

homogeneous groups on the basis of common ethnicity, race, class, regional origin, age, personality traits, or upbringing. To the contrary, an objective of basic training is to eliminate individuality. Militaries take pride in bringing together disparate individuals, submerging individual identities, and creating a group identity. Some of the more cohesive groups in the U.S. armed forces—special forces, for example—build strong cohesion by emphasizing the frequency and duration of contact—not by stressing individual characteristics.

Similarity of values and attitudes is least important as a source of group solidarity at the time when military effectiveness is most important: in combat. Studies of racially integrated units in the U.S. Army in World War II found that the closer to combat, the better the relations between black and white soldiers.⁶³ Two military psychiatrists observed a similar pattern in the U.S. Army Air Corps during World War II: "Friendships are easily made by those who might never have been compatible at home, and are cemented under fire. So sweeping is this trend that the usual prejudices and divergences of background and outlook, which produce social distinction and dissension in civil life, have little meaning to the group in combat. Religious, racial, class, schooling, or sectional [regional] differences lose their power to divide the men. . . . Such powerful forces as anti-Semitism, anti-Catholicism, or differences between Northerners and Southerners are not likely to disturb interpersonal relationships in a combat crew." Mutual aid in the face of an enemy attack brought these airmen together: "The emotional attitudes the fliers take toward each other have less to do with the accident of their individual personalities than with the circumstances of their association."⁶⁴

THE INTEGRATION OF AFRICAN AMERICANS AND WOMEN, AND UNIT COHESION
 Another powerful source of evidence regarding the effect of openly gay and lesbian personnel on unit cohesion comes from experiences in similar types of situations and in particular with the integration of African Americans and women in the U.S. armed services. In both cases, military representatives warned that integration would disrupt unit cohesion. Yet in both cases, integration did not undermine primary group cohesion. These findings correspond with social science research on how easily group cohesion develops and the relatively small role that individual characteristics play in the formation of

63. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1, *Adjustment during Army Life*, p. 592.

64. Roy R. Grinker and John P. Spiegel, *Men under Stress* (Philadelphia: Blackiston, 1945), pp. 21–24.

group cohesion. Nevertheless, these results are important: they provide strong evidence of how wrong opponents of integration have been.

African Americans, women, and homosexuals are different, but the issue is whether these differences are relevant to the question of the effect of integration on unit cohesion and military performance.⁶⁵ In some ways, the integration of homosexuals may be easier than racial integration: there is greater public support for homosexuals than there was for racial integration, and homosexuals do not suffer from the educational handicaps that racism inflicted on blacks. Indeed, the analogy with African Americans may be dangerous because it exaggerates the potential problems with the open integration of gays and lesbians. Racial integration demanded fundamental changes in the structure of the armed services; the open integration of homosexuals would not require the military to disband whole units or reorganize working, living, and recreation facilities. Nor would open integration have to battle prejudicial attitudes about the inherent inferiority of the previously excluded or segregated group. Whereas many senior officers claimed in the 1930s and 1940s that blacks could not master complex military tasks or fight on the offensive, the Pentagon readily admits that homosexuals are good soldiers.

The open integration of homosexuals may, however, raise other issues that racial integration did not: stereotypes of homosexuals tend to challenge traditional notions of masculinity, and the potential for sex among members of the group can arise. But here the analogy with women becomes instructive: traditional notions of femininity also challenge warrior images, and the problem of sexual relations again occurs. These analogies have limitations, but they are useful: they point to problems that may occur with the full integration of homosexuals. They also provide lessons about the U.S. military's ability to integrate previously excluded or segregated groups.

RACIAL INTEGRATION. During the 1930s and 1940s, the U.S. armed services argued that racial integration would undermine unit cohesion. In 1942 the U.S. Navy explained its support for segregation: "The necessity for the highest possible degree of unity and esprit de corps—the requirement of morale—all

65. For discussions of the analogy between African Americans, women, and homosexuals, see David Ari Bianco, "Echoes of Prejudice: The Debates over Race and Sexuality in the Armed Forces," in Craig A. Rimmerman, ed., *Gay Rights, Military Wrongs: Political Perspectives on Lesbians and Gays in the Military* (New York: Garland, 1996), pp. 47-70; Michael R. Kauth and Dan Landis, "Applying Lessons Learned from Minority Integration in the Military," in Herek et al., *Out In Force*, pp. 86-105, esp. pp. 92-98; and RAND, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy*, pp. 158-160.

these demand that nothing be done which may adversely affect the situation. Past experience has shown irrefutably that the enlistment of Negroes (other than for mess attendants) leads to disruptive and undermining conditions." Forshadowing Senator Nunn's 1993 field hearings on homosexuals in the military in the tightly packed environment of Navy submarines, Navy officials stressed that "men on board ships live in particularly close association; in their messes, one man sits beside another; their hammocks or bunks are close together; in their common task they work side by side; and in particular tasks such as those of a gun's crew, they form a closely knit, highly coordinated team."⁶⁶ The U.S. Army also claimed that segregation was necessary to maintain confidence and trust in military units.⁶⁷ Army Chief of Staff George Marshall explained that "to intermingle colored and white enlisted personnel in the same regimental organization . . . would inevitably have a highly destructive effect on morale—meaning military efficiency."⁶⁸ According to senior officers, the military was designed to defend the nation, not solve its social ills. If the issue of integrating African Americans were forced, cohesion, teamwork, and discipline would suffer.

