

HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON
AT TACOMA

COREY KEARN,

Plaintiff,

v.

LAKEWOOD POLICE DEPARTMENT,
et al.,

Defendants.

CASE NO. C10-5334-RBL

ORDER GRANTING
DEFENDANTS' MOTION TO
DISMISS

(Dkt. #89)

Plaintiff Corey Kearn filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit against various police officers, alleging some officers used excessive force and others failed to intervene during the use of excessive force when they arrested him. Here, Pierce County deputies Jeffrey Reigle and Mark Rickerson move to dismiss. The motion is granted.

I. FACTS

On January 12, 2010, Kearn stole a laptop from a residential home. After the theft, Kearn was pulled over by officers, but then fled, leading Lakewood police and Pierce County deputies on a high-speed chase until the officers used a "pursuit intervention technique" maneuver to stop Kearn's car. Officers removed Kearn from his car and handcuffed him. Kearn alleges the officers then assaulted him.

1 The claims are barred by the statute of limitations. Kern was arrested in January 2010,
2 but failed to file his claim against Rickerson until February 2013—three years and one month
3 later.

4 Additionally, Kern’s claims against Rickerson do not relate back to the date of the
5 original complaint. An amendment adding a defendant relates back to the date of the original
6 complaint if three conditions are met: (1) if the amendment arises out of the same conduct
7 asserted in the original complaint; (2) if the new defendant “received such notice of the action
8 that [he] will not be prejudiced in defending on the merits”; and (3) if the new defendant “knew
9 or should have known that the action would have been brought against [him], but for a mistake
10 concerning the proper party’s identity.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(C). Further, the newly-added
11 defendant must receive actual notice of the suit and constructive notice of the mistake (i.e.,
12 elements two and three) within 120 days of filing. *Id.* (noting that defendant must receive notice
13 of suit and have constructive notice of mistake within the time period specified by Fed. R. Civ.
14 P. 4(m)—120 days).

15 While Kern’s claims against Rickerson arise out of the same conduct alleged in the
16 original complaint, Rickerson did not receive actual notice of Kern’s lawsuit within 120 days of
17 the original complaint’s filing. Kern filed his original complaint on May 11, 2010, but
18 Rickerson did not learn about Kern’s suit until October 2012. Rickerson Decl., Dkt. #92 at 2.
19 Since Rule 15(c)(1)(C)(i)’s notice requirement is not met, Kern’s claims against Rickerson do
20 not relate back.

21 For these reasons, the Court dismisses Kern’s claims against Rickerson.
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1 **B. Kern’s Claims Against Reigle Are Barred Because Kern Failed to Timely**
2 **Serve Reigle.**

3 Reigle argues Kern’s claims against him are barred because Kern failed to timely serve
4 the Complaint under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 4(m). Defs.’ Mot., Dkt. #89 at 8.

5 Under Rule 4(m), a court must dismiss an action without prejudice if a defendant is not
6 served within 120 days after the complaint was filed. Fed. R. Civ. P. 4(m). If the plaintiff shows
7 good cause for the failure to serve, then the court must extend the service time for an appropriate
8 period. *Id.* If the plaintiff fails to show good cause, the court may dismiss without prejudice or
9 extend the service time period. *In re Sheehan*, 253 F.3d 507, 512 (9th Cir. 2001). In
10 determining good cause, the court may consider “factors like a statute of limitations bar,
11 prejudice to the defendant, actual notice of a lawsuit, and eventual service.” *Efaw v. Williams*,
12 473 F.3d 1038, 1041 (9th Cir. 2007) (citation and internal punctuation omitted).

13 In this case, Kern filed his original complaint on May 10, 2010, but Reigle was not
14 served until February 4, 2013—more than three years later and outside the statute of limitations.
15 Dkt. #97. Kern argues that good cause exists given the “considerable confusion” about whether
16 Reigle was an officer with the Lakewood Police Department. Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. #102 at 11.
17 Kern also argues that his initial *pro se* status and incarceration provide good cause. Pl.’s Resp.,
18 Dkt. #102 at 12–13.

19 The Court will assume that these factors constitute good cause; but even then, good cause
20 ceased to exist when Kern was appointed counsel on June 14, 2012. Upon appointment of
21 counsel, Kern was responsible for notifying his attorneys of the failure of service. Even without
22 that notice, Kern’s counsel learned that Reigle was a Pierce County deputy and had not been
23 served. Pl.’s Resp., Dkt. #102 at 4. Indeed, in August 2012, Kern was notified that Reigle
24

1 would not waive his defenses under Rule 4(m). Hamilton Decl., Ex. B, Dkt. #91. There is no
2 indication that Reigle attempted to evade service.


3 Because good cause ceased to exist in June 2012, and Kearn failed to serve Reigle within
4 120 days after, the Court must conclude that dismissal under Rule 4(m) is appropriate.

5 **III. CONCLUSION**

6 For the reasons stated above, Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #89) is **GRANTED**, and all claims
7 against Defendants Reigle and Rickerson are **DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE**.

8 **IT IS SO ORDERED.**

9 Dated this 8th day of April, 2013.

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11 RONALD B. LEIGHTON
12 UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE