on all the members to remain in the group." Laurel W. Oliver, *Cohesion Research: Conceptual and Methodological Issues*, Research Note 90-133 (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences [ARI], September 1990), p. 2. Although "primary group cohesion" and "esprit de corps" are both group concepts, "primary group cohesion" refers to the cohesion within a small group, whereas "esprit de corps" is a sense of group identity or pride in a larger collectivity such as a regiment. In contrast, "morale" is an individual-level phenomenon and refers to an individual's well-being or self-satisfaction. Larry H. Ingraham and Frederick J. Manning, "Cohesion—Who Needs It, What Is It, and How Do We Get It to Them?" *Military Review*, Vol. 61, No. 6 (1981), pp. 6-7.

6. U.S. Senate, Committee on Armed Services, *Policy Concerning Homosexuality in the Armed Forces*, July 20, 1993 (Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1995), p. 710.

of a person whose open orientation and self-definition is diametrically opposed to the rest of the group will cause tension and disruption."⁷

Senior U.S. military officers worried that the open integration of homosexuals would hinder the development of cohesion within small groups. "Those who engage in conduct that is inconsistent with those of the group are not trusted or respected," explained Powell and Admiral David Jeremiah, vice chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and "in an atmosphere of distrust, orders may not be carried out and commonplace friendly gestures that promote camaraderie—everyday youthful horseplay and rough-housing, a pat on the back or an arm around the shoulder—become suspect, arouse fear or aversion, and destroy group cohesion."⁸ Powell explained that "to win wars, we create cohesive teams of warriors who will bond so tightly that they are prepared to go into battle and give their lives if necessary. . . . We cannot allow anything to happen which would disrupt that feeling of cohesion within the force."⁹ Air Force Chief of Staff General Merrill McPeak put it most bluntly: "Open homosexuals would paralyze a unit, and degrade unit cohesion and erode combat effectiveness."¹⁰ In his opening statement during the 1993 Senate hearings, Senator Nunn claimed that U.S. national security was at stake: "When the interests of some individuals bear upon the cohesion and effectiveness of an institution upon which our national security depends, we must, in my view, move very cautiously."¹¹

Much of the debate about homosexuals in the military starts with the premise that U.S. policy must represent some balance or compromise between two competing ideals: guaranteeing civil rights and maintaining military effectiveness. ~~Large that no such compromise is necessary. Senator Nunn's caution was understandable, but misplaced. American policymakers are not facing a trade-off between national defense and civil rights; the open integration of gays and lesbians would not disrupt unit cohesion or undermine military performance.~~ The argument about unit cohesion is based on two propositions: (1) that primary group cohesion enhances military effectiveness, and (2) that ~~openly gay and lesbian personnel would disrupt unit cohesion and thus military performance. These propositions are wrong.~~ They do not reflect what social science research and experience have demonstrated about the rela-

7. *Ibid.*, p. 762.

8. *Ibid.*, p. 761.

9. *Ibid.*, p. 708.

10. *Ibid.*, p. 762.

11. U.S. Senate, *Policy Concerning Homosexuality*, March 29, 1993, p. 3.

tionship between cohesion and performance and the effect of integrating previously excluded groups on primary group cohesion. Abolishing discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the U.S. armed forces ~~would advance civil rights and military readiness.~~

I begin this article with an overview of the sources of military effectiveness and the U.S. Army's policies and attitudes toward unit cohesion. I then focus on the two theoretical puzzles that are central to the rationale for the current U.S. military policy toward homosexuals. First, I draw on an extensive body of research in the social sciences that challenges the proposition that unit cohesion is critical to military effectiveness. Quantitative, experimental, historical, and sociological studies have not found a causal link leading from cohesion to performance. Indeed, group cohesion can diminish an organization's performance. Second, I address the claim that the open integration of homosexuals would undermine primary group cohesion. Again, social science provides little support for this proposition. Cohesion develops easily and is primarily a function of situational and structural factors—not the characteristics of individual members of the group. To the extent that shared attitudes and beliefs contribute to cohesion, they encourage the development of the type of cohesion—social cohesion, or a sense of cohesion based on interpersonal attraction—that is least likely to enhance performance. These social scientific findings about the sources of unit cohesion and its relationship to performance correspond to findings from practical experiences. ~~It provides evidence from studies of racial and gender integration in the U.S. military as well as the integration of homosexuals in foreign military organizations and organizations similar to the military.~~ This evidence demonstrates that previously segregated groups can be integrated into military organizations without disrupting unit cohesion and military effectiveness. Indeed, it appears that open integration of homosexuals would increase military readiness. I conclude with a set of policy implications that follow from this analysis.

