McDonald v.	Employment Security Department		Doc. 24
1		HONORABLE RONALD B. LEIGHTON	
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6	UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT WESTERN DISTRICT OF WASHINGTON		
7	AT TACOMA		
8	YVONNE MCDONALD,	No. 13-cv-5248-RBL	
9	Plaintiff,	ORDER	
10 11	v.	(Dkt. #18)	
12	EMPLOYMENT SECURITY DEPARTMENT,		
13	et al.,		
14	Defendants.		
15			
16	Defendants have moved to dismiss discrimination claims because Plaintiff filed her		
17	EEOC complaint after the 180-day limitation period. Nat'l Railroad Passenger Corp. v.		
18	Morgan, 536 U.S. 101, 105 (2002); 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-(5)(e).		
19	Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) may be based on either the lack of a cognizable legal		
20	theory or the absence of sufficient facts alleged under a cognizable legal theory. <i>Balistreri v</i> .		
21	Pacifica Police Dep't, 901 F.2d 696, 699 (9th Cir. 1990). A complaint must allege facts to state		
22	a claim for relief that is plausible on its face. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 129 S. Ct. 1937, 1949		
23	(2009). A claim has "facial plausibility" when the party seeking relief "pleads factual content		
24	that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the		
25	misconduct alleged." <i>Id.</i> Although the Court must accept as true a complaint's well-pled facts,		
26	conclusory allegations of law and unwarranted inferences will not defeat an otherwise proper		
27	Rule 12(b)(6) motion. Vasquez v. L.A. County, 487 F.3d 1246, 1249 (9th Cir. 2007); Sprewell v.		
28	Golden State Warriors, 266 F.3d 979, 988 (9th Cir. 2	2001). "[A] plaintiff's obligation to provide	

the 'grounds' of his 'entitle[ment] to relief' requires more than labels and conclusions, and a formulaic recitation of the elements of a cause of action will not do. Factual allegations must be 2 enough to raise a right to relief above the speculative level." Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555 (2007) (citations and footnote omitted). This requires a plaintiff to plead "more 4 than an unadorned, the-defendant-unlawfully-harmed-me accusation." Igbal, 129 S. Ct. at 1949 5 (citing Twombly). 6

Plaintiff appears to concede that she filed her complaint late, but seeks equitable tolling on the grounds that she "actively pursued other remedies" (which are unspecified) and because "her decision-making and cognitive abilities were affected" by the alleged discrimination and harassment. These vague reasons are insufficient under Ninth Circuit precedent. See Johnson v. Henderson, 314 F.3d 409, 414 (9th Cir. 2002) (equitable tolling appropriate where reasonable plaintiff would not have known of the existence of a possible claim within the limitations period).

Moreover, as Defendant notes, Plaintiff had filed an EEOC complaint in 2007 and clearly knew the procedures. The Court must therefore conclude that Plaintiff's claims are time barred. Defendants' Motion to Dismiss (Dkt. #18) is GRANTED, and the case is DISMISSED

WITH PREJUDICE.

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Dated this 23rd day of July 2013.

RONALD B. LEIGHTON UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE