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The Honorable Ronald B. Leighton

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
AT TACOMA

MAJOR MARGARET WITT,

Plaintiff,

vs.

UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF  
THE AIR FORCE, et al.,

Defendants.

NO. C06-5195 RBL

MOTION FOR PRELIMINARY  
INJUNCTION AND  
MEMORANDUM IN SUPPORT OF  
MOTION

**Note for Motion: May 12, 2006  
Oral Argument Requested**

MT FOR PRELIM INJUNCTION AND  
MEMO IN SUPPORT  
NO. 06-5195 RBL

WIT004 plds hd114201 4/24/06

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19

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1 **I. RELIEF REQUESTED**

2 Plaintiff, Major Margaret Witt, moves this Court pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 for  
3 a preliminary injunction restraining the defendants from: (a) discharging the Plaintiff  
4 from the United States Air Force; and (b) barring the Plaintiff from earning pay and  
5 points from the United States Air Force and prohibiting them from withholding her pay,  
6 or in any other way penalizing her as a result of allegations that she engaged in  
7 homosexual conduct.

8 **II. CRITERIA FOR ISSUING PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION**

9 Rule 65 authorizes the granting of a temporary restraining order and a preliminary  
10 injunction in appropriate circumstances. Under the traditional formulation utilized by the  
11 Ninth Circuit, this Court should consider:

12 (1) the likelihood of the moving party's success on the merits; (2) the  
13 possibility of irreparable injury to the moving party if relief is not granted;  
14 (3) the extent to which the balance of hardships favors the respective parties;  
15 and (4) in certain cases, whether the public interest will be advanced by  
granting the preliminary relief.

16 Miller ex rel. NLRB v. Cal. Pac. Med. Ctr., 19 F.3d 449, 456 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1994) (en banc).

17 Pursuant to this test the moving party must show either (1) probable success on the merits  
18 and the possibility of irreparable harm or (2) the existence of serious questions going to the  
19 merits, the balance of hardships tipping sharply toward the party requesting the preliminary  
20 relief, and at least a fair chance of success on the merits. Id. These alternative formulations  
21 are not separate tests but represent "two points on a sliding scale in which the required

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1 degree of irreparable harm increases as the probability of success decreases.” *Id.*, quoting  
2 United States v. Odessa Union Warehouse Co-op, 833 F.2d 172, 174 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1987).

3 District courts commonly grant requests for injunctive relief and to stay military  
4 discharge proceedings in similar cases where homosexual service members have filed suit  
5 to prevent their discharge. See, e.g., Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d 1160, 1161 (9th Cir.  
6 1992)(“The district court denied the Army’s motion to dismiss without prejudice and  
7 stayed the action pending completion by the Army of its administrative investigation.”);  
8 Watkins v. U.S. Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1431 (9th Cir. 1987), aff’d on other grounds, 875  
9 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989)(en banc) (“[T]he district court enjoined the Army from  
10 discharging Watkins on the basis of his statements admitting his homosexuality.”);  
11 Meinhold v. U.S. Department of Defense, 34 F.3d 1469 (9th Cir. 1994) (affirming  
12 injunction against discharge); Thomasson v. Perry, 80 F.3d 915, 921 (4th Cir. 1996)  
13 (“The district court preliminarily enjoined Thomasson’s discharge pending resolution of  
14 his claims.”); Able v. United States, 44 F.3d 128, 132 (2d Cir. 1995).

15 As demonstrated in this memorandum, issuance of a temporary restraining order  
16 and/or preliminary injunction is necessary and appropriate in this case under either of the  
17 above formulation of the Miller test set forth above.

### 18 **III. EVIDENCE RELIED UPON**

- 19 1. Declaration of Major Margaret Witt.
- 20 2. Affidavit of Major Faith M. Mueller.
- 21 3. Declaration of Stacey Julian.

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1 Spokane but reported to McChord for reserve duty approximately 3-5 days each month.  
2 On some occasions since moving to Spokane she has been activated to full-time service as  
3 required by military need.

4 Most of her career has been spent in Aeromedical Evacuation Squadrons, which  
5 are responsible for inflight management and care of ill and injured patients transported by  
6 military aircraft. *Id.* Major Witt served in Europe, caring for ill and wounded soldiers in  
7 Bosnia during the 1990s. Her most recent foreign service was in Oman in 2003, where  
8 she went on dozens of missions to care for soldiers fighting the current war in Iraq. On  
9 May 14, 2003, President Bush awarded her an Air Medal citation in recognition of her  
10 “meritorious achievement while participating in sustained aerial flight as Medical Crew  
11 Director” for the 320<sup>th</sup> Air Expeditionary Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron. *Id.* ¶ 6. The  
12 citation noted how “her airmanship and courage directly contributed to the successful  
13 accomplishment of important missions under extremely hazardous conditions and  
14 demonstrated her outstanding proficiency and steadfast devotion to duty.” *Id.* She received  
15 an Air Force Commendation medal in December 2003 for saving the life of a Department  
16 of Defense employee who collapsed aboard a commercial flight. *Id.* ¶ 7.<sup>1</sup>

17  
18 Among the honors she received in 2003 was being named Officer of the Quarter  
19 Award for the 2003 Third Quarter. *Id.* ¶ 9. That award states, “The Officer of the Quarter

---

20 <sup>1</sup> Over the course of her 18+ years with the Air Force, she received the following medals: Meritorious Service  
21 Medal, Air Medal, Aerial Achievement Medal, Air Force Commendation Medal, Air Force Achievement Medal,  
Air Force Outstanding Unit Award, Combat Readiness Medal, National Defense Service Medal, Armed Forces  
Expeditionary Medal, Air Force Overseas Ribbon Long, Air Force Longevity Service, Armed Forces Reserve  
Medal, Small Arms Marksmanship Ribbon, and Air Force Training Medal. *Id.*, ¶ 5.