The issue was forced, and the segregationists were wrong. During World War II, two important experiences in the U.S. Army challenged military assumptions about racially integrated units. ~~First, the Army integrated officers candidate training, blacks and whites successfully lived and trained together.~~ Second, and far more important in refuting the official Army position on racial integration, black infantry replacements were used during the Allied advance in Western Europe in the spring and summer of 1945. Responding to manpower shortages, General Dwight D. Eisenhower issued a call for black volunteers; over 2,500 black soldiers were assembled for infantry conversion training, organized into fifty-three platoons, and sent to the field to serve within previously all-white companies.⁷⁰

66. Reproduced in Morris J. MacGregor and Bernard C. Nalty, eds., *Blacks in the United States Armed Services: Basic Documents*, Vol. 6, *Blacks in the World War II Naval Establishment* (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1977), p. 61.

67. See, for example, the statements by Kenneth C. Royal, the secretary of the army, and General Omar N. Bradley, Department of the Army, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Services*, Vol. 9, *The Fahy Committee*, pp. 505–506, 633.

68. In a letter to Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr., September 27, 1940, reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Services*, Vol. 5, *Black Soldiers in World War II*, p. 28.

69. Morris J. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces, 1940–1965* (Washington, D.C.: Center of Military History, 1981), pp. 46–51.

70. Ulysses Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Chief of Military History, 1966), pp. 688–695.

Shortly after the Allies declared victory in Europe, a team of researchers studied this bold experiment: they interviewed more than 350 company-grade officers and platoon sergeants, and collected questionnaires from more than 1,700 white enlisted men. ~~The integration of black troops had not created social disension or disrupted unit cohesion.~~ Most officers and enlisted men had supported segregation, but service in integrated units altered their views: 77 percent claimed that they had become more favorable. As one platoon sergeant put it: "When I heard about it, I said I'd be damned if I'd wear the same shoulder patch they did. After that first day when we saw how they fought, I changed my mind. They're just like any of the other boys to us." Indeed, 96 percent of the officers reported that relations within the integrated units were much better than anticipated. When questioned about whether white and black soldiers had gotten "along together amicably," 93 percent of the officers and 60 percent of the enlisted men said "very well"; everyone else said "fairly well." A company commander explained that "our platoons got so small that we had to put a white squad in the colored platoon. You might think that wouldn't work well, but it did. The white squad didn't want to leave the platoon. I've never seen anything like it."⁷¹

This experiment also showed that integrated units fought well together. Within a month of the deployment of black platoons, positive evaluations came pouring in. The 104th Division reported that "the combat record has been outstanding. They have without exception proven themselves to be good soldiers."⁷² Interviews and surveys conducted by civilian scientists reported similar results: more than 80 percent of the commissioned and noncommissioned officers felt that the black troops had performed "very well" in combat.⁷³ General Eisenhower agreed: "I decided to infiltrate them as individuals, into units already in the front lines. Some of the commanders, one of whom was [General] George Patton, strongly objected on the ground that some of our units were from the South and trouble would result. Our experience was just the opposite. There was not a single objection brought to my attention. On the contrary, from all sides there came heartwarming reports of the success of the experiment, including from George."⁷⁴

Experiences with integrated units during the Korean War repeated the World War II example: racial integration did not undermine unit cohesion, and integrated units fought effectively. Faced with surpluses in black troops and high

71. Quoted in Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1, p. 592.

72. Quoted in Lee, *The Employment of Negro Troops*, pp. 696-697.

73. Stouffer et al., *The American Soldier*, Vol. 1, pp. 588-589.

74. Reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Services*, Vol. 5, p. 503.

battle losses in white units, commanders began assigning black soldiers to previously all-white units; by December 1951, the composition of African Americans in some units equaled their proportion of the national population. Once again, the integration was carefully analyzed. A team of social scientists from the Operations Research Office at Johns Hopkins University directed a large-scale investigation comparing the integrated and segregated units. This project, entitled *Project Clear*, consisted of two major troop opinion surveys and numerous interviews. The results were unambiguous: the researchers concluded that "integration has proceeded smoothly and without friction or conflict. No major problems have arisen and each group accepts the presence of the other."⁷⁵ Extracts from interviews with enlisted men illustrate that their reactions contrasted sharply with those anticipated by opponents of racial integration: "Far as I'm concerned it worked pretty good. . . . When it comes to life or death, race does not mean any difference. . . . It's like one big family. . . . Got a colored guy on our machine gun crew—after a while I wouldn't do without him. . . . Concerning combat, what I've seen an American is an American. When we have to do something we're all the same. . . . Each guy is like your own brother. . . . We [an integrated squad] had something great in common, sleeping, guarding each other—sometimes body against body as we slept in the bunker." The integrated units also performed effectively. Although noting the difficulty in obtaining accurate measures of performance, *Project Clear* reported that "no indication has been found, in a careful examination of the available data, that the presence of a proportion of Negroes is in any way related to the efficiency of the units as rated by its commanding officer."⁷⁶

