

Ultimately, Holtel believed his disclosure, “never affected my relations with US and other personnel in a negative way.” Describing himself, he cited his leadership style as the most important reason why he did not experience difficulties: “Oh, even if it sounds old-fashioned, I think there’s still a lot of truth in what Napoleon once said, ‘It’s the commander who makes the regiment.’ You’re the commander. You decide, and you said this is the way it’s going to be. That’s it.” This traditional view of authority characterized not only the way in which he dealt with coming out as gay to the service members who served under him, but also for many potentially contentious issues. Confronting the issue of women joining his teams of observers, he presented the issue directly to his staff as one of practical necessity. As he said to them,

“[Women] are a part of quite a lot of military organizations all over the world, and if we ask them to deliver people to the Eritrea mission, it means they could deliver men and women. And we have to deal with that. Or tell them in advance that we don’t want women. Well if you feel like doing that, then feel free.” I waited for the comments. So they decided not to do that, so we got a few women.

Overall, Holtel’s experience at UNMEE confirmed his sense that there are many more important issues facing UN peacekeeping operations than homosexuality. Ranking sexuality low on this of problems, he said that “skin color is number one on the list of priorities; the second is NATO and non-NATO; the third is male or female. And being gay or not, well it depends on how you deal with it.”

Upon leaving UNMEE Holtel received excellent evaluations and also received commendations both from his Force Commander, Brigadier General Peter Augustine Blaye, the Head of the Mission of the Organization of African Unity, and Joseph Legwaila, the Special Representative of the Secretary-General of the United Nations for UNMEE. Legwaila’s commendation noted that:

[T]he energetic sincerity of your commitment to the Mission’s success has made you indispensable ... You have been a leader in word and deed for the military observers, and a staunch defender of the Mission in your daily contacts with the parties. You leave behind a high standard of professionalism as a soldier, a peacekeeper, and a peacebuilder.

Even though Holtel somewhat modestly dismissed the importance of the praise those officials offered, he recognized that “the fact that I’m gay, because they both know, they both were aware, has nothing to do with the job you do.”

Major Philip Edwards, Technical Liaison Officer, Canadian Air Force

Major Philip Edwards has served in the Canadian Armed Forces for nineteen years. For four years, he served on the liaison staff of the Canadian Embassy in Washington, D.C., and worked directly with two Pentagon agencies. In his role as Technical Liaison Officer, he came into contact with approximately 75 U.S. personnel, twenty percent of whom were military personnel, while the rest were civilians. Of the military personnel he worked with, most were mid-grade officers, including captains, majors, lieutenant colonels, and occasionally full colonels.

He worked closely with another Canadian in his office, but his remaining peers were exclusively U.S. personnel. He described the tenor of this office as a “very close

collegial atmosphere” and very “cordial.”⁵⁹ Relations between him and his fellow Canadian and the U.S. civilian and military staff were quite good, with the occasional healthy competition between them. Edwards described the cultural differences as apparent but minimal:

[I]t’s the, “What’s the difference between an American and Canadian?” that always comes up in issues. I would say it’s a healthy tension—either the fifty-first state of the eleventh province, depending on your perspective. But in the areas that I work in, these are very close and special relationships. Everyone involved is ... governed by security regulations ... but ... as a foreigner, even, it’s very rare that you’ll encounter any tension.

According to Edwards, the nature of his service with the U.S. personnel allowed him to develop very close working relationships with his colleagues, and differences in national identity did little to threaten them.

The friendly work atmosphere laid a foundation for Edwards to come out and serve in his role as an openly gay officer with no detriment to the smooth workings of his office. Edwards characterized his approach to disclosing his sexual orientation as a slow gradual process. “In most cases,” he said, “people have known me quite well before they come into that part of my life.” Many of his colleagues learned of his sexual orientation through observing Edwards’ actions, rather than through explicit conversations. When appropriate, he brought his partner to social events organized through work. Edwards could not think of any negative repercussions after appearing with his partner in such situations: “I’ve not detected any change in people’s attitudes or relationship with me.” Even when the director of one of the agencies that he worked for invited him to his Christmas party, Edwards said, “‘I’m bringing my partner with me,’ and certainly no one gave me any negative repercussions or suggested that that not occur.” His coming out was a very quiet, yet very visible, statement that he considered carefully, a tactic that may have helped promote greater acceptance.