1 Award is given only to those individuals who have demonstrated exceptional  
2 professionalism, leadership and service to our country. This Award is recognition for  
3 superior dedication not only to the United States Air Force, but to the civilian community as  
4 well.” *Id.*

5 These honors are fully consistent with her outstanding record of military service. She  
6 routinely received glowing performance evaluations from her superiors. Her most recent  
7 performance evaluation praised her for “excellent organizational and management skills”;  
8 for being an “excellent mentor” who is “often sought out by peers for advice”; for taking on  
9 new responsibilities; for being an “outstanding squadron and Air Force representative” who  
10 had been “hand picked to coordinate humanitarian mission and patient transport with  
11 multiple civilian, military, government and DOD agencies”; and for being a “recognized  
12 leader” both among her peers and her superiors. *Id.* ¶ 8.

13 As of April 4, 2004, Major Witt became Standards and Evaluations Flight  
14 Commander for the 446<sup>th</sup>. *Id.* ¶ 4. This assignment gave her management responsibility  
15 for over 200 flight nurses and medical technicians. As described by a colleague:  
16

17 It is important to recognize how significant it is that Major Witt was selected  
18 to be the chief of Standards and Evaluations for the 446<sup>th</sup> AES. The person  
19 selected to be the head of StanEval has to be “the best of the best.” That is  
20 why they are selected for that position. The person who evaluates the  
21 performance of others has to be extremely highly regarded by the rest of the  
unit in order to perform the evaluation job successfully. That is why Major  
Witt was selected for the position – because she is so uniformly highly  
regarded by everyone in the unit.

1 *Declaration of James Schaffer*, ¶¶ 19.

2 Because of her outstanding record of achievement and service, Major Witt was  
3 picked to be a “poster child” for the Air Force Nurse Corps recruitment in 1993.

4 *Declaration of Witt*, ¶10. Her photo appears on many recruiting posters, brochures, and  
5 similar materials. Her colleagues agree that she makes a fine representative for the Air  
6 Force. *E.g., Declaration of Master Sergeant Jill Brinks*, ¶ 10. (“I have seen the recruiting  
7 posters which feature Major Witt and also personally believe that Major Witt exemplifies  
8 the qualities that makes [sic] one a good and valuable member of the U.S. Air Force”).  
9 Ironically enough, these recruitment materials continued to be used, even after the Air  
10 Force began the process of involuntarily discharging Major Witt from the service.

11 **B. THE AIR FORCE SEEKS TO DISCHARGE MAJOR WITT BASED ON**  
12 **ALLEGATIONS OF A CONSENSUAL SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH A**  
13 **CIVILIAN WOMAN THAT OCCURRED OFF OF AIR FORCE PROPERTY**  
14 **IN THE PRIVACY OF MAJOR WITT’S HOME.**

15 During the summer of 2004 Major Witt learned that on behalf of the Department  
16 of the Air Force, Major Adam Torem had begun investigating an allegation that Major  
17 Witt had engaged in homosexual acts with a civilian woman. *Decl. of Witt*, ¶12. The  
18 allegation is true: Major Witt was engaged in a committed and loving long term  
19 relationship with a civilian woman from July 1997 through August of 2003.

20 Major Witt met her partner while attending physical therapy school. *Id.* ¶13. The  
21 woman was never a member of the United States Air Force, or of any other branch of the  
armed forces, and was never a civilian employee of any branch of the armed forces. *Id.*

1 The relationship ended in August of 2003. *Id.* ¶ 4. While they were together, Major Witt  
2 and her partner engaged in sexual relations with each other in the privacy of their home in  
3 Spokane, Washington. *Id.* Major Witt has never engaged in sexual relations with a  
4 woman while on duty, nor has she ever engaged in sexual relations with a woman on the  
5 grounds of any Air Force base. *Id.* ¶15.

6 Major Witt understands that Major Torem made a final report in which he  
7 correctly concluded that she had engaged in sexual relations with the civilian woman. *Id.*  
8 ¶ 19. However, this conclusion was not based on any statements or admissions from  
9 Major Witt, who never made any disclosures about her sexual orientation or about any  
10 sexual acts during the course of the investigation. *Id.* ¶ 18.

11 **C. MAJOR WITT KEPT HER SEXUAL ORIENTATION PRIVATE AND DID**  
12 **NOT VIOLATE THE AIR FORCE'S "DON'T TELL" REGULATIONS;**  
13 **NONETHELESS, FELLOW SERVICE MEMBERS ASSUMED SHE WAS A**  
**LESBIAN AND HAD NO OBJECTIONS TO SERVING WITH HER.**

14 Major Witt kept her sexual orientation and her relationship private. *Id.* ¶16-17.  
15 She did not consider it to be anyone else's business, and she knew that Air Force  
16 regulations could cause her to be separated from the service if she told others in the  
17 military that she was homosexual. *Id.* To the best of Major Witt's knowledge, no one at  
18 McChord Air Force Base knew that she was a homosexual until the summer of 2004  
19 when news of the investigation began to spread. *Id.* ¶ 18. (The only possible exception  
20 was Senior Master Sergeant James Schaffer, who was Major Witt's neighbor and fellow  
21 volunteer firefighter in Spokane. While on their way to firefighting training, Schaffer

1 once asked Witt how long she and her civilian partner had been together, and she told him  
2 how many years it had been. *Id.* Sgt. Schaffer initiated the conversation, and Major Witt  
3 did not introduce the topic to an unwilling listener.)

4 Despite her discretion, a large number of service members suspected or assumed  
5 that Major Witt was a lesbian. None of them cared. Typical is this statement from Major  
6 Faith Mueller:

7 I was recently told by a friend of Major Witt's that she believes Major Witt is  
8 being discharged because she is accused of being a lesbian. Before I was told  
9 this, I suspected Major Witt was a lesbian. I can say without reservation that  
10 this fact makes absolutely no difference to me. In my opinion, if command  
11 were to announce to everyone on base that Major Witt was a lesbian and that  
12 she was remaining in the service, her continued presence in the Air Force  
would not have any negative impact upon our squadron's morale, discipline,  
or combat readiness, and no negative effect whatsoever on me personally. It  
would still be my strong desire to have her remain in the service and to  
continue to work with her.