GENDER INTEGRATION. Opponents of increasing the participation of women in the U.S. armed services often argue that the integration of women will disrupt unit cohesion. For example, **41 percent of servicemembers surveyed in the early 1990s believed that putting women in combat units would hinder the development of unit cohesion.**⁷⁷ A former Army officer explained his reasoning: "Most skills in the military, especially combat skills, are learnable by anyone within six to eight weeks. But military unit effectiveness and cohesion are far more the result of socio-psychological bonding—anthropologically,

75. Leo Bogart, ed., *Social Research and the Desegregation of the U.S. Army* (Chicago: Markha, 1968), p. 182.

76. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 64.

77. Cited in Martin Binkin, *Who Will Fight the Next War? The Changing Face of the American Military* (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1993), p. 40.

male bonding—among soldiers within combat groups.”⁷⁸ However, studies of basic training, extended exercises, and day-to-day operations show that gender integration does not disrupt unit cohesion or decrease military performance.

In the early 1990s, the U.S. Navy conducted pilot programs with gender-integrated companies in basic training. Survey data on twenty-two companies (nine all-male; four all-female; and nine integrated) found that members of integrated companies perceived that unit cohesion in their companies was higher than in segregated ones.⁷⁹ Structured interviews also revealed the development of cohesion within gender-integrated units. As one female put it, “At first I didn’t like the idea [of integrated units], but now after working with the males I think it is probably a lot better. We are more like brothers and sisters trying to help each other through this. . . . We don’t see it as male and female, we see it as a team.”⁸⁰

During the same period, the U.S. Army also experimented with gender-integrated basic training. The first phase of the program began in 1991, and after tracking its performance, a group of researchers from the Army Research Institute for the Behavioral and Social Sciences (ARI) reported that there were “no significant trends” associated with gender integration.⁸¹ The Army chief of staff decided to integrate basic training at the squad level for combat support and combat service support units. The next phase of the Army’s program began in 1993, and ARI conducted a large study that allowed for comparisons between integrated and segregated companies as well as changes in gender-integrated companies over time. The second phase was equally successful, and the third and final phase was conducted in 1995 at two installations in which all of the companies were gender integrated. To the extent that gender integration had any effect on unit cohesion, it improved it. For example, ARI reported that “soldierization” (as measured by self-reported levels of pride and commitment, individual improvement during basic training, individual and platoon morale, and teamwork and cohesion) of female soldiers in a gender-

78. Quoted in Jeff M. Tuten, “The Argument against Female Combatants,” in Nancy Loring Goldman, ed., *Female Soldiers—Combatants or Non-Combatants?* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 1982), p. 251.

79. Jerry C. Scarpate and Mary Anne O’Neill, *Evaluation of Gender Integration at Recruit Training Command, Orlando Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida* (Patrick Air Force Base, Fla.: Defense Equal Opportunity Management Institute, Division of Policy Planning Research, 1992), p. 2.

80. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 4.

81. Three battalions were gender integrated: one to the squad level; the other two to the platoon level. Jacqueline A. Mottern, David A. Foster, Elizabeth J. Brady, and Joanne Marshall-Mies, 1995 *Gender Integration of Basic Combat Training Study*, ARI Study Report 97-01 (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. ARI, 1997), p. 4.

integrated environment was much higher than that of women in all-female units. Male soldiers in gender-integrated companies had the same or higher levels of soldierization as men in all-male companies.⁸² Discussions in focus groups reinforced the survey results. One female trainee commented: "At first, they try to help you do something just because you're female, not because you are a soldier. Now everybody is helping everybody, not because of gender, but because they need help." Another female explained that "there was some initial flirtation between the sexes, but that was quickly moved to the back burner as the trainees realized that teamwork was essential if everybody wanted to graduate."⁸³

Studies of extended field exercises have also shown that the inclusion of women has not disrupted unit cohesion. One female soldier remarked that "a new set of norms was beginning to emerge—a sort of 'we're all in this together' and there was a push toward equality and interdependence." Another commented on the segregated sleeping arrangements, explaining that she "didn't want to be in a tent with females she didn't know [but would] rather be with a group that [she] worked with."⁸⁴ As the military sociologist David Segal explained, "The stress of military operations itself fosters cohesion. . . . field training exercises suggest that it is the commonality of experience of the soldiers involved, rather than their gender, that produces cohesion."⁸⁵ The finding that the integration of women does not disrupt unit cohesion has been repeated in studies of day-to-day operations in the military: a recent RAND report on the assignment of women since April 1993 into previously closed military occupations concluded that "gender integration is perceived to have a relatively small effect on readiness, cohesion, and morale." In fact, gender integration was seen as having positive effects on cohesion: professional standards in the workplace were raised because the presence of women hindered the development of the excessive social bonding that encourages activities that interfere with good discipline and behavior.⁸⁶

82. *Ibid.*, pp. v, viii, ix, 27, 30.