Yet Edwards was not unaware of the potential problems that could have emerged, for he did join the Canadian military long before it lifted its ban on homosexual personnel. When he considered his role as a foreign officer serving in the U.S., he recognized the need to exercise caution and restraint, not only for his own well-being, but for the way in which he represented Canada, as well. He said, “[B]ecause I understand U.S. military systems ... I’ve been very deliberate in my actions ... as a liaison officer, you’re a guest in the organization, so you don’t want to do anything to raise anyone’s profile in a negative way.” Yet his restraint should not be mistaken for timidity or shame in himself, for he firmly believed his sexuality posed no embarrassment for his country, nor gave Americans reason to feel uncomfortable around him or judge the value of his work. Coming out—even in a non-combat setting—required patience and the correct timing: “[I]t’s not something that I’ve been ashamed of or ... scared of doing. It’s just that [it needs to happen] at the right time or the right moment.”

Yet the U.S. personnel with whom Edwards worked showed him more than just grudging acceptance. Not only did Edwards bring his partner to social functions, but also

⁵⁹ The following discussion is based on Major Philip Edwards, interview with first author, 3 April 2002.

during work itself, colleagues included him in their conversations and asked about his partner. In addition, Edwards worked so well with some of his heterosexual military colleagues that they developed friendships outside of the office. When asked if he experienced any conflicts specifically with the U.S. military personnel with whom he worked, Edwards replied, "Not really, actually. A couple of them ... who are straight have turned into some very good drinking buddies. I guess if you can do that outside of work hours, then I would I think that hasn't had much effect." Edwards concluded that "My experience has been that it [his sexual orientation] has really been a non-issue."

Edwards's extended service as a liaison officer in the U.S. earned him excellent evaluations from both U.S. and Canadian military officials. A retired U.S. Air Force Lieutenant-General who worked with Edwards issued him a Certificate of Appreciation, which recognized his "valuable and outstanding contributions" and "ceaseless efforts to promote and enhance the close collaboration" with Canada.⁶⁰ His annual evaluation also praised him: "Major Edwards has experienced outstanding success as an LO [Liaison Officer] during his tour ... He has developed into a consummate diplomat, a skilled networker. He is an exemplary worker, a self-starter, who sets a high bar in personal conduct."⁶¹ Being open about his sexual orientation while serving with U.S. personnel did nothing to impede his successful performance, nor did it affect the recommendation of his promotion to Lieutenant-Colonel.

First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen, Royal Marechaussee, Dutch Department of Defense

From August 1992, to February 1993, First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen served as Deputy Provost Marshall in the Military Force Police in the Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai. He was stationed in the South Camp, and most of the personnel in his barracks were from the United States. He commanded a small Dutch contingent of military police, which unlike the military police in the U.S. armed forces is distinct from the regular Dutch military.

In 1981 Egypt, Israel, and the United States created the MFO to ensure that the Camp David Accords, the peace agreements that signaled the end of the Yom Kippur War, would be upheld. The precursor to the MFO was under a UN mandate, but political differences between the U.S. and the Soviet Union prompted the U.S.S.R to block the extension of UNEF II, which in turn prompted the U.S. to develop the MFO, a peacekeeping operation independent of the UN. Based in Rome, it has its own civilian director general and forces comprised initially of infantry battalions from the United States, Fiji, and Colombia. Since its inception, the U.S. has continued its involvement, and the Netherlands, Canada, the United Kingdom, and Uruguay also have contributed forces. Primarily an observer mission, the MFO acts as an impartial authority and diplomatic arbitrator.⁶²

⁶⁰ Certificate of Appreciation, issued to Major Philip Edwards, July 2002.

⁶¹ Personnel Evaluation Report 2001/02, issued to Major Philip Edwards, 25 April 2002.

⁶² See David R. Segal and Ronald B. Tiggler, "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World," *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (1997): 373-90; and David R. Segal and Mady Wechsler Segal, *Peacekeepers and Their Wives* (Westport: Greenwood Press, 1993).

For the most part, personnel from different national contingents do not work closely together at MFO.⁶³ But throughout his service in the Sinai, Neijenhuijzen did interact with U.S. personnel and faced ongoing difficulties in working with them. Describing the conflict in terms of the U.S. service members' unwillingness to comply with international standards, he emphasized how he attempted to cooperate with them, and how they failed to reciprocate:

I tried to work together, because [the] military police [should have been] seventeen people ... and I had only five, and I want[ed] to make a mix of the teams. But they have to work on the standard operation procedure. And that was the problem. They won't cooperate, but the only one who's cooperating was me, but not the Americans.⁶⁴

From his vantage point, Neijenhuijzen thought that the U.S. military police did not understand their proper role in the MFO, nor how to meet the goals of the mission according to standards set by the headquarters staff. Neijenhuijzen also attributes American resistance to U.S. service members' impression that the Dutch force commander was biased against them. Neijenhuijzen observed,

Although [the US military police] thought, "Oh, because he's Dutch, these are the rules that you made." And I never could explain ... really who made this kind of rules, because it was Israel, Egypt, America, and some other countries ... Also America make this rule, I say. It's not Holland ... and all the time they [U.S. personnel] try to make the rules to what they want to be ...