13 *Affidavit of Major Faith M. Mueller*, ¶¶ 13-14. *See also Declaration of Major Sue Schindler*,  
14 ¶ 11-12; *Declaration of Major Sharon Carlson*, ¶ 12, 15; *Declaration Sgt. James Schaffer*,  
15 ¶ 14; *Declaration Major Julia Scott*, ¶ 14; *Declaration Sgt. Jill Brinks*, ¶ 12; *Declaration*  
16 *Major Annie Thomas*, ¶ 13.

17 Female service members, who the military presumably wishes to shield from being  
18 in close proximity to a lesbian colleague, report that they have no problems sharing living  
19 and bathing space with Major Witt:

20 I have shared sleeping quarters with Major Witt. In October of 2003  
21 during a mission to New Zealand I shared a room with her. There were  
no problems. I did not feel my privacy was infringed upon, and I would  
have no reservations about sharing living quarters with her again. I have



1 always found Major Witt to be strong, professional and disciplined  
2 military officer. I felt fortunate to serve with her and I would welcome  
the opportunity to serve with her again.

3 *Decl. Scott, ¶ 9. See also Decl. Brinks, ¶ 19; Decl. Carlson, ¶ 10; Decl. Mueller, ¶ 10.*

4 Male colleagues also share a high opinion of her:

5 In 2003 I was deployed to Seeb Air Force Base in Oman as part of a real  
6 world deployment. This was during the buildup of forces prior to the start  
7 of Operation Iraqi Freedom. During my tour of duty in Oman, I was  
8 assigned to Maj. Witt's flight crew where I flew with Major Witt on real  
9 world missions, many of which were flights to pick up and transport  
10 armed forces personnel injured in Afghanistan and Kuwait in the build up  
prior to OIF. We flew many urgent missions in the theater of operations  
taking critically-wounded, injured and ill U.S. service members out of  
those areas. As a result of this flight experience with Major Witt, I am  
extremely familiar with her abilities, knowledge, military skills, and  
leadership capabilities.

11 I have always known major Witt to be highly professional, skilled and  
12 disciplined. I have the utmost trust and confidence in her abilities as a  
13 member of the U.S. Air Force and am honored to serve with her as a  
member of the 446<sup>th</sup> AES.

14 I believe that Major Witt is a highly valuable, well-liked and well-  
15 respected member of our Unit. She also plays an important role in  
16 ensuring the good order, morale and cohesion of our Unit. She is highly  
skilled at managing people under her command, and knows how to be  
inclusive when she leads.

17 Based on my personal observations of Major Witt I can say with  
18 confidence that her presence in the Air Force greatly enhances our Unit's  
combat efficiency and readiness.

19 *Decl. Schaffer, ¶¶ 6-9.*

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1 In short, the Air Force personnel were not bothered by what they assumed to be  
2 Major Witt's lesbian sexual orientation. Instead, they respected her for her knowledge,  
3 skills, and leadership abilities:

4 I know Major Witt very well. I have worked closely with her. She has an  
5 immense amount of knowledge that she can impart to new service members  
6 who receive training from her. She is very militarily professional, and very  
7 respectful of the chain of command. She knows her job backwards and  
8 forwards, and is incredibly knowledgeable. She is highly regarded within  
9 the unit. People go to her with problems because she solves them. In the  
10 field of aeromedical evacuation you have to be able to think quickly and to  
11 deal with rapidly changing critical situations. She has these qualities. The  
12 bottom line is that people like Major Witt save lives.

13 *Declaration of Major Julia Scott, ¶ 3. See also, Affidavit of Major Faith M. Mueller, ¶¶ 5-7.*

14 **D. DISCHARGING MAJOR WITT WILL HAVE A SERIOUS ADVERSE**  
15 **IMPACT ON THE MILITARY READINESS, MORALE, AND**  
16 **ORDER OF HER UNIT.**

17 On November 4, 2004 Major Witt was ordered to report to the commander's  
18 conference room by Lieutenant Colonel Jan Moore-Harbert. *Witt Decl. ¶ 20.* Col.  
19 Moore-Harbert informed Major Witt that Colonel Mary Walker would be initiating  
20 separation proceedings against Major Witt on grounds of her having committed  
21 homosexual acts. *Id.* Colonel Moore-Harbert described this separation action as "the  
hardest thing she ever had to do in the Air Force," and she cried when she received the  
order. *Schaffer, ¶ 12.* Major Verna Madison, who was also present for this meeting, said  
that "she was so upset about Colonel Walker's decision that she felt like taking off her  
uniform." *Id. ¶ 13.*

1 As one might expect from the sudden departure of a highly decorated and well  
2 regarded officer, Major Witt's abrupt absence from the base has caused considerable  
3 adverse effects on morale and cohesion. As described above, Major Mueller believes that  
4 returning Major Witt to duty -- even if accompanied by a declaration that she is  
5 homosexual -- would be better for unit morale and cohesion than her discharge:

6 I firmly believe that discharging Major Witt from the U.S. Air Force would  
7 be detrimental. Moreover, I believe that our Unit's morale, cohesion and  
8 good order would be severely jeopardized if Major Witt is discharged.

9 *Affidavit of Major Mueller*, ¶ 14; *Decl. Schaffer*, ¶ 20; *Decl. Julian*, ¶ 19; *Decl. Schindler*,  
10 ¶ 13; *Decl. Carlson*, ¶ 14; *Decl. Brinks*, ¶ 13; *Decl. Thomas*, ¶ 14.

11 Making matters worse is the fact that Major Witt's discharge occurs at a time  
12 when the Air Force Reserve's area of greatest need is for flight nurses. *Decl. Witt*, ¶ 29.  
13 At the rank of Major, as of April 4, 2006 the Air Force Reserve had 121 vacancies for  
14 flight nurses. *Id.* This is the largest number of vacancies for *any* duty assignment for  
15 officers in the Air Force Reserve. *Id.* But for the fact that Major Witt was separated from  
16 the 446<sup>th</sup> AES in November of 2004, she would be deployed and would now be serving as a  
17 flight nurse either stateside or overseas in Qatar, Iraq or Germany. *Id.* As noted by Sgt.  
18 Schaffer: "[I]t would be downright stupid to discharge such a skilled and knowledgeable  
19 officer, especially in a time of war when people with her level of military skill and  
20 professionalism are so badly needed, and in such short supply." *Decl. Schaffer*, ¶ 20.

