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6 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT  
7 WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON  
8 AT TACOMA

9 UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,

10 Plaintiff,

11 v.

12 STEVEN C. NAGY, et al.,

13 Defendants.

CASE NO. C11-5066BHS

ORDER GRANTING  
DEFENDANTS' MOTION  
FOR EXTENSION OF TIME

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15 This matter comes before the Court on Defendants' (the "Nagys") motions for  
16 continuance (Dkt. 10) and extension (Dkt. 20) of the Court's initial scheduling order (Dkt.  
17 4). The Court has considered the pleadings filed in support of and in opposition to the  
18 motions and the remainder of the file and hereby denies the motions for the reasons stated  
19 herein.

20 On April 15, 2011, the Nagys moved the Court to continue the initial scheduling  
21 order. Dkt. 10. On April 20, 2011, Plaintiff (the "United States") responded in opposition  
22 to the motion. Dkt. 11. On May 6, 2011, the Nagys replied.<sup>1</sup>

23 The Nagys' motion to continue (Dkt. 10) is more properly characterized as a  
24 motion for extension of time to comply with the initial scheduling order (Dkt. 4), and the  
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26 <sup>1</sup>The Nagys' response is styled as a "motion for extension of time"; however, the motion  
27 is simply attempting to accomplish the same result as their prior motion to continue. *Compare*  
28 *Dkt. 10 with 20*. The Court terminates the motion for extension (Dkt. 20) and treats it as a reply  
to the motion to continue (Dkt. 10).


1 Court treats it as such. The Nagys contend that the United States does not oppose their  
2 motion for extension. However, the Nagys mischaracterize the United States' response.  
3 Although the United States does not oppose having a longer than typical discovery  
4 period,<sup>2</sup> the United States does oppose extending the initial scheduling order deadlines.  
5 Dkt. 11 at 2.

6 Because the Nagys are proceeding *pro se*, the Court will generally grant some  
7 latitude. Here, the Nagys request the Court to extend the dates in its initial scheduling  
8 order for about three months. Such an extension is excessive, given the administrative  
9 nature of the Court's initial scheduling order. *See* Dkt. 4 (setting initial deadlines).  
10 However, a one-month extension is appropriate at this time.

11 Therefore, the Nagys' motion for extension (Dkt. 10) is hereby **GRANTED**. The  
12 initial scheduling order deadlines shall be extended by one month as follows:

- 13 1. FRCP 26f Conference deadline is **June 8, 2011**;
- 14 2. Initial Disclosure deadline is **June 22, 2011**; and
- 15 3. Joint Status Report due by **June 28, 2011**.

16 DATED this 10th day of May, 2011.

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20 BENJAMIN H. SETTLE  
21 United States District Judge

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27 <sup>2</sup>The parties are encouraged to determine and submit to the Court an appropriate  
28 proposed discovery schedule within their joint status report, to be filed in accord with the order  
herein.