As Neijenhuijzen admitted, "It was for me not a happy time," and this conflict was never resolved adequately during his tour of duty.

During Neijenhuijzen's service in Sinai, the U.S. Congress enacted the then-new Don't Ask, Don't Tell law. Prior to his deployment in the Sinai, Neijenhuijzen had served without incident as an openly gay police force member in the Netherlands. Among Dutch personnel in Sinai, he said, "I was really open. I could be clear about everything." But Neijenhuijzen exercised greater discretion with U.S. personnel. He felt he should not reveal his sexual orientation "to the Americans, because they have the Don't Ask, Don't Tell [policy], and we have to respect this."

Yet Neijenhuijzen's discretion did not keep his sexual orientation secret from the Americans. "There was an [American] investigator," he said, "and we had some investigations. He came in my room in the barracks, and at that time I had my boyfriend's picture on my desk. He came inside, he looked to it, and he didn't ask." Neijenhuijzen suspects that this incident explains how U.S. personnel discovered that he was gay. Subsequently, Neijenhuijzen felt pressure from U.S. personnel to admit that he was gay, but in the context of other problems he was facing with American service members, as well as his confusion as to what would happen if he did acknowledge his sexual orientation, Neijenhuijzen resisted doing so:

Yes, they must be aware about my sexual orientation, because they sometimes try to ... they want [me] to say actually, "I'm gay," but I don't

⁶³ David R. Segal, email to first author, 17 July 2002.

⁶⁴ The following discussion is based on First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen, interview with first author, 15 May 2002.

want to say "I'm gay," because I want to respect the rules of America ... But because the problems I had with the operational procedures, I had the really strong feeling [that] they want to put me out ... My chief ... didn't like this at all. He say, "Joop, be quiet, because I don't want to have problems with the Americans." So [if] I choose to really say, "Hello, I'm gay," then they have a reason to put me out and bring me to North Camp...

By the time of his interview for this study, Neijenhuijzen knew that the U.S. policy towards gays would not have resulted in his dismissal from a multinational force. But at the time of his deployment in the Sinai, he was not as confident. And given the conflict that already existed with Americans in the unit, he believed that their attitudes toward homosexuality could provide them with an additional reason to question his authority.

This case study illustrates that difficulties can emerge when openly gay service members from non-American countries work with U.S. personnel in a multinational peacekeeping operation. Some might interpret this case study as an illustration of how the mere presence of an openly gay service member can erode unit effectiveness. Neijenhuijzen, by contrast, believes that the Don't Ask, Don't Tell policy facilitated U.S. service members' ability to question his authority, especially given the prior conflict between the Dutch military force police and U.S. contingent. According to Neijenhuijzen, the primary difficulty between him and his American colleagues was not his sexual orientation or even what the U.S. personnel thought of it, but rather their insistence on deviating from standard operating procedures stipulated by the Multinational Force and Observers Headquarters in Rome.

Petty Officer Writer Stuart O'Brien, Royal Australian Navy

For four months in 1999, Petty Officer Writer Stuart O'Brien served aboard the HMAS Melbourne in the Persian Gulf alongside U.S. and British ships. Operating under a UN mandate, these ships boarded Iraqi vessels suspected of breaching UN sanctions. During the operation a small group of U.S. sailors remained on O'Brien's ship to train Australian service members. As well, additional American personnel boarded O'Brien's ship weekly and spent time with O'Brien and his Australian colleagues.

O'Brien characterized relations between U.S. and Australian personnel as quite good: "There were no dramas whatsoever."⁶⁵ Members from both countries worked well together, respected each other's differences, and enjoyed the experience. Remembering time they had to socialize, O'Brien said, "We used to mix and mingle with the Americans, and there was no big dramas there. We all got along. I think they sort of realized that Australians have got a bit of a happy-go-lucky attitude ... they did enjoy our presence ... because we were laid back. They were on edge, and it was like, well, get on with life." Rather than causing U.S. service members to judge or think less of the Australians, their more playful attitude may have facilitated easier interactions between members of two different cultures. As O'Brien noted, "They realized that even though we are a laid back sort of people ... we do get the job done. So it was never a big issue. I think if anything it made us more approachable."