21 Major Mueller's prediction that Major Witt's discharge would harm unit morale is  
borne out by the declaration of Technical Sergeant Stacey Julian, who served with Major

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1 Witt in Oman as well as at McChord AFB. He reports that everyone he has talked to in  
2 the 446<sup>th</sup> Aeromedical Evacuation Squadron is very upset that Major Witt is being  
3 discharged:

4 I have talked to many other people in the 446<sup>th</sup> AES about the decision to  
5 initiate separation proceedings against Major Witt, and in general they have  
6 reacted with shock, confusion and amazement. I have never heard any service  
7 member say that they approved of the decision, and in general everyone has  
8 responded by asking, "Why?" Our squadron has always had gays and lesbians  
9 in it, and their presence is widely known, but until this decision to seek a  
10 discharge against Major Witt it has never been an issue. We had two openly  
11 gay service members who retired (voluntarily) many years ago and no one  
12 ever sought to question their presence in the Air Force.

13 In my opinion the Commander's decision to initiate an administrative  
14 discharge proceeding against Major Witt has seriously hurt unit morale, and  
15 that morale would be further harmed if the Air Force went ahead and actually  
16 discharged her. The incident has been seriously deflating to everybody in the  
17 446<sup>th</sup> AES. Everyone who has discussed it in my presence has said they  
18 think the decision was a bad one.

19 I have been in the Air Force over 20 years. I recently decided that I would  
20 apply for retirement. The Air Force's decision to initiate separation  
21 proceedings against Major Witt was a factor which contributed to my  
decision to apply for retirement from the service. I no longer want to serve in  
an organization which mistreats people in the way the Air Force is  
mistreating her.

*Declaration of Stacey Julian, ¶¶ 13-15, 19.*

**E. THE AIR FORCE DID NOT PROVIDE MAJOR WITT WITH A  
PROMPT POST-DEPRIVATION HEARING.**

On November 4, 2004, Colonel Mary L. Walker informed Major Witt (through  
Col. Moore-Harbert) that the Air Force would be initiating administrative separation  
proceedings against her. On November 9, 2004 Major Witt received by certified mail a

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1 letter stating that pursuant to AFI 36-3209 Colonel Walker had initiated an administrative  
2 separation proceeding, and that Major Witt “may not participate in any pay or point  
3 activity pending resolution of separation action.”<sup>2</sup> Major Witt has been deprived of her  
4 position since that time.

5 Even though Major Witt has been placed on suspension, no hearing has been  
6 provided in the interim. Indeed, the next formal action taken regarding the discharge was  
7 the issuance of a letter on March 6, 2006, fully sixteen months after her suspension from  
8 duty. The March 6 letter was a “notification of initiation of action” from the Air Force  
9 explaining that Major Witt could request a hearing before an administrative discharge  
10 board at Fort Robins AFB in Georgia if she wished to contest her discharge. Major Witt  
11 promptly requested a board hearing, but no date for that hearing has yet been set, and in  
12 fact, to date there has been no written response from the Air Force to her request. It is  
13 unknown how many more months may elapse before the Air Force chooses to give Major  
14 Witt a hearing.

#### 15 **V. LIKELIHOOD OF SUCCESS ON THE MERITS**

16 In the interest of judicial efficiency, this preliminary injunction motion will limit  
17 its discussion to Major Witt’s substantive and procedural due process claims. By doing  
18 so, she does not waive her claims based on equal protection or free speech theories.  
19

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20 <sup>2</sup> By denying her any “point activity” the Air Force ceased to credit any time after November 9, 2004 towards  
21 the 20 years of service that an Air Force officer needs in order to be entitled to a military retirement pension.  
Thus, if Major Witt is ultimately discharged by the Air Force, by virtue of the November 9, 2004 order  
depriving her of either pay or point activity, she will not be entitled to a retirement pension, because she did not  
have 20 years of service on the date that order was issued.

1 A. DISCHARGING MAJOR WITT WOULD VIOLATE SUBSTANTIVE DUE  
2 PROCESS.

3 1. Lawrence v. Texas Established that the Right to Engage in Consensual  
4 Sexual Acts with An Adult (Including An Adult of the Same Sex) Is an  
5 Aspect of Liberty Protected By the Due Process Clause.

6 In June 2003 the U.S. Supreme Court overruled its prior decision in Bowers v.  
7 Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986) and held that the freedom to engage in consensual sexual  
8 acts – even with a partner of the same sex – is a substantive aspect of liberty protected by  
9 the Due Process Clause. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 567 (2003). “[L]iberty gives  
10 substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their private lives in  
11 matters pertaining to sex.” Id. at 572. The Court reversed the convictions of John  
12 Lawrence and Tyron Garner, and struck down Texas’ statute which made it a criminal  
13 offense for them to engage in a consensual act of sodomy:

14 The petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives. The State cannot  
15 demean their existence or control their destiny by making their private sexual  
16 conduct a crime. ***Their right to liberty under the Due Process Clause gives***  
17 ***them the full right to engage in their conduct without intervention of the***  
18 ***government.*** “It is a promise of the Constitution that there is a realm of  
19 personal liberty which the government may not enter.” [Citations]. The  
20 Texas statute furthers no legitimate state interest which can justify its  
21 intrusion into the personal and private life of the individual.

22 Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, (bold italics added), *citing* Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505  
23 U.S. 833, 847, 112 S.Ct. 2791, 120 L.Ed.2d 674 (1992).

24 Relying on cases that recognized a constitutionally protected autonomy to make  
25 personal sexual decisions (like Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965), Eisenstadt  
26 v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972), and Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)), Lawrence noted

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1 how “the protection of liberty under the Due Process Clause has a substantive dimension  
2 of fundamental significance in defining the rights of the person.” 539 U.S. at 565. The  
3 freedom to enter into an intimate relationship with another consenting adult shares that  
4 fundamental significance.