Military Effectiveness

Primary group cohesion is only one of many factors that may influence a military's performance. Political, strategic, operational, and tactical factors such as the quality of training, intelligence, and supply capabilities, as well as the military's objectives and strategy, contribute to battlefield effectiveness. In addition, many other factors besides primary group cohesion affect an individual's combat motivation. Leadership is one of the most important. Socio-

logical and social psychological studies of combat during World War II found that leaders were critical in fostering motivation: surveys of enlisted men in the Pacific found that those with favorable attitudes toward their commanding officers were more likely to be ready for further combat than those who expressed consistently negative beliefs.¹² Contemporary studies continue to stress leadership as a key factor in inspiring soldiers in combat and ensuring that primary groups' goals correspond with those of the larger organization. Some analysts, for example, attribute the U.S. Army's disintegration in Vietnam to failures of leadership.¹³ Lessons from the Vietnam War, and to a lesser extent the 1982 Israeli invasion of Lebanon, have encouraged analysts to revisit the role of ideology, patriotism, and a belief in the legitimacy of the war in motivating soldiers in combat. This can range from an explicit ideological commitment, as discussed in James McPherson's work on the American Civil War, to what Moskos termed "latent ideology," or an underlying commitment to the purpose of the war.¹⁴ Still other analysts discuss the roles of religion and hate as helping to sustain soldiers in combat and to link primary groups to the goals of the formal organization.¹⁵

Although the rationale for excluding open homosexuals from the U.S. armed forces is based on their purported negative effect on primary group cohesion, the U.S. military does not devote much attention to the development of unit cohesion. In fact, some of the fundamental components of its personnel policies are not designed to enhance unit cohesion. For example, unlike the British system in which soldiers remain in the same regiment for their entire career,

12. Samuel A. Stouffer, Arthur A. Lumsdaine, Marion Harper Lumsdaine, Robin M. Williams, Jr., Brewster Smith, Irving L. Janis, Shirley A. Star, and Leonard S. Cottrell, Jr., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2, *Combat and Its Aftermath* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1949), pp. 118-127, esp. p. 125; see also Edward A. Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 12 (Summer 1948), p. 281.

13. Robert B. Smith, "Why Soldiers Fight. Part 1. Leadership, Cohesion, and Fighter Spirit," *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 18 (1983), pp. 16-22; and Paul L. Savage and Richard A. Gabriel, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the American Army," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 2, No. 3 (May 1976), pp. 340-376.

14. James M. McPherson, *What They Fought For, 1861-1865* (New York: Anchor Books, 1994); and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., *The American Enlisted Man* (New York: Russell Sage, 1970), pp. 134-156. Shils and Janowitz had stressed the German soldier's devotion to Hitler ("Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," p. 304); and John Dollard had looked at the role of ideology in the Lincoln Brigade in the Spanish Civil War in *Fear in Battle* (New Haven, Conn.: Yale University Press, 1943).

15. Samuel J. Watson, "Religion and Combat Motivation in the Confederate Armies," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 58, No. 1 (January 1994), pp. 29-55; and John A. Ballard and Alecia J. McDowell, "Hate and Combat Behavior," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 17, No. 2 (Winter 1991), pp. 229-241.

the U.S. Army trains, assigns, and deploys its soldiers as individuals. Small units have high personnel turnover rates: indeed, some units have as much as 45 percent turnover annually. Cohesion develops, but it is largely unregulated by higher authorities.¹⁶ During World War II, for example, recruits were trained in the United States, sent overseas, and then parceled out as individuals according to the needs of units in the field. Soldiers could become casualties before other men in the unit knew their names, and upon recovery, wounded soldiers were often not returned to the unit where they had previously served and developed ties.¹⁷ ~~This personnel system often referred to as unit assembly~~ ~~parts approach, is periodically critiqued for undermining unit cohesion.~~ The U.S. Army has experimented with more unit-based systems, but it has not changed its personnel policy. It continues to emphasize the material components of military performance such as industrial power and superior technology while downplaying the more social aspects such as primary group cohesion. In comparing the American system with other Western armies, a report from the Walter Reed Army Institute of Research (WRAIR) explained that "the American army placed increased emphasis on the individual and on managerial efficiency rather than on unit cohesion. . . . Easily measurable, strength could be affected by sound management while, as an intangible, unit cohesion was forgotten."¹⁸

Despite the Pentagon's continual reference to unit cohesion in debates about homosexuals in the military, during day-to-day operations U.S. military officers' attitudes and behavior do not reflect a concern with the development of primary group cohesion. In the early 1980s, for example, the U.S. Army experimented with a unit rotation system called COHORT in which company- and later battalion-sized units were recruited, trained, and assigned as units for their first three-year tour. WRAIR monitored and evaluated the program and conducted extensive surveys and interviews of participants; it found that cohesion increased in the stabilized units, but it also found that battalion staff and company-level leaders did not value unit cohesion. According to WRAIR, "Military cohesion has not been valued as a combat multiplier in the U.S.