83. Quoted in Larry Lane, "Basic Training—Together," *Soldiers*, Vol. 50, No. 3 (March 1995), <http://www.dtic.mil/soldiers/march95/p13.html>.

84. Quoted in M.C. Devibiss, "Gender Integration and Unit Deployment: A Study of GI's," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 11, No. 4 (Summer 1985), pp. 538, 540; see also Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Female GIs in the Field," *Society*, Vol. 22, No. 6 (September/October 1985), pp. 28–33.

85. David R. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam: Citizenship and Military Manpower Policy* (Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1989), p. 123.

86. Margaret C. Harrell and Laura L. Miller, *New Opportunities for Military Women: Effects upon Readiness, Cohesion, and Morale* (Santa Monica, Calif.: RAND, 1997), pp. xvii, 53–67.

Gender-integrated units also perform effectively. In 1996 the General Accounting Office (GAO) reported that gender-integrated basic training "does not negatively affect the performance of trainees."⁸⁷ Studies of basic training have found that soldiers, especially women, perform better on several basic tests in gender-integrated companies.⁸⁸ In addition, gender-integrated field exercises have not decreased military effectiveness. In 1975 the U.S. Army conducted exercises based on the assumption that if increasing numbers of women were added to units, a point would be reached at which their integration would degrade unit effectiveness. However, ARI data showed that gender integration (up to 35 percent) did not degrade performance. Two years later, the Army studied the North Atlantic Treaty Organization's annual REFORGER exercise in which stateside combat divisions are redeployed to Europe to participate in its defense. Again, the integration of women did not significantly affect operational capabilities.⁸⁹

THE INTEGRATION OF GAYS AND LESBIANS, AND UNIT COHESION

The final set of evidence that suggests that the open integration of homosexuals would not disrupt unit cohesion and military performance comes from experiences with gays and lesbians themselves. This evidence comes from three sources: other organizations, such as ~~police and fire departments; foreign military organizations; and the U.S. armed services themselves~~.

~~POLICE AND FIRE DEPARTMENTS.~~ Since the 1970s, ~~many police and fire departments in the United States have openly integrated homosexuals.~~ These organizations differ from the military in an important way: they are not asking their members to kill others. They do, however, share characteristics that are often cited as barriers to the open integration of gays and lesbians in the U.S. military. Individuals work in teams, often use the same rest rooms, and sometimes sleep in close proximity. More important, the stakes can be life or death, and morale, cohesion, and trust are all seen as important to the successful performance of their missions. These experiences provide indirect evidence that the open integration of gays and lesbians would not disrupt unit cohesion

87. GAO, *Basic Training: Services Are Using a Variety of Approaches to Gender Integration* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, 1996), p. 2.

88. Mottern et al., *Gender Integration*, p. 52; and Leora N. Rosen, Doris B. Durand, Paul D. Bliese, Ronald R. Halverson, Joseph M. Rothbert, and Nancy L. Harrison, "Cohesion and Readiness in Gender-Integrated Combat Service Support Units," *Armed Forces and Society*, Vol. 22, No. 4 (Summer 1996), p. 538.

89. Segal, *Recruiting for Uncle Sam*, pp. 122-123.

or undermine military performance. For example, an early study of the San Francisco Sheriff's Department program to integrate gays and lesbians found that sexual orientation was not relevant to the performance of professional duties.⁹⁰ This finding has been repeated around the country. In 1992 the GAO visited eight police and fire departments; all of the departmental officials reported that the open integration of gays and lesbians had not led to serious problems or degraded performance.⁹¹ The next year, a team of researchers from RAND studied police and fire departments in six large American cities; the cases were carefully chosen to provide the best approximation of the U.S. military. They avoided cities such as San Francisco or Key West that would be unrepresentative samples because of their large homosexual populations and tolerant attitudes toward sexual orientation. They also chose to study large urban areas because the departments would have paramilitary structures for command and control. Given their size, these police and fire departments were also likely to contain homosexuals serving openly. The researchers visited Chicago, Houston, Los Angeles, New York, San Diego, and Seattle. They concluded that despite negative and hostile attitudes toward homosexuality within most of the police and fire departments, when the leadership signals that integration is important, the open presence of gays and lesbians does not compromise performance.⁹²

FOREIGN MILITARY ORGANIZATIONS. The experience of foreign military organizations provides direct evidence that the open integration of gays and lesbians does not destroy unit cohesion or degrade military effectiveness. Although the regulations differ, at least fourteen countries allow gays and lesbians to serve openly. In the early 1990s, the GAO examined many of these foreign forces and concluded that "the presence of homosexuals in the military is not an issue and has not created problems in the functioning of military units."⁹³ The GAO's assessment was based on a general overview and in-depth studies of four countries with over 50,000 active military personnel whose forces had been involved recently in regional conflicts or United Nations peacekeeping missions. Perhaps least surprising were the assessments the

90. Michael Thomas McIntyre, *Homosexuality in the U.S. Military*, master's thesis (Monterey, Calif.: Naval Postgraduate School, 1980), p. 96.