5 It suffices for us to acknowledge that adults may choose to enter upon this  
6 relationship in the confines of their homes and their own private lives and still retain  
7 their dignity as free persons. When sexuality finds overt expression in intimate  
8 conduct with another person, the conduct can be but one element in a personal bond  
that is more enduring. The liberty protected by the Constitution allows homosexual  
persons the right to make this choice.

9 *Id.* at 567.

10 The five-justice majority opinion in Lawrence recognized that its substantive due  
11 process analysis was not wholly separate from equality decisions like Romer v. Evans,  
12 517 U.S. 620 (1996) (invalidating a Colorado law that discriminated on the basis of  
13 sexual orientation). One of the Court’s concerns was to ensure that the lives of  
14 homosexual persons are not “demeaned” by government-imposed “stigma” that would be  
15 “an invitation to subject homosexual persons to discrimination both in the public and in  
16 the private spheres.” 539 U.S. at 575. So while the majority opinion relied upon  
17 substantive due process theory, it recognized that discrimination against gay people was  
18 itself a serious constitutional harm to be avoided.

19 Lawrence cited with approval to a decision of the European Court of Human Rights  
20 (“ECHR”) invalidating a sodomy law of Northern Ireland. Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 573,  
21 citing Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 45 Eur.Ct.H.R. (1981) & ¶ 52. Fifteen years after

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1 Dudgeon, the ECHR held that the United Kingdom's policy of discharging homosexuals  
2 from its armed forces violated Article 8 of the Convention for the Protection of Human  
3 Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the Convention"). Lustig-Prean & Beckett v. The  
4 United Kingdom, ECHR Nos. 31417/96 and 32377/96. Both Lawrence and Lustig-Prean  
5 are premised upon the same fundamental principle. The Lawrence Court held: "The  
6 petitioners are entitled to respect for their private lives," 539 U.S. at 578, and the ECHR  
7 based its decision on Article 8(1) of the Convention, which states: "Everyone has the right  
8 to respect for his private . . . life."

9 The petitioners in Lustig-Prean were military service members who were discharged  
10 from the Royal Navy because, like Major Witt, they had engaged in a private sexual  
11 relationship with a civilian partner. The United Kingdom admitted it had interfered with  
12 their right to "respect for their private lives," but contended that such interference was  
13 justified and legally permissible under Article 8(2) which allows exceptions "in accordance  
14 with the law [where] necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security,  
15 [or] . . . for the prevention of disorder . . ." The ECHR considered the UK's contention that  
16 to maintain "national security" the discharge of these homosexual service members was  
17 "necessary in a democratic society." The standard employed by the ECHR for Article 8  
18 analysis is quite similar to the constitutional standard for determining whether a law  
19 infringes upon the substantive due process right of respect for one's private life.  
20 "[R]egulations imposing a burden on [such rights] may be justified only by compelling state  
21

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1 interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only those interests.” Carey v. Population  
2 Services, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977).

3 The ECHR concluded that the UK had failed to meet its Article 8 burden of showing  
4 that exclusion of homosexuals from the military was necessary in a democratic society:  
5 “[T]he Court would underline the link between the notion of “necessity” and that of a  
6 “democratic society”, the hallmarks of the latter including pluralism, tolerance and  
7 broadmindedness.” Lustig-Prean, at p. 34, ¶ 80. “[W]hen the restrictions concern ‘a most  
8 intimate part of an individual’s private life”, there must exist “particularly serious reasons’  
9 before such interferences can satisfy the requirements of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention.”  
10 Id. at p. 34, ¶ 82. Recognizing that the UK’s “core argument” was that “the presence of  
11 open or suspected homosexuals in the armed forces would have a substantial and negative  
12 effect on morale and, consequently, on the fighting power and operational effectiveness of  
13 the armed forces,” the ECHR rejected this argument, noting that it was founded upon private  
14 prejudice against homosexuals, which could not be considered to amount to sufficient  
15 justification “any more than similar negative attitudes towards those of a different race,  
16 origin or colour.” Id. at p. 37, ¶ 90. In this respect the decision of the ECHR is virtually  
17 synonymous with the decisions of the U.S. Supreme Court which hold that “[p]rivate  
18 biases may be outside the reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give  
19 them effect.” Palmore v. Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984). Accord City of Cleburne v.  
20 Cleburne Living Center, Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 448 (1985).  
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1           2.     **The Air Force Must Present Actual Evidence to Support Its Contentions,**  
2                    **and Cannot Simply Demand That The Courts Defer to the Speculative**  
3                    **Judgment of Military Professionals.**

4           Like any constitutional decision announcing fundamental rights, Lawrence applies to  
5           the military. While courts afford a substantial degree of deference to military decision-  
6           making, “Congress, of course, is subject to the requirements of the Due Process Clause  
7           [even] when legislating in the area of military affairs.” Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S.  
8           163, 176 (1994). Congress is not “free to disregard the Constitution when it acts in the area  
9           of military affairs. In that area, as any other, Congress remains subject to the limitations of  
10          the Due Process Clause.” Rostker v. Goldberg, 453 U.S. 57, 67 (1981). “Our citizens may  
11          not be stripped of basic rights simply because they have doffed their civilian clothes.”  
12          Chappel v. Wallace, 462 U.S. 296, 304 (1983).

13          The Ninth Circuit has similarly noted that military judgments are not to be lightly  
14          overruled by the judiciary, but that does not mean that courts are to simply accept all  
15          military assertions in the absence of any supporting evidence. “[T]here is not now and must  
16          never be a ‘military exception’ to the Constitution.” Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850  
17          F.Supp.910, 915 (W.D. Wash. 1994), *aff’d sub nom.* Cammermeyer v. Perry, 97 F.3d 1235  
18          (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1996). To defer to military judgment “in the absence of any supporting factual  
19          record . . . would come close to denying reviewability at all,” and the Ninth Circuit has

1 expressly held that military judgments regarding the presence of homosexuals in the armed  
2 forces *are* subject to judicial review. Pruitt v. Cheney, 963 F.2d at 1166-67.<sup>3</sup>

3           **3. In Its Post-Lawrence Decisions, The Court of Appeals for the Armed**  
4           **Forces Has Held It Is Appropriate to Review A Military Law Burdening**  
5           **Freedom of Sexual Conduct To Determine Whether It Is Constitutional**  
6           **“As Applied”.**