16. James Griffith, "The Army's New Unit Personnel Replacement and Its Relationship to Unit Cohesion and Social Support," *Military Psychology*, Vol. 1 (1989), pp. 17-19; and J.D. Buck Wray, "Replacements Back on the Road at Last," *Military Review*, Vol. 67, No. 5 (May 1987), pp. 46-51.
17. Samuel J. Newland, "Manning the Force German-Style," *Military Review*, Vol. 67, No. 5 (May 1987), p. 42.

18. Peter W. Kozumplik, "Comparative Wartime Replacement Systems," in David H. Marlowe, ed., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation: Technical Report No. 4* (Washington, D.C.: WRAIR, December 1986), p. 44. The U.S. Army also does little to develop an esprit de corps or identification with the regiment or larger unit.

Army."¹⁹ WRAIR's interviews and observations revealed "very little appreciation . . . regarding the importance of capitalizing on buddy knowledge to enhance unit cohesion."²⁰ Commanders ignored the possibilities that COHORT provided: "Virtually every small-unit leader reported that if the assignment of replacements were up to him, he would assign replacements as individuals rather than in pairs or groups. The leaders contended that replacements could not and should not be assigned in order to build cohesion, but rather to the squad that had the greatest numerical need."²¹ In explaining why high-ranking officers appeared unconcerned about the central reason for the development of COHORT units, one of WRAIR's final technical reports explained that in the U.S. Army, "cohesion is presumed to be a by-product, not a core goal leaders need be trained to create and maintain."²² "There is," WRAIR explained, "no commitment in the Army to building and maintaining group cohesion."²³

Because unit cohesion is only one of many factors that may contribute to military effectiveness, and because U.S. Army officers and personnel policy are indifferent to the development of primary group cohesion, there are reasons to doubt its importance. This raises the issue of exactly what the relationship between unit cohesion and military performance is.

Unit Cohesion and Military Effectiveness

Studies of World War II established the conventional wisdom that primary group cohesion is the main factor motivating soldiers in combat. Reacting against the belief that devotion to National Socialism explained the German soldier's determined resistance, Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz's classic study concluded that solidarity with one's comrades, not belief in a cause, motivated the German soldier. "As long as [the German soldier] felt himself to be a member of his primary group," they explained, "his soldierly achievement was likely to be good."²⁴ This lesson was also taken away from studies of the U.S. Army in World War II. The four-volume work edited by Samuel

19. Department of Military Psychiatry, *Evaluation of the Unit Manning System: Lessons Learned to Date* (Washington, D.C.: WRAIR, 1987), p. 1.

20. "Executive Summary," in Marlowe, *Unit Manning System: Technical Report No. 4*, p. 3.

21. Robert J. Schneider, Paul Bartone, Theodore Waz, Michael McGee, and David Hoppengardner, "Unit Reconstitution in a Wartime Scenario," in Marlow, *Unit Manning System: Technical Report No. 4*, p. 56.

22. Faris R. Kirkland and Linette R. Sparacino, eds., *Unit Manning System Field Evaluation: Technical Report No. 5* (Washington, D.C.: WRAIR, 1987), p. 2.

23. Schneider et al., "Unit Reconstitution in a Wartime Scenario," p. 57.

24. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," p. 284.

Stouffer, *The American Soldier*, underscored the central importance of camaraderie in small combat groups: "The men get close-knit together," an infantryman explained. "They depend on each other—wouldn't do anything to let the rest of them down. They'd rather be killed than do that."²⁵ Samuel Marshall's *Men against Fire* echoed this view, and the French combat officer and military theorist Colonel Ardant du Picq had eloquently expressed a similar opinion in his discussion of the role of unit cohesion a century ago.²⁶

CORRELATION OR CAUSATION?

The results from more than five decades of research in group dynamics, organizational behavior, small-group research, sports psychology, social psychology, military history, and military sociology challenge the proposition that primary group unit cohesion enhances military performance.²⁷ This conclusion has three parts. First, despite an enormous amount of research on both military and nonmilitary groups, researchers disagree about whether a correlation exists between cohesion and performance. In 1972 a well-known literature review asked, "How can one continue to believe that productivity and cohesiveness are positively related when the results of competent research indicate that in many cases the opposite is true?"²⁸ Two decades later, little has changed: a 1996 review stated that the "topic of cohesiveness is still very much an unsettled concern in the literature."²⁹ At best, several recent meta-analyses provide evidence for a modest positive correlation between cohesion and performance.³⁰

25. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2, p. 136.

26. S.L.A. Marshall, *Men against Fire* (New York: William Morrow, 1947), p. 161; and Ardant du Picq, *Battle Studies: Ancient and Modern* (Harrisburg, Penn.: Military Service Publishing, 1958), p. 29.

