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| 8 | UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON | |
| 9 | AT SEATTLE | |
| 10 | BP WEST COAST PRODUCTS LLC, | CASE NO. C11-6074 MJP |
| 11 | Plaintiff, | ORDER GRANTING PARTIAL |
| 12 | v. | SUMMARY JUDGMENT AND ORDER OF EJECTMENT |
| 13 | SKR INC, | |
| 14 | Defendant. | |
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| 16 | THIS MATTER comes before the Court on Plaintiff BP's motion for partial summary | |
| 17 | judgment on the right to possession of a gas station owned by BP and subleased by Defendant | |
| 18 | SKR, at 14555 S.W. Tualatin Valley Highway, Beaverton, Oregon, 97066 ("the Property"). (Dkt. | |
| 19 | No. 34 at 2.) BP asks for an order ejecting SKR from the Property and restoring possession to | |
| 20 | BP. Having considered the motion (Dkt. No. 34), response (Dkt. No. 42), reply (Dkt. No. 44) and | |
| 21 | all related documents, this Court GRANTS partial summary judgment and EJECTS SKR from | |
| 22 | the property. | |
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Background

BP filed suit against SKR, Inc., Sharif K. Riad and his wife (collectively "SKR") alleging
SKR refuses to sell their branded products in violation of certain franchising agreements, deed
restrictions, and trademark rights. (Dkt. No. 1.) SKR operates two gasoline stations, including
one in Beaverton, Oregon, subleased from BP. BP's lease on the property in Oregon extends to
June 30, 2014. (Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) BP entered into the "am/pm® Lease PMPA Franchise
Agreement" to sublease the property to SKR ("the sublease"). (Dkt. No. 36-1). The sublease
became effective October 1, 2008, set to expire September 30, 2011. <u>Id</u>. at 1.

BP contends they terminated the sublease on October 28, 2011, after the end of the
sublease term, or SKR terminated the lease by sending notice on November 14, 2011 to BP
purporting to terminate the franchise agreement. (Dkt. No. 44.) BP notes that SKR, in its Answer
to this lawsuit, agreed that the franchise agreement was terminated. (Dkt. No. 21 at 2.) BP argues
the franchise agreement and sublease are one in the same, entitling them to possession of the
land. (Dkt. No. 34 at 4.) SKR argues they did not terminate the sublease by their November 14th
letter, but only the Gasoline Dealers Agreement (GDA) or franchise agreement.

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Analysis

18 A. <u>Standard for Summary Judgment</u>

Summary judgment is only available when there is no disputed issue of fact for trial.
Warren v. City of Carlsbad, 58 F.3d 439, 441 (9th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 516 U.S. 1171 (1996).
The facts are viewed in the light most favorable to the party opposing the motion. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). "Summary judgment will not
lie if . . . the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving
party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The moving party has the

burden to demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue concerning any material fact. Adickes v.
S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 159 (1970). If this is done, the burden shifts to the nonmoving
party to establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding an element essential to that party's
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477
U.S. 317, 323-24 (1986). To discharge this burden, the nonmoving party cannot rely on its
pleadings, but instead must have evidence showing that there is a genuine issue for trial. Id. at
324.

8 B. Orders of Ejectment

To bring an action for ejectment, a party must have legal estate in the property involved,
as well as the present right to possession thereof. Eggen v. Wetterborg, 237 P.2d 970, 974
(1951). There is no dispute as to BP's legal estate in the property. (Dkt. No. 34 at 2.) The only
dispute regards the continuing validity of the sublease and the right to present possession. If the
sublease was terminated, BP has both legal estate and the right to present possession, and SKR
should be ejected. (Dkt. No. 36-1 at 23.)

15 C. <u>Status of the Sublease</u>

According to Oregon law, "The rules applicable to the construction of written contracts in 16 17 general are to be applied in construing a written lease. Such a contract must be considered as a 18 whole, and from such examination the intent of the parties must be gathered. Such construction should be given the agreement, if possible, as will render all its clauses harmonious, so as to 19 20carry into effect the actual purpose and intention of the parties as derived therefrom." Eggen v. 21 Wetterborg, 237 P.2d 970, 974 (1951). The Petroleum Marketing Practices Act, 15 USC §2801, 22 (PMPA), which governs and is referenced by the BP/SKR agreement, has been interpreted by the 23 9th Circuit as requiring that a franchise agreement containing both the lease of real property and a 24

motor fuel supply agreement be construed together. <u>Prestin v. Mobil Oil Corp.</u>, 741 F.2d 268 (9th
 Cir. 1984). If SKR terminated part of the am/pm® Lease PMPA Franchise Agreement, they
 terminated the whole.

On November 14, 2011, a letter was sent on behalf of SKR by Mr. David A. Schiller to
BP entitled "Notice of Failure to Cure Events of Default and Termination of Gasoline Dealers
Agreement for Failure to Cure and for continued Violation of Washington, California, and
Oregon State Law" (Dkt. No. 35-2.) This letter purports to "terminate the Gasoline Dealers
Agreement." (Dkt. No. 35-2 at 3.) BP correctly maintains there is no separate "Gasoline
Agreement," but an integrated contract including both the franchise obligations and the sublease
of the land.

The sublease agreement integrates the use of the land and the other franchise obligations
in such a way that the document must be taken as a whole. Based on SKR's letter and their
Answer in this case, SKR agrees no franchise relationship exists. SKR cannot have it both ways.
If no valid franchise relationship exists the sublease has been terminated, leaving no remaining
question of fact.

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Conclusion

It is agreed that SKR terminated and intended to terminate at least part of the sublease
and franchise agreement. It is a question of law as to whether SKR can terminate part of the
agreement without terminating the whole. Finding they cannot, this Court GRANTS partial
summary judgment as to BP's right to the property and EJECTS SKR from the property.

The clerk is ordered to provide copies of this order to all counsel.

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| 1 | Dated this 17th day of October, 2012. |
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Marsha J. Pechman

Chief United States District Judge