

September 1998. In April 2001, Officer Dixon completed canine handling training and began his
duties as a K-9 officer. Dixon was partnered with Robyn, a dog that had been previously partnered
with another officer. Dixon was required as a part of his duties to keep Robyn at his home and to
provide care and maintenance of the dog. Dixon's canine duties ended with the retirement of
Robyn on January 1, 2007. The retirement of Robyn also ended the City of Forks Police
Department K-9 program. In June 2007, Officer Dixon resigned from the police force. Officer
Dixon filed his complaint for damages on March 18, 2008.

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Summary Judgment Standards

Pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), the court may grant summary judgment "if the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with affidavits, if any, show
that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c). The moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law
when the nonmoving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of a claim on
which the nonmoving party has the burden of proof. <u>Celotex Corp. v. Catrett</u>, 477 U.S. 317, 323
(1985).

There is no genuine issue of fact regarding the date Officer Dixon began his canine duties,
the date such duties terminated, and the date he commenced suit seeking overtime compensation
under the FLSA and the Washington Minimum Wage Act (MWA).

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Statutes of Limitation

20 The three-year statute of limitations of RCW 4.16.080(3) applies to Washington Minimum

21 Wage Act (MWA) claims. <u>Seattle Prof'l Eng'g Employees Ass'n v. Boeing Co.</u>, 139 Wn.2d 824,

22 837, 991 P.2d 1126 (2000); Mitchell v. PEMCO Mut. Ins. Co., 134 Wn.App. 723, 737, 142 P.3d 623

23 (2006). The FLSA imposes a two-year statute of limitations for unpaid overtime compensation. 29

24 U.S.C. § 255(a); <u>McLaughlin v. Richland Shoe Co.</u>, 486 U.S. 128, 135 (1988). The statute of

25 limitations is extended to three years for a willful violation of the FLSA. Id.

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A cause of action for overtime wages accrues at each regular payday immediately following 1 the work period during which services were rendered and for which overtime compensation is 2 claimed." Karr v. City of Beaumont, Tex., 950 F.Supp. 1317, 1325 (E.D. Tex. 1997); Truslow v. 3 Spotsylvania County Sheriff, 783 F.Supp. 274, 279 (E.D. Va. 1992). The statute is tolled when the 4 plaintiff's complaint is filed. 29 U.S.C. §§ 255(a). Under the FLSA, an action to recover unpaid 5 overtime compensation is barred unless commenced within two years after the cause of action 6 accrues, except where the violation was "willful," in which case the action may be commenced 7 within three years. 29 U.S.C. § 255. A cause of action for unpaid wages accrues each payday on 8 which the wages due to an employee were not paid. Biggs v. Wilson, 1 F.3d 1537, 1540 (9th Cir. 9 1993). Thus, Officer Dixon's claims for overtime compensation accrued with each pay period and 10 any claims accruing more than three years prior to the date of commencing suit are barred by the 11 statute of limitations. FLSA claims found not "willful" are barred if the pay period ended more than 12 two years prior to commencement of the suit. 13

ACCORDINGLY, for claims subject to the three year statue of limitations, Plaintiff's claims are limited to the three years before he filed his suit, that is the canine officer pay periods ending on, or after, March 18, 2005. Claims subject to the two year statute of limitations must have accrued no earlier than March 18. 2006.

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DATED this 9th day of June, 2009.

FRANKLIN D. BURGESS UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE

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