7           Major Witt respectfully submits that it would be appropriate to rule that 10 U.S.C.  
8 § 654 and AFI 36-3209 are facially unconstitutional and void in all respects. At the same  
9 time, however, she acknowledges that there is an alternative approach that would afford  
10 her relief without requiring this Court to interfere to such an extent with the judgment of  
11 another branch of government. In a series of post-Lawrence decisions, the Court of  
12 Appeals for the Armed Forces has expressly concluded that Lawrence applies to service  
13 members and that this application demands a “searching constitutional inquiry.” United  
14 States v. Marcum, 60 M.J. 198, 205 (C.A.A.F. 2004). Marcum recognized that service  
15 members retain the right to form intimate sexual relationships under Lawrence, and that  
16 any military incursion on that right must be justified in light of a strong governmental  
17 interest in military readiness, combat effectiveness, or national security *and* that the rule  
18 be “narrowly tailored to accomplish these interests.” Id. at 204-05. As a result, court  
19 martial for sodomy (whether homosexual or heterosexual) require careful examination of

20 <sup>3</sup> The ECHR employed the same approach in Lustig-Prean, and expressly “note[d] the lack of concrete evidence to  
21 substantiate the alleged damage to morale and fighting power that any change in policy would entail,” pointing out  
that the lower court “found that there was no actual or significant evidence of such damage as a result of the presence  
of homosexuals in the armed forces . . .” Lustig-Prean, at p. 37, ¶ 92. On the contrary, the evidence relating to the  
acceptance of open homosexuals into the military forces of several countries demonstrated that there was no such  
damaging effect. Id. at p. 39, ¶¶ 97-98.

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1 the facts and context to see how the interests of the military balance against the rights of the  
2 service member in the particular case. Such cases call for “contextual, as applied analysis,  
3 rather than facial review,” and “[t]his is particularly apparent in the military context.” Id. at  
4 205. For example, where the sodomy occurs between superiors and subordinates, as was the  
5 case in Marcum and United States v. Stirewalt, 60 M.J. 297, 304 (C.M.A. 2004), then the  
6 right does not resemble the right to consensual sexual intimacy recognized in Lawrence and  
7 the military rule may be constitutionally applied.

8 This analysis clearly contemplates that in some cases it will be unconstitutional for  
9 the military to apply a rule in derogation of a service member’s constitutional right to sexual  
10 intimacy. Indeed, Major Witt submits that the military’s policy against homosexual conduct  
11 and statements of homosexual orientation cannot ever be constitutionally applied in cases  
12 like hers that raise no concerns about intra-military fraternization. But at the very least, the  
13 constitution does not permit the discharge in the present case for the reasons that follow.

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1  
2       **4. Major Witt's Conduct Enjoyed Constitutional Protection and Cannot**  
3       **Give Rise To The Harms The Discharge Is Purportedly Trying To**  
4       **Avoid; Hence The Air Force Cannot Meet Its Burden.**

5       The stated purpose of the policy against homosexuals in the military is that their  
6       presence "would create an unacceptable risk to the high standards of morale, good order  
7       and discipline, and unit cohesion that are the essence of military capability." 10 U.S.C.  
8       § 654(15); AFI 36-3209 ¶ 1.15.15. The record reflects that Major Witt's conduct poses no  
9       risk to these important ends. If anything it is her discharge that will hurt morale, good  
10       order and discipline, and unit cohesion.

11       **a. Major Witt's Conduct Did Not Adversely Affect The Unit.**

12       As discussed further below, the rationales for the rule against homosexual conduct  
13       in the military are insubstantial in general, but they are unquestionably outweighed by the  
14       factors present in this case. Among the more relevant facts are the following:

15       1.     Civilian Partner. Major Witt's sexual partner was not a member of the armed  
16       forces. Such sexual conduct posed no danger of coercion and no impediment to military  
17       discipline or morale as was the case in Marcum and Stirewalt.

18       2.     Committed Relationship. Major Witt's sexual conduct occurred within the  
19       context of a years-long committed relationship. This poses less risk that she would make  
20       unwelcome advances on persons within the military. (Of course, even if she did, it would  
21       properly be remedied through the military's policies on sexual harassment, a problem known  
22       to arise among heterosexual service members.) Lawrence protected sexual expression not

1 just for its own sake, but because of its role in expressing and deepening committed  
2 relationships, 539 U.S. at 567, so its application is especially strong here.

3 3. Not on Military Property. No sexual conduct occurred on any Air Force  
4 premises.

5 4. Geographically Remote. Major Witt and her partner lived in Spokane,  
6 hundreds of miles across the state from McChord AFB. Major Witt's colleagues were not  
7 in a position to learn about or observe – and therefore take offense at – her relationship  
8 with a civilian partner.

9 5. Private Home. Major Witt's sexual conduct occurred in her own home.  
10 Lawrence gave special weight to the right of adults to “choose to enter upon this [intimate]  
11 relationship *in the confines of their homes and their own private lives* and still retain their  
12 dignity as free persons.” 539 U.S. at 567 (bold italics added). This observation is in keeping  
13 with other decisions giving special respect to the home as a protected place in our society for  
14 sexual expression. See Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 565 (1969) (“Whatever may be  
15 the justifications for other statutes regulating obscenity, we do not think they reach into  
16 the privacy of one's own home”).

17 6. Reservist. During her relationship with her civilian partner, Major Witt  
18 was on reserve status. For most of her days, she was taking courses at Eastern  
19 Washington University, working as a physical therapist, volunteering as a firefighter, and  
20 pursuing other civilian activities. She was present at the base only a few days per month.  
21

1 Whatever adverse impact a lesbian Air Force officer might have on her unit is lessened  
2 when she is for most days completely absent from that unit.

3 7. No Voluntary Disclosure. Major Witt adhered to the “Don’t Tell”  
4 provisions of the Air Force policy. She kept her private life private, and did not force any  
5 unwanted or unwelcome disclosures about her sexual orientation on her colleagues.