27. For a comprehensive analysis and literature review of the experimental and quantitative research on cohesion, see Robert J. MacCoun, "What Is Known about Unit Cohesion and Military Performance," in RAND, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy: Options and Assessment* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND/National Defense Research Institute, MR-323-OSD, 1993), pp. 283-331, 490-506; and Robert J. MacCoun, "Sexual Orientation and Military Cohesion: A Critical Review of the Evidence," in Gregory M. Herek, Jared B. Jobe, and Ralph M. Carney, eds., *Out In Force: Sexual Orientation and the Military* (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996), pp. 157-176.

28. Ralph Stogdill, "Group Productivity, Drive, and Cohesiveness," *Organizational Behavior and Human Performance*, Vol. 8, No. 1 (August 1972), p. 26.

29. Richard A. Guzzo and Marcus W. Dickson, "Teams in Organizations: Recent Research on Performance and Effectiveness," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 47 (1996), pp. 307-338, quotation on p. 310.

30. A meta-analysis is a statistical technique that integrates many different studies by converting research results from a set of studies into a common metric that can then be combined across studies to derive generalizations about the entire sample of studies. For discussion, see John E. Hunter, Frank L. Schmidt, and Gregg B. Jackson, *Meta-analysis: Cumulating Research Findings across*

Second, even those studies that have uncovered a correlation between cohesion and performance have not determined the causal relationship. Most of the quantitative and experimental studies are not designed to establish the direction of causality; a recent meta-analysis that found a positive relationship between cohesion and performance referred to the issue of causality as "a looming question."³¹ However, the more the experimental and quantitative studies take timing into consideration, the more support there is for the hypothesis that the causal direction runs from success to cohesion, *not* from cohesion to success: studies of the influence of performance on cohesion have yielded consistently strong positive relationships. As an analyst who studied ROTC rifle teams put it, "It is relatively simple for people to be friendly and happy when the situation is rewarding."³² Historical and sociological studies of military units have replicated this finding. A study of unit cohesion in the German Army during World War II, for example, found no evidence that cohesion led to military effectiveness: it was the German Army's superior military performance (military skill and exceptional organization and training) that led to cohesion, not the other way around.³³

Third, scholars working outside of the quantitative and experimental literature have also cast doubt on the proposition that primary group cohesion increases military effectiveness. For example, Charles Moskos explained that "the very ubiquity of primary groups in military organizations . . . leaves unanswered the question of why various armies—independent of training and equipment—perform differently in times of war."³⁴ A later article that Moskos coauthored with a colonel in the U.S. Army suggested that primary groups were becoming even less important in explaining combat performance in the all-volunteer force.³⁵ Military historians have also challenged previous claims

Studies (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1982). For a review of the recent meta-analyses of cohesion and performance, see Brian Mullen and Carolyn Copper, "The Relation between Group Cohesiveness and Performance: An Integration," *Psychological Bulletin*, Vol. 115, No. 2 (March 1994); see also "Cohesion Research: Do Cohesive Groups Win, or Does Winning Produce Cohesion?" (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. ARL, 1998). <http://98.97.199.12/cohesion.htm>.

31. Mullen and Copper, "The Relation between Group Cohesiveness and Performance," p. 215.
32. Albert Myers, "Team Competition, Success, and the Adjustment of Group Members," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 65, No. 5 (November 1962), p. 330.

33. W. Victor Madej, "Effectiveness and Cohesion of the German Ground Forces in World War II," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, Vol. 6, No. 2 (Fall 1978), pp. 233–248.

34. Moskos, *The American Enlisted Man*, p. 147; see also Stephen D. Westbrook, "The Potential for Military Disintegration," in Sam C. Sarkesian, ed., *Combat Effectiveness: Cohesion, Stress, and the Volunteer Military* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1980), pp. 244–278.

35. Charles W. Brown and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "The American Volunteer Soldier: Will He Fight?" *Military Review*, Vol. 56, No. 6 (June 1976), p. 16.

about the role of primary group cohesion in combat motivation. Omer Bartov, for example, in his study of German soldiers on the eastern front in World War II, reached conclusions very different from that of Shils and Janowitz. Bartov argued that primary groups cannot explain German soldiers' motivation because, given the devastating losses sustained by the German forces, *there were no primary groups*. With casualty figures in some units averaging 98 percent for enlisted men and 194 percent for officers, "raw recruits . . . suffered heavy losses . . . without ever having an opportunity to get to know their comrades." Yet they kept on fighting.³⁶ Echoing Moskos's earlier comment, a historical analysis of the Confederate armies in the Civil War argued that the exaggerated importance given to group cohesion makes it difficult to explain variation in combat performance. As this historian put it, "In its blunter popular forms, the stress on 'not letting your buddies down' is a virtual caricature."³⁷