91. GAO, *DOD's Policy on Homosexuality*, pp. 6, 15, 41.

92. RAND, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy*, pp. 106-157, esp. pp. 147-149; see also Stephen H. Leinen, *Gay Cops* (Brunswick, N.J.: Rutgers University Press, 1993).

93. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military: Policies and Practices of Foreign Countries* (Washington, D.C.: GAO, NSIAD-93-215, June 1993), p. 3.

GAO received from Swedish officials. In 1987 Sweden prohibited discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the military, and the new policy resulted in few, if any, problems. Most Swedish officials agree with the policy, and although they have not conducted any studies specifically designed to address this issue, Swedish officials report that the participation of homosexuals has not hurt unit readiness, effectiveness, cohesion or morale. In 1992, the Canadian courts ruled that the armed services must remove all restrictions based on sexual orientation. The Canadian experience may be more relevant to U.S. policy because the military actively resisted the change; the decision was controversial; and many analysts warned of impending problems such as mass resignations, lower recruitment, problems with cohesion and morale, and attacks against gay servicemen. These problems have yet to materialize.⁹⁴

Some of the most compelling evidence that the open integration of gays and lesbians does not undermine unit cohesion and military effectiveness comes from the experiences of the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF). In the spring of 1993, the IDF adopted a policy of nondiscrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in recruitment, assignment, and promotion. Previously, homosexuals were prohibited from serving in intelligence positions requiring top security clearances and were required to undergo psychological examinations to determine their eligibility for service. These policies were never formally implemented, officials reported to GAO researchers that the IDF had effectively integrated homosexuals since 1948, and they could think of few problems that their presence had caused. IDF officials explained that homosexuals performed as well as heterosexuals and that their inclusion had not hindered readiness, effectiveness, cohesion, or morale.⁹⁵ The Israeli military psychologist Reuven Gal also reported that Israeli military commanders have historically given a lot of latitude to homosexual soldiers; if soldiers were well regarded, they would be allowed to continue to serve in that unit.⁹⁶

U.S. ARMED FORCES. Because American policy prohibits gays and lesbians from openly serving in the armed services, there are few studies of the effect of homosexuals on unit cohesion and military effectiveness. However, two

94. Ibid., pp. 232-32; and Rosemary E. Parks, "Opening the Canadian Forces to Gays and Lesbians," in Wilbur J. Scott and Sandra Carson-Stanley, eds., *Gays and Lesbians in the Military* (New York: Aldine de Gruyter, 1994), pp. 165-180. The discussion of foreign militaries also draws on RAND, *Sexual Orientation and U.S. Military Personnel Policy*, pp. 65-105; and Paul A. Gade, David R. Segal, and Edgar M. Johnson, "The Experience of Foreign Militaries," in Herek et al., *Out In Force*, pp. 106-130.

95. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, pp. 38-43.

96. Reuven Gal, "Gays in the Military: Policy and Practice in the Israeli Defense Forces," in Scott and Stanley, *Gays and Lesbians in the Military*, pp. 186-188.

DoD-commissioned reports have reached conclusions at odds with the Pentagon's policy toward gays and lesbians: the 1957 Crittenden report and the 1988 PERSEREC report.⁹⁷ Neither report was commissioned to study the suitability of gay and lesbian service in the armed forces. The Crittenden report was commissioned to evaluate the procedures for processing homosexuals out of the Navy, and the PERSEREC report was asked to study the correlation between homosexuality and security-risk violations. However, both went beyond their original mandates, and both raised questions about the rationale for DoD's exclusionary policy. The PERSEREC report put it most boldly: "Studies of homosexual veterans make clear that having a same gender or an opposite gender orientation is unrelated to job performance in the same way as being left- or right-handed."⁹⁸ The pattern of homosexual discharges in the U.S. military also raises questions about whether gays and lesbians are a threat to combat effectiveness: relatively more homosexuals are discharged in peacetime than in war. During combat the Pentagon often allows homosexuals who divulge their homosexuality to continue to serve. Indeed, discharges for homosexuality in the U.S. military dropped during World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and the Gulf War, while some of the larger purges of gays and lesbians occurred during peacetime.⁹⁹

There is also anecdotal evidence of gays and lesbians serving openly in the U.S. military. One of the most well known cases is that of Margaret He Cammermeyer, the National Guard nurse discharged for being a lesbian, whose experience was popularized in the television movie *Serving in Silence*. Colonel Cammermeyer disclosed her status during a security background check in 1989 and continued to work until her discharge three years later. Those in her unit knew she was a lesbian. Her final evaluation in 1991 could not have been more positive: both as an individual—"This officer is exemplary in her dedication,"—and as the leader of a group—"Her strong leadership has been a key element in improving medical readiness of the unit."¹⁰⁰ Similarly, Parris Watkins was drafted into the Army in 1968 and served openly both in combat and in peacetime. During discharge proceedings in 1975, the Army board stated that "there is no evidence suggesting that his behavior has had either a degrading effect upon unit performance, morale, or discipline, or upon his own job performance." Indeed, Watkins's performance as a female impersonator at

97. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, pp. 7, 34–35.