⁶⁵ The following discussion is based on Petty Officer Writer Stuart O'Brien, interview with first author, 17 July 2002.

From O'Brien's testimony it seems likely that the easy interactions between U.S. and Australian sailors also helped facilitate the U.S. sailors' ability to deal with O'Brien's sexual orientation. Using his characteristic phrase, O'Brien said that with regard to his service as an openly gay man in the Australian Navy alongside U.S. forces, "It was never any dramas there." O'Brien was comfortably out with his fellow sailors on the HMAS Melbourne, and he says that U.S. personnel who boarded his ship "knew exactly who I was ... because everybody did on the ship, so it wasn't a secret and it wasn't hidden or anything." His Australian colleagues asked about his male partner in front of U.S. service members and made other references to his sexuality—all without causing any negative responses among Americans who spent time on the Australian ship.

O'Brien clearly knew that even if problems had emerged between him and a U.S. service member, his position was not threatened. If conflicts had developed, he said, "We basically draw the line and say, 'We're here to do a job.' Everything else gets left behind." If a problem had persisted, then he would have outlined possible steps, including replacing himself for that specific task, or replacing the U.S. service member. He notes that "It's an individual thing, and if I can deal with it, then it's fine. If the other person can't, then they're the one that needs to fix the problem." Even though he expressed willingness to work with U.S. personnel uncomfortable serving with an openly gay man, no U.S. service members complained or expressed any concern about working with O'Brien; everyone was able to focus on getting the job done. During the interview, he repeatedly emphasized that focusing on common goals helped the sailors negotiate cultural differences: "We're in different navies, but we're here to do the same job. So it's not an issue, and it shouldn't be an issue."

In addition to serving with heterosexual American sailors, O'Brien worked closely with a U.S. sailor who revealed that he was gay to a small group of Australians. O'Brien recalled, "We came across one of the U.S. guys we had on board, who was actually gay and did come out to small group of us." O'Brien commented that the gay U.S. sailor felt comfortable in doing so [coming out], and he realized that we were so laid back and didn't really care, and it wasn't an issue for us. That he was comfortable in discussing that with us, whereas with his own people, with the American fellows, he would not have mentioned it at all for fear of repercussions.

O'Brien's presence in the operations did not threaten unit cohesion or the mission's success, and O'Brien believed that he contributed to the successful collaboration among Americans and Australians. His commanders concurred, for shortly thereafter, they promoted him from Leading Seaman to Petty Officer. As he observed, "I went from a ship to an admiral's office, so I was doing something right."

Lieutenant Rolf Kurth, Royal Navy

Lieutenant Rolf Kurth joined the Royal Navy in 1990 and served until 1997 when he was discharged for homosexuality.⁶⁶ After nearly four years in civilian life, Kurth was invited to rejoin the navy after the British government lifted its gay ban to comply with a

⁶⁶ The following discussion is based on Lieutenant Rolf Kurth, interview with second author, 3 October 2003.

ruling of the European Court of Human Rights.⁶⁷ Kurth re-enlisted in 2001, and in January 2003 he passed the Principle Warfare Officers' course, graduating in the top of his class. After completing the course, he joined the Royal Navy's largest amphibious ship. This ship, which for security purposes will be referred to as SHIP A, was deployed in the Gulf throughout the recent war against Iraq. During the latter stages of the conflict, Kurth's ship took over the command function of a high-profile Royal Navy ship, which will be referred to as SHIP B.

While numerous U.S. sailors served onboard SHIP A, Kurth worked closely with a team of six Americans. Kurth's team, which consisted of two officers, one chief petty officer and three petty officers, joined the ship to help manage relations with American forces. Kurth explained, "In the beginning, SHIP B, was in charge. SHIP B left the Gulf and left SHIP A in charge. When they did, this team transferred from SHIP B to SHIP A. They were a team of liaison people who helped us integrate with the American forces." Regarding his relationship with the American team, Kurth commented, "I was their direct link to the ship on day-to-day work matters, but not administratively ... [I]n actual operations, what we were doing, they would always come directly to me if they needed anything. Because we had that sort of relationship, we talked all the time and I felt that I got along very well with them."