This skepticism about the importance of primary group cohesion accords with the views of some of the first scholars to study combat motivation in World War II. On the fortieth anniversary of the publication of *The American Soldier*, Robin Williams, a principal contributor to the chapter on combat motivation, stressed that subsequent analyses have given "disproportionate attention" to primary groups. Williams pointed out that the volume on combat also dealt at length with other sources of combat motivation such as the role of leadership, ideology, self-interest, and institutional rewards and penalties.³⁸ Indeed, the original volume warned against placing too much emphasis on unit cohesion. In a section that begins "It is important to avoid any one-sided interpretation of the social forces that kept men in combat," the researchers stressed—like Bartov fifty years later—that enormous casualty figures often minimized the importance of primary group cohesion. In the data itself, "solidarity with the group" is not as important as often assumed. When enlisted infantrymen in a veteran division were asked what was most important in keeping them going, 39 percent responded "ending the task"; 14 percent "solidarity with the group"; 10 percent "by thoughts of home"; and 9 percent out of "a sense of duty and self respect." These surveys were conducted after

36. Omer Bartov, "Daily Life and Motivation in War: The Wehrmacht in the Soviet Union," *Journal of Strategic Studies*, Vol. 12, No. 2 (June 1989), pp. 201–202; for a similar conclusion, see Stephen G. Fritz, "We Are Trying . . . to Change the Face of the World—Ideology and Motivation in the Wehrmacht on the Eastern Front: The View from Below," *Journal of Military History*, Vol. 60, No. 4 (October 1996), p. 690.

37. Watson, "Religion and Combat Motivation," p. 31.

38. Robin M. Williams, Jr., "The American Soldier: An Assessment, Several Wars Later," *Public Opinion Quarterly*, Vol. 53, No. 2 (Summer 1989), p. 165.

the fact and may reflect what soldiers would like to believe was the reason for their actions: that loyalty to others, not fear of punishment, motivated their actions.³⁹ In addition, the surveys of individuals' attitudes were only occasionally related to indirect observations of group performance. *The American Soldier* provides little evidence that cohesive groups actually fought better than less cohesive ones.⁴⁰

GROUP COHESION AND DYSFUNCTIONAL BEHAVIOR

Research on the relationship between cohesion and performance provides at least two reasons why primary group cohesion may be as likely to undermine performance as enhance it. First, group cohesion can check the effectiveness of the *larger organization* of which the group is a part. Second, group cohesion can hinder the task performance of the *group itself*.

• PRIMARY GROUP OPPOSITION TO ORGANIZATIONAL NORMS. Group cohesion can limit organizational performance when it encourages the primary group to pursue goals that are at odds with those of the formal organization. Students of industrial relations have often pointed to this phenomenon: employers fear that individuals in highly cohesive work groups will feel compelled to produce at a group norm that limits productivity. One analyst called this the "dark side of cohesion," and it can take on especially ominous forms in the military.⁴¹ Fraggings is an extreme example. Dubbed "fraggings" during the Vietnam War because of the frequent use of fragmentation grenades, these violent assaults on U.S. military officers were occasionally carried out by individual soldiers pursuing a personal vendetta, but over 80 percent of the fraggings in Vietnam were part of a carefully planned *group* activity. Individuals talked to one another, providing support and encouragement, and collected bounties of cash donations. A chilling ritual often accompanied this group activity: the target would be warned what to expect if he did not change his behavior. First, a smoke grenade would be rolled into his sleeping or working area; then, a tear-gas grenade; and finally, a fragmentation grenade. In the words of one psychiatrist, "The prevalence and openness with which the assault of a superior

39. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 2, pp. 100-102, 106, 108.

40. Similarly, Marshall's data showed that primary group relations were important to soldiers in combat—not that soldiers to whom it was important fought better. Marshall's data were not as systematically collected as he implied. See Roger J. Spiller, "S.L.A. Marshall and the Ratio of Fire," *Royal United Services Institute Journal*, Vol. 133, No. 4 (Winter 1988), pp. 63-71.

41. Nora Kinzer Stewart, *Mates and Muchachos: Unit Cohesion in the Falklands/Malvinas War* (Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1991), p. 18.

was discussed by the troops provides an atmosphere that approached positive sanction for such actions."⁴² As Moskos explained, "It is an irony of sorts that the primary group processes that appeared to sustain combat soldiers in World War II are close cousins to the social processes that underlaid the vast majority of fraggings in Vietnam."⁴³

Group cohesion can also encourage an active drug subculture, antiwar activities, and collective acts of indiscipline. "Drug use is a *social activity*," explained an analyst of the Vietnam War, "and it was drug use which formed the basis of *solidarity* in many cases for some small groups in the army."⁴⁴ Shils and Janowitz also discussed this "darker side of cohesion" and, in particular, the role that it played in large-scale desertion. Many Wehrmacht soldiers, for example, claimed that they were able to desert because they had discussed it with their comrades and had received some form of support. Indeed, during the last stages of World War II, the Allies were able to use soldiers who had been "good comrades" to encourage group surrenders; after being captured, these soldiers were sent back to the German line to convince their fellow soldiers to desert.⁴⁵ A study of desertion in the Confederate Army during the American Civil War uncovered a similar phenomenon. During the second half of the conflict, desertion rates were highest in those companies *recruited on a local basis*; homogeneity and cohesion encouraged desertion—not devotion to the Southern cause.⁴⁶ These actions hurt combat performance, and they occurred because primary groups did not share the goals of the larger organization—not because of the absence of primary groups.