98. Sarbin and Karols, *Nonconforming Sexual Orientation*, p. 33.

99. Shultz, *Conduct Unbecoming*, pp. 68–71, 295–296, 384, 387.

100. Quoted by Zilly in "Cammermeyer v. Aspin," p. 925.

Army events earned him commendation from one of his commanding officers: "Where comradeship is evident, so is high morale and good discipline, which are the signs of a great unit. The [event] could not have been a success without your full support, enthusiasm, initiative, and imagination."¹⁰¹

Whereas there is theoretical and empirical evidence that the open integration of gays and lesbians would not disrupt unit cohesion or military performance, there is no comparable evidence to support the Pentagon's discriminatory policy. GAO reported that DoD's "policy is not based on scientific or empirical data, but rather on the considered judgment of military professionals . . . [and] that such judgment is primarily anecdotal."¹⁰² Other analysts agree with this assessment. Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics during the Reagan administration, stated in court that the justification for the ban on homosexuals serving in the military is "without factual foundation." Indeed, DoD admits that it cannot provide scientific evidence in support of its argument. In 1993 General John Ojten, a member of the military working group that studied the issue of homosexuals in the military, and former Assistant Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn stated that they had no facts—defined as statistics, scientific studies, and reports rather than opinions and anecdotes—supporting the rationale for the military's discriminatory policy toward gays and lesbians.¹⁰³ The lack of evidence supporting the Pentagon's policy toward homosexuals is not surprising: DoD has never attempted to document its argument about the negative effect of homosexuals on unit cohesion or operational effectiveness. In 1988 the PERSEREC report recommended that future research examine the claim that the presence of gays and lesbians is a barrier to the development of group cohesion and morale, but DoD never followed up on this advice.¹⁰⁴

Instead of attempting to provide support for its arguments, the Pentagon has responded by ignoring or dismissing theoretical or empirical evidence that challenges the rationale for its discriminatory policy. For example, DoD argued

101. Quoted in Shultz, *Conduct Unbecoming*, pp. 242, 310.

102. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, p. 68.

103. Both cited in Zilly, *Can we ever be a Spivak?*, p. 924. Such confidence in the professional judgment of military officers despite the lack of evidence is not new. In 1942 a memo from the War Department explained that "the utilization of colored units is a problem that defies rigorous analysis because of the intangible nature of such factors as racial prejudice, social implications, combat efficiency, and international relations." Reproduced in MacGregor and Nalty, *Blacks in the United States Armed Services*, Vol. 5, p. 157.

104. Sarbin and Karols, *Nonconforming Sexual Orientation*, pp. 25, 33; and GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, p. 27.

that the GAO erred in stating that the Crittenden and PERSEREC reports did not support its policy toward gays and lesbians. In raising this objection, DoD was not arguing that the GAO incorrectly represented the conclusions in these reports; instead, GAO "erred" because it paid attention to conclusions to questions that the reports had not been commissioned to address.¹⁰⁵ Similarly, in testimony before the Senate, the general counsel for DoD, Jamie Gorelick, stated that the military working group did not consider the Crittenden report "a material resource, but rather a historical background docket." She also stated that the PERSEREC report was a "draft that was never completed" and that it had not done what it was tasked to do.¹⁰⁶ Indeed, DoD did not accept the initial PERSEREC report. According to Korb, when the draft PERSEREC report was issued in 1988, the Pentagon reacted angrily, and officials in the office of the secretary of defense labeled it a draft so that it would not have to be released to the public. They then directed the authors of the study to rewrite the report, omitting the section on suitability. The report was not finalized until September 1991, and the revised report dropped many of the offending sections, including the statement that sexual orientation was as relevant to military service as being left or right handed.¹⁰⁷ In addition, senior military officers have dismissed lessons from the open integration of gays and lesbians in foreign military organizations as not applicable to the American situation. For example, Admiral Jeremiah and General Powell argued before the Senate that the American "cultural heritage and legal framework," as well as the worldwide deployment of U.S. forces, limit any parallels to other countries' policies toward gays and lesbians in the military.¹⁰⁸

This willingness to explain away or ignore evidence that challenges military policy beliefs is hauntingly familiar. After World War II, the US Army ignored findings from *The American Soldier* that challenged numerous preconceptions about racial integration; two major Army reports, the Gillem report in 1945 and the Chamberlin report in 1950, adamantly opposed racial integration. Senior military officers also attempted to prevent the public release of evidence that racial integration had been successful. General Brehon B. Somervell, commanding general of the Army Service Forces, argued that the experiments with racial integration in 1945 were inconclusive and that organizations such as the

105. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, pp. 7, 34–35, 71.