6 8. Widespread Assumptions. Despite her silence on the topic, it was widely  
7 believed that Major Witt was a lesbian. The rule against homosexuals serving in the  
8 military is premised on the notion that disruption will occur if their sexual orientation  
9 becomes widely known. Here, Major Witt’s sexual orientation was widely known (albeit  
10 through no words or conduct of her own), but no disruption of any sort resulted. Her  
11 colleagues have submitted declarations saying that they believed that she was a lesbian,  
12 but did not care. Further, they said that she would be welcomed back to duty even if she  
13 made an official announcement that she was lesbian (so that no speculation was required).  
14 In this way, her case closely resembles Watkins v. United States Army, 875 F.2d 699 (9<sup>th</sup>  
15 Cir. 1989) (en banc), which issued an injunction forbidding discharge of an openly gay  
16 service member because his orientation had been widely known for years with no adverse  
17 effects on his unit.

18 9. Affirmative Harm from Discharge. The record contains multiple  
19 corroborated testimony that Major Witt’s discharge is hurting morale. At least one officer  
20 testified that the threatened discharge of Major Witt contributed to his decision to resign  
21 after decades of service, saying that “I no longer want to serve in an organization which

1 mistreats people in the way the Air Force is mistreating [Major Witt].” *Decl. Julian* ¶ 19.  
2 Another officer said “she was so upset about Colonel Walker’s decision that she felt like  
3 taking off her uniform.” *Decl. Schaffer*. ¶ 13. The declarants are unanimous in  
4 explaining that the discharge proceedings to date have injured morale and unit cohesion,  
5 and that a final discharge would injure it even further. *Affid. Mueller*, ¶ 14; *Decl. Schaffer*,  
6 ¶ 20; *Decl. Julian*, ¶ 19; *Decl. Schindler*, ¶ 13; *Decl. Carlson*, ¶ 14; *Decl. Brinks*, ¶ 13;  
7 *Decl. Thomas*, ¶ 14.

8 **b. The Air Force Cannot Justify Discharge.**

9 In contrast to these facts of record, the Air Force has no evidence to demonstrate  
10 that Major Witt poses a problem for the military that outweighs her right to autonomy in  
11 forming intimate personal relationships. As Professor Kier’s declaration attests, several of  
12 our allies permit homosexuals to serve in their armed forces without noticing any adverse  
13 effect whatsoever on the ability to function efficiently and smoothly.

14 Several studies have analyzed the effects of lifting restrictions on gay and  
15 lesbian service in the armed forces of other countries. Each study  
16 concludes that the open integration of homosexuals has no negative effect  
17 on military effectiveness. For example, following a Canadian judicial  
18 decision prohibiting discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation in the  
19 military, gays and lesbians have served openly in the Canadian armed  
20 forces. A 2000 study concluded that this change in policy has not hurt  
21 military performance:

CF officials, military scholars, involved non-governmental  
and political leaders, and gay soldiers have all concurred  
that the removal of the ban has had, to their knowledge, no  
perceivable negative effect on the military. The issue of  
gay and lesbian soldiers in the Canadian Forces has all but  
disappeared from public and internal military debates.



1 *Declaration of Professor Elizabeth Kier*, ¶ 11, quoting A. Belkin and J. McNichol, *Effect*  
2 *of the 1992 Lifting of Restrictions on Gay and Lesbian Service in the Canadian Forces:*  
3 *Appraising the Evidence*, University of California at Santa Barbara, Publications (April,  
4 2000). Similar studies on the effects of allowing homosexuals to serve openly in the  
5 armed forces of Israel, the United Kingdom, and Australia, reached the same conclusion.  
6 *Kier Declaration*, ¶¶ 12-15.

7  
8 This observation is not limited to foreign armies. American military forces have  
9 served overseas with integrated military forces without problems. *Kier*, ¶ 17. In addition,  
10 there are quite a few known instances of gay service members serving in the American  
11 military without causing difficulties. *Id.* ¶ 32. Thus, the actual American experience  
12 belies the blanket generalization behind the Air Force policy.

13 Moreover, there is a scholarly consensus that the assumptions upon which the  
14 present policy of excluding homosexuals from the armed forces are incorrect and  
15 unsupported by any evidence:

16 The current policy of excluding open gays and lesbians from the U.S.  
17 armed forces is based on two propositions:

- 18 (a) primary group cohesion enhances military effectiveness, and  
19 (b) openly gay and lesbian personnel would disrupt unit cohesion and  
20 thus military performance.

21 Both of these propositions are *wrong*. They do not reflect what social  
science research and experience have shown about the relationship  
between cohesion and performance and whether the integration of  
previously excluded groups affects primary group cohesion.

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1 *Kier Declaration*, ¶ 19.

2 The same dire predictions were made by military authorities opposed to the  
3 integration of blacks and women into the armed forces, and yet they were proved wrong  
4 when unit cohesion and military performance proved *not* to be adversely affected by these  
5 changes.

6  
7 Our historical experience also shows that the integration of new social  
8 groups into the U.S. military does not disrupt unit cohesion or degrade  
9 military performance, even though military authorities had forecast serious  
10 risks to combat effectiveness. Studies of racial and gender integration of  
11 the U.S. armed forces repeatedly find that these previously segregated  
groups were integrated *without* disrupting unit cohesion and military  
performance. Moreover, these studies support the conclusion that the open  
integration of gays and lesbians into our armed forces would *increase*  
military effectiveness.

12 *Kier Declaration*, ¶ 24. See also ¶¶ 25-30. See also Watkins II, 837 F.2d at 1449  
13 (describing racial integration of the American military), *aff'd on other grounds* 875 F.2d 699  
14 (9<sup>th</sup> Cir. 1989) (en banc). The internal studies of the Defense Department have reached the  
15 conclusion that there is no evidence to support the military's discriminatory policy  
16 against homosexuals. *Kier* at ¶¶ 34-35. Sadly, the military has attempted to suppress  
17 these internal studies because they have all reached the conclusion that there is no  
18 empirical support for Defense Department's policy of excluding homosexuals.