These examples underscore the indeterminacy of group cohesion. Primary group cohesion can undermine organizational effectiveness if the group does not share the goals of the larger organization. Several analysts argue that during the last few years of the Vietnam War, unit cohesion was more likely to reinforce dissent rather than commitment to the goals of the U.S. military. Groups developed their own normative systems that challenged those of the

42. Thomas Bond, "The Why of Fraggings," *American Journal of Psychiatry*, Vol. 133, No. 11 (November 1976), p. 1330. See also *ibid.*, pp. 1328–1329; and Robert B. Smith, "Why Soldiers Fight: Part 2. Alternative Theories," *Quality and Quantity*, Vol. 18 (1983), pp. 33–58.

43. Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Surviving the War in Vietnam," in Charles R. Filey and Seymour Leventman, eds., *Strangers at Home: Vietnam Veterans since the War* (New York: Praeger, 1980), p. 80.

44. John H. Faris, "An Alternative Perspective to Savage and Gabriel," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 3, No. 3 (May 1977), p. 461 (emphasis added).

45. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," pp. 286–287.

46. Peter S. Bearman, "Desertion as Localism: Army Unit Solidarity and Group Norms in the U.S. Civil War," *Social Forces*, Vol. 70, No. 2 (December 1991), pp. 321–342.

larger organization; as one military analyst explained, these alternative values and goals made "certain acts of resistance feasible that would not have been possible when the non-obligated individual was still isolated."⁴⁷

SOCIAL VERSUS TASK COHESION. The distinction between task cohesion and social cohesion helps explain how cohesion can limit a group's performance. Social cohesion, or affective bonding, refers to interpersonal attraction or "the nature and quality of emotional bonds of friendship, liking, caring, and closeness among group members." Groups are socially cohesive to the extent that members enjoy one another's company and share an emotional closeness. Task cohesion, or instrumental bonding, refers to a "shared commitment among members to achieving a goal that requires the collective efforts of the group."⁴⁸ Unlike the inconclusive results from studies of the relationship between cohesion and performance, researchers are finding consistently positive relationships between task cohesion and performance, but not between social cohesion and performance. Both individual studies of military groups and meta-analyses confirm this finding.⁴⁹ For example, a recent meta-analysis of more than two hundred studies reported that the relationship between cohesion and performance is the result of a commitment to the goals of the group, not interpersonal attraction.⁵⁰

Soldiers understand this distinction. A survey of the U.S. Army found that although soldiers believe cohesion is important in combat, they do not equate it with friendship. "I don't like Smedley, and Smedley doesn't like me," one private explained. "But we know what each other can do, and we'd rather go to war together than with some hotshot we don't know."⁵¹ Organizational theorists have long warned managers not to assume that cohesive groups improve productivity. In socially cohesive groups, individuals often devote their energies to maintaining interpersonal relations rather than achieving the group's tasks; the most efficient groups are often ones that indulge in the least social activity. Patterns of interpersonal communication, for example, differ in socially cohesive and task-cohesive groups: discussion is frequent in socially cohesive groups, whereas conversation in task-cohesive groups is limited to

47. Westbrook, "The Potential for Military Disintegration," p. 258; see also Moskos, "Surviving the War in Vietnam," p. 82; and Faris, "An Alternative Perspective," pp. 457-461.

48. MacCoun, "What Is Known about Unit Cohesion," p. 291.

49. For an extensive review of the research on social and task cohesion, see *ibid.*, pp. 290-293.

50. Joseph Psotka, "Cohesion Research: Do Cohesive Groups Win, or Does Winning Produce Cohesion?" *Newsletter: U.S. Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences* (Winter 1995), <http://198.97.199.12/cohesion.htm>.