106. U.S. Senate, *Policy Concerning Homosexuality*, July 21, 1993, p. 801.

107. Lawrence Korb, "Evolving Perspectives on the Military's Policy on Homosexuals: A Personal Note," in Scott and Stanley, *Gays and Lesbians in the Military*, p. 223.

108. U.S. Senate, *Policy Concerning Homosexuality*, July 20, 1993, p. 756.

~~National Association for the Advancement of Colored People might use the data to exert pressure for further racial integration.~~ Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall agreed that the surveys should not be made public because "the conditions under which the [black] platoons were organized and employed were most unusual."¹⁰⁹ General Omar Bradley expressed similar concerns while also claiming that the successful experiences with racial integration in the Air Force were not applicable because soldiers were more dependent on one another in the Army.¹¹⁰

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While military officers' professional judgment about the open integration of homosexuals should be carefully considered, the Pentagon should not base policy on assumptions that have little theoretical or empirical support. One advantage of social science is that it can challenge policy that is based on myth and prejudice. It can also be used to question policy that hurts military readiness. Racial segregation of the U.S. armed services was costly and inefficient, and lowered combat effectiveness. It required the creation of separate units and facilities, and segregated units often performed poorly. Separate was not equal: black units suffered from low morale and were poorly equipped, trained, and led.¹¹¹ ~~Racial integration of the U.S. armed forces was a victory for civil rights and national defense.~~

The debate about homosexuals in the U.S. military focuses on the question of whether a change in policy will degrade military effectiveness. By examining the two parts of the rationale for the Pentagon's policy toward homosexuals, this article challenges the argument that openly gay and lesbian personnel would disrupt unit cohesion and military performance. ~~We should also ask, however, whether the current policy of excluding openly gay and lesbian personnel itself hurts military readiness. Are there reasons to think that as in the case of racial integration, a change in policy would lead to an increase in military effectiveness? In other words, would lifting the ban on openly gay and lesbian personnel be a gain for civil rights and military effectiveness? We do not know. There are few studies of foreign military organizations that have~~

109. Quoted in MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, pp. 54-55.

110. MacGregor and Nally, *Blacks in the United States Armed Services*, Vol. 9, pp. 637-638.

111. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, pp. 3-57.

litted the ban on homosexual military service and the Pentagon has not asked this question.

There are, however, some indications of the inefficiencies of the current policy of barring open homosexuals from the U.S. military. First, investigating and discharging homosexual servicemembers costs time and money: for example, the U.S. armed forces discharged 16,692 enlisted personnel and 227 officers during the 1980s. According to GAO estimates, the recruiting and initial training costs of replacing each enlisted troop were \$28,226, and every officer \$120,772; these sums do not include court costs.¹¹² Second, just as racial and gender segregation hurt the morale of African Americans and women working in an anti-homosexual environment, presumably hurts the morale of gay and lesbian personnel. Third, gay and straight women in the military are now subject to the practice of "lesbian baiting," in which women are often accused of being lesbians when they rebuff men's sexual advances or report sexual abuse. Instead of investigating and disciplining the individuals accused of harassment, commanders often respond by investigating and sometimes discharging the target of the harassment.¹¹³ Allowing lesbians to serve openly would not abolish sexual harassment, but it would curtail the lesbian baiting that discourages women from reporting sexual harassment and destroys the careers of dedicated personnel. Finally, research has shown that soldiers who perceive that the Army is supportive of their families are more likely to be committed and satisfied, and thus to reenlist. This finding suggests that the lack of such support for the families of gay and lesbian personnel has a negative effect on homosexual servicemembers; the military cannot support the families of homosexuals if they cannot serve openly.¹¹⁴

Although there may be additional reasons why the current policy hurts military effectiveness, future research is likely to show that racial segregation was relatively more inefficient than DoD's policy of barring open homosexuals from the U.S. armed forces. Inefficiencies were certainly more evident: unlike blacks, homosexuals are not segregated into costly, separate, and unequal units that become obviously malfunctioning parts of the military. Proponents of lifting the ban on openly gay and lesbian personnel may find this conclusion

112. GAO, *Homosexuals in the Military*, pp. 4, 25, 31-32.

113. C. Dixon Osburn, Michelle M. Benecke, and Kirk Childress, *The Fourth Annual Report on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue"* (Washington, D.C.: Servicemembers Legal Defense Network [SLDNI], 1988), <http://www.sldn.org/reports/fourth.htm>.

114. Mady Wechsler Segal and Jesse J. Harris, *What We Know about Army Families* (Alexandria, Va.: U.S. ARI, 1993).

discouraging: the less costly the current policy, the less likely a change. It is important to remember, however, that racial segregation did not become costly and inefficient in 1948—it had always hindered military effectiveness. President Harry Truman's executive order in 1948 forbidding racial discrimination in the U.S. armed forces cannot be understood as simply a response to inefficiencies. It was a political decision to address a costly policy that violated the civil rights of American citizens. Although discrimination toward homosexuals is probably not as dysfunctional as racial segregation, it is just as much a violation of civil rights. And just as racial desegregation did not compromise national defense, removing the current ban on openly gay and lesbian personnel in the U.S. military would not require making trade-offs between the needs of national security and the rights of American citizens.