When asked which members of the US team were aware of his sexual orientation, Kurth replied that "it is fairly well known around the entire ship ... because I am the only openly gay man on board the ship and at the time there were well over a thousand people onboard—you can imagine a ship at sea, doing the same thing over and over, in an environment that is quite tense but also quite boring, if nothing is happening people talk and if there is a little bit of gossip, it goes around very quickly." When pressed in a subsequent email to explain how he knew that Americans were aware of his sexual orientation, Kurth wrote,

[M]y sexual orientation was common knowledge and comments are often made in the mess, VERY subtly, that make it very clear that people are aware. For example, when men are sitting around looking at a pretty girl in the newspaper or on TV, sometimes someone will make a comment like "Well, you're not the best person to judge!" or "Like you'd know!"

Kurth spoke in positive terms about his interaction with the US officers in the team: "The working relationship with them was great, and I got along very well with them." When asked if these officers reacted towards him differently from his British colleagues, he responded: "No, they didn't behave any differently than British colleagues. They were very friendly."

Synthesis and conclusions

Viewed collectively, the evidence presented in this study suggests that the presence of openly gay and lesbian personnel in multinational units in which Americans serve has not had a negative impact upon cohesion or military performance. Perhaps more importantly, it is an issue that has generated little attention, as one official with the

⁶⁷ See Aaron Belkin and R.L. Evans, "The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence" (Santa Barbara, CA: The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, 2000), posted at www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/PublicationsHome.htm.

UN DKO observed: “[I am] just not aware of any instances of sexual orientation becoming an issue in the field.”⁶⁸ Experts from NATO, NORAD, the UN, and scholars who have studied these organizations all express similar observations. No one consulted for this study could think of an instance in which an openly gay or lesbian service member undermined a unit’s ability to complete its mission.

Four of the five case studies illustrate this conclusion clearly, but the fifth case study calls for additional commentary. First Lieutenant Joop Neijenhuijzen did experience difficulties in his unit. Unlike other service members discussed in this study, Neijenhuijzen was not fully candid about his sexual orientation with U.S. personnel. And, Neijenhuijzen served in a multinational unit ten years ago, while others served more recently. While Neijenhuijzen’s and his unit managed to accomplish their mission, conditions were more tense than ideally would have been the case. Neijenhuijzen’s example seems to confirm that strong and clear leadership is necessary for preventing problems and managing them should they emerge. In the absence of such leadership, units such as Neijenhuijzen’s tend to under-perform.

Scholars who study cultural diversity and multinational units all suggest that improving multinational operations requires addressing many problems that are more pressing than divergent sexual orientation policies. Homosexuality simply does not rank as a problem that presents much difficulty. For instance, Moskos’ suggests that disparity in income, health insurance, English-language competency, accountability, and civilian-military relations are the most important issues.⁶⁹ For the UN, tensions between the militaries of developing and developed nations warrant much more attention, as does the integration of women in peacekeeping operations. And as has been made evident, NATO still struggles to initiate standardization programs for defense materials. Addressing the issue of homosexuality is simply not a priority.⁷⁰ And for both NATO and the UN, more general concerns about command and control issues far outweigh the issue of homosexuality.

Finally, scholars may debate the extent to which findings from this study may or may not be relevant for assessing the plausibility of the unit cohesion rationale, the notion that the presence of openly gay service members disrupts unit cohesion. On the one hand, the international setting itself may help explain why homosexual personnel do not disrupt multinational units. A number of experts discussed the diplomatic nature of personnel in multinational environments. As Thomas-Durrell Young observes, “When you’re working in [a multinational military] environment ... as you go up the chain [it] becomes excessively polite.”⁷¹ In places like NATO headquarters, derogative comments about someone’s sexual orientation become less and less likely; it would be improper for anyone, regardless of their personal opinions, to cause problems because of it.⁷² Many personnel who serve in multinational operations do so on a voluntary basis, and scholars have suggested that such personnel may display greater tolerance toward diversity. On

⁶⁸ Kuhl, email.

⁶⁹ Moskos, 14.

⁷⁰ Young, interview.

⁷¹ Young, interview.

⁷² Moskos notes that in general “the level of respect and cordiality between the officers of the various nationalities at SHAPE is remarkably high” (13).

the other hand, one underlying premise of the unit cohesion rationale is that American service members do not like gays and lesbians and cannot form bonds of trust with them that are necessary for promoting and sustaining military effectiveness. Evidence presented in this study, however, indicates that American personnel serving in multinational units have worked quite closely and effectively with openly gay service members from foreign countries, and that integrated service has not compromised the effectiveness of military units.