19 [T]wo Defense Department commissioned reports reached conclusions  
20 that are at odds with the Pentagon's policy towards gays and lesbians: the  
21 1957 Crittenden Report and the 1988 PERSEREC report. For example,  
the PERSEREC report bluntly stated: "Studies of homosexual veterans  
make clear that having a same gender or an opposite gender-orientation is

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1 unrelated to job performance in the same way as is being left or right-  
2 handed.”

3 *Decl. Kier*, ¶ 32, quoting Sarbin & Karols, Nonconforming Sexual Orientation, p. 33.

4 The GAO concluded that the Defense Department’s “policy is not based on  
5 scientific or empirical data, but rather on the considered judgment of  
6 military professionals . . .” GAO, Homosexuals in the Military, at p. 68.  
7 Other analysts agree: Lawrence Korb, former assistant secretary of defense  
8 for manpower, reserve affairs, and logistics during the Reagan  
9 administration, stated that the justification for the ban on homosexuals in  
10 the military is “without factual foundation.” See *Declaration of Dr.*  
11 *Lawrence J. Korb*, dated June 7, 1993, (Appendix H), on file in  
12 Cammermeyer v. Aspin, 850 F. Supp. 910, 024 (W. Wash. 1994). Indeed,  
13 ***DoD admits that it cannot provide scientific evidence in support of its***  
14 ***argument***. In 1993 General John Otjen, a member of a working group that  
15 studied the issue of homosexuals in the military, and ***former Assistant***  
16 ***Secretary of Defense Edwin Dorn stated that they had no facts – defined***  
17 ***as statistics, scientific studies, and reports, rather than opinions and***  
18 ***anecdotes – supporting the rationale for the military’s discriminatory***  
19 ***policy towards gays and lesbians***. *Id.* at 924 & n.22.

20 The lack of evidence is not surprising: DoD has never attempted to  
21 document its argument about the negative effect of homosexuals on unit  
cohesion or operational effectiveness. In 1988 the PERSEREC report  
recommended that future research examine the claim that the presence of  
gays and lesbians is a barrier to the development of group cohesion and  
morale, but DoD never followed up on this advice. Instead, the DOD  
attempted to suppress the PERSEREC Report: DoD labeled it a draft so that  
it would not be released to the public. This pattern of behavior is familiar.  
After World War II, the U.S. Army tried to prevent the public release of  
studies that showed that the limited experiments with racial integration had  
worked. For example, Army Chief of Staff General George Marshall  
argued that surveys regarding racial integration of units in 1945 should not  
be disclosed. MacGregor, Integration of the Armed Forces, pp. 54-55.

*Decl. Kier*, ¶¶ 34-35 (bold italics added).

The Government’s discriminatory policy is counterproductive, because allowing  
homosexuals to serve openly in the armed forces would actually improve unit cohesion

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1 and military effectiveness. *See Decl. Kier*, ¶¶ 18 (“Thus the “Don’t Ask Don’t Tell”  
2 policy seems to undermine its apparent intent: rather than promote unit cohesion, the  
3 policy seems to impede it.”). The bottom line is that the Defense Department continues to  
4 enforce a policy that rests solely on prejudice and has no evidence to support it:

5 There is no evidence supporting the Pentagon’s rationale. To the contrary,  
6 decades of social science research provides overwhelming evidence that  
7 the open integration of homosexuals in the armed forces does not hurt  
8 combat performance. Just as racial segregation degraded military  
9 effectiveness, the current policy toward homosexuals in the U.S. military  
degrades military efficiency. Abolishing discrimination on the basis of  
sexual orientation in the U.S. armed forces would advance civil rights *and*  
military readiness.

10 *Kier Declaration*, ¶ 9.

11 “The mere recitation of a benign . . . purpose is not an automatic shield which  
12 protects against any inquiry into the actual purposes underlying a statutory scheme.”  
13 Weinberger v. Wisenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 648 (1975). Where the actual purpose is mere  
14 ratification of prejudice, the constitution is offended. “Private biases may be outside the  
15 reach of the law, but the law cannot, directly or indirectly, give them effect.” Palmore v.  
16 Sidotti, 466 U.S. 429, 433 (1984).

17 c. **Discharging Major Witt Will Not Be Narrowly Tailored To**  
18 **Achieve The Air Force’s Stated Goals.**

19 Even if the court credits the Air Force’s recitation of benign purposes, it must  
20 consider whether its rule is narrowly tailored to serve those purposes. When a law burdens a  
21 fundamental right, a reviewing court must determine whether the particular infringement is  
“precisely tailored” to achieve a “compelling governmental interest.” Plyler v. Doe, 457

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1 U.S. 202, 216 (1982). “[R]egulations imposing a burden on [such privacy rights] may be  
2 justified only by compelling state interests, and must be narrowly drawn to express only  
3 those interests.” Carey v. Population Services, 431 U.S. 678, 686 (1977). Judicial  
4 protection of substantive due process rights “require[s] particularly careful scrutiny of the  
5 state needs asserted to justify their abridgement.” Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S.  
6 833, 848 (1992) (citations omitted). Accord, Cleburne, 473 U.S. at 440 (when laws  
7 “impinge on personal rights protected by the Constitution” they “are subjected to strict  
8 scrutiny and will be sustained only if they are suitably tailored to serve a compelling state  
9 interest.”); Griswold, 381 U.S. at 485 (even a legitimate governmental purpose “may not  
10 be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly and thereby invade the area of  
11 protected freedoms”).

12 Discharge of *all* homosexual members of the Air Force who engage in homosexual  
13 acts is not a “narrowly drawn” policy. On the contrary, in order to pursue a military  
14 career, a homosexual service member must be completely celibate and refrain from  
15 engaging in any homosexual conduct for the entire time he or she serves in our armed  
16 forces. In *addition*, the service member must refrain from making any statement  
17 acknowledging his or her sexual orientation. Thus the statute and the regulation deny the  
18 homosexual service member both the right to engage in “private sexual conduct” free  
19 from governmental intervention recognized by Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 578, and “the right  
20 to define one’s own concept of existence” which Casey and Lawrence recognize to be the  
21 right “at the heart of liberty.” 505 U.S. at 851.

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