51. Kirkland and Sparacino, *Unit Manning System: Technical Report No. 5*, pp. 14-15.

what is necessary to achieve the group's goals.⁵² Indeed, a report prepared for the DoD warned against "too much affective cohesion [because it] might interfere with the critical appraisal of performance that is needed to maintain quality output, as members become concerned with supporting each other and raising group morale instead of concentrating on the task at hand."⁵³ Members of socially cohesive groups may also hesitate to correct the actions of group members or may become overconfident in the group's abilities. Tests of crew performance found that "battle-rostering" (assigning aviation crews to work together for extended periods of time) often leads to overconfident crews. The best way to improve performance, these researchers found, is through increased standardized training—not team familiarity.⁵⁴ In addition, although group cohesiveness can hinder quality decisionmaking, this effect is most likely when social cohesion, or interpersonal attraction, is strong; in contrast, poor decisionmaking is less likely when task cohesion is high.⁵⁵

To summarize, fifty years of research in several disciplines has failed to uncover persuasive evidence for the first proposition used to defend the discriminatory policy toward homosexuals in the U.S. armed forces: that there is a causal relationship leading from primary group cohesion to military effectiveness. Recent meta-analyses have found a modest correlation between task cohesion and performance, but they have not established causality. Cohesion may be unrelated to performance; it may increase performance; it may be a product of performance; or it may undermine performance. This evidence alone, coupled with the U.S. Army's indifference to developing unit cohesion, raises serious doubts about the rationale for barring openly gay and lesbian personnel from military service. If cohesive groups do not enhance military performance, then we need not worry if the presence of homosexuals affects group cohesion. However, because the evidence is ambiguous and some ana-

52. Aharon Tziner, "Differential Effects of Group Cohesiveness Types: A Clarifying Overview," *Social Behavior and Personality*, Vol. 10, No. 2 (1982), pp. 231–232; and Kurt W. Back, "Influence through Communication," *Journal of Abnormal and Social Psychology*, Vol. 46 (1951), pp. 9–23.

53. James P. Kahan, Noreen Webb, Richard J. Shavelson, and Ross M. Stolzberg, *Individual Characteristics and Unit Performance: A Review of Research and Methods* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, R-3194-MIL, 1985), p. 81.

54. D.K. Leedom and R. Simon, "Improving Team Coordination: A Case for Behavior-Based Training," *Military Psychology*, Vol. 7, No. 2 (1995), pp. 109–122.

55. Paul R. Bernthal and Chester A. Insko, "Cohesiveness without Groupthink: The Interactive Effects of Social and Task Cohesion," *Group and Organization Management*, Vol. 18, No. 1 (March 1993), pp. 66–87; and Brian Mullen, Tara Anthony, Eduardo Salas, and James E. Driskell, "Group Cohesiveness and the Quality of Decision-Making: An Integration of Tests of the Groupthink Hypothesis," *Small Group Research*, Vol. 25, No. 2 (May 1994), pp. 189–204.

lysts do argue that unit cohesion enhances military effectiveness, the next section examines the second part of the rationale for the Pentagon's discriminatory policy toward homosexuals that openly gay and lesbian personnel would degrade unit cohesion and undermine military performance.

Gays and Lesbians, and Unit Cohesion

Social science research on the sources of primary group cohesion challenges the proposition that the open integration of gays and lesbians (or as General Sullivan put it, the presence of others with apparently different values and behavior) would disrupt unit cohesion. Dissimilar values and attitudes do not hinder the formation of the type of cohesion that may contribute to performance, and cohesion develops easily regardless of the characteristics of individual members. In addition, the experiences of African Americans, women, and homosexuals show that organizations, including the U.S. military, can effectively integrate previously excluded or segregated groups without undermining unit cohesion.

SOCIAL COHESION VERSUS TASK COHESION AND PERFORMANCE

Quantitative and experimental studies of the relationship between performance and task cohesion and social cohesion suggest that the open integration of gays and lesbians would not degrade military effectiveness. Researchers have discovered that social cohesion has a negative, or no, relationship to performance, whereas task cohesion is correlated with performance.³ This finding means that the type of cohesion that may be related to performance (task cohesion) is also the type of cohesion that the introduction of individuals with different values and attitudes would not disrupt. The sense of group cohesion based on "teamwork" has little to do with whether the members enjoy one another's company, share an emotional bond, or feel part of some "brotherhood of soldiers." It is only the sense of group cohesion based on mutual friendship, or social cohesion, that relates to the need for similar values and attitudes among members. In other words, it is the component of cohesion based on interpersonal attraction that is both most likely to arise within a homogeneous group and least likely to contribute to military effectiveness. Indeed, to the extent that social cohesion has any effect, it is more likely to undermine a group's effectiveness. The implications are clear: selecting group members on the basis of expected interpersonal compatibility will not enhance performance and may undermine it.