References

- Azimi, Nassrine, and Chang Li Lin, eds. *The Reform Process of United Nations Peace Operations: Debriefing and Lessons: Report of the 2001 Singapore Conference*. Boston: Kluwer Law International, 2001.
- Belkin, Aaron and Geoffrey Bateman, eds., *Don't Ask, Don't Tell: Debating the Gay Ban in the Military*. Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2003.
- Belkin, Aaron, and R. L. Evans. "The Effects of Including Gay and Lesbian Soldiers in the British Armed Forces: Appraising the Evidence." Santa Barbara, CA: The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, 2000. Available from www.gaymilitary.ucsb.edu/Publications/british_pub1.htm; Internet.
- Belkin, Aaron, and Melissa Levitt. "Homosexuality and the Israel Defense Forces: Did Lifting the Gay Ban Undermine Military Performance?" *Armed Forces and Society* 27, no. 4 (2001): 541-566.
- Belkin, Aaron, and Jason McNichol. "Homosexual Personnel Policy of the Canadian Forces: Did Lifting the Ban Undermine Military Performance?" *International Journal* 56, no. 1 (2001): 73-88.
- Bolger, Daniel P. *Savage Peace: Americans at War in the 1990s*. Novato, CA: Presidio, 1995.
- Coffey, Joseph I. *The Future Role of NATO*. New York: Foreign Policy Association, 1995.
- Crickland, Fred W., Paul T. Mitchell, and Katherine Orr, eds. *Multinational Naval Cooperation and Foreign Policy into the 21st Century*. Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1998.
- Dandeker, Christopher. "The United Kingdom: The Overstretched Military." In *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles. C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 32-50.
- Dandeker, Christopher. "New Times for the Military: Some Sociological Remarks on the Changing Role and Structure of the Armed Forces of the Advanced Societies." *British Journal of Sociology* 45 (1994): 637-654.
- Dandeker, Christopher and David Mason. "Diversity in the UK Armed Forces: The Debate about the Representation of Women and Minority Ethnic Groups." In *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces: Experiences from Nine Countries*, eds. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1999. 55-72.
- Downes, Cathy. "Australia and New Zealand: Contingent and Concordant Militaries." In *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles. C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 181-204.
- Dreisziger, N. F., ed. *Ethnic Armies: Polyethnic Armed Forces from the Time of the Habsburgs to the Age of the Superpowers*. Waterloo, Ontario, Canada: Wilfried Laurier University Press, 1990.
- Eitelberg, Mark J. "Military Manpower and the Future Force." In *American Defense Annual: 1993*, ed. Joseph Kruzell. New York: Macmillan, 1993. 135-153.
- Elron, Efrat, Boas Shamir, and Eyal Ben-Ari. "Why Don't They Fight Each Other? Cultural Diversity and Operational Unity in Multinational Forces." *Armed Forces and Society* (1999) 26: 73-97.

- Elron, Efrat, et al. "Cooperation and Coordination Across Cultures in the Peacekeeping Forces: Individual and Organizational Integrating Mechanisms." In *The Psychology of the Peacekeeper: Soldiers Holding Fire*, ed. A. Adler and T. Britt. Prager Press, in press.
- Evans, Rhonda L. "U.S. Military Policy Concerning Homosexuals: Development, Implementation and Outcomes." Santa Barbara, CA: The Center for the Study of Sexual Minorities in the Military, 2001. Available at www.gaymilitary.ucsc.edu/Publications/evans1.htm; Internet.
- Fleck, Dieter. "Legal Issues of Multinational Military Units: Tasks, Missions, Stationing Law, Command and Control." In *International Law Across the Spectrum of Conflict*, ed. Michael N. Schmitt. Newport, Rhode Island: Naval War College, 2000.
- Gal, Reuven and Stuart A. Cohen. "Israel: Still Waiting in the Wings." In *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles. C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 224-241.
- Gordon, Stuart. "Icarus Rising and Falling: The Evolution of UN Command and Control Structures." In *Aspects of Peacekeeping*, ed. D. S. Gordon and F. H. Toase. Portland, Oregon: Frank Cass, 2001. 19-41.
- Halley, Janet. *Don't: A Reader's Guide to the Military's Anti-Gay Policy*. Durham: Duke, 1999.
- Hambrick, Donald C., et al. "When Groups Consist of Multiple Nationalities: Towards a New Understanding of the Implications." *Organization Studies* 19 (1998): 181-205.
- Henderson, William Daryl. *Cohesion: the Human Element in Combat*. Washington, D.C.: National Defense University Press, 1985.
- International Peace Academy. *Peacekeeper's Handbook*. New York: Pergamon Press, 1984.
- Jamison, Linda S. *The U.S. Role in United Nations Peace Operations*. Third Edition. Washington, D.C.: Council for a Livable World Education Fund, 2001.
- Kier, Elizabeth. "Homosexuals in the U.S. Military: Open Integration and Combat Effectiveness." *International Security* 23 (1998): 5-39.
- Lomsky-Feder and Eyal Ben-Ari. "From 'The People in Uniform' to 'Different Uniforms for the People': Professionalism, Diversity and the Israeli Defence Forces." In *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces: Experiences from Nine Countries*, eds. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1999. 187-210.
- Long, Scott. *Sexual Orientation and the Human Rights Mechanisms of the United Nations: Examples and Approaches*. International Gay and Lesbian Human Rights Commission, 1999. Available from http://www.iglhrc.org/issues/UN/Human_Rights_Mech_UN.pdf; Internet.
- MacCoun, Robert J. "Sexual Orientation and Military Cohesion: A Critical Review of the Evidence." In *Out in Force: Sexual Orientation and the Military*, ed. Gregory M. Herek, Jared B. Jobe, and Ralph M. Carney. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1996. 157-176.
- Millen, Raymond A. *Tweaking NATO: The Case for Integrated Multinational Divisions*.