Conclusions and Recommendations

Opponents of the open integration of gays and lesbians in the U.S. military often present unit cohesion as the critical reason for maintaining the current policy because it relates most directly to combat effectiveness. But it is not the only objection raised to lifting all restrictions on homosexuals in the U.S. armed forces. Concerns about privacy and violence against homosexuals must also be addressed. Some openly gay and lesbian personnel have successfully served in the U.S. armed services, but homosexual servicemembers are also verbally abused, physically attacked, and sometimes killed. Simply lifting the ban on open homosexuals in the military may not be sufficient to protect the rights of gays and lesbians or to ensure that military performance does not suffer. After all, the abuse of homosexual servicemembers hurts military readiness. Anti-homosexual behavior would be less likely if gays and lesbians were allowed to serve openly; this abuse now occurs in a context in which the victims have no guarantees that reporting harassment will not lead to their own investigation and discharge.¹¹⁵ However, even if homosexuals were allowed to serve openly, anti-homosexual behavior may not disappear from the U.S. military. Indeed, changing the policy in peacetime may be more difficult: experience suggests that the further from combat and the less dependent individuals are on one another, the more likely it is that prejudice and conflict will surface. It

115. C. Dixon Osburn, Michelle M. Benecke, and Kirk Childress, *Conduct Unbecoming: The Third Annual Report on "Don't Ask, Don't Tell, Don't Pursue"* (Washington, D.C.: SLDN, 1997), pp. 17–21.

was in the rear areas, for example, where much of the racial tension that exploded in the U.S. military in the 1970s occurred.

A commitment to uphold the policy's intent, especially among the leadership of the armed services, must accompany a change in policy to abolish discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the U.S. military. The experiences of foreign military organizations and other organizations that have openly integrated gays and lesbians show the importance of leadership in overcoming implementation problems. If this commitment is weak, civilian oversight can play an important role in encouraging compliance. In 1948 Truman created the Fahy Committee to oversee the implementation of his executive order calling for racial equality in the armed services. This civilian advisory committee to the president challenged many of the arguments justifying racial segregation, kept the momentum for integration on track, and helped clarify the administration's policy to the military. Indeed, those branches of the armed services to which the Fahy Committee devoted less attention, such as the Marine Corps, made the least progress in implementing racial equality.¹¹⁶ The process of racial integration of the U.S. armed services also provides examples of the critical role of senior officers in the implementation process; civilian *and* military leadership must work together to ensure that the necessary commitment exists.¹¹⁷

The U.S. military should take two further steps to implement a change in policy to openly integrate gays and lesbians. First, the military must clearly specify acceptable and unacceptable behavior. Officers should understand the implications of the new policy, and these expectations must be communicated to all members of the organization. All should know what is expected of them. Second, a change in policy must be supported with an enforcement system that monitors and controls behavior. Policy statements about "zero tolerance" toward sexual harassment in the U.S. military have not been successful, in part because they have not been reinforced by an appropriate system of rewards and punishments. A recent survey revealed that most servicewomen keep their complaints to themselves because they do not think that their accusations will be taken seriously.¹¹⁸ New policy statements have little value without sanctions to enforce them. The military must create mechanisms for registering and

116. Sherie Mershon and Steven Schlossman, *Foxholes and Color Lines: Desegregating the U.S. Armed Forces* (Baltimore, Md.: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1998), pp. 187–217.

117. *Ibid.*, pp. 219, 228–229, 261, 308, 312–315, 322–333.

118. Peter I. Kilborn, "Sex Abuse Cases Stun Pentagon, but the Problem Has Deep Roots," *New York Times*, February 10, 1997, p. A13.

investigating violations, and officers must discipline violators of the new policy. The military should reward officers who uncover violations of the policy under their command.

The U.S. military has shown a remarkable ability to implement wide-ranging institutional change. When Truman issued his executive order in 1948, the U.S. armed services was a traditional, conservative, and overwhelmingly Southern institution; even blood supplies were segregated during World War II. The U.S. military is now considered a model for race relations. The services initially resisted racial integration, it took several decades for the process to unfold, and there is still racism in the military. But the integration of African Americans demonstrates the power of the military to implement radical change. The military is a hierarchical, formal, and rule-driven institution. It is one of the most "total institutions" in terms of its control over the socialization process of its members and its ability to use carrots and sticks to ensure compliance with organizational goals. As the civil rights movement understood, it can command where civilian institutions can only persuade.¹¹⁹ The open integration of gays and lesbians in the military would not proceed without problems or be accomplished overnight. Experience has shown, however, that the U.S. armed services has the ability to be at the leading edge of civil rights, and that by doing so, it can enhance military effectiveness.

119. MacGregor, *Integration of the Armed Forces*, p. 17.