GROUP COHESION AS A DEPENDENT VARIABLE

Social science research on the conditions that foster group cohesion also suggests that the open integration of gays and lesbians would not disrupt unit cohesion. Scholars have identified at least ten factors that enhance group cohesion. These include structural factors such as stability of membership, group size, and the frequency and duration of contact. The more time people spend together, the more likely they will experience or invent commonalities, and the stronger group cohesion will be. For example, regimental systems and technical aspects of weapons systems that keep soldiers together in groups for long periods affect opportunities for interaction and thus unit cohesion. Situational factors, such as a sense of tradition or equity within the group or the group's recent experience, are also important for the formation of group cohesion. The more successful groups tend to be more cohesive, and the presence of a threat or intergroup competition increases a group's cohesion. Finally, the characteristics of individual members are also important: the more members of a group share attitudes and values, the more cohesive the group. For example, similar backgrounds, such as social class, regional origin, age, or ethnic identity, contribute to group cohesion (defined as interpersonal attraction).⁵⁶

Only the last factor—similarity/homogeneity—is potentially relevant to a discussion of whether openly gay and lesbian personnel would disrupt unit cohesion. Shared attitudes, however, are not intrinsic characteristics; straight men may be more likely to share values and attitudes with straight men, but shared values and attitudes can be created among disparate members. Take, for example, two Marine recruits at Parris Island, an African American and a Southern skinhead, who overcame their differences and bonded against another out-group: "We both agreed that the Jews owned the first slave ships."⁵⁷ This example, however distasteful, illustrates how easy it is to create a sense of group cohesion—even among individuals who appear to have little in common. The longer and more intense the interaction, the less important individual characteristics become. A study of the effect of internal disagree-

56. Alexander L. George, "Primary Groups, Organization, and Military Performance," in Roger W. Little, ed., *Handbook of Military Institutions* (Beverly Hills, Calif.: Sage, 1971), pp. 303–305; Ingraham and Manning, "Cohesion—Who Needs It?" pp. 8–10; John M. Levine and Richard L. Moreland, "Progress in Small Group Research," *Annual Review of Psychology*, Vol. 41 (1990), pp. 585–634; and MacCoun, "What Is Known about Unit Cohesion," pp. 299–307.
57. Quoted in Thomas E. Ricks, "Separation Anxiety: 'New' Marines Illustrate Growing Gap between Military and Society," *Wall Street Journal*, July 27, 1995, p. 1.

ment on group cohesion concluded that "social interaction . . . is such a powerful determination of in-group attraction that it overrides the possible negative effects of the dissimilarity in belief systems."⁵⁸ But even this is not necessary: social psychologists have discovered that merely being placed in a group—however random or arbitrary—creates positive attitudes toward other group members even when there is no social interaction between or within groups. In fact, group membership leads to in-group favoritism even where members of the group dislike one another. In other words, it is not interpersonal attraction (or shared values and attitudes) that leads to a group identity, but group membership that leads to interpersonal attraction. As a leading social psychologist put it, individuals "seem to like the people in their group just because they are in-group members rather than like the in-group because of the specific individuals who are members."⁵⁹

Studies of cohesion in the military have replicated these findings: situational and structural factors—not individual characteristics—are the important determinants of primary group cohesion. Leadership style and functional interdependence are more important, for example, than similarity of social status for explaining variation in group solidarity.⁶⁰ Shils and Janowitz stressed situational and structural factors—leadership, spatial proximity, and common experiences—as the critical sources of primary group cohesion, and Moskos's study of the U.S. Army in Vietnam led him to view primary groups as pragmatic responses to situational incentives.⁶¹ Experiments with group replacement systems in the U.S. Army underscore the importance of interaction in the development of unit cohesion.⁶² Indeed, few modern armies attempt to create

58. Jacob M. Rabbie and Karel K. Huygen, "Internal Disagreements and Their Effects on Attitudes towards In- and Out-groups," *International Journal of Group Tensions*, Vol. 4, No. 2 (June 1974), pp. 242-243.

59. John C. Turner, "Social Categorization and Group Behavior," in Edward J. Laurer, ed., *Advances in Group Processes*, Vol. 2 (Greenwich, Conn.: JAI Press, 1985), p. 84; and Henri Tajfel, Claude Flament, Michael Billig, and R.P. Bundy, "Social Categorization and Intergroup Behavior," *European Journal of Social Psychology*, Vol. 1, No. 2 (March 1971), pp. 149-175. For an application to international relations, see Jonathan Mercer, "Anarchy and Identity," *International Organization*, Vol. 49, No. 2 (Spring 1995), pp. 229-252.

60. Edward Gross, "Symbiosis and Consensus as Integrative Factors in Small Groups," *American Sociological Review*, Vol. 21, No. 2 (April 1956), pp. 174-179; and Frederick J. Manning and Terrence D. Fullerton, "Health and Well-Being in Highly Cohesive Units of the U.S. Army," *Journal of Applied Social Psychology*, Vol. 18, No. 6 (May 1988), pp. 516-517.

61. Shils and Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht," pp. 281, 286-289, 315; and Moskos, "Surviving the War in Vietnam," p. 73.

62. Mark A. Vaitkus, *Unit Manning System: Human Dimensions Field Evaluation of the COHORT Company Replacement Model* (Frederick, Md.: U.S. Army Medical Research and Materiel Command, 1994).