- Carlisle, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2002.
- Moskos, Charles C. "Multinational Military Cooperation: Enhancing American Military Effectiveness." Unpublished paper prepared for Headquarters, U.S. Air Force and the Science Applications International Cooperation, 2002.
- Moskos, Charles C., John A. Williams, and David R. Segal, eds. *The Postmodern Military: Armed Forces after the Cold War*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000.
- Office on Women in the NATO Forces. *Women in the NATO Armed Forces: Year-in-Review*. Brussels, Belgium: International Military Staff, NATO, 2000.
- North American Aerospace Defense Command. "NORAD Home." Available from <http://www.norad.mil>; Internet.
- North Atlantic Treaty Organization. *NATO Handbook*. Brussels: NATO Office of Information and Press, 1995.
- NATO Information Service. "Women in Uniform: Vicki Nielsen Examines the Integration of Women in NATO Armed Forces." *NATO Review* 49 (Summer 2001): 30-32.
- Palin, Roger H. *Multinational Military Forces: Problems and Prospects*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995.
- Pinch, Franklin C. "Canada: Managing Change with Shrinking Resources." In *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 156-181.
- Preston, R. A. "The Multicultural and Multi-National Problems of Armed Forces." In *New Dimensions in Military History*, ed. R. F. Wiegly. San Rafael: Presidio Press, 1975. 227-241.
- Ray, Ronald D. *Military Necessity and Homosexuality*. Washington, D.C.: Brassey's, 1993.
- Richardson, Rudy and Jolanda Bosch. "The Diversity Climate in the Dutch Armed Forces." In *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces: Experiences from Nine Countries*, eds. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1999. 127-156.
- Segal, David R., and Mady Wechsler Segal. *Peacekeepers and Their Wives: American Participation in the Multinational Force and Observers*. Westport, Connecticut: Greenwood Press, 1993.
- Segal, David R., and Tiggler, Ronald B. "Attitudes of Citizen-Soldiers Toward Military Missions in the Post-Cold War World." *Armed Forces and Society* 23 (1997): 373-90.
- Shanker, Thomas and James Dao. "U.S. Might Refuse New Peace Duties Without Immunity." *The New York Times*. 3 July 2002, national ed., A1, A4.
- Siekman, Robert C. R. *Basic Documents on United Nations and Related Peace-Keeping Forces*. Boston: Mariner Publishers, 1989.
- Soeters, Joseph L. "Value Orientations in Military Academies: A Thirteen Country Study." *Armed Forces and Society* 24 (1997): 7-32.
- Soeters, Joseph L. "Culture and Flight Safety in Military Aviation." *International Journal of Aviation Psychology* 10 (2000): 111-133.
- Soeters, Joseph L., and Ricardo Recht. "Convergence or Divergence in the

- Multinational Classroom? Experiences from the Military." *International Journal of Intercultural Relations* 25 (2001): 423-440.
- Soeters, Joseph L. and Jan van der Meulen. *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces: Experiences from Nine Countries*. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1999.
- United Nations. *Implementation of the Recommendations of the Special Committee on Peacekeeping Operations and the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations*. A/56/732. New York: United Nations, 2001.
- United Nations. *The Brahimi Report*. A/55/502. New York: United Nations, 2000.
- United Nations, Department of Public Information. (2002). "United Nations Peacekeeping." 2002. Available from <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/dpko/ques.htm>; Internet.
- . "UNMEE: United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea." 2001. Available from http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/unmee/body_unmee.htm.
- UNGLOBE. "Information Kit." New York: United Nations Gay Lesbian or Bisexual Employees, 2000.
- United States, Joint Chiefs of Staff. *Joint Tactics, Technique, and Procedures for Peacekeeping Operations*. Joint Pub. 3-07.3. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Department of Defense, 1994.
- United States, Department of Defense. *A Guide for DoD Personnel Participating in NATO Standardization*. Washington, D.C.: U.S. Government Printing Office, 1991.
- van der Meulen, Jan S. "The Netherlands: The Final Professionalization of the Military." In *The Postmodern Military*, ed. Charles C. Moskos, John Allen Williams, and David R. Segal. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000. 101-120.
- Winslow, Donna. "Diversity in the Canadian Forces." In *Managing Diversity in the Armed Forces: Experiences from Nine Countries*, eds. Joseph Soeters and Jan van der Meulen. Tilburg, Tilburg University Press, 1999. 33-54.
- Young, Thomas-Durell. *Multinational Land Forces and the NATO Force Structure Review*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 2000.
- . *Multinational Land Formations and NATO: Reforming Practices and Structures*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997.
- Young, Thomas-Durell, ed. *Command in NATO after the Cold War: Alliance, National, and Multinational Considerations*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1997.
- Young, Thomas-Durell and Karl H. Lowe. *The Case for U.S. Participation in NATO Multinational Corps*. Carlisle Barracks, PA: Strategic Studies Institute, U.S. Army War College, 1990.

Interviews

- Anonymous. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. 28 August 2002.
- Anonymous. International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters. 17 October 2002.
- Ben-Ari, Eyal. Associate Professor and Chair, Department of Sociology and Anthropology, Hebrew University of Jerusalem. 31 August 2002.
- Edwards, Philip. Major, Canadian Air Force. 3 April 2002.
- Holtel, Rene. Colonel, Royal Netherlands Army. 24 April 2002.
- Kurth, Rolf. Lieutenant, Royal Navy. 3 October 2003.
- Martin, Douglas. Major, Canadian Army, Deputy Director of NORAD Public Affairs, NORAD. 21 October 2002.
- Neijenhuijzen, Joop. First Lieutenant, Royal Marechaussee, Dutch Department of Defense. 15 May 2002.
- O'Brien, Stuart. Petty Officer Writer, Royal Australian Navy. 17 July 2002.
- Young, Thomas-Durell. Senior Lecturer, Center for Civil Military Relations, Naval Postgraduate School. 1 July 2002.

Personal Communication

- Blaye, Peter Augustine. Brigadier General, Head of the Mission of the Organisation of African Unity. Letter to Col. Rene Holtel. 24 September 2001.
- Codner, Michael. Assistant Director Military Sciences, Royal United Services Institute. Email to first author. 11 February 2002.
- Dandeker, Christopher. Professor, King's College London. Email to first author. 29 January 2002.
- De Coning, Cedric. Training and Evaluation Service, Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. Email to first author. 24 and 27 August 2002.
- Dehaes, Karen. AA/PIA International Military Staff, NATO Headquarters. Email to first author 28 October 2002.
- Edwards, Philip. Major, Canadian Air Force. Email to first author. 22 July 2002.
- Dooley, Michael. Colonel, U.S. Army, Political-Military/Joint Logistics Officer, U.S. Army Peacekeeping Institute. Email to first author. 29 April and 21 August 2002.
- Holtel, Rene. Colonel, Royal Netherlands Army. Email to first author. 19, 24, and 28 April 2002, and 24 July 2002.
- Koller, Jan. President, United Nations Gay Lesbian or Bisexual Employees (UNGLOBE). Email to first author. 21 August 2002.
- Kuhl, Corinna. Department of Peacekeeping Operations, United Nations. Email to first author. 10 September 2002.
- LaViolette, Denise. Lieutenant-Commander, Canadian Forces Public Affairs Officer. Email to first author. 24 June 2002.
- LaViolette, Nicole. Professor, University of Ottawa, Law Faculty. Email to first author. 24 June 2002.
- Legwaila, Legwaila Joseph. Ambassador, Special Representative of the Secretary General of the United Nations for the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea. Letter to Col. Rene Holtel. 27 September 2001.
- Millen, Raymond A. Lieutenant Colonel, Director of National Security Affairs, USAWCC-SSI. Email to first author. 24 October 2002.

Segal, David R. Professor, University of Maryland. Email to first author. 17 